Wycliffe, John

JOHANNIS WYCLIF

MISCELLANEA PHILOSOPHICA.

VOL. II.

CONTAINING DE UNIVERSALIBUS
FRAGMENTA
NOTAE ET QUAESTIONES VARIAE
DE MATERIA.

NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE MSS. UNIV. PRAG. IV. H. 9., AND III. G. 10.

BY

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LONDON.
PUBLISHED FOR THE WYCLIF SOCIETY BY TRÜBNER & Co.
PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD.
1905.

JOHNSON REPRINT CORPORATION
NEW YORK AND LONDON

MINERVA, G.m.b.H.
FRANKFURT AM MAIN

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First reprinting, 1966

Printed in the United States of America

INTRODUCTION.

The present volume of Wyclif's *Miscellanea Philosophica*, which with the works already published contains all his philosophical writings, whether spurious, doubtful, or authentic, with the exception of his great work *De Ente*, is not less interesting than the first, but presents fewer new points of interest. All that I wrote concerning Wyclif's philosophy in my Introductory Essay to the first volume applies of course to the second, as it may also be truly said to apply to every one of his works. It will therefore be unnecessary to write a very elaborate Introduction; a few remarks concerning the manuscripts, their authenticity and date, and the analysis of the text of each work, seems to be sufficient.

I would however point out, in regard to possible shortcomings and mistakes, that I have been still worse off for the editing of this volume than for the former one. In the first, it is true, *De Actibus Animæ* was copied from the only manuscript extant; but for the *Replicatio de Universalibus* I had two, and for the *De Materia et Forma* as many as five manuscripts to consult. But in the editing of the present volume I have had in every case to do with unique manuscripts; which of course immensely increased my labours and difficulties. Add to this the fact that the writing is in both MSS. very careless and illegible, as much so as (I will not say, more than) the worst specimens I have met with in *Logica* or elsewhere; and occasional slips will, I hope, be readily accounted for and forgiven. Mr. Matthew has, as ever, been ready with his unfailing help and suggestions, some of much worth, of which I have been glad and thankful to avail myself. My hearty thanks are also due to Dr. Furnivall, who though anxious to see the volume terminated as soon as possible, and doing his best to hasten its slow progress through the press, has nevertheless understood my position, and the conflicting claims of speed and thoroughness, which I have indeed attempted to conciliate as well as I could.

I. The Manuscripts, authenticity and dates of the works.

De Universalibus and *Fragmenta* take up from f. 193[b] to f. 259[b] of MS. IV. H. G. of Prague University. *Notae* extends from f. 1[a] to the end of f. 4[b] (Univ. Prag. III. G. 10), with the exception of 1[b] and the greater part of 2[a], which has already been published (see Note, p. 158). *De Materia* begins with f. 135[a] of the same MS. and ends on f. 139[b]. A full description of both the MSS. will be found in the *Miscellanea Philosophica*, Introduction, pp. LXIX, LXX.

As to their authenticity, we must first state that only *De Universalibus* and *De Materia* are noticed in Shirley's catalogue; I copied the others in Vienna, on the chance that they might be portions of the lost works of Wyclif, and acting under Dr. Furnivall's advice. There are a few peculiarities about *De Universalibus* which differentiate it from the other works of Wyclif. One is the great number of mistakes in grammar, some of which seem certainly ascribable to the writer and not to the copyist; another is the frequent recurrence of certain expressions (such, for instance, as *cum tunc*) which are rare in the other works. The writer's attitude towards the Roman Church (see p. 11, l. 30—35) and his assertion that God can, if He chooses, preserve accidents in being without their subjects (p. 78, l. 29—33) — an assertion which Wyclif, even in so early a treatise as *De Actibus Animae*, assailed with great vigour — may also incline us to doubt whether this tractate was really by him, although by far the greater part of his philosophical system is to be found therein. But we recognize here, not only the doctrine, but the power and subtlety of Wyclif; and the old argument: If not by Wyclif, then by whom? naturally presents itself since we know of no Realist contemporary worthy of mention by his side. As to the above stated points, they are easily answered if we note (p. 137) that the writer excuses himself for his inexperience which has made him diffuse, and write, he says, "satis pueriliter". And a few lines lower he again alludes, not without a touch of pride, to his "pueriles deductiones". If we assume that we have here Wyclif's very earliest work extant, mistakes of grammar, awkwardness of repeated expressions, orthodoxy as concerns Rome, and even his belief in "absolute accidents" are all explained. For my own part, I have no doubt that the work is authentic.

De Materia is so mutilated that it is difficult to form any judgment at all concerning it. Its authenticity, so far as I can see, amounts to this: We have no reason to believe that it is not by Wyclif, since it is his doctrine, and written in a style indistinguishable from his. It is true (see Note, p. 170) that a work ascribed to Johannes Huss de Hussynetz has the "incipit" and the first page, but the first page only, identical with this work. But Huss, as has been amply shown by Dr. Loserth more than once, was what we moderns would call a plagiary of Wyclif; and the circumstance that only the first page is identical seems rather to show that Huss borrowed it from the present tractate, and that this tractate is by his master's hand.

Fragmenta, as I found when copying the last lines (p. 156, l. 16—17) are by another author. Nevertheless, these fragments are quite in their place here. They were evidently written by some disciple, who in all probability copied them with insignificant additions from some of the lost works of Wyclif.

Notae et Questiones Variae have about as much authenticity as *De Materia*, save that *De Materia* alone is mentioned in Shirley's Catalogue. A point in their favour is also the fact that one of these "Notae" is identical with one of the *Questiones Tredecim*, already published with *De Compositione Hominïs.*

We may set aside the question of the dates of these last short tractates as impossible to answer, but that of *De Universalibus* may be approximately fixed. Granting that it is by Wyclif, it is certainly earlier than *De Actibus Animae*, itself earlier than *Logica*. The admission of "Absolute Accidents", already mentioned, which Wyclif combated during the whole of his subsequent career, seems to be a sufficient proof of this; besides, there are indications here and there in the work that the cosmological system of "punctal atoms", so carefully elaborated in *Logica*, which (as we have elsewhere shown) clashes with the idea of accidents separated from a substance and finally comes into collision with the doctrine of Transubstantiation itself, was not yet fully developed. As I showed in Miscellanea, vol. I, p. XXXIII, *De Actibus Animae* was not much, if at all, anterior to Wyclif's Mastership at Balliol College. It is very probable that the present work was written by him when an undergraduate; though of course the precise date cannot be ascertained.

II. Analysis of the De Universalibus.

Chapter I. (pp. 1—6.) Wyclif begins by proving the existence of Real Universals from the doctrine of Divine Ideas, or ideal archetypes of all created things, eternally existent in God. It is probable that this proof, placed first here, was also first in order of time amongst the reasons which led to his conversion to Realism from the prevailing Nominalism of the Oxford Schools. The discrepancy, not to say the contradiction, between the doctrine of the World of Archetypes (so general amongst the early Fathers that it was almost a dogma of the Church, so universally admitted that St. Augustine did not hesitate to say: "He who denies them is an infidel") and the tenets of Nominalism, must have struck Wyclif from the first. For these patterns of things, or Archetypes, where and what are they? They are in God's mind, and therein endowed with eternal existence and reality; they correspond to the many individuals in the created world — the Ideal man to the multitude of created man, and so forth: therefore they are Universals. To deny them were to stand convicted of infidelity by the authority of Augustine; but as soon as Wyclif's youthful mind accepted them, he accepted them with all the consequences that he thought they contained. God certainly knows man not only as this or that particular man, but in his essence as a human being; and all other beings likewise (p. 2, l. 20 to p. 3, l. 25). This cannot be identical with the essence of any individual as known by God, since it applies equally to all individuals, and they therefore cannot be its proper and distinct object. What then is that distinct object? It can be nothing else but Created Humanity, eternally known by God as Creatable Humanity. And if the Idea is of something, surely it is of something real; and if the Idea of the Particular and of the Universal Man are distinct, no doubt the Particular and the Universal Man must be distinct also, unless we deny truth to these Divine Ideas (p. 3, l. 25 to p. 4, l. 5). These, having for objects things which are distinct, must be distinct one from another, though not from God (p. 4, l. 4—14); must be distinct from their objects, since the copy cannot be the same as the pattern (ib., l. 14—22), and cannot be denied, if we admit that God knows all things from all eternity (ib., l. 22—38).

Chapter II. The Divine Essence is as it were a mirror in which all possible created things are reflected, and this reflection is the Ideal

World. This must be admitted unless we refuse to believe in God's omniscience (p. 6, l. 1—28). God's knowledge must be of something necessarily existing, since His knowledge exists necessarily; if then this object be not the Ideal World, it must be the world as we know it, our world: but this does not exist necessarily. Each created being is distinct from others, and so has a distinct intelligibility; the Divine Essence cannot by itself be identical with all these different objects. As one seal stamps only one species of impression, so God must have other patterns besides His Essence to stamp the multitude of creatures with (ib., l. 28, 29; p. 7, l. 1—35). It is absurd to say that an Infinite Artist requires no model for His creations. On the contrary, the greater the artist, the more perfect his mental pattern is (p. 8, l. 7—15). Only in the case of a finite artist the mental pattern is not eternal; with the Infinite Artist, it is eternal or is not at all (ib., l. 15—38). The distinctness of God's knowledge of all things in Himself implies a multitude of ideas; if there were only a few, or one, the knowledge would be confused. And what of God's knowledge of things that never were, nor will be, but only might be? The object of that knowledge must be in Himself, or not exist at all. We must therefore admit an Ideal World, if we admit that anything can exist (p. 9, l. 1—60).

Note by the way that Wyclif here openly admits the possibility of things that never are nor will be. As we have shown elsewhere, this is in conflict with this more matured system. Even in the present work (Ch. XXI, p. 131) we find Wyclif asserting that every Universal must at some time or other *exist in its own proper form;* and yet more clearly (p. 137) that every species must at some time or other really exist. He had not yet extended his conclusion to every possible *particular* being; but the drift of his argument was already leading him that way.

Chapter III. Wyclif here adds several remarks, designed to forestall objections which might be made to his doctrine of an Ideal World. It contains in itself a vast multitude of forms that differ really amongst themselves, and may therefore be called different realities in God; although the Catholic faith allows us only to call the Three Divine Persons Things *(res).* Their difference is not, like that of the Three Persons, a numerical difference (so at least I understand the term *suppositaliter*, p. 10, l. 34, though it may be understood as a difference of subject, *supposition),* nor of essence, like that of God and His

creatures. One is *not* the other, and they are therefore really different though in the same subject. They are identical with the Divine Essence by eternal communication (emanation?), and therefore cannot properly be called God, like one of the Three Divine Persons; but this eternal communication of the Deity makes them to be God in a restricted sense. As Augustine says, they are Life in God; that is, they live in Him everlastingly (p. 10; p. 11, l, 1—23).

It is true that St. John Chrysostom punctuates this text differently; instead of "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", he joins "Quod factum est" to the preceding sentence, and begins another with "In ipso"· This would destroy the effect of the preceding argument. But the Roman Church follows Augustine's punctuation. This would be decisive as fixing the meaning of the text, if meant as a dogmatic assertion, or even as an approbation of St. Augustine's view; if meant only to declare the probability of his opinion, we are free to assert it as true (ib., l. 23 to end; p. 12, l. 1—5). I have already pointed out Wyclif's attitude of appeal to Rome on this point; though it must be added that Rome seemed to be in his favour, and orthodoxy was easy.

Wyclif's comparison of the Divine Essence to a mirror found, it seems, more than one opponent; also his doctrine that the Ideas could in any way be identified with God. The image in a mirror is not its essence, but a mere accident. If these Ideas are God, they must be God formally, like the Word or the Holy Spirit; which would be a heresy. To this it may be replied that, distinct one from another, they all share in the Personality of the Word; or that they all share in God's essence which is their subject, as corporality is the subject of igneity; as fire is really a body, so the Ideal World is really God. Yet we must not conceive them as forms determining God's essence, since they are but the exemplars of creatures which He may create. If they are the forms of anything, it is of those creatures alone. They have no essence at all of their own, apart from that of God, and it is only as exemplars that they are conceivable (p. 12, l. 5 to end; p. 13, l. 1—29).

Wyclif goes further. Every such Idea in God is the supreme measure (ratio) of existence of the creature whose exemplar it is, and every creature is identical with its own created measure of existence; *a fortiori* it must be identical with its uncreated measure (ratio). Therefore every creature, in so far as it is thus identical, *is* the Divine Life itself.

This argument may perhaps be put a little more clearly. There is something in common between a seal and the impression actually stamped upon it, and the seal is therefore identical with the impression to some extent. But if so far identical, it must also be in so far identical with the signet which gives the impression; for that which is common to both copy and pattern must be the same in both (p. 13, l. 29 to end; p. 14, l. 1—4). The argument is subtle, but perhaps a little too subtle, and I suspect that the author's opponents would join issue with him on this point.

If then we can say: "Any creature in its ideal nature is God"; can we conclude: "Therefore any creature is God?" No; for the usual sense of the words would mean that any creature is God without restrictions. When a restrictive term is used to qualify a term, we cannot conclude anything by eliminating this restriction. A man is a good burglar: we cannot thence conclude simply that he is good. And therefore if, by saying that a creature is God in a certain sense, i. e. in its intelligible being, we scandalize the weak, it is better to avoid saying so (p. 14, l. 4—30). The question, however, cannot be thus eluded, and no doubt Wyclif's adversaries urged the point more than once to the admission that, in a sense, any creature was God. The argument certainly seems to mean identity *a parte rei.* A being is identical with its own finite measure of existence; therefore it is also identical with its Ideal, or supreme measure of existence, in so far as there is *something really common between* the two. If Wyclif means this, he exposes himself to the objection: "Then, in some sense, we are really identical with God!" If he means only an analogy, or a figure of discourse, he escapes the difficulty, but his argument seems to fail. And indeed I do not remember to have met with the same line of reasoning anywhere else; it was probably abandoned later for the notion of Transcendental Entity, common both to God and the Creature, but in two different and only analogical senses.

To the objection just noted, our author replies: It is strange that modern logicians and theologians should be so squeamish about this identity of merely ideal existence, when, according to them, the Word might assume, not only the nature of man, but that of a brute; and an ass might be God. And since (again according to them) all things are necessary in God, and what is necessary must be true, then an ass

is necessarily God! (p. 14, l. 30 to end; p. 15, l. 1—20). It is impossible to know who were the 'modern logicians and theologians' against whom this sharp retort was directed. If we consult St. Thomas (Sum. Theol. p. III., qu. 4, art. 1. Ad secundum) we find that he denies that brutes are 'assumptible' by any Divine Person. What is not capable of a lesser perfection, is not capable of a greater. A body incapable of sensitive life must also be incapable of reason. Brutes are incapable of being united to God by knowing and loving Him; therefore they must be incapable of the infinitely greater hypostatic union. The argument would seem to imply absolute impossibility. But St. Thomas only concludes: "Creatura rationalis . . . non habet *congruitatem* . . ." thus leaving in doubt the question whether the 'assumption' is or is not impossible to God's absolute power. I must add, however, that I have only been able to consult the Summa Theologica. It is well known that theologians do not like to ascribe any bounds to God's omnipotence short of the clearest contradiction in terms, and they distinguish carefully between 'potentia absoluta' and the 'potentia ordinata' or controlled by Infinite Wisdom. For myself, I do not see that anything implying the negation of Infinite Wisdom fails to be a contradiction in terms; for it would amount to the denial of God's existence.

Chapter IV. The beauty of the Ideal World is God's own beauty; therefore infinite. An existing creature is not infinitely beautiful, and in this sense is not identical with its Ideal and Eternal exemplar. But it *is* notwithstanding eternally intelligible; and this eternal intelligibility, existing before its temporal entity, really belongs to it, though not *quà* temporally existing. It is therefore true to say that the ass is its Idea, is eternal, infinitely beautiful, etc. if we keep cautiously to the sense in which this is true, and avoid scandalizing those who cannot or will not understand this doctrine. On one hand, the being of the ass, as existing *hic et nunc*, differs from its Ideal Form; on the other, as eternally intelligible, it is the same (p. 16—19, l. 10). There are dialectical difficulties in the way, but they are not insurmountable (p. 19, l. 10—29).

Are these Ideals absolute or relative forms? Absolute, since their existing copies are absolute. If relative, they would be relative to their copies alone; and this cannot be, since the accident of the existence of their copies makes no difference in their own entity. Besides, we cannot class them with relations, which are the most imperfect of all

entities, since they are infinitely real and beautiful and perfect (p. 19, l. 29 to end; p. 20, l. 29).

Has everything that we can conceive a separate Idea? If so, to each of the infinite degrees of heat, cold, etc. which are possible, we can conceive a separate corresponding Divine Idea. But these degrees are not infinite; we must admit in each genus one which is the highest possible, and comprises all the others; and it is to this one that the Idea corresponds. For wherever we think of *more* and *less*, we also think of *most* (p. 20, l. 29 to end of chapter). Here it may be allowed to extend the old Scholastic argument given briefly in the text, in order to make out Wyclif's meaning more thoroughly. Take, for instance, the term *strong*; A und B are both strong, but A is stronger than B. What does this mean but that of all the possible members of the class A and B, A is the strongest? Say now that *strong* is not restricted to A and B, but includes a third, C; either C is not so strong as B (in which case A is still the strongest of the class A, B and C) or as strong (in which case A and C are together the strongest members of that class) or lastly C is stronger than A, and C is the strongest member of the class. We may increase the class of 'beings that are strong', to any extent, and we shall always find that, if we admit the notion of *more* and *less*, one stronger than another, the notion of *most* necessarily follows, in the sense of 'that than which none is stronger'. Obviously this line of argument is employable whenever the idea of *more* or *less* occurs, connected with other terms, and no matter how many individuals the class contains. Thus, if we take it that some men are more intelligent than others from a given fixed point of view, and we take the class of 'all men at present existing', there will be one man (or several men) most intelligent of all in the sense I have given. Similarly, if we take the class of 'all men that have lived, live, or will live'. And lastly it will also be true if we take the class of 'all men that have lived, live, or will or might live under any conceivable circumstances'. In every case, *more* implies a *most*. This is extremely important for any student of Scholastic Theology, for it gives the key to several demonstrations, especially to one concerning the existence and the attributes of God. (See St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. 1[a] P. qu. II, art. 3 in corp. art. "Quarta via, etc.")

Chapter V. Hitherto Wyclif, discussing only the Ideal World, of which the reality is not distinct from that of God, was not dealing with

Real Universals properly so called; for God's Ideas are not only real beings in a very peculiar sense, but they are also Universals in a very peculiar sense, i. e. because they influence the existence of many particulars as their archetypes. He now proceeds to prove the Universals proper, viz., those which exist in created things.

Everything good is good and pleasing to God. He sees it and wills it. But what is it then that He sees and wills? No answer can be given to this question, other than: That common goodness which is in all creatures. If we do not admit any common goodness, then God sees nothing that is common to all; the proposition that "Everything good is good" becomes unmeaning; and yet it is necessarily true. If, on the contrary, we admit a common goodness which is in every created nature as such, we shall by a like reasoning be forced to admit a common humanity in all men, and so forth. And a denial would subvert the whole of our Catholic faith and practice, and even obedience to the King (p. 23—25, l. 9).

Again, if the Scholastic axiom, that Every Being is good, be true, it follows that universal goodness belongs to Being. This, known by God, and including His own goodness, is something neither created nor increate, but abstracted from the idea of God and of His creatures; if abstract, then universal (p. 25, l. 9—28).

Besides, it is absurd to say that our knowledge of Nature extends only to the propositions made concerning it; we must know what the propositions signifiy. Now this is in every case something universal. And even in practical matters, we know that a groat is worth more than a farthing. This is not only a knowledge of the proposition, but of the Universals, *Every groat*, and *Every farthing*. A man is universally and really an animal: can this be, without *animal* being something universal and real? No more than there can be mighty labour without might. 'A man being an animal' depends on 'All men being animals' (cf. *Replicatio de Universalibus*, W's *Miscell. Phil.* vol. I, p. 133); and this is the dependency of the Particular upon the Universal. We know this by the dependency of one proposition upon another; God knows it without their aid, and directly. If one man had nothing really in common with another, all men would be as different from each other as men are from stones. Resemblance cannot proceed from mere particularity, which only makes one thing not to be another (p. 25, l. 28 to p. 27, l. 34).

Moreover, to deny Universals is to deny Scripture. In Genesis it is said that God created animals in their genera and species. This cannot mean 'according to their Archetypes', since 'in' is not synonymous with 'according to'. Nor does it mean our ideas or the words we use to signify them; nor the multitude of particular animals that have existed or will exist, since God did not create them all at that time. The words must stand for the essential resemblances of things, which are in the things, and afford a foundation for classification; if not, they are utterly unmeaning (p. 27, l. 34 to end of chapter).

Chapter VI. Universals are thus the intrinsic formal causes of particular beings. If it seems hard to think that one formal cause can exist identically in many particulars, remember that many such particulars may have one and the same efficient, final and material cause: why make an exception for formal causes alone? The adversaries will here quote Aristotle: Form is that which separates and distinguishes. This is true; but form separates those things which have it from those which have it not; it joins together all those of the same species. As we know, the loss of a form entails separation and dissolution in the beings which lose it. Those who say that a form cannot exist in more than one being would curtail God's Omnipotence. Not only one particular fire but all fire is fire; every peasant knows that, and thus tacitly admits a universal Form of igneity. He does not indeed explicitly assert it, nor does he know anything about the proposition affirming it; all the same he knows perfectly well that the thing is true. And even learned men who verbally deny the existence of Universals are often forced to admit them as a matter of fact (p. 29—p. 31, l. 28).

Indeed, a universal fact (All fire is fire) is more certainly known than its particular (This fire is fire); and if it were not so, no principle of science would be more self-evident than the particulars deduced therefrom. In fact, those principles would be no more than mere aggregates of particular propositions, and there would be no inference at all. But they exist, and whether known and uttered by us or not, they are independent of the facts which they determine. Really, there is no need to prove this, nor is it possible to reason with an adversary who denies the objective existence of light, colour, sound, etc. Being in general, and sensible Being in particular, once admitted, open the door to the admission of the Universal. To deny it is like denying the Principle of

Contradiction; the denial is merely verbal, not real. Our own nature irresistibly impels us to admit the Universals; and since we cannot destroy nature, why not yield to it? (p. 31, l. 28 to end of chapter).

Chapter VII. We have then Universal Entity, first object of the mind, predicated *in* many and *of* many subjects, yet not belonging to any of the five Predicables (Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident) though more truly existing in its subjects than any of these; and also, by that same existence in a subject, distinct from the Ideal Exemplars, which have no such formal existence. As God is a common Form in the Three Divine Persons, so Entity is a common form in every being without exception (p. 33). — In the marginal notes I put inadvertently, "*Somewhat like* the Deity", etc. I now think that the restriction ought to be erased; and indeed there is nothing in the text to imply any restriction. If we go through Wyclif's philosophical works, we shall always find him consistently defending his position by reference to the Divine Essence and the Holy Trinity. The genesis of his system may perhaps be stated thus. He had arrived at the conviction that there are Real Universals, and Entity, the most universal of all; the subordinate Universals are distinct one from another somehow, and somehow from the supreme Universal, Entity. What was the distinction, and how was it to be understood so as neither to fall into Pantheism on one hand, non to the denial of reality to the Universals on the other? Here Wyclif bethought him of the mystery of the Holy Trinity, in which the Divine Essence is each of the Three Persons, distinct therefrom only by a logical distinction *(distinctio rationis)*, whilst the Three are really distinct from each other, though One in the Unity of God. If (we may suppose he thought) Entity is assumed as the common form of all beings, God and His creatures alike, which are notwithstanding really different from each other, as the Father is different from the Son, we have a standpoint that is impregnable, since any argument to prove that such a distinction is absurd would be tantamount to a denial of the doctrine of the Church. As there are Three Persons in One God, so there are many particulars and One Being. He thus avoided saying that 'Man is God', since (in his view) there is the same relation between Man and God, as between the Father and the Son; now the Father is *not* the Son. Yet they are both the same Being, just as both the Father and the Son are God. This of course was open to the objection that he

solved the whole question of Universals by constant reference to the most obscure mystery in the whole Christian faith; not to speak of many other secondary difficulties which he spent his life-time in trying to surmount, and his explanation of which finally put him in opposition with many doctrines of the Church. Nevertheless, it may be frankly said that amongst all the many shades of more or less extreme Realism, that which Wyclif expounded seems perhaps the most reasonable; or, if you prefer, the least unreasonable. Of the theory of Moderate Realism, which touches Conceptualism on one side, and exaggerated Realism on the other, avoiding the difficulties of each system, and expounded and upheld by the greatest masters of Scholastic thought, I have already written much, both in *Logica*, vol. II, pp. XI—XIII, and in *Misc. Phil.* vol. I, Preliminary Essay, pp. XXVI—XXVII.

Wyclif subsequently plunges into a disquisition upon the three kinds of Universals. As there is Metaphysical, Logical, and Grammatical truth, so there are three kinds of universality, strictly corresponding to these (p. 36, l. 1—17). A Metaphysical Universal is that which *is* common to many; a Logical Universal is that which is only *thought as* common to many; it results from our power of abstraction from particulars, and has no existence save in the thinking mind. But it is that by which we know the Real Universal; for it must stand for something, and that something can neither be our own mind nor the abstractive act which it produces, neither being universal (ib. l. 17 to end p. 37, l. 1—12). The argument is excellent, and in my opinion admits of no reply; but it does not prove that the Universal is, in existing and concrete things, anything more than 'a fundamental possibility of being abstracted by the mind', which is the theory of Moderate Realists.

Of this last theory Wyclif, absorbed in his struggles with the Nominalists, either does not speak at all (at least in the works that I have seen) or he deals with it in the following paragraphs. If so, he shows that he never understood it, or was only imperfectly acquainted with that doctrine. He considers it as the theory of those who make all universality to consist in mere Logical abstraction ("negant in rebus universalitatem metaphysicam" . . . p. 39, l. 4), thus treating it as pure Conceptualism. And I am the more justified in thinking that he meant by these words the Moderate Realism of Aristotle, of Alexander Hales, of Aquinas and Duns Scotus and a host of others, since we find him ad-

mitting that many great philosophers (multos famosos, p. 37, l. 12) held the opinion which he thinks is inadmissible, and even quoting one of the greatest, Aristotle (p. 39, l. 8, 9). It seems therefore advisable to analyse the paragraphs from p. 37, l. 12 to p. 40, l. 12, with special care, not omitting to give (where necessary) the replies which might be made by upholders of this doctrine, so as both to show the difference between Wyclif's system and theirs, and to point out the misconception under which I think he laboured.

Many great writers compare the Universal with Primordial Matter, in so far as the latter is never bereft of all forms, and is only conceived as thus bereft by the act of our mind which can think it without thinking of them. In like manner the nature of a thing does not exist apart from its concrete conditions of existence, but may be thought apart from them by the mind; its universality is therefore a mere abstraction, and a fiction produced by our intellect (p. 37, l. 12—30). Moderate Realists, admitting the greater part of this exposition of their theory, would dissent from its conclusion, or at least point out a distinction here. Universality, formally considered, is indeed a mere abstraction; but that from which we abstract is truly and really *such that we are enabled to think it as universal.* The resemblances between beings exist *before* they are thought of as resemblances; before they are actually joined together by one general idea, they are in themselves and truly capable of being thus joined together. They are indeed not universal in the way that our notion of them is; but they supply the basis in fact of that very universality, which we therefore cannot call a mere fiction.

Wyclif admits that there is in the mind an act of abstraction by which the Subjective Universal, or the general idea, is formed. But he rejects the comparison with Primordial Matter as quite worthless. As a fact, Matter exists, not in time indeed, but in its nature, previously to any of its determinations, and this separate existence does not by any means depend upon our thought of it. Now the same may be said of Universals. The nature of man (or Humanity) for instance, exists (not indeed in time but in its essence) previously to any individual man; when we abstract from individuals we do not make Humanity, we only find it. The truth of things cannot depend on the truth of our thoughts concerning them (p. 37, l. 30 to p. 39, l. 3). — To this the reply would probably be that all Wyclif says here is quite true, but beside the mark.

The Universal nature of Man certainly must be somehow before we can abstract it. But the question is, How is it there? Just as it is in our minds and after we have abstracted it, or otherwise? It is sufficient to suppose that it is there indeed, but *in potentiâ*, not *in actu*, as something merely capable of being abstracted, of being thought as the One in Many. This capability of being thus thought is *real;* the being actually thought as One in Many is notional. What Wyclif has to prove is that this real aptitude, existing in many individuals, of being embraced in one idea, is one and the same quality in itself, and not as many qualities as there are concrete beings. The redness of one poppy and the redness of another are two concrete determinations of each flower, but such that we, seeing them, may form thence the general idea of redness. To say that this redness is one and the same identical reality, universal in the flower as it is in our thoughts, is to go too far.

It is quite possible (if we remember how universally dominant the system of Nominalism was in England at that time) to suppose that Wyclif may never have had the opportunity to speak with a philosopher holding these moderate views, and his misconception of the theory is therefore easily accounted for. He goes on to say that philosophers who deny metaphysical universality to things, and only admit logical universality, should not be listened to; and he boldly counts (with a restrictive *forte* indeed) Aristotle himself amongst these (p. 39, l. 3—22). But the Greek philosopher's *dictum* (Universale animal aut nihil est, aut posterius est singulari) whilst it certainly militates against Wyclif's system, may be explained with the greatest ease in the sense of St. Thomas and his followers, if we take into account Aristotle's other sayings and the general drift of his theory of cognition.

Our author proceeds to show other shortcomings in this view, as he understands or misunderstands it. It would confound metaphysical with logical truth; yet God made the one first, and allowed men afterwards to know it by means of the other. It would imply the denial of an essence which is common to many species, as happens in the case of a genus (for instance, the essence of Animal is common both to Man and to Brute). And it would entail the refusal to admit that primordial matter exists, save when considered as such by abstracting it from its forms (p. 39, l. 22 to end; p. 40, l. 1—12). — All these difficulties are set aside by the preceding distinctions.

Wyclif points out that his theory easily explains the existence of a more universal form (v. g. Life) in one less universal (Humanity for example); the former extends to the latter as the divine Essence extends to the Father. — I believe, however, that the doctrine which made of God a Universal of which the Three Persons are the particulars had already been condemned by the Catholic Church; and therefore this could only have been meant by Wyclif as an analogy. But if only an analogy, it does not seem at all easy to point out the difference, since he takes the Trinity and the relations of the Three Persons with each other and with the Godhead as the central point of his system. If these relations are identical with those of the Universals and their particulars, is it not natural to conclude that the Divine Essence must be a Universal? — A Universal which does not exist in each of its individuals — such, for instance as Plato's Ideal Man, which led Aristotle to deny all reality to Universals — is impossible; that is, impossible naturally; whether, like the accidents in the Sacrament of the Altar, it can be miraculously sustained in existence without existing in any particular, is doubtful; at any rate, it has an existence of its own, far nobler than that of its subjects (p. 40, l. 12 to p. 41, l. 25). Note here again how explicitly Wyclif states his belief in the doctrine of Absolute Accidents, of which he was soon to see the incompatibility with his perfected system. The chapter ends with a few remarks concerning 'Grammatical' Universals, which are merely the words used to mean a Universal idea or thing; and also concerning another division, given by Grosseteste (p. 41, l. 25 to p. 42, l. 13).

Chapter VIII. Here the author begins by enumerating a series of objections (p. 43 to p. 44, l. 11), to which, both here and in the following chapters, he replies at great length. As he however answers them in a very diffuse manner, and without any further reference to them, it is unnecessary to state them here.

A great many ideas, such for instance as God, Being, etc. though universals in Wyclif's theory, are not comprised under genera and species, as Universals should be. — To answer this would be difficult if we accept the usual definition. We ought rather to say that "A Universal is a thing, capable of being predicated as one form existing *in* many separately, and *of* those many which are as it were its matter and its subjects". If we take this definition, and start from any particular sub-

stance, we shall find that any Universal predicated thereof is either predicated of it as a substance or not. If as a substance, either of the whole substance, and then it is a *species*, or it is the predicate of another universal which determines it, and is called *genus*, or it determines the genus in the formation of a spécies, and is a difference. (Example: Man = *species;* animated being = *genus;* rational = *difference,*) If the Universal does not belong to its singular as a substance, it either belongs to the whole species taken in its abstract essence, and is a *property;* or to the individual as such, and is an accident (p. 44, l. 11 to end; p. 45, l. 1 to 16).

God, therefore, though He might be called a Universal if we follow the old definition *(Unum in multis et de multis predicatum)* since He is predicated of the Three Persons, is not to be called so according to the one given above. He is not predicated of the Divine Persons as a form existing in several subjects essentially different, since they have the same identical essence. *Being* again, and the other Transcendentals (the *Something*, the *Good*, and the *True*) do not exist in their subjects as forms in matter, and correspond to none of the five Praedicabilia above mentioned; so they, though real, are not properly Universals (p. 45, l. 16 to p. 46, l. 11). Then our definition of the Universal as a Form implies that it limits its subjects; whereas both God and Entity are unlimited. God, as an absolute actuality, and primordial matter, as a potentiality equally absolute, are both beyond the scope of the Predicaments, which deal only with substances in which actuality and potentiality are combined. Units, points, and numbers are *like* forms in respect to the singulars which they determine, but in themselves they rather share the pure potentiality of matter, and so cannot be classed amonst the Universals (p. 46, l. 11 to p. 47, l. 29). The difficulty as to whether universal rationality is or is not the form of singular rationality is met by the assertion that there is no such thing as singular rationality distinct from the singular man, since a singular man and his humanity are one and the same (p. 47, l. 29, to p. 49, l. 25).

"But if there is One God in Three Divine Persons, does it not follow that there is one Man only in many human persons, if we follow up the theory? This is clearly absurd" (p. 49 to end of chapter).

Chapter IX. The answer to the preceding question which so abruptly closes Ch. VIII — so abruptly, indeed, that the division is pro-

bably a mistake of the copyist, if not of the writer, who, we must remember, was very young and inexperienced — is that Humanity, one in itself, is not one but many in its singulars; so that there is not one man but many. There is only a formal (not a real) distinction between the individual humanity and the singular man, between the white individual and his individual whiteness. Persons differ in respect of their singular humanities; otherwise we might say that there was only one singular man; which is false and heretical. But singular attributes, unlike those which are universal, add nothing to the perfection of the being which possesses them (p. 50—52, l. 7).

Thus a given man is identical with his humanity, his animality, and his rationality; but these are not identical with one another; just as every compound nature is at the same time matter, form, and compound, and yet these three are not the same, though having the same essence. Matter means a being in its lowest, form the same being in its highest degree of perfection; and the compound itself is that being considered both ways. Each of these is therefore the same individual thing viewed from different standpoints (p. 52, l. 7 to p. 53, l. 9). Thus, whilst in intelligent beings three things of the same nature (*memory*, *intelligence* and *will*, as is more than once expounded in Wyclif's works) form an image of the Trinity, there is in all beings a vestige of the Trinity, caused by things that are not of the same nature — genus, species, and difference, which in man correspond to animality, humanity and rationality, one underlying the other which determines it, and the two together forming the species (p. 53, l. 9 to end of page).

From p. 54 to p. 57, a discussion concerning the relations between higher and lower Universals results at the end of the chapter in the assertion that they differ as one 'formalitas' (taken in the sense of Duns Scotu's theory) differs from another. The arguments are in great part unintelligible to my mind; but perhaps the reader may find a clue to understand them if I set forth here very briefly what I know about that once famous and now forgotten theory. It amounts, however, to very little. Scholastics before Scotus used to admit the *distinctio rationis* and the *distinctio realis*. The former was a mere distinction between a thing considered in one way and the same thing considered in another way. It was divided into *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*, in which the difference in consideration is based, not upon anything in the nature of the thing

considered which lends itself to this distinction, but merely upon the action of the thinking mind; and *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*, in which the nature of the thing considered lends itself to the distinction. For example, we are forced to think God as merciful and just, separating the two ideas in our mind; but in reality His justice and His mercy are the same, and are both identical with God's Essence. But when we think of Plato as a philosopher and a poet, the same man is both, and there is no real distinction at all between the two. Yet Socrates, not being both by his nature, happens to be such that be can be considered from either point of view; and to consider him *only* as a poet, or *only* as a philosopher, would not give us a false, but only an inadequate idea of the man. *Real distinction*, on the other hand, was affirmed when the things thought of differed in themselves and anteriorly to being thought, and this *realis distinctio* was either *major* or *minor*, either *sicut res differt a re*, or *sicut res differt a modo ipsius rei*. There were other, but less important divisions. — Now Duns Scotus tried to introduce a distinction that was less than any *realis distinctio*, and yet greater than any *distinctio rationis*. It was the *distinctio formalis a natura rei*. The same man is animal and rational; and therefore the distinction between animality and rationality, taken as factors of the idea *Man*, is a notional distinction merely. But animality, taken in itself, is *a parte rei* independent of rationality taken in itself, since animality can really exist without being accompanied by rationality; and on the other hand, as rationality cannot exist without animality, the former depends upon the other. But if of two things one is independent of the other and the second dependent on the first whether we think of them or not, there must be a real distinction, but on one side only. A formal distinction was therefore a distinction which in one respect was merely notional, and was real in another. It is pretty generally agreed among Scholastics at the present day that this so-called *distinctio formalis* ought to be classed amongst the *distinctiones rationis ratiocinatae:* though very few, I fear, understand what Scotus really meant, and for what purpose he introduced these *formalitates*.

Chapter X. That which answers to the question, What is this? is the essence of a thing; and this answer being generally true of all things bearing the same name, the essence of anything must be universal; and the more universal the more perfect it is. There must be a most and a

least universal; and one may, by God's power, be united to another of a higher or lower rank. This hierarchy is necessary, for the essence cannot be made up of two or more parts independent of one another, and consequently accidental (p. 57; p. 58, 1—30). — To conceive Wyclif's meaning more clearly, let us take 'Something animated and rational' on one hand, and Something large and red' on the other. 'Rational' depends on 'animated' and is inconceivable without it. A being may be animated and rational, or animated and not rational, or neither, but *not* rational and not animated; whereas we can perfectly conceive something large and red, or large and not red or red and not large, *or neither*. These, as separately conceivable, are accidental to each other's essence, whilst 'animated' is essential to 'rational'.

As there are three sorts of differences, real and essential, real but not essential, and merely formal difference, so there are correspondingly three sorts of composition: quantitative, uniting parts really and essentially different, and easily conceivable; qualitative, of matter and form, which are really distinct, but forming only one essence as the determining and determinable parts of the same being (that v. g. out of which a watch is made, and that which makes it to be a watch); and formal composition, the most abstruse of all, between things which differ neither really nor essentially. Rationality, for instance, added to animation, makes Man; these are two, but only formally. This composition is very similar to that of matter, form, and compound, as may readily be seen: and these formal parts may be called different modes of the same being (p. 58, l. 30 to end; p. 59—p. 60, l. 38).

We can only improperly predicate one of these parts of the other; and the genus, according to Aristotle, cannot in any sense be predicated of its difference, for the idea of the latter is outside of the intension of the former. *Animality* and *rationality* are, taken together, parts of the species *humanity;* and one part is not another. Thence it follows that entity is not a genus; if it were, it would form a lower species by the addition of something else, extraneous to entity; but it is clear that there can be no such thing (p. 60, l. 30 to p. 61, l. 30).

A genus, which belongs to the essence of anything previously to its species, must at some time or other have all its possible species, for otherwise it would be mutilated and incomplete (p. 61, l. 30 to p. 62, l. 32). Wyclif returns to this idea on p. 137, almost in the same terms

and with the very same argument; an oversight that we may consider as a further proof of the youthful inexperience which he confesses. A few remarks on genera more or less general, and species more or less special, serve to conclude the chapter (p. 62, l. 32 to end; p. 63).

Chapter XI. The writer now comes to Specific Difference, by which the genus is divided into species; and he thereupon treats of divisions. No genus can be adequately divided by means of one division alone; and the same may be said of definitions, which contain the dividing term, affirmed or denied (p. 64). Wyclif here alludes to what are called cross-divisions, as the example he gives shows plainly. The number three is odd, prime, and incomposite; that is, not produced by the addition of other numbers (unity not being considered as a number). The example is from Aristotle; but it seems that 'prime' is an unnecessary division; only two numbers, 2 and 3, are 'incomposite' in the sense stated. And 'odd', if we add it to 'incomposite', leaves the number 3, whether we add 'prime' or not (p. 65, l. 1—21).

This theory, however, is exposed to considerable difficulties. The principal is that by introducing more than one principle of division, the genus is divided into species which overlap, instead of excluding each other. Wyclif's manner of putting it (p. 65, l. 21 to end; p. 66, l. 1—13) is somewhat obscure. It may be thus explained: Cross-divisions introduce differences which are not essentially contained within the genus. If we divide *animal*, v. g. by two differences which are independent of each other, such as *large* and *beautiful*, and these by others of the same sort, we can never get to the ultimate species. This does not explicitly state that the divisions overlap *within* the genus, but that they may contain what is beyond it. As a fact, if not comprised within the genus, they will overlap; some animals will be large and not beautiful, others beautiful and not large In this connection we may quote the words of Jevons (Elementary Lessons in Logic, XII, p. 105—107), who takes the side opposed to Wyclif: "The division must be founded upon one principle or basis. It would be obviously absurd to divide books into folio, quarto, French, German, and dictionaries, because these species overlap each other, and there may be French or German dictionaries which happen to be quarto or folio and belong to three species at once. A division of this kind is said to be a Cross-Division, because there is more than one principle of division, and the several species in con-

sequence cross each other and produce confusion. . . . . But when subdivision is employed, and each of the species is considered as a genus which may be subjected to a further separation, a new principle of division may and in fact must be employed each time. . . . . The most perfect divisions in a logical point of view are produced by continually dividing each genus into two species by a difference, of which an example has been given in the Tree of Porphyry. This process is called Dichotomy . . . . . ; it is also called Exhaustive Division. . . . ."

To answer this, Wyclif takes the case of quantity, which is either continuous or not, either having position in space or not. If continuous and having position in space, it includes all mathematical bodies; if continuous without position, it is Time, or Duration. Non-continuous quantity, having position in space, is inconceivable (universaliter negatur, p. 67, l. 25, 26); we have, therefore, only a third species, number, which is non-continuous and without position in space. Now 'continuous' and 'having position in space' are not by themselves species in regard to quantity, and genera in regard to the three subaltern species enumerated; for if they were, they would exclude each other as species, and not have the same species (i. e. mathematical bodies) included under them both as genera. The three species, therefore, though produced by these cross-divisions, are directly subalterns to quantity. We can take them as they are; each has a proper difference that belongs to no other. One is '*continuous and having position in space*'; the second is '*continuous without position*'; the third is '*neither continuous nor having position*'. And this is all we want to distinguish them essentially from one another; the divisions do not by themselves constitute an essential difference, but only when taken together (p. 66, l. 12 to p. 69, l. 3). A difference may be said to belong only to one species or to many, according as we consider all the cross-divisions which make it up, or only one of them; or as we consider it in itself or together with its opposite; or lastly if we think it as the difference *from* one species to another, or *between* them. These two last views, however, as Wyclif admits, do not agree with Porphyry's standpoint, when he states that a difference expresses the *howness* of many different species (p. 69, l. 3 to p. 70, l. 23).

Chapter XIV. Here the author begins to treat of accidents. These can only improperly be said to belong to genera and species. For though 'whiteness' may be said to determine the genus 'colour', it determines

as much (if not more) the substance to which it belongs. And whiteness appearing in A is simply A turning white; it is the production, not of a thing, but of the mode of a thing. Yet this mode is real, and so in a sense accidents are realities and have real genera and species (p. 71; p. 72, l. 1—21). Here comes the difference between the *proprium* and the *accidens*. The *proprium* (v. g. risibility in man) is so closely connected with the abstract essence of the substance that it can have neither genera nor species in any sense. It is, however, a Universal, constant in all individuals of the same species or genus, whether the species be ultimate or not. Sex, for instance, is a property of all animals, and 'animal' is a genus. However, the *proprium* does not differ really from that of which it is predicated, just as genus, difference and species are not really different; whereas the accident differs really from the essence of the thing (p. 72, l. 21—p. 75, l. 18).

The *Proprium* is, according to Porphyry, "quod inest omni, soli, et semper", always present in all individuals of a given class, and in no others. The accident is what may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject. It is divided into *separable* and *inseparable*: *inseparable* in reality, when it is always found in a given individual, though it may be thought as not present; whilst the other Universals are not even separable in thought. Even inseparable accidents can be really separated by God's power; He can make a substance to exist without accidents. And though whiteness is 'the being white of a substance' it can also exist without its substance, since it has an essence different therefrom (p. 75, l. 18 to p. 79, l. 8).

Chapter XIII. Proprium and *Accident* are said to inhere; the others to be predicated. How many sorts of Predication are there? Predication being the union of subject and predicate, there are three sorts, greater, less, and least, according to the perfection of this union. The first is an essential union between subject and predicate: 'Man is an animated being'. The second implies something real in, but not essential to, the subject: 'This man is white'. The third implies something that is true of the subject, but not a real quality existing in it: 'God is loved by me'. In Holy Scripture we find that John the Baptist is Elias; this again is true, but Elias is not really predicated of John the Baptist (p. 80 to p. 82, l. 20). But if Elias is truly yet not really John the Baptist, why should it not be as true to say: 'Peter is Paul?' Because Christ uttered this

proposition, making it true figuratively. Was the goat which Abraham sacrificed figuratively Christ, since it was a figure of Christ? No, for not every figure is figuratively identical with the thing it represents. Some are, some are not; God alone knows why. Such a form of predication is only true within its own limits; if taken to mean another kind of predication, it becomes false (p. 82, l. 20 to p. 84, l. 10). — This theory, from some points of view, is identical with that which in Wyclif's later works served him to explain the Eucharistic Presence of Christ. But in the latter he maintains that the 'figurative identity', really true, can be called real; and in *De Apostasia* he even maintains that the Paschal Lamb, being the figure of Christ, *was* Christ, though less perfectly so than the Host. These developments naturally sprang from the idea here already expressed, that Christ's words have the power of bestowing on a subject and a predicate some sort of identity that could not exist without them.

Here he openly combats the assumption that 'truly' means 'really'. If it did, since the Father is truly different from the Divine Essence, He would be really so. Probably Wyclif came later to find this distinction untenable, since the Father is not truly different from the Godhead, but only according to our imperfect mode of thinking, which distinguishes what is identical in itself, just as we think separately of Edward VII and of the King of England. And this is the more likely when we find him admitting that his sketch of the matter is inadequate, and requires completion *and possibly correction* (p. 84, l. 10 to p. 85, l. 29).

We prove these three degrees of predication by the principle that all difference of perfection, such as may be found in predication, implies not only a positive, but a comparative and a superlative as well. And as, taking a greater, a less and a least within each of these degrees of entitative perfection, we have the nine choirs of Angels, so we get nine degrees of predicative union, of which examples are given. There are also other divisions in this matter (p. 85, l. 29 to end of chapter).

Chapter XIV. The so-called Expositorial Syllogism being closely connected with predication, Wyclif here proceeds to examine it. Its general form requires the middle term to be a singular, and it is much used in different ways to a combat the theory of Universals. Leaving the detailed examination of this syllogism to another tractate, various fallacies proceeding more or less from the abuse of this argument will here be

refuted. "Every *thing* is singular, and Realists affirm that Universals are *things*". Yes, but they deny that every thing is singular; for Universal things cannot be singular. "*Substance* is identical with *ass*, and *man* with substance". But this gives no conclusion, since *Substance* ought to be, and is not, taken distributively. One might by a like argument prove the Father to be the Son. The syllogism is worthless unless we say (which we do not) that *Substance* is identical with each particular man (p. 87 to p. 89, l. 3).

Aristotle expresses himself differently; a statue, according to him, is not a stone, but is *of* stone. But this is only a difference of language: *to be of stone* is *to be a stone modified in a certain way;* and in like manner the Father is God from a certain point of view. Any other manner of arguing lands us in heresy or in absurdity; or would land us in heresy were it not for the formal declarations of the Church. They are therefore, dangerous and sophistical subtleties (p. 89, l. 3 to end of chapter).

Chapter XV. Wyclif here formulates (p. 91 to p. 94, l. 6) thirteen objections, most of them bearing on the doctrine of Transcendent Being, common to God and His creature, and proceeds to answer them. We give the objections together with the answers.

(1) "If there is Transcendent Entity, there will be also transcendent beauty, common both to God and the creature; for entity and beauty imply one another. Every creature would be beautiful with the infinite beauty of God". — We must admit, however, the existence of Transcendent Entity, since we conceive it distinctly, apart from the entity of particulars, and in thinking of it, we certainly think of *something.* But the argument is worthless. The Finite possesses the infinite beauty of God, but not infinitely (p. 94, l. 6 to p. 95, l. 12). This same distinction serves also to answer the fifth objection, viz., that God would be no better than the lowest of His creatures. For though God and the creature have the same entity, God has it in an infinitely more perfect manner than the creature. Besides, He possesses special attributes which He alone can possess (p. 95, l. 12—30). In the text, the preceding objection is numbered as the seventh. This is a copyist's mistake no doubt.

(2) "Transcendent entity would be more divine, being universal, than God Himself". — No, for He is the cause of that entity; and His own incommunicable Being is anterior to the other, as the cause is to

the effect. He is, therefore, more universal as its cause; it is more universal in predication only. The mere universality of a predicate does not argue its perfection. Perfection, however, generally follows; and always in the case of creatures, if the predication be formal (i. e. essential to the subject) (p. 95, l. 12 to end of chapter).

Chapter XVI. (3) "Transcendent Entity, being caused, cannot be God, the uncaused; yet it is God, according to this theory". — *a)* In so far as it is caused, it is something that is not-God; but we cannot conclude thence that it is simply not God, i. e. that its idea excludes that of God. *b)* It comprises non-Deity, but it comprises Deity also. *c)* The argument would only have weight if we were so absurd as to maintain that the Universal is formally singular; for the Singular alone is unable to be predicated at the same time of contradictory subjects. The answers *b)* and *c)* are the best, but *a)* is simplest, and suffices: and these answers show us where we can argue from the affirmative, A is a not-B, to the negative, A *is not* B, and where we cannot (p. 99—p. 102, l. 30).

(4) "The goodness of any being would be infinite, since it has Trancendental Entity". — Not if the possession be only partial and finite. But the adversary retorts that this either means: A thing is at the same time finitely and infinitely good (since 'to have infinite goodness' is 'to be infinitely good'), or means nothing. We deny this; *to have goodness* is not the same as *to be good*. And if he insists, then we say that no creature can have infinite essential goodness (p. 102—103, l. 36).

(6) "God and a stone would be one, since they would have absolutely the same entity". — If 'absolutely' is meant to determine the thing which is Transcendental Entity, we have merely the statement that one and the same thing is a stone, and is God. If it is taken to determine the affirmation of identity, then a stone would be God; a heresy which we deny (p. 103, l. 36 to p. 104, l. 11).

(7) "There would be only one Being, since Entity is numerically one, and all things would be identical therewith". — But 'numerically one' means in the usual sense a being that is one and cannot exist in many numerically distinct individuals; in that sense we must deny that Entity is numerically one. Entity is one in itself, yet may be shared by many; and if that is meant by 'numerically one', the argument fails (p. 104, l. 11—31).

(8) "Every being is separately numerable; therefore none can have being in common with another." — The same distinction should be made here as in (7) (p. 104, l. 31—39).

(9) "Every being is an individual; therefore there is no universal Being." — A like distinction should again be made. That by which Universal Being is Universal Being — its formal essence — cannot be shared with many; and if you call that alone individuality, nothing follows. But if you say that Being is individual, meaning that it can in no sense belong to many individuals, we deny this (p. 104, l. 39 to p. 105, l. 11).

(10) "Every creature would be as identical with God as the Father or the Son is identical with the Divine Essence." — It is almost impossible to explain the distinction given here without recurring to the Latin terms used in the text. The Father, according to theologians, is *unum* (ens) with the Son; but He is not *unus* (Pater) with the Son. In like manner, a horse, for instance is *unum* (ens) with God, but not *unus* (equus) with God. The argument makes the difference between God and the creature to correspond between that of a Divine Person and the Godhead: which difference is not real but fictive. Wyclif, on the contrary, says that it corresponds to the difference between the Persons, which all Catholic theologians admit to be real (p. 105, l. 11 to p. 196, l. 16).

(11) "If, because every man is a being, there is a Universal Being, so, because every man is singular, there would be Universal Singularity! This is absurd." — Not if properly understood. Truth may be uttered respecting falsehood, and universality may be predicated of singularity. But there is no Universal Person; when we say 'A Person', this is a mere abstraction of the mind; and as soon as personality is abstracted, it ceases to be incommunicable. There is, in different senses, a singular Universal and a Universal Singular (p. 106, l. 16 to end of chapter).

Chapter XVII. The adversaries urge that, "if the Universal Man is singular, then it (or he) is identical with the singular man, and there remains only singular humanity". — But this is an equivocation; for we do not say that the Universal is identical with its singular taken as an individual. We mean no more than: Every man is this, that, or the other singular, but is not one of them alone' (p. 108 to 109, l. 30). — 'But', it is said, 'what does *this, that, or the other* stand for? It must be for one or more singular men, or for nothing at all; if for the first, your Universal is only so many individuals; if for the second, it does not

exist". — We answer that there is no need for it to stand for anything in particular. The subject of a proposition may be unreal, and yet the proposition may be true; for instance, *A Chimaera cannot run.* One of two alternatives is true; this is necessary *in sensu composito,* and false *in sensu diviso.* We cannot say that the first alternative is true, nor that the second is so *(in sensu diviso)*; but we are obliged to admit that one of the two — we know not which, but take both together *(in sensu composito)* — is necessarily true, with a 'disjunctive existence' (p. 109, l. 30 to end of p. 110). — To show this distinction more clearly still, I may be allowed to quote once more from Jevons' Elementary Logic, which sets it forth far better than I could do. "The Fallacy of Composition is a special case of equivocation, arising from the confusion of an universal and a collective term. . . . . We must not argue that . . . . . because each of the witnesses in a law case is liable to give false or mistaken evidence, no confidence can be placed in the concurrent testimony of a number of witnesses. . . . . The Fallacy of Division is the converse of the preceding, and consists in using the middle term collectively in the major premise but distributively in the minor, so that the whole is divided into its parts. Thus it might be argued: All the angles of a triangle are (together) equal to two right angles; A B C is an angle of a triangle, therefore A B C is equal to two right angles". It is evident that the argument used by Wyclif's opponents was a fallacy of Composition. They said: The Universal Man is identical with the singulars A, B, C . . . therefore the Universal Man is identical with all singular men, and is nothing more than they. Wyclif replied by positing a 'disjunctive existence' of the Universal in each, which is not the same as singular existence.

What then is the nature of this 'disjunctive existence?'. It consists in being indifferent to and independent of the subjects in which it is found. When we say. 'One of these two, A or B, must be true', we predicate the existence of truth as certain; but this existence is not more bound to A than to B. The Universal then, being to the Particular as Form is to Matter, may be either contingent or necessary; the Particular here meaning the general term with *Some* prefixed to it: *Every man is some man.* As matter is vague and indeterminate until determined by its form, so *Some man* is in comparison with *Every man* a vague and indeterminate object of thought (p. 111—p. 113, l. 11). Wyclif says that

this is hard to understand, even by philosophers (difficillime a philosophis et sicut impossibiliter a grossis est secundum hunc modum apprehensibile, p. 112, l. 34, 35); and I willingly admit that the general drift of this passage seems very obscure. Continuing his comparison with matter, he remarks that as matter may be manifold, so there may be many such vague, particular, yet not singular, objects. This passage too, at such a distance of time and without the means of knowing any more about the question than our author chooses to say, — seems to me 'difficillime apprehensibile'; and as I frankly confess in a foot-note (p. 113) concerning the two following paragraphs, I must rank myself amongst the *grossi*, to whom the apprehension of these things is as it were impossible (p. 113, l. 11 to p. 114, l. 40). The chapter closes with some further remarks about Particularity, as distinct both from Singularity and from Universality, properly so called (p. 114, l. 40 to p. 115, l. 30).

Chapter XVIII. The first .three pages (p. 115 to p. 118, l. 20 are relatively without interest, being merely a continuation of the former remarks, and winding up with the assertion that the difficulty consists in pointing out what thing corresponds to the truth of disjunctive propositions, and consequently (I may say) of particular propositions in general. For a particular proposition, v. g. '*Some man runs*' is equivalent to an indefinite number of disjunctives, containing all the singulars under Every Man: 'The man A, or the man B, or . . . . . the man Z runs. But I must here explain a point which, if left unexplained would seem not far removed from absolute absurdity. On p. 115, and again on p. 118, Wyclif declares that a disjunctive may be true when *neither* of its parts are true; and he gives us an example: I speak or I do not speak. Now it looks as if there could be no time when I neither speak nor do not speak. Such, however, is not his meaning. The disjunctive proposition is true, — when? Eternally. Now neither *I speak* nor *I do not speak* is eternally true. If we understand thus the "pro aliqua mensura vel aliquo tempore" on p. 116, l. 10, and p. 118, l. 5, 6, the whole meaning of the two passages is quite clear.

At this point, our author examines the question of the inherence of the Universal in its particulars. As there are three kinds of difference and of predication, so there are also three degrees of inherence. When I say: "My right eye or my left is necessary to see", "Necessary to see" belongs in fact either to one eye or the other, but vaguely and

without exclusion of inherence in either (the examples given here are mine, not Wyclif's). When I say: "A or B is the first boy in the class", "First boy in the class" belongs to A or to B; we know not to which of the two, yet we know that it belongs distinctly to one, *excluding* the other. This is a higher form of inherence, since the vagueness is only in our thought, not in the fact. The lowest of these forms, being the least perceptible, has been denied by some, who are too deeply plunged in the senses to perceive it. The highest is when a Universal is affirmed of many together: as, "All men are mortal". "Mortal" belongs to each man separately and to the whole multitude of singular men together. The cavils of our opponents proceed from their not distinguishing between these various sorts of inherence, and are answered victoriously by means of this distinction (p. 118, l. 20 to end of chapter).

Chapter XIX. Wyclif replies to the objection numbered (13), interverting the order of the objections stated in Ch. XV. "The *Proprium*, or property, is not part of the essence of the species, yet it is common to all. In what subject then does the Universal *Proprium* inhere? When we say, "Man is capable of laughter", *Capable of laughter* does not belong merely to individual man, being common to all; nor to the species, since the Universal Man is not capable of laughter". There are several answers. One is that "capable of laughter" is nothing but a peculiar standpoint from which the species Man is considered, and therefore is objectively identical with Man. But the faculty of laughing varies in the individuals in which it is found (p. 122). Again, we may say that the proposition means only that every man, *quà* man, is capable of laughter; here *man* is taken, neither as an individual nor a species, but as something between; and we have theological instances which authorize us to do so (p. 123, l. 1—37). For we may consider the Universal *man* either without reference to the subjects in which it inheres, or with such reference; in the first case, the species *man* cannot laugh, in the second it can (p. 123, l. 37 to p. 124, l. 24). There are also other answers which amount nearly to the same; and by means of these or similar answers, difficulties concerning accidental Universals are also solved. We must, however, remark that though we speak of species and genera in accidents, these are mere abstractions — not realities like the essential differences of substances one from another (p. 124, l. 24 to end of chapter).

Chapter XX. Possibly following up the idea of 'abstract Universals', Wyclif now proceeds to state that some are simply real, some potentially real, and some merely conceptual, or pure abstractions. There is only one sun, but by a miracle there might be many. The sun is therefore a potential Universal, which in the ordinary course of nature exists only in one singular. If we admit St. Thomas' doctrine that each angel is of a different species which cannot possibly exist in more than one individual, we shall still be able to conceive the Universal of each species of angel, though this is only Universal in our minds (p. 127, l. 1—27). Thus there are three degrees of Universality, from greatest to least: actual, potential, and merely conceptual; though these degrees have nothing to do with the entitative perfection of the singulars. Of the last (conceptual) we may say that we ought to follow the doctrine of St. Thomas concerning Angels, and consequently admit in their case only conceptual universality. These three degrees are in close connection with the degrees of essential difference above mentioned (p. 127, l. 27 to end of chapter).

Chapter XXI. Wyclif returns to the question already dealt with before, viz., whether there can be any Universal which is never existent in any of its singulars, and he proceeds hereupon to classify the ten categories — substance and the nine sorts of accidents, which are the substance as perfected in three ways (quidditatively, qualitatively, and quantitatively) and in three degrees (little, more, and most). These, combined, give nine determinations of Substance; but it is very difficult — if we admit (though this is doubtful) that the Nine Categories of Aristotle rightly correspond to these divisions of Substance — to show how and in what sense they correspond; we may let the question drop (p. 131 to p. 135, l. 30). Notwithstanding we can show that there must be ten categories and not more, but omit for want of space many arguments by which this division can be proved (p. 135, l. 30 to p. 137, l. 13). Now these ten categories have under them species of which they consist; and if any species were wanting, they would therefore be mutilated; which is contrary to God's wisdom and power. But certain species will not exist after the Day of Judgment (p. 137, l. 13 to end of chapter).

Chapter XXII examines whether Universals have more perfect entity than their respective singulars. It must be so, for no number of singulars can equal the perfection of the species. Yet the individual Man, not the Universal, is the image of God and of the Trinity. If then intellectual

natures have Universals, these cannot be more perfect; which contradicts what has just been said. Most writers deny that this image exists in the human soul, for then it would be, like the Trinity, Three Persons; and the Word of God united to the human soul in Christ would be also three persons. But the fact is that the Church, having for very good reasons chosen to call the Uncreated Three by the name of persons, and not the Created Trinity, we may either call the latter so or not; there is nothing derogatory to God in doing so (p. 139 to p. 142, l. 25). As to Christ, if we call the parts of a soul persons, we must assume that when united to the Word, they lose their hypostases; if not, we may simply call them constituents: it does not follow that what is a Person in God must necessarily be a person in man (p. 142, l. 25 to p. 143, l. 14). At any rate, the argument first stated fails. If each man is the image of God, the Universal Man, being each singular man, is the image of God many times repeated, and therefore far more perfect. This as regards natural perfection; as to supernatural entity, a singular may be more perfect than the Universal (p. 143, l. 14 to end of chapter).

Chapter XXIII. Wyclif now at last answers the twelfth difficulty, which tends to show that Universals, doing nothing and being of no use, are mere superfluous monsters. This he denies. For firstly they are the formal causes of things. It would be impossible for any singular being to exist without them, since the singular is implied in the Universal. They are also final causes. The non-existence of Man would mean the non-existence of any singular man, and not vice versâ; therefore the former does not exist for the latter, but the latter for the former; and as the non-existence of Man would be a far greater evil than the non-existence of any particular man, the existence of the former is a far greater good than that of the latter (p. 145 to 147, l. 26). Also, they are, in a sense, efficient causes. 'Man' does what his singulars do, i. e. in his singulars, though not in himself. They are not properly agents, however, nor need they be. In themselves they do not act, but in their state of union with individuals, the acts of these may be said to be theirs, since they are the principles of the individuals. Therefore they are exceedingly useful, and far more so than their individuals (p. 147, l. 26 to p. 150, l. 4). *Universal man* is a bond of common humanity between man and man, and we should rejoice that this bond exists (p. 450, l. 4—17). Wyclif ends the chapter and the work by declaring

that in view of the great advantage which accrues to us thereby, no one should deny the Universals, if not certain that they do not exist, and it is impossible to attain such certitude. Men who have a common board (this looks like a hit at some monastic opponents) ought not to be so set against a common humanity. "For myself," he says, "I rejoice to share therein, and I feel that it deserves far more praise and love than my own individuality."

III. Analysis of the Fragmenta.

As the writer declares on p. 256, l. 16, 17, "*Suppono quedam tradita in 3^cio tractatu loyco Magistri Johannis Wyclif,*" we are, as I said before, entitled to regard these pages as at least inspired by the Master, though written by a disciple. But nowhere else in his printed works does Wyclif give such desperate and uncompromising directions for the defender in an exercise of 'Obligations'; and most likely they were only for use in cases of extreme danger, and when the defender was very hard pressed. I have already stated at some length (*Logica,* vol. I. Introduction, pp. XXVII—XXX) what I suppose this exercise to have been, and need not repeat it here.

There are three modes of answering in the Exercise of Obligations. The first consists in admitting the premises of the syllogism separately, and denying them, if taken together so as to form a copulative. And if they be not thus taken together, it is still possible to deny the conclusion of any syllogism; for it is impossible to prove that the conclusion is right without a copulative proposition, which can always be denied (p. 152 to 153, l. 26). This looks a good deal like an abuse of dialectical subtlety; for then any argument, however powerful, might be rendered worthless. For instance: "All men are mortal *and* Englishmen are men", might be denied, whilst we admit each of the parts separately; and it becomes very hard indeed to prove the copulative syllogistically when there is no direct denial of its parts. And the writer remarks (p. 154, l. 30—35) that this and the following mode of defence are available not only in Obligations, but in other arguments (indifferenter in casu vel extra casum). But no doubt it was a convenient way of getting out of a tight place.

The second mode of answering consisted in admitting or denying the premises as may be more convenient, but always denying the conclusion. And if it be argued: You ought to admit this conclusion, for you know it is logically drawn; answer: "To be logically drawn is not enough, the conclusion must not make me contradict myself; and therefore I deny it." If v. g. you admit that Every man runs, deny its contradictory (that some man does not run); then, should the opponent say: "You do not run and you are a man;" you can also admit this, but deny the conclusion, as landing you in self-contradiction (p. 153, l. 26 to p. 154, l. 35). This mode too seems to savour somewhat of quibbling. It may be doubted, indeed, whether 'in casu vel extra casum' has the sense which I give to it, viz., that these answers are applicable to all arguments; but I do not know what other sense they can bear, specially together with the context (*obligatus*, l. 34). Moreover, *casus* is very often used by Wyclif in this precise sense. Compare Logica, vol. I, p. 70, l. 25, 26; p. 71, l. 3, 6, 10, 11; and further in many places, in which *casus* stands for the proposition put for admission and denial in the Exercise of Obligations.

The third mode is much simpler, but must, if followed, have led — possibly with no bad results — to the total abandonment of this Exercise. It is as if a chess-player had found an easy means to get a drawn game in every case. You answer as you like, and deny the conclusion: if urged, deny that there is any power of conclusion in the premises, because in these Exercises words have no longer the meaning which they usually bear. A man swears that he is committing perjury; is he doing so or not? Answer Yes or No, as you please. If Yes, the adversary then points out that you contradict yourself, since you admit that he speaks the truth. You deny that; and when he presses you, say; The argument is unmeaning, and has therefore no consequence at all: the propositions have been admitted, merely because in these exercises one is obliged to admit or deny them. The writer ends by pointing out (no doubt to a very raw beginner) that such an answer cannot be used except in these special cases (p. 154, l. 35 to p. 156, l. 8). The few lines entitled *Insolubilia Pulchra* call for no comment, and are only important because of the allusion to Wyclif which they contain.

IV. Analysis of the Notae et Questiones Variae.

It is almost impossible to analyze a text so corrupt as this. It is better then to take the two most salient passages. From p. 158 to p. 161. Wyclif examines the question whether every truth has a corresponding falsehood. By falsehood we cannot mean non-entity, for then we would mean nothing (p. 159, l. 5—10); it is an entity, the belief that something which is, is not. Now the First Truth (There exists a God) can have no corresponding falsehood, since that would be an entity, and absolutely bad, even as God is absolutely good; but nothing is absolutely bad. Nor can the Second Truth (Creatures exist) have a corresponding falsehood. That, if it existed, would be the worst of all things; and there is no such 'worst'. — And consequently since these truths, which are entities, make up the sum of being, no truth can have an opposite falsehood: for no entity has a contradictory non-entity. — Waiving for a moment the peculiar theories of Wyclif's system, we cannot but admit that this last argument sheds light upon many a modern controversy. Hegel has affirmed, as all know, that Being and Non-Being are one and the same, since to be thought of is to be, and Non-Being is thought of. As Wyclif points out, Non-Being is not, and cannot be, the contradictory of Being. When we say Some Non-Being is a Being, we say true in a certain sense; when we say, Some Not man is a man, we say what cannot possibly be true. Yet the first proposition, as it stands, looks as self-contradictory as the second. As a matter of fact, Being is not taken in the same sense in the subject as Being in the predicate; we have two different terms, though there is a certain analogy between them. The Principle of Contradiction (*pace* Hegel!) thus remains unassailable, since it only affirms that you cannot assert and deny at the same time the same thing *in the same sense*. Non-Being is something thought of, but it is not thought of in the same way as Being thought of without the negation. In the same way, if it should be said: What is not thought of is thought of: "It is," we answer, "but it is thought of negatively, whilst the predicate *Thought of* embraces every manner of thinking." These subtleties are worth while noticing, since the name of their inventor is Hegel.

Another point, which touches the very essence of Wyclif's theory, is that All positive entities exist in one first mode of being, and conse-

quently, that All positive entities *(omne genitum)* have eternal existence *(esse)* p. 167—168. We cannot, of anything that has existed or will exist (positive entities) say absolutely, "This does not exist". Since it is eternally true that it will exist or has existed, the 'will exist' or 'has existed' *is* eternal; and this truth being identical with entity, some entity must therefore be everlastingly predicable of this being, and no absolute negation of its existence can be true. Therefore everything exists (in a sense) eternally; but we must distinguish between its *intelligible existence,* its *becoming,* and its specific being. Only the first is everlasting. Thus far Wyclif; but it is easily conceivable that his followers may have proceeded farther. For the 'becoming' of any being is eternally true, and so is its specific being; and if we distinguish between its 'intelligible becoming' and its 'becoming as a fact', then it may be urged that 'becoming as a fact' is also eternally true. The argument might be continued indefinitely, with an indefinite number of distinctions, neither assailant nor defender being worsted.

V. Analysis of De Materia.

Though the text of this tractate is less corrupt than that of the former three, if we consider each sentence in particular, it is not less difficult to analyze than they are. There is a great gap, — I think between pages 172 and 173; indeed it would seem as though what precedes p. 173 has no connection whatever with the rest of the treatise. The title, *De Materia,* is merely conjectural (see Shirley's Catalogue) and nothing more is said about matter after p. 172. This indeed is not a sufficient reason to conclude that these two parts are fragments of different treatises, for Wyclif is often given to wandering far from his subject; but it authorizes us in analyzing the two parts separately.

First Part (p. 170—173). Primal matter never can be a predicate. This means, not that we cannot say of any given body, This is matter; but that it is the first underlying subject of all forms; all forms or determinations are therefore predicable of it, and not *vice versâ.* We say truly, This is matter, but then we mean determined matter, not the first underlying subject. The question is, whether this primordial matter is absolutely formless in its essence. Wyclif proceeds to solve the problem, noting the different terms used to denote matter, form, and compound,

he defines substantial and accidental form, and draws certain corollaries from these premises, which no doubt were to serve for the full solution: but the first part comes to an end here, and we find nothing more on the subject.

Second Part (p. 173 to the end of the work). Here we have two questions answered. The first, is (p. 173, l. 2, 3) Whether the Universals have only ideal being in the Divine Mind; the second seems to be, so far as I can judge, Whether the Universals are really distinct from their singulars. To the first he answers (p. 173, l. 3, 4; p. 175, l. 14, 15) that we must admit the Divine Ideas of all things; and (p. 173, l. 38, 39) that every creature, in its intelligible being, is God. He nowhere states explicitly that the Universals have only ideal Being in God; but this is easy to gather from the whole sense of p. 174. — As to the second question, he on p. 179, l. 4, 5, after having described the various sorts of Universals, and enumerated the various opinions concerning them, declares distinctly that there is no Universal that is really and essentially different from its singulars. Such an opinion is, perhaps wrongly, ascribed to Plato by Aristotle. Yet the Universal has an entity of its own, and differs from its singulars by a formal difference only; but each Universal differs really from every other.

Such are the five tractates, or fragments of tractates, which are now published. Either by reason of their original imperfections, or by those which the copyists have introduced, they are far less easy to analyze than the works contained in the first volume. Yet even the short and inadequate analysis which I have given shows here and there many flashes of profound thought, not unworthy of the great thinker who wrote these tractates.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

193[b] | Cum multis in philosophia prima famosis visum sit oportere non esse formas quasdam rerum communes quas quidam universalia seu rerum universalitates appellant, aliis vero apparet huiusmodi formas sic necesse esse; et eciam illi qui res singulares existentes has formas habere, vocibus negant, corde illas habere profiteri coguntur; et quamvis eas a singularibus vocetenus removent, semper mente ipsas in illis participant; et nedum intellectus, sed et sensus corporei tales formas in singularibus percipere videntur, prius naturaliter percipientes istam substanciam esse coloratam quam ipsam hoc vel alia specie coloris colorari, et prius esse rubram quam vel hoc vel illo gradu rubedinis proformari: propter quod, licet retractis temporibus multa et plurima, hinc, inde, alta et profunda contra et iuxta posita sint, ut veritas huius materie claresceret; videtur tamen non esse inutile eciam in nostro tempore adhuc utcumque motiva apparencia que occurrere poterunt contra et iuxta se ponere et oculo indifferenti perspicere easdem, si forte dominus veritatis falsitatem circa hanc materiam detegere et verum, ita amplius patefacere dignaretur. Et sicut nemo presumere debet quod de veritatibus suis materiam hanc hominibus delucidare posset, sic nemini pie et humiliter in veritate philosophari conanti desperandum est; quando deus infinite potens, sciens, et benivolus est eum in hac re ad satis illuminare. Accedamus ergo cum fiducia ad tronum gracie, motivis hinc inde petentes, querentes, et puls-

Are there Universal forms of things, or are there none? Even those who seem to deny them, admit them in reality; and though the question has long been disputed, it is good to go into the arguments on both sides even in our days, regarding them with impartiality. We must not presume on the strength of our reason, but trust that God will give us light in this matter. Let us then in humble confidence enquire whether the ideal forms of things exist or do not exist in the Divine mind.

1. Capitulum primum *deest MS.* 2. Gap for initial letter *MS.* 2. (2) fomosis *MS.* 12. percipiens (!) *MS.* 22. ta *MS.* 23. me un͡ *pro* neminini *MS.* 27. cu͡ *pro* eum *MS.*

1. MSS. Univ. Prag. IV. H. 9. 2. *Philosophia prima*, i. e. Ontology or General Metaphysic. 12. *Percipientes.* In this copy there are a great many grammatical errors. I shall only correct those which render the sense ambiguous.

> Some even consider that to deny their existence would be a sin against faith unless there were some evident reason for such denial. We, taking it that the arguments *pro* are conclusive, those *contra* being sophisms, will first expound the former; and in the first place examine whether the full and proper intelligibility of things really exists in God. God has full knowledge of any man as he is a man, of any individual man as *that* individual, of any animated being as *that* animated being. The animated being may be a man, and the man this individual, but God knows him in these three different ways with full cognition; — of the individual, the less general, and the more general: this is indubitable. But every intelligibility in God's mind is an archetype; so the cognition of man *qua* man is the principle of creating Man *qua* man, *not qua* individual.

antes, si in mente divina sint vel non sint forme rerum ydeales communes.

Videtur enim quibusdam literatis ad salutem necessarium non discredere esse huiusmodi formas ydeales; valde eciam infidelis esset deo qui sibi hunc mundum sensibilem abnegaret. Et quia multitudo ydearum (a katholicis doctoribus in nullis vel paucis famosis negare presumentibus) creditur esse mundus architypus longe preciosior mundo | isto sensibili, infidelis deo 194[a] videretur qui sine patenti racione hunc mundum architypum abnegare presumeret. Et quia credimus argumenta pro parte affirmativa de necessitate concludere, et pro parte negativa esse puras apparencias zophisticas, ideo in primis, si quod motivum pro affirmacione occurreret inducemus, posterius zophismata huius materie, si deus dederit, dissolvenda. Et quia ydee in mente divina videntur potissime esse intelligibilitates prime et propriissime rerum ad extra, ideo pro primo argumento videndum est si in hoc eis veritas consenciat.

Argumentatur igitur sic: deus maxime proprie intelligit hominem ut homo est, Sor ut Sor est, et animal ut animal est etc. Igitur in mente divina est propriissime intelligibilis homo ut homo est, etc. Et per consequens in mente divina est proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis, ut homo est; et per consequens deus secundum illam solum intelligit hominem ut homo est, et non ut Sor est, vel ut animal est: igitur est proprie propria intelligibilitas in mente divina animalis ut animal est, alia ab animalitate Platonis; et sic de Sorte ut Sor est.

Igitur in mente divina sunt tres intelligibilitates maxime proprie. Prima singularis, scilicet Sortis, ut Sor est. Secunda communis, et 3[a] universalior. Igitur est dare universalem ydeam hominis, ut homo est, in mente divina, et aliam animalis, ut animal est, et aliam corporis, ut corpus est, etc. Nec est ponendum in dubium, si deus intelligat propriissime Sortem ut Sor est, et hominem ut homo est, et animal ut animal est, etc., cum homo intus proprie intelligat Sortem ut Sor est, et hominem ut homo est, etc. Cum igitur in mente

3. lia φ *MS.* 16. dissolvende *MS.* 21. Sor ut ut *MS.* 39. ho *MS.*

divina proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis, ut homo est, sit apud deum proprie propria racio formandi hominem, ut homo est, igitur deus secundum illam non potest formare ad extra hominem, ut Sor est, vel ut animal est, vel ut calidus est, vel aliquo alio modo, nisi ut homo est, et per consequens secundum illam racionem non potest ad extra formare nisi humanitatem simpliciter, et per consequens communem humanitatem; ut est impossibile quod in mente divina esset intelligibilis propriissime homo ut homo, nisi ibi esset proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis, ut homo, cum *esse pro-*
194b *priissime intelligibilem hominem* | *ut homo* sit proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis ut homo etc. Sic quod in mente divina est propria proprie intelligibilitas Sortis, ut Sor est, et proprie propria hominis, ut homo, et proprie propria animalis, ut animal. Nec prima potest esse aliqua reliquarum, cum tunc intelligibilitas proprie propria animalis, ut animal est, esset intelligibilitas proprie propria Sortis, ut Sor est, et per idem esset intelligibilitas proprie propria Platonis ut Plato est, et Brunelli ut Brunellus est, et istius equi, ut iste equus est; quod contradiccionem implicat, cum tunc solius Sortis intelligibilitas esset non solius Sortis intelligibilitas.

This proves that Universal Humanity is created separately from its individual. Man, *qua* man, could not be intelligible to God's mind, unless that intelligibility were present there. The three intelligiblities of animality, humanity, individuality, exist as separate forms in God's mind, and therefore separately realizable in the world of existences.

Igitur, cum sunt per ordinem ille 3ᵉˢ diverse intelligibilitates in mente divina, scilicet proprie propria animalis, ut animal est, hominis ut homo est, Sortis ut Sor est, et quelibet illarum secundum hoc est racio proprie propria et exemplar deo ad formandum ad extra: patet [quod] secundum primam deus format propriissime ad extra animalitatem simpliciter, et per consequens communem et non singularem; et per secundam format humanitatem simpliciter communem et non aliquam singularem; quia, qua racione unam singularem, eadem et quamlibet . . . Et illa racio esset proprie propria humanitati cuidam, et non esset proprie propria eidem. Secundum autem terciam propriissime format Sortei-

The Idea, archetype by which Humanity is formed, cannot be at the same time the archetype of an individual, for it would apply to all individuals equally well, and not be their distinctive images in God's mind. If these exemplars are thus distinct, that which is realized by them must be distinct also. Otherwise, God would not properly know,

9. p 9 le *MS.* 30. quod *deest MS.*

21. *Brunellus* occurs elsewhere in Wyclif's works as the name of an ass. 35. *Et illa.* Some words seem to be omitted here.

v. g. what animality is in itself, but only this or that animal.

tatem. Et sicut ille forme exemplares propriisime ad invicem distingwuntur, ita opportet et propriissima eorum formata ad extra, quando existunt, distingwi. Igitur opportet distinccio inter humanitatem simpliciter, animalitatem simpliciter, et Sorteitatem, et istam animalitatem singularem, et humanitatem simpliciter, et istam humanitatem singularem: alioquin proprie propria intelligibilitas animalis, ut animal est, esset proprie propria huius animalis, ut hoc animal est, et sic esset proprie propria alterius ut huius, et tercii, et sic de aliis omnibus: quod est inconveniens, ut prius.

Notwithstanding all defects in the putting of this argument, it must convince any candid man.

Et videtur quod non [sophistice sed] sincere et in simplicitate bene perpendens vim huius racionis, non obstante quod vis hec non sit hic expressa perfecte, habebit efficax et sufficiens motivum ad assenciendum primo formis ydealibus, eciam communibus, et hoc in deo; deinde formis universalibus in rebus creatis singularibus subiectatis.

It led Plato and others to admit both the ideal world and the World of Universals; as Augustine says, who adds that no one can attain to true wisdom, unless he understands this doctrine.

Videtur eciam quod Plato, et alii sapientes ante et posterius eum vi huius racionis | (que vis varie in 195a argumentis potest explicari); vi, inquam, quod moti fuerint ad ponendum vere universalia ydealia in mente dei; et exhinc formas communes rebus singularibus secundum illas ydeas inpressas. Unde beatus Augustinus, 83 questionum, questione 46ta, sic scribit: "Non est verisimile sapientes ante Platonem istas raciones quas Plato ydeas vocat, non intellexisse; siquidem ex eis tanta vis constituitur ut nisi hiis intellectis sapiens esse nemo possit." Et sequitur: "Sunt namque ydee principales quedam forme vel raciones rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles que ipse formate non sunt; ac per hoc eterne et semper eodem modo se habentes; secundum eas tamen dicitur formari omne quod oritur vel interit."

Augustine's definition of the Ideal Forms, according to which God made and governs all things.

Et postmodum arguit ydeas esse; ut, vi argumenti superioris ista racione expressa, necesse est deum omnia condita raccionabiliter facere et gubernare. Sed impossibile est quitquam fieri racionabiliter sine racione, ergo est dare raciones quibus deus causat universalitatem ad extra, et ille sunt ydee, de quibus est sermo.

12. sophistice sed *deest; a gap MS.* 20. p t 9 *MS.* 28. et ut *MS.*

Nec restat aput quem sint iste raciones eterne, nisi aput deum. [S]acrilegum enim esset dicere deum intueri extra se exemplar sui ad extra producti.

They must be in God, for God cannot look for patterns of things to be created elsewhere than in Himself.

Nec potest dici quod non sint multe raciones, quia, ut dicit Augustinus: "Restat ut omnia racione sint condita, nec eadem racione homo quam equus." Hoc enim absurdum est existimare pro tanto, quia tunc proprie propria racio producendi equum esset proprie propria racio producendi hominem, et e contra: quod contradiccionem implicat, vel non esset in mente divina proprie propria racio equi secundum quam deus propriissime formaret equum ad extra, cum tamen racionabiliter propriissime servet equum ad extra.

They must be many, for the archetype of a horse cannot be that of a man.

Nec potest dici quod proprie propria racio intrinseca equi ad extra sit illa racio proprie propria, 2^m quam deus format sic proprie equum ad extra. Licet enim equus secundum illam racionem formetur a deo, non tamen deus secundum illam creatam racionem format ad extra equum, sed secundum racionem proprie propria increata et eterna; quia secundum intelligibilitatem proprie propriam equi, que necessario est eterna.

They must be different from the created essences, which depend upon these increate and eternal ones.

Hec ergo propriissime rerum ad extra formabilium
195b intelligibilitates | in speculo deitatis sicut ydola pulcherrima, eterna, incommunicabiliter relucentes, sunt ipsarum rerum primo potissime et maxime proprie raciones, forme exemplares exemplario, et producibilitates. Nemo ergo audeat negare ydeas in mente dei, nisi sciat vere salvare deum posse proprie et distincte valde intelligere atque racionabiliter formare, exemplare, et producere res extra producibiles ut sunt sic distincte et proprie valde intelligibiles, formabiles, exemplabiles et producibiles racionabiliter, negando proprie proprias et simpliciter necessarias rerum extra producibilium raciones, exemplaria, intelligibilitates, et producibilitates. Cum autem hoc quod sic salvandum esset a negante ydeas in deo contradiccionem implicare videtur, omnino consenciendum nobilibus illis ydeas clare immediate divina dicentibus se esse ibidem . . . . . .

They appear in the mirror of Deity, as beautiful images of things which may be produced. And to deny them it would be necessary to reconcile this denial with the admission that God knows eternally all that He can produce; but no reconciliation is possible.

2. acrilegum *(quite plain) MS.* 22. for^m *MS.* 29. ut *twice MS.*

37. Some words are no doubt wanting here; the text seems, besides, to be corrupt as it stands, though that of course must remain uncertain.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

This mirror of Deity, being absolutely perfect, must contain all the images of possible created things; for even a common mirror is worthless, if it does not represent its object.

Secundo principaliter argumentatur: cum essencia divina sit speculum intellectuale, verum, mundum, clarum, et amplum simpliciter infiniter, igitur sicut speculo corporali et sue contradiccioni speculari multam derogaret si in eo non possent relucere vera et propria ydola corporaliter visibilia, sic magis derogaret illi speculo si non possent in eo relucere vera ydola et valde propria intellectualiter visibilia rerum intellectualium a speculo illo distancium et diversarum. Et quia speculum illud propter infinitatem sue perfeccionis non potest recipere in se de novo ab alieno talia ydola — ymmo, magis derogaret illi speculo actualissimo, si non necessario eternaliter in eo omnium ydola talia relucerent, cum tamen ibi relucere possunt — igitur de actu necessario tot relucent quotquot poterint.

Again, taking any possible creature, God knows it; unless we admit His actually knowing that He does not know it!

Item, signato quocunque possibili, deus necessario intelligit illud, et noscit noticia simplicis apprehensionis, sicut necessario noscit illud posse esse; ergo, si aliquod intelligibile quod posset intelligere non de actu intelligeret, deus sciret quod intelligibile ipse posset intelligere et non de actu intelligeret: quod est inconveniens. Cum autem deus apud se distincte | et proprie valde 196 signaret et diceret intellectualiter illud quod posset intelligere, et tamen illud non intelligeret, videtur contradiccionem implicare, distincte scilicet et proprie signare et dicere intellectualiter hoc, et non intelligere hoc.

Then, God's knowledge being perfect,

Argumentatur igitur sic: Deus simpliciter necessario intelligit distincte et proprie valde *hoc* (demonstrato

2 Capitulum Secundum *deest; gap of one line and blank space for initial S. MS.* 19. 9° pro ergo *MS.* 25. quia videtur *MS.*

5. *Speculari.* I cannot make anything of this, nor of the four preceding words. The general sense, however, is quite clear. Mr. Matthew makes the very ingenious suggestion that '*contradiccio*' may stand for the reflection in the looking-glass. This would explain the whole sentence at once; and if the word '*contradiccio*' is never used in this sense, we may readily assume it to be a mistake of the copyist.

effectu possibili non necessario). Igitur deus simpliciter necessario intelligit *hoc* secundum suam racionem proprie propriam. Si enim non potest quidquam intelligere nisi secundum aliquam eius racionem, non poterit quidquam intelligere aliud ad summum distincte et proprie, nisi secundum eius valde distinctam et proprie propriam racionem. Cum ergo deus simpliciter necessario intelligat *hoc* (quocunque effectu possibili signato); intelligat, dico, ad summum distincte et proprie: igitur secundum eius proprie propriam racionem et non secundum eius proprie propriam racionem ad extra. Cum autem deus simpliciter necessario illud intelligeret secundum eius propriam existenciam ...... et sic necessario esset in propria existencia; quod est inconveniens. Igitur intelligit illud secundum proprie propriam eius racionem in deo simpliciter necessariam.

its intelligible object must be so likewise; and if there were no Ideas, the object would be the created thing itself that would thus (being known as existing) exist necessarilly; which is absurd.

Nec potest dici quod essencia divina esset proprie propria racio intelligendi cuicunque possibili intelligibili, quia tunc esset unius solius racio talis intelligendi et non esset unius solius: igitur etc.

Item, deus primus artifex format et distingwit res ad extra in suis per se primis et propriis existenciis per illapsum regule et forme artis sue in materiam sue artis, que materia est res ipsa extra formata; sicut artifex humanus, per quemdam illapsum forme artis sue (ut sigilli in cera vel forme in plumbum etc.), format et distingwit artificiatum. Si enim non esset multiformitas, sed per totum uniformitas in forma artis dei, non possent res ad extra nisi uniformiter et non gradualiter dispariter existere; nec est dubitandum deum apud se habere necessario regulam et formam artis sue; nec est katholico discredendum quin deus illabatur in intima cuiuscunque creature et per consequens, cum forma artis illabitur, pulchre formando et distingwendo suam fabricam.

The answer, that the Divine Essence is the intelligibility of all things possible, is absurd; for their intelligibilities are not one, but distinct. Besides, God creates things by stamping them with His supreme art, as a seal stamps wax; if there were only one seal, there would be only one species of things.

196b Item, varia opera operata operari | artificialiter secundum exemplaria propriissima est simpliciter perfeccionis; igitur hoc convenit deo. Et per consequens deus habet apud se propriissima exemplaria suorum operatorum. Et antecedens patet; quia quanto artifex in terris artificialia sua operatur secundum exemplaria magis propria,

As a painter or a sculptor has the man he paints or sculpts more vividly before his mind's eye, and expresses this interior image in colours or

14. *Et sic.* There is no gap before these words, but I incline to think something has been omitted here.

stone, so the work will deserve more praise: and a like idea exists in God's mind. Let it not be said that God, being infinite, requires no pattern to work by. The greater the artist, the more perfect is his mental pattern.

tanto amplius secundum hoc laudatur: ut quanto pictor vel lapidicida magis proprie aliquem hominem in exterioribus concipit et secundum hoc facit artificialiter eius ymaginem, secundum hoc magis laudatur. Igitur varia operata secundum exemplaria eorum propriissima artificialiter operari est simpliciter perfeccionis. Nec potest dici quod deus propter immensitatem sue potencie et sapiencie ac perfeccionis non requirit ad operandum ulla propria exemplaria pro operatis suis. Quanto enim artifex in arte sua est potencior, sapiencior, perfeccior, tanto concipit modum magis proprium secundum quem magis proprie rem efficiat. Deus igitur concipit propriissimum modum sui operati secundum quod ipsum extra efficiat.

To say that God produced within Himself this mode or model according to which He brings things into existence, were to suppose in Him an act which is not eternal; such an act we must either deny absolutely or say that it exists in the eternal concept of God.

Nec valet dici quod deus vel alius artifex, in concipiendo proprium modum rei operate secundum quem ipsam operatur, fit in se proprius modus rei existendi extra deum; quia tunc deus illum proprium modum faceret et operaretur in se secundum se ipsum; et per consequens deus operaretur illum modum quodammodo post se ipsum, sed quia nichil potest gignere se ipsum nec gigni a se ipso, sic nichil potest aliqua prioritate vel posterioritate esse ante se ipsum vel posterius se ipso, cum tunc esset in aliquo gradu prioritatis vel posterioritatis in quo ipsum non esset; non potest esse quod aliquod sit sibi ipsi modus secundum quem ipsum operaretur et fieret. Aut ergo deus non concipit apud se proprium modum rei secundum quem operaretur rem in suam propriam existenciam, aut est proprius modus aut racio propria rei apud deum eternaliter secundum quem operatur operatum suum. Primum autem videtur tollere industriam et ingenium summi artificis in operando artificiose: igitur secundum videtur asserendum: quod prius artifex, concepto summe proprio modo rei, secundum quem ipsam | rem fabricaret, postea 197ª
tempore suo 2^m illum modum conceptum eternaliter in mente dei operatur rem cum suo proprio et per se primo modo existendi.

4. ꝫ *pro* secundum *MS.* 17. mſi *MS.* 19. mſi *MS.* 23. ptꝰ *MS.* 24. seipsum *MS.* 35. ptꝰ ea *MS.*

17. *Fit, etc.* With the exception of *fit* (which I have changed from *sit* in the copy) and of the expression that may be either *in se* or *nisi*, the whole of this sentence is marked as *certainly* identical with the *MS.*

Item, deus intra se totaliter distincte et proprie valde noscit singula que possunt extra eum in suis propriis modis et formis existere; et uniuscuiusque talium distincta et propria talis noticia dei intra seipsum totaliter terminatur ad distinctam et propriam racionem intra deum totaliter sistentem. Sed non est possibile esse unicam valde distinctam et valde propriam racionem aput deum et intra singulorum illorum possibilium; quia tunc talis cuiuslibet et nullius eorum esset valde propria. Singulum ergo talium possibilium habet valde sibi propriam racionem intra deum totaliter terminatam obiective per modum formalis obiecti distincta et propria nimis noticia dei totaliter ad intra de tali possibili. Et cum multa possibilia in nulla mensura existunt in propria forma extra deum, [si] non terminatur distincta noticia dei totaliter ad intra de quocunque possibili, [sed] terminatur ad racionem ad extra rei, tunc talis noticia non esset totaliter ad intra, sed extra transiens in racionem extra sistentem. Primum autem antecedens cum prima consequencia huius racionis patet; quia deus ad intra perfectissime et totaliter noscit distincte et proprie valde singularia illa possibilia; et non est possibile quod distincta et propria noticia dei totaliter ad intra non terminetur ad racionem valde propriam rei cognite, sicud ad objectum formale apud deum totaliter ad intra sistens. Alias enim aliqua distincta noticia dei non terminaretur ad per se proprium suum obiectum, vel non haberet ibi per se proprium obiectum, ubi totaliter sisteret, et non ultra procederet: que sunt inconveniencia.

God knows all things possible distinctly; therefore the term of His cognitive act corresponding to each must be not one, but many, and all within Himself. Otherwise His knowledge of them would be confused. Many possible things never exist except in God's mind; if then God's knowledge of them was not complete without their actual existence at some time, the object of His cognitive act would be dependent upon that existence outside of Himself, would either not be the proper object of His act, or be no object at all.

Patet ergo quod singulorum possibilium *existere* extra deum sunt in mente divina proprie, eterne, et necessarie raciones que sunt summe proprie et prime ipsarum intelligibilitates, secundum quas oportet eas via perfeccionis primo intelligi. Et non est possibile aliquem esse sapientem circa effectus quanto ex prima causa prodeunt, nisi prima via perfeccionis tales ydeas cognoscat. Hec ergo pauca ad presens pro qualicunque probacione, sed firma assercione multitudinis
197b ydearum in mente divina, sunt adducta. |

This 'possibility of existence' is the primordial intelligibility of things in God's mind.

6. et *pro* esse *MS.* 11. terminantem *MS.* 15. si *deest MS.* 17. sed *deest MS.* 23. quia pro quod *MS.* 36. effcm *MS.* 37. pdeut *MS.*

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

We must here add a few words against the sophistical attacks made upon this world of Ideas.

Ceterum vero pro defensione huius mundi pulcherrimi nobis sensualibus absconditi, ne per apparencias sophisticas destrui videatur, aliqua sunt adicienda. Et ut fiat brevius, videtur sufficere quod hic inseratur sentencia ex qua videtur posse satis responderi ad questiones et inpugnaciones sophisticas que in hac materia poterunt ventilari.

There are as many ideal forms as there are things which may exist out of God; the totality of these forms is the Archetypal Universe in God's mind, but not the architype of all *things, those v. g. which depend on our free-will. Though the Catholic faith teaches that there are only three eternal things, yet in this sense there are many more, not merely figments, but substantial. They differ from each other really, but not essentially nor numerically. Comparison of this World of Divine Ideas with the Trinity and with Christ incarnate.*

Est ergo sciendum quod, quotquot possunt res in suis per se primis propriis formis vel modis extra deum sistere, tot sunt talium rerum proprie ydee. Et tota multitudo omnium illarum simul est mundus architypus in mente divina. Et licet ille mundus architypus secundum partem illius multitudinis principiet exemplariter ad extra res existentes, non tamen est possibile quod ille mundus secundum se totum et quodlibet illius multitudinis principiet res ad extra exemplariter; quia contingencia ad utrumlibet in tota sua latitudine adhuc angusta est, quod non potest in se capere distanciam veritatum contingencium ad invicem contradictoriarum. Et licet secundum veritatem katholicam in deitate solum sint tres res eterne realiter inter se differentes, quarum quelibet personaliter subsistens formaliter et naturaliter est deus omnis bonitatis et pulchritudinis simpliciter infinite, tamen in mente divina ille ydee 2^m beatum Augustinum (ut superius fuit allegatum) sunt res, et sic sunt valde multe res; et videntur pocius esse res et raciones reales quam res racionis, cum sunt multo pociores raciones substanciarum intellectualium creatarum quam ille nature intellectuales, que utique sunt reales res et raciones; et ens reale prestancius est ente racionis. Et secundum hoc videntur ille ydee inter se et ad invicem differre realiter, non tamen essencialiter neque suppositaliter. Persona autem

2. *Blank space for initial C. MS.* 34. u3 *MS.*

divina a creatura differt realiter, suppositaliter [et] essencialiter, et ab alia persona divina differt realiter et suppositaliter. Et videtur quod sicud deus temporaliter gratiose, contingenter, cummunicat homini in Christo
198a unitatem et ydemptitatem | personalem verbi dei, ut homo in Christo sit una et eadem persona cum verbo dei, quod sit tota trinitas principians multitudinem ydearum in mente divina necessario et eternaliter, miro modo communicans omnibus illis unitatem et ydemptitatem divine essencie; ut unaqueque earum sit una et eadem divina essencia et unus solus verus deus; nulla tamen illarum potest esse formaliter deus, sicud deitas, et trinitas, et quelibet personarum divinarum formaliter est deus. Nulla enim illarum habet deitatem ab intrinseco per modum forme sue intrinsece, sed quod forte cuilibet earum modo nobis inestimabili communicatur nobilitas, unitas et ydemtitas deitatis et divine essencie; et quelibet earum eternaliter et necessario redditur deus et divina essencia. Cum enim, secundum beatum Augustinum, "quod factum est in ipso", (scilicet verbo dei), "vita erat", et non utique nisi prima vita, oportet ydeam quamlibet esse vitam primam, que deus est.

None of them can, like the Divine Persons and Christ, be called formally God. But though these ideas are not God they are in God, and intrinsically united with Him, and thus Divine; for, according to Augustine they are Life in Him, and share in His eternal Life.

Verumtamen beatus Chrysostomus illum textum Johannis primo sic distingwit: "Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine [ipso] factum est nichil quod factum est. In ipso vita erat." Et si textus sic deberet distingwi (sic tamen ecclesia Romana non distingwit, sed sicud beatus Augustinus) tunc illud argumentum iam superius adductum videtur ex parte materie inefficax ad probandum propositum. Verumtamen, quia ecclesia Romana Catholica sic distingwit et legit: "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", et si assertive, vel determinative, vel eciam approbative hoc facit, tunc sicut "quod factum est erat vita in deo" ita et a maiori raciones ille vitales et vivaces erant vita in deo: vita scilicet prima divina. Si autem ecclesia faceret hoc solum sequens beatum Augustinum, probabiliter sic distingwentem textum ewangelii, sicut eciam cantat de beata Maria Magdalena quod ipsa fuerit "in civitate peccatrix"etc. sequens in hoc opinionem beati Gregorii, ut a quibusdam dicitur, et beati

Chrysostom, however, punctuates this verse of St. John's Gospel otherwise, thus: Without Him was nothing made that was made. In Him was life. The Roman Church follows Augustine's punctuation; which, if meant to assert that it is the right one, is a decisive argument in favour of ideas; at any rate it is a probable argument in their favour.

1. et *deest MS.* 4. grōſe *MS.* 9. communicat *MS.* 17. nobis *MS.* 18. rdd͡r *MS.* 25. ipso *deest MS.* 40. a *deest MS.*

Augustini; quamvis beatus Hieronymus et Chrysostomus Johannes aliud sentenciant; tunc ut quid non similiter assertive ex facto ecclesie possit dici quia "quod factum est in ipso vita erat".

It may be denied that these Ideas are one with the Divine Essence; for the image in a mirror is not the mirror's essence, and that only which is formally God can be called Divine in any way. If they were, they would each of them be the Word, or the Holy Ghost, and this were a heresy. Either none of them is God, or they are all God, being necessarily one with Him. Possibly they share in the Personality of the Word, though distinct one from another. Or, as these Ideas are the uncreated essences of things, infinitely more perfect than they, God's essence is to them what created corporeity is to created igneity, aqueity etc.

Et forte dicerent aliqui quod, licet ydee sint vere in | mente divina, non tamen essent divina essencia, 198b sicud ydolum sensibile in corporali speculo non est ipsum speculum. Et sic forte dicerent ulterius quod omne illud, et solum tale, quod est forma in deo, sive in deitate, est deus vel est deitas, sive in quo deitas est per modum forme intrinsece, et sic nulla ydearum talium est in deitate; quia tunc persona divina per modum naturalis producentis voluntarii principiaret talem ydeam formaliter esse deum. Et sic talis ydea formaliter esset filius dei naturalis, vel spiritus sanctus: quod nephas est dicere; quia tunc essent multi filii vel spiritus sancti in divinis. Igitur vel nulla talis ydea est deus neque divina essencia, vel quelibet talis est deus et est divina natura; forte secundum hoc quod deus eternaliter necessario communicat sibi unitatem et ydemptitatem divine essencie, seu assumit eam eternaliter necessario ad illam unitatem et ydemptitatem. Et sic eciam quia ydee ille relucent appropriate in verbo dei quod appropriate est res summi patris, forte diceretur quod communicatur eis personalitas verbi dei et 2m hoc essent verbum dei, non tamen ex hoc una est reliqua. Vel dicendum quod ydea in mente dei est divina essencia et deus, quia racio create essencie corporee habet essenciam et est essencia corporea, et racio spiritualis creata rei intellectualis est essencia spiritualis intellectualis. Et quia ydee sunt infinite nobiliores raciones quam ille create, igitur quelibet habet essenciam eternam et est essencia eterna, cum sola divina essencia, quamlibet talem ydeam in se eternaliter relucentem principiat quemadmodum (vel quasi per modum quo) essencia corporea principiat in se creatam racionem: scilicet quidditatem totam ignis, aque, terre, vel alterius rei corpore.

Thus, as the essence of fire is really a corporeal essence, so

Igitur sicut creata racio (puta, tota quidditas ignis, gracia exempli, est essencia corporea ignis, est et ipse ignis) sic videtur quelibet ydea in mente divina esse

2. q) *pro* quid *MS.* 18. u3 *MS.* 28. est *pro* essencie *MS.*
33. cum autem *or* tamen ante *MS.*

divina essencia et est deus. Non tamen ydea formaliter est essencia divina vel deus, sicud nec tota ignis quidditas est formaliter ipse ignis vel eius essencia | 199a corporea, que transit de uno *esse* substanciali in aliud. Nec est putandam quod, si ille ydee in mente divina sunt eternaliter forme, quod igitur [sunt] forme informantes divinam essenciam vel aliquod suppositum vel individuum alicuius nature. Cum enim solum sint forme exemplares, contra racionem earum est quod sint alicuius essencie vel alicuius suppositi vel individui cuiuscunque nature forme informantes; nec sunt forme exemplares divine essencie vel suppositi divini, sed solum rerum ad extra producibilium, et illis solum concretive nominant vel denominant exemplariter, et non insistenter vel inexistenter. Et sic secundum ydeam equi non deus vel divina essencia dicitur formabilis, sed solus equus; et ita de aliis. Et quelibet earum nominat formaliter se esse illam racionem ydealem, et quelibet earum ydearum secundum suum per se primum proprium et adequatum modum est pulchra, nobilis, formosa, amabilis, deliciosa, delectabilis, et preciosa nimis infinite; quamvis nullum earum habeat essenciam vel naturam creatam vel increatam in se per modum forme inexistentis, sed ex hoc quod ipsa ydea secundum suum proprium modum est et habet essenciam divinam, et est ipsa essencia divina, ut dictum est: ipsa secundum suum per se primum et adequatum est sic nobilis et pulchra etc.

Et videtur quod si per impossibile homo perpetuo clare et secure videret unicam earum, peccato ab eo remoto, ipse inenarrabiliter delectaretur in illam. Videtur ulterius primo aspectu simpliciter dicendum — cum quelibet talis ydea creature sit suprema propria racio creature eiusdem, et cum ipsa creatura sit tota sua racio creata, incomparabiliter minus nobilis quam racio illa increata, et quecunque res est sua pocius tota essencialis prestantissima racio quam ipsa sit racio sua minus nobilis — [quod] quelibet creature est sua talis racio increata. Et ulterius ipsa creatura nequaquam secundum suam ad extra existenciam, sed secundum suam illam ydeam in mente divina, est ipsa vita prima:

each Idea is the Divine essence; but as fire itself is not that which underlies the change from one substantial form to another, so these Ideas are not identical with the Divine Essence as principiating them. They are forms indeed, but as mere exemplars of things to be created, not as intrinsically determinants in the Divine Essence itself. The Divine Idea of a horse, v. g. is merely the pattern according to which God can create a horse. All these Ideas are infinitely beautiful, though none have any essence at all of their own, except as patterns, and in so far, each is the essence of the Divine Mind.

To see a single one of them for ever would secure ineffable bliss. Now, as every creature is identical with its created measure of being, *a fortiori* it is identical with its supreme increate measure, its Divine Idea.

6. sunt *deest MS.* 14. inſiſtet’ *MS.* 18. met illam *MS.* 38. quod *deest MS.*

iuxta illud Johannis 1°. "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", sicud exponit Augustinus et doctores ecclesie post eum.

Yet we must not say that an ass is God; for this, according to the usual sense of the words, would mean that both are identical in outward existence. We have no right to affirm a thing with restrictions and then to affirm it without them; thus: *An ass quà existing in the Divine Mind, is God*:: *an ass is God*, is a fallacy. And if the restricted proposition be offensive to weak minds, better avoid making it.

Nec tamen debet dici vel concedi quod asinus est deus vel quod equus est deus, quia | [199b] simplices existimabunt, cum verba iuxta nostram capacitatem et usitatum intellectum sonant, quod asinus in sua exterius existencia sit deus. Sic enim cum dicitur "asinus", apprehendimus asinum in sua propria existencia; et cum additur "est deus", apprehendimus asinum in sua exterius existencia esse deum; et ille sensus est hereticus. Igitur non sequitur: Asinus 2m suam racionem ydealem in mente divina est deus; igitur asinus est deus. Sicud enim, secundum logicos, arguendo a termino aliquo cum termino distrahente vel diminuente in significando a racione formalis significati talis termini ad seipsum, deposito tali termino distrahente vel diminuente, non valet argumentum: ut non sequitur; "iste est bonus nequam; igitur iste est bonus": sic non valet argumentum a termino sumpto cum termino rapiente in significando a prima racione formalis significati ipsius termini ad nimis superexcellentem racionem ad seipsum terminum sine rapiente termino sumptum pro modica racione formalis significati termini. Et sic non sequitur: "Asinus 2m suam racionem ydealem, vel secundum *esse* ydeale, sive ydealiter, est deus: igitur asinus est deus." Et si infirmos offenderet hoc dictum: "Asinus secundum *esse* intelligibile vel ydeale est deus", caucius est tacendum.

Yet modern theologians, whilst they are scandalized thereby, admit that the Word being man, a man is God; and that He might have assumed any other animal, had He chosen, so that an ass might be God without restrictions!

Et multi moderni theologi et logici despiciunt et male kapiunt, cum dicitur quod asinus ydealiter vel 2m *esse* ydeale est deus. Et illos, 2m eorum theologiam et logicam simul, oporteret concedere quod asinus necessario est deus, lapis necessario est deus, equus necessario est deus, capra necessario est deus. Nam tales 2m theologiam suam concedunt quod verbum dei potest assumere in unitatem suppositi naturam asini, equi, capre etc., sicud assumpsit naturam hominis. Et sic assumendo verbum dei esset asinus, esset capra, esset equus etc. sicud modo est homo. Dicunt illi secundo iuxta suam logicam quod in omni proposicione

5. et *pro* existimabunt *MS.* 11. nec *MS.* 21. apna *MS.*

de necessario in sensu diviso, subiecto non contracto, ipsum subiectum (cum supponat) supponit pro illo quod est vel potest esse huiusmodi: ut asinus necessario est deus, i. e. illud quod est asinus vel potest esse asinus necessario est deus, modo iuxta illa simul oporteret
200ª eos concedere quod asinus | necessario est deus, quia *hoc* necessario est deus (demonstrando verbum dei) et *hoc* est vel potest esse asinus; igitur asinus necessario est deus. Et eciam quia illa, "asinus necessario est deus", iuxta eos significat quod illud quod est asinus vel potest esse asinus necessario est deus. Et hoc est verum, iuxta eos, quod verbum dei, quod est asinus vel potest esse asinus, necessario est deus. Prioris ergo theologie et logice colleccio videtur ex illo verbo ewangelii, sicut legit ecclesia: "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", et a beato Augustino esse recipienda, tenenda, et sapienter docenda. Colleccio autem theologie et logice posterioris videtur caute esse tenenda, vel pocius dimittenda.

In their system, too, everything said of a necessary subject is actually true: An ass might be God, and as all things in God are necessary, therefore it is so!

It is therefore preferable to adhere to the old theology and to Augustine's reading of the words of St. John; the modern system is less safe.

Sed forte instatur adhuc contra superiorem logicam, ubi conceditur: "Asinus secundum racionem ydealem est deus." Contra: sic sequitur: "asinus secundum racionem ydealem est deus: igitur asinus secundum veritatem est deus." Ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative cum ceteris paribus; et ex consequenti: "asinus 2^m^ veritatem est deus: igitur asinus vere est deus: igitur asinus est deus". Respondetur negando consequenciam primam, quia non sunt cetera paria. Nam in antecedente sumitur ly "asinus", cum termino rapiente, cum in significando a racione parva ad superexcellentem nimis racionem; in consequente autem non sic. Nam termini transcendentes, qualis est et ille terminus "veritas" non minuunt, distrahunt, vel rapiunt terminos non transcendentes; neque omnes termini speciales hoc faciunt, sed quedam sic, quedam sic, racionabili dei ordinacione, qui omnem veram logicam et locucionem bonam ordinat et disponit racionabiliter.

It may be urged that what is in its ideal archetype is truly thus: if an ass is God in its ideal archetype, it is truly God, and without restrictions.

But here we make the meaning of the word *ass* pass from ideal to real existence, and commit a fallacy.

10. quia *MS.*

25. *Paribus.* Add: recte arguitur, or words to the same effect.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

As God is the underlying essence of these ideas, He is also their beauty, which is in one sense the same for all, and in another diverse,

Sed reddeundo: sicud divina essencia est ydeis illis peressencia, ita pulchritudo essencialis eiusdem essencie est illis peressenciali pulchritudine; et sic sunt omnes pares, ymmo, et penitus eiusdem essencialis pulchritudinis. Et sicud persona divina habet pulchritudinem essencialem penitus eandem cum qualibet alia persona divina, habet tamen, sicud realitatem personalem propriam, ita et pulchritudinem personalem propriam aliam a pulchritudine personali cuiuslibet alterius divine persone; que tamen pulchritudo personalis non est alia | a pulchritudine essenciali; differt tamen ab ea 200[b]

just as the Divine Persons are the same yet different;

2^{m} formam sive racionem sicud persona non est res alia ab essencia, differt tamen secundum racionem sive modaliter ab illa: sic quelibet ydea in mente dei cum qualibet alia est eiusdem pulchritudinis essencialis, sed habet aliam pulchritudinem ydealem propriam a qualibet alia; que pulchritudo ydealis non est realiter differens a pulchritudine essenciali, sed 2^{m} racionem. Et sicut pulchritudines personales divinarum personarum sunt sibi pares cum per se sibi coequales, licet sint realiter et personaliter ille persone, sed non gradualiter 2^{m} plus et minus differentes, sic videtur quod omnes pulchritudines ydeales proprie sint ad invicem priores, licet ydee ad invicem sint realiter et ydealiter differentes.

or as genera differ in beauty from their species, and yet have something which is identical.

Vel sicud genus in creaturis est secundum se pulchrius quam sua species secundum se, et species 2^{m} se pulchrior quam suum individuum 2^{m} se, et una species pulchrior alia, sic eciam ydee proprie talium sint sic gradualiter pulchre.

And each is infinitely and ideally beautiful.

Adhuc forte quelibet earum est infinite pulchra ydealiter proprie. Cum autem ydea asini sit infinite

1. Capitulum Quartum *deest*. 2. *Blank space for initial S. MS.*
3. p24[a] *MS.* 26. si sicud *MS.* 29. quod sic *MS.*

pulchredinis videtur quod grossus asinus non sit illa sua ydea, quamvis superius fuerit motivum ad hoc aliquale adductum. Et forte posset dici quod superius motivum solum arguit quod asinus secundum suum purum *esse* ydeale est ydea sua et per consequens vita prima; sed non ex hoc oportet simpliciter dici quod asinus sit illa sua ydea; quia tunc asinus in sua existencia esset illa ydea. Unde, sicut multi negant quod creata res sit sua tota essencialis racio eciam formaliter rei, manifesta — sic quod homo non sit humanitas, ignis non sit igneitas etc. — ita asserunt sic *a maiori*: creata res non est sua racio essencialis increata non formaliter creature inexistens. Et, dato quod creatura esset tota sua racio creata sibi intrinseca, non propter hoc oporteret quod esset racio que non est sibi intrinseca et creata; quia hec secunda racio plus longe secundum puritatem distat a re creata quam racio formalis intrinseca.

It follows that an ass really existing cannot be identical with its Idea, though it has been stated to be such.

There are many who deny that an existing man is identical with existing Humanity, and *a fortiori* that anything is identical with its ideal Archetype.

Verumtamen, quamvis ewangelium non dicat "quod
201ª factum est in ipso vita erat", ne credatur factura inesse facture vel inesse presencie temporalis *esse* vita prima; dicit tamen "quod factum est in ipso vita erat", scilicet, antequam haberet *esse* facture, sic videtur quod asinus erat ydea sua; erat quidem ante *esse* facture in *esse* intelligibili vel ydeali. Nec videtur offendere sapientes dicere quod asinus est ydea sua, dummodo intelligatur quod non asinus in *esse* presencie temporalis sit ydea, nec quod asinus in sua forma existencie sit ydea, sed quod asinus ante et supra *esse* facture habeatur in mente, ydeale proprium summi artificis. Et sic illud *esse* ydeale ante omnem facturam et ante tempus: et ecce cum bonum possibile sit omne ens esse et non potest esse melius quam omne ens, tunc eius transcendens quod est "omne ens esse" est optimum possibile. Et tamen asinus grossus est illud ens transcendens, et e contra illud nobilissimum ens transcendens est asinus. Non quod asinus 2ᵐ racionem suam propriam formalem et intrinsecam sit ens transcendens, nec quod ens transcendens secundum suam propriam intrinsecam racionem sit asinus, sed forte quod deus unitatem et ydemptitatem

The sense of the text in St. John's Gospel is not that eternal life exists in a temporal being, but that its intelligibility existed eternally before it was produced in time.

The ass *is* Transcendent Entity, not in its present and intrinsic measure of being, but in so far as it shares in the same entity as its archetype.

1. vide͡ *MS.* 10. mat*a* *MS.* 29. est *pro* esse *MS.* 29. habeat *MS.*

primo debitam ente transcendenti communicat asino et cuilibet quantumlibet inperfecto enti in propria existencia; et in illa unit et ydemptificat ens transcendens cum quolibet tali, et econtra; et sic asinus est ens transcendens et econtra.

> Sharing thus in the same entity, it becomes true (in a sense) to say that the ass *is* its Idea; but this is a delicate and difficult question.

Sic forte posset aliquis opiniative dicere quod deus unitatem et ydemptitatem, primo debitam ydee proprie asini, illam communicat asino et non alii creature cuius non est ipsa ydea: et secundum hoc unit et ydemptificat ydeam propriam cum suo ydeato, et econtra. Et sic secundum talem unionem apud sapientes esset verum quod asinus est sua ydea; et econtra est predicacio vel fundat predicacionem non formalem intrinsecam unius de altero secundum habitudinem qua unum est propria forma exemplaris alterius, unum recipit unitatem et ydemptitatem alterius; et sic uniuntur et ydemptificantur, ut asinus sit ydea, et econtra. Sentencia autem in hac materia est sciencie et pietatis.

> We should carefully avoid scandalizing the weak and the perverse, and treat the whole matter with reverence and piety, in which we often fail. But we ought to hold firmly, on the one hand that the proper being of the ass is not identical with its Idea, and *vice versâ*; and that its intelligible being is eternally identical therewith:

Unde caute tacenda est coram infirmis, ignaris discipulis, et protervis; et totum cum | [201b] timore et pietate tractari debet. Et quia in hoc plurimum deficimus, non est mirum quod modicum veritatis in hac re tam abscondita cognoscimus. Et quomodocunque altercacio fiat et contencio de verbis huius materie, sentencialiter tenendum est quod asinus non est in sua propria formali existencia in mente divina ydea, nec ydea illa est in propria sua forma asinus, sed asinus habet quodammodo *esse* proprie proprium ydeale in mente dei ante omne *esse* creatum. Et ipse asinus cum omne esse creatum erat et est pure illud suum proprium *esse* ydeale; et sic ydea et asinus ante omne *esse* creatum. Sed illud purum *esse* proprium ydeale erat et est vita prima; sed ydea non est asinus, quia nec est asinus ante *esse* creatum, cum non sit *esse asinum* ante *esse creatum*; nec ydea est asinus post *esse* creatum, cum tamen ydea fieret asinus postquam prius non esset asinus, et sic ex eodem vita prima (puta deus) fieret asinus, leo, caper, equus, etc. quod est inconveniens.

> The Ideal ass is not the real ass, for then it would be more

Nec si ad bonum sensum et intellectum, asinus est vel erat ydea [sequitur], quod igitur ydea est vel erat asinus; quia asinus ante *esse* creature est vel erat sua

1. a suis *MS.* 20. tolium *MS.* 40. sequitur *deest MS.*

propria ydea, cum erat purum suum *esse* intelligibile proprium. Ydea autem nec ante *esse* creature nec post, nec in *esse* creature, est asinus; nec est hic conversio consequencialis: "Asinus est vel erat ydea; igitur ydea est vel erat asinus." Sicut enim ipsa albedo est sua pura intrinseca quidditas, nec est nec potest esse alba; sic ipse asinus est vel erat sua pura intelligibilitas in deo; sed illa pura intelligibilitas nec est, nec erat, nec poterit esse, asinus.

than a pure intelligible entity. No one can say that *Whiteness is white.*

Nec videtur sollicitandum quomodo illa habeat converti: "Asinus est vel erat ydea sua in deo"; quotlibet enim sunt proposiciones kathegorice affirmative que non possunt in forma converti. Si tamen contencio, si utique voluerint extorquere huius proposicionis aliquam conversionem, potest dici quod sic convertatur: "Asinus est vel erat ydea, igitur ydea est vel erat *hoc*," demonstrando per *le* "hoc" purum proprium et totale *esse* ydeale asini in mente dei, vel asinum possibilem in puro *esse* intelligibili existente. Multi enim concedunt de conversione illius: "Nulla essencia divina generat."
202a Ego autem ad presens non video | necessitatem [convertendi] proposiciones, nisi de quanto per syllogismum expositorium conversio fundari poterit; quod impossibile vel nimis difficile est in plurimis, cum non possit semper medium singulare adaptari cui secundum eandem racionem singularem utrumque extremum formaliter affirmative insit, vel unum affirmative et aliud negative desit.

As to the mode of converting the proposition concerning this matter, it is of no importance. Yet we may say: "*The existent Ass is its Ideal: therefore the Ideal Ass is whatever is intelligible in the former.*" But it is not possible to convert all propositions, and therefore it is not necessary.

Ulterius de ydeis dubitatur si sint forme absolute vel respective. Et videtur dicendum, cum ydea equi vel hominis [sit prestancior] quam eius intrinseca forma qua equus est equus vel homo est homo; et cum forma absoluta sit prestancior forma respectiva, ydee autem forme absolute, et hoc maxime rerum et formarum absolutarum ad extra; et cum ydola in specie corporali, si sunt forme, non videntur esse respective sed absolute forme; cum vero ydee in speculo divino sint forme relucentes in speculo illo spirituali et verissimo, sicud ydola sensibilium lucent in corporali speculo, videtur quod sint forme reales absolute. Eciam cum sint forme

Are these Ideas relations or absolute forms? The latter, since they are more perfect than the substantial existing forms, made after their pattern, which are certainly absolute. The Idea of a horse is not relative to the existing horse by itself, nor vice versa;

5. ipse albus *MS.* 10. alba *pro* illa (!) *MS.* 21, 22. convertendi *deest MS.* 22. nec^te ppones. 30. ab^te ul rcime *MS.* 31. sit prestancior *deest MS.* 35. eciam *pro* et cum *MS.*

and we can find nothing else to relate it with.

pure positive, et non privative, si essent relative, tunc haberent per se extrema; et oporteret quod ydea equi per se esset respectivum ad equum, et econtra equus, ut huiusmodi, esset per se respectivum ad ydeam: quod non est verum. Nec dabitur que res 2^{m} ydeam habet se respective ad aliud. Non enim equus habet se respective 2^{m} ydeam suam ad quidquam, nec aliquod aliud habet se respective secundum propriam ydeam equi. Ydee ergo rerum absolutarum non sunt respective, sed absolute forme; ydee tamen ad invicem relativorum, sicud paternitatis et filiationis, cum sint proprie propria presencia essencialia formalia et exemplaria relativorum ad invicem, ut huiusmodi sunt, forme relative exemplares dicende sunt, sicud forme exemplate sunt forme relative exemplate.

Besides, we cannot class these Divine Ideas of infinite beauty and reality amongst relations, which are pure notional entities. Where they are the principles of absolute realities, they too are absolute; where of things related, they indicate relation, yet are most real.

Nec est putandum quod ydee in mente dei, cum sunt exemplaria principia formalia secundum exemplaria factibilium, quod sint ita modice debilis realitatis quod inter encia racionis et inter encia relativa que ponuntur minime realitatis ipse sint comparande universaliter. Sicut enim, iuxta superius dicta, sunt infinite pulchritudinis essencialis et infinite pulchritudinis realis, sic sunt infinite realitatis essencialis secundum essenciam divinam. Sunt eciam infinite realitatis ydealis | secundum 202b
suum proprium per se et primum modum. Et ubi ydee sunt principia formalia propria rerum absolutarum, sunt forme absolute; ubi autem rerum per se respectivarum sunt ydee forme respective, semper tamen valde reales.

Is there an infinite number of Divine Ideas, corresponding to each degree of heat, &c.? No; for the higher degree being more perfect, comprises the lower, and there must be a highest degree of all.

Ulterius est dubium utrum sint simpliciter infinite ydee caliditatum, frigiditatum etc., 2^{m} quod infinite possunt esse gradus caliditatis maiores et minores; et sic de singularibus, et aliis formes in infinitum intensius. Et videtur dicendum quod non; nam, cum gradus caliditatis ut duo sit perfeccior quam gradus caliditatis ut unum, et per consequens prior via perfeccionis: igitur propria ydea gradus caliditatis ut duo existens per se proprium et essenciale principium eiusdem gradus

7. aliquot *MS.* 11. filia 4 *MS.* 12. pn^cia *MS.* 30. calidi^tu frigidi^tu *MS.* 36. î *pro* igitur *MS.*

5. *Non est verum.* Because the existing horse and its archetype are only relative after the accident of the creation of the former; therefore *per accidens*, not *per se*.

caliditatis erit prior de per se in racione principii essencialis, formalis, et exemplaris (via perfeccionis procedendo) quam ydea propria gradus caliditatis ut unum; et quia non contingit in infinitum procedere in principiis per se essencialibus, formalibus, exemplaribus, respectu graduum caliditatis, attendendo principiacionem exemplarem, ordine et via perfeccionis, ut principiando, via perfeccionis, prius nobiliorem gradum, postea minus nobilem. Si enim contingeret sic simpliciter in infinitum procedere, tunc non esset dari primum, proprium et essenciale, formale et exemplare principium gradus caliditatis, via perfeccionis computando. Igitur nec medium, ymmo omnia illa principia graduum caliditatis essent simul media; igitur ante omnia simul essent primum principium exemplare essenciale: quod contradiccionem videtur implicare. Sic igitur videtur esse danda prima ydea caliditatis que simpliciter, via prime perfeccionis, possit exemplariter exemplare et proprie gradum caliditatis et gradus caliditatis quam illa ydea haberet proprie exemplare: sed ille existit in propria forma. Ipse enim summus possibilis: quia si de possibili daretur maior, et sic perfeccior, tunc illius propria ydea, via perfeccionis, haberet prius exemplare proprie quam ydea data prima, que primo potest via perfeccionis exemplare: quod est impossibile.

Now if there were infinite degrees, none would be the highest, and consequently there would be none;

which is self-contradictory.

There is therefore one Divine Idea of heat, which in its perfection stands for all degrees, and at the same time represents the greatest possible heat.

Et sic videtur ulterius quod in omni latitudine formarum est devenire ad summum gradum possibilem: ut ad summam caliditatem possibilem, summam frigiditatem possibilem etc. Videtur enim, iuxta dicta, quod deus
203a necessario in eterno racionibus essencialibus constituit statūm usque ad quantum potest pervenire. Sic eciam videtur deus omnia in disposicionibus essencialibus et accidentalibus disposuisse in numero, pondere, et mensura, nedum de facto sed et de possibili. Unde, sicud inconveniens esset procedere in infinitum in principiis formalibus, essencialibus, et intrinsecis cuiuscunque creature, sic inconsonum videtur quod contingeret in infinitum procedere in principiis essencialibus formalibus et exemplaribus cuiuscunque latitudinis formarum. Sic enim nec quo ad viam generacionis, nec perfeccionis,

And in every species of form, we can arrive at the most perfect that is possible, God having disposed all things in perfect order, not only those which exist, but those which may exist; otherwise we should find no first or highest Idea of all.

12. ĩ *MS.* 17. prime via *MS.* 20. proprie exemplare *twice MS.*
20. existat *MS.*

These are the possibilities of things to be produced by God; He does not need them, since He needs nothing; but He requires them.

esset dare primam ydeam in aliqua latitudine formarum; et quotquot sunt ydee in mente divina, que sunt producibilitates rerum ad extra, et quoddam *posse produci* talia producibilia, tot sunt *posse producere* formaliter in deo que sunt sicud quedam formales proprietates divine nature. Et licet deus non indigeat ydeis, sicud nec ipse potest aliquo modo 2^m divinam naturam esse indigens, requirit tamen eas ad intelligendum, producendum, et conservandum producibilia ad extra. Est autem secundum beatum Augustinum, Egidium, et alios, ydea forma exemplaris eterna 2^m quam deus est productivus creature. Et sic 2^m quosdam omnis et sola creature habet proprie ydeam in mente divina. Et sic peccata et defectus in moribus non habent ydeas in mente divina; privaciones autem et carencie, si quas deus iuste infligit hominibus vel inmittit aliis creaturis, videntur habere ydeas in mente dei secundum quas eas inmittit vel infligit creaturis.

Sin, and moral defects, have no Divine Idea: but all other evils have.

A further knowledge of the beauty of this world of Ideas is reserved for the next life.

De pulchritudine et claritate mundi architypi multa possunt dici que occuli mentis non essent nobis relati. Ydeo, cum deus nobis illum ad futuram vitam reservavit absconditum, contenti utcunque de iam dictis modicis de formis universalibus ydealibus, ulterius tractatum ad formas communes rebus formaliter insitas aliqualiter longiorem comittamus.

3. quedam *MS.* 14. heat̃ *MS.* 20. *or* quia *pro* que *MS.*
20. occli m̃tis *MS.* 20. non esset *MS.*

20. *Que oculi.* Unintelligible as regards construction.

CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

Et argumentum factum primum simul pro communibus ydeis et universalibus formis rebus inexistentibus hic pro repetito habeamus, adicientes aliqua plura, si 203b forte veritas | huius materie dignaretur amplius, lacius, et profundius nobis ceterisque clarescere. Et videtur hic argumentandum tali modo. Placet deo simpliciter necesse omne bonum esse bonum, sicut deus placenter et simpliciter wult omne bonum esse bonum: igitur ex assumpto est placens deo simpliciter necessario omne bonum esse bonum nisi placens commune, scilicet commune bonum formaliter omnibus bonis inexistens. Ex consequente illo leviter deducitur communis humanitas in hominibus, communis equinitas in omnibus equis: et sic de aliis. Et quomodo adversariis poterit salvare quod liceat cuicunque placenter diligere quod *omne bonum est bonum*, et tamen non liceat sibi placere quod omne bonum est bonum? aut quomodo diceret quod creature racionabiliter placet quod omne bonum est bonum, et quod deo non placeret simpliciter necessario quod omne bonum est bonum? aut quomodo simplices fideles ferrent hoc, cum pagani obicerent eis: Quomodo deus vester est simpliciter bonus, cum non placeat sibi quod omne bonum est bonum? Quis eciam audebit dogmatisare simplicibus fidelibus quod hoc non est tenendum, quod "omne bonum est bonum". Si autem *hoc* est tenendum, quod 'omne bonum est bonum", queritur quid demonstratur per *ly* "hoc"; et non dabitur nisi commune bonum formaliter omni enti: igitur simplices firmiter tenentes hoc quod "omne bonum est bonum" firmiter tenent communem bonitatem omnibus. Item tunc non est predicandum, tenendum, et diligendum, quod "quilibet predestinatus erit beatus", nec esset

We shall now develop the argument in favour of the Universals existing in things.

This proposition: *Everything good is Good*, is willed by God and pleasing to Him. Thence we readily deduce the Universals; and it is a principle not to be gainsaid.

Whover denies the Universals, must deny the very idea of *Everything good*,

likewise that general one of the Predestined.

1. Capitulum quintum *deest.* 2. *a gap; Blank space for initial E MS.* 11. mfi *MS.*; *ib.* sed *pro* scilicet *MS.*

the axiom that Every creature is subject to God,

firmiter tenendum et valde timendum quod quilibet finaliter malus perpetuo dampnabitur. Igitur nec est firmissime tenendum et nullatenus dubitandum quod omnes qui extra ecclesiam katholicam decedunt perpetuo dampnabuntur; et nec esset iustum neque dignum quod, "quilibet homo est sub potestate dei", nec est iustum neque dignum quod "omnis creatura sit subiacens dei imperio". Et sic eciam omnis falso iuraret

the words of the Preface in the Mass,

a simili in prefacione aperte et quottidie cantans quia "vere dignum et iustum est, equum et salutare, nos tibi semper et ubique gracias agere, domine sancte, pater omnipotens eterne deus", cum non esset dignum et iustum, | quia nullum singulare iustum est "nos semper 204a et ubique" agere gracias eterno patri omnipotenti, sed non commune iustum est universalis graciarum accio semper et ubique existens.

the law of annual confession and communion,

Eciam queritur que res est statutum ecclesie, videlicet, quod "omnis utriusque sexus semel in anno confiteatur circa festum pasche". Et queritur a negantibus communia statuta, sicut et communes res in pluribus per modum forme, que res est hoc statutum,

obedience to the Dean of a Faculty,

gracia exempli, quod quilibet ingrediens facultatem debet iurare obedienciam decano; et sic de aliis statutis. Et queritur si negantes communia bona auderent

and should say to the King that the men in his realm are not his subjects; he should even deny that all creatures proceed from God.

dicere coram rege assertive: "Rex, non est iustum nec dignum quod quilibet rusticus de regno tuo sit sub tua potestate sub tuo dominio, vel sub tua iurisdiccione", cum tamen secundum negantes bona communia sit hoc verum et firmiter dicendum in forma propria. Item, tunc christiani per mundum dispersi non deberent hoc firmiter tenere, quod "quelibet creatura est a deo", quia si sic queritur quid per *ly hoc* demonstretur, non proposicio aliqua, quia nullam talem oportet Cristianos per universum mundum habere, nec aliquod singulare simplex vel aggregatum, quod esset "quamlibet creaturam esse a deo"; si demonstrat communem veritatem formaliter in omni creature existente habetur intentum.

He must deny this article of Christian faith that 'every' man must rise again; for this is not a mere collection of singular propositions: "A, B, C . . . must rise again."

Item, sicut fides katholica est quod adventum Cristi ad finale iudicium omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis, ita est fides katholica quod quilibet homo resurgere habet cum corpore suo in adventu Cristi ad iudicium. Queritur ergo que res et que veritas est ista fides katholica, que est "quemlibet hominem habere resurgere cum suo corpore ad adventum Cristi in iudicium?" Non est aliqua proposicio in mente, vel

in voce, vel in scripto; talis enim quelibet esset instabilis nimis et inpermanens ad fideliter et firmiter credendum eam; nec potest esse quod proposicio aliqua talis sit "quemlibet hominem habere resurgere"; quia tunc nulla illa singularis res, que est illa proposicio, esset "illum hominem habere resurgere", et sic de singulis. Ergo est veritas katholica communis, que est "quemlibet hominem habere resurgere".

Again, every being is good; if we admit this, we admit universal goodness to belong to Being.

Similiter, semper circumscriptis signis potest esse quod "omne ens est bonum et non potest non esse quin omne ens est bonum; igitur necessarium est quod omne ens est bonum". Et sic necessarium est omne
204[b] ens esse bonum. | Et veritas necessaria, circumscriptis signis, est omne ens esse bonum; et que, nisi illa veritas communissima formaliter omni enti, scilicet esse *bonum*, sive bonitas uniuscuiusque entis?

As God knows that Every Being is good, what *is* that which He knows? Something neither increate nor created, but abstracting from both, viz., the universal goodness of Being.

Similiter, deus simpliciter necessario scit omne ens esse bonum: igitur simpliciter necessario scit scitum vel scita, "omne ens esse bonum": igitur simpliciter necessario scitum vel scita sunt "omne ens esse bonum"; sed non simpliciter scita sunt omne ens esse bonum. Quia queritur que simpliciter scita sunt "omne ens esse bonum"; nec increata, nec creata, nec utrumque, ut faciliter patet calculanti; igitur simpliciter necessario scitum est omne ens esse bonum. Et hec est bonitas analoga omnis entis simpliciter necessaria et necessario simpliciter a deo scita.

A philosopher's knowledge of nature extends not only to the proposition, but to what it signifies; which is *something* universal; everybody knows that a groat is more than a farthing.

Similiter, cum philosophi determinate et distincte sciunt quod "omne ens naturale est per se mobile", ad quid vel ad que terminatur principaliter talis sciencia eorum distincta et determinata? Et non datur nisi veritas communis que est "omne ens naturale esse per se mobile"; et sic de: omnis ignis est calidus etc. Nec philosophi determinant suas tales distinctas, actuales, et habituales sciencias principaliter ad proposiciones mentales, vel alia signa vocalia, vel scripta, cum et layci simplices querunt scire distincte, non proposiciones mentales, vocales vel scriptas, sed a parte rei pocius quod quilibet grossus suus valet plusquam unus obulus.

20. nccia *MS.* 20. fut *MS.* 21. fut *MS.* 22. fut *MS.* 30. ad q' al ad qua *MS.* 33. omni igne est calidum *MS.*

Item communius est apud studentes pragenses bibere cerevisiam quam bibere vinum, et bibere vinum minus commune, et commune est eis comedere carnes etc. De illo communi queritur . . .

A man is an animal universally, but this cannot be without universal animality. Is not "Who runs, moves" a universal truth?

Similiter, circumscriptis signis, universaliter ita est quod homo est animal, sed sicud fortiter laborare sine fortitudinem implicat contradiccionem, sic universaliter esse ita quod homo est animal a parte rei sine universalitate a parte rei implicat contradiccionem.

Igitur et queratur a laycis ydiotis si esset negandum quod universaliter est ita quod, "qui currit, ipse movetur", et ita de aliis consimilibus. Similiter oportet, ad hoc quod Sor est animal, quod omnis homo sit animal; igitur oportunum est ad *Sortem esse animal, omnem hominem esse animal:* queritur que res, que veritas sit illud *oportunum,* et illa oportunitas: et non dabitur nisi animalitas communis omnis hominis. Similiter requiritur ad *istum hominem esse, esse hominem*; | et 205ª non econtra. Consulatur ergo deus apud quem non est noticia confusa. Quid ergo? sic requiritur *ad hominem istum esse,* et non econtra; et dabitur communis humanitas cuiuslibet hominis. Similiter prius naturaliter et consequencialiter, circumscriptis signis, est *hominem esse* quam sit *istum hominem esse.* Nam circumscriptis signis deus sine noticia et supposicione confusa tantum scit quod si est *istum hominem esse* tunc est *hominem esse;* et non, si est *hominem esse* est *istum hominem esse.* Igitur deus, circumscriptis signis, aput semetipsum distingwit *esse hominem,* sicud prius naturaliter consequencialiter ad *istum hominem esse,* cum dicat apud se non de signis sed de re extra: Si est esse *istum hominem,* tunc est *esse hominem*; et non, si est *esse hominem,* est *esse istum hominem.* Et si nos sine talibus instrumentis, scilicet proposicionibus, sciremus veritatem condicionalem et consequencialem, sicut scit deus, eciam sic iudicaremus. Et videtur magna imperfeccio in nobis,

A is an animal because all men are animals; it is animality in which the dependency consists.

God, without the aid of propositions, knows the Universal thing which they signify; knows the dependence of the individual upon the general. We know this, thinking by means of propositions;

1. comne *MS.* 11. currit quod *MS.* 14. optunu *MS.* 23. quciater *MS.* 30. quciater *MS.*

1. *Pragenses.* In other Bohemian MSS. of Wyclif's works, we frequently meet with Pragensis for Oxoniensis, &c. 4. *Queritur.* The end of this argument is wanting: but there is no gap in the text to show it.

et gravis ignorancia rerum, et ignorancia negacionis et disposicionis, si prioritatem naturalem et consequencialem quam deus apud se diiudicat et quam nos per instrumenta proposicionalia debemus cognoscere, quod talem prioritatem principaliter et totaliter instrumentis nostris attribuimus, rebus derelictis. Et quis artifex vellet principaliter et totaliter cognoscitive insudare circa instrumenta, ut huiusmodi sunt?

but it were very wrong of us to ascribe this dependency only to the instruments by which we know it.

Item, deus dicit apud se quod Sorti, sed non solum sibi, convenit scilicet esse hominem. Dignetur ergo deus edicere, cum dicat Sorti, sed non solum sibi, convenire esse hominem, que veritas, que res est *esse hominem* ibi in tali dicencia dei? Et certum est quod beatus in patria dicit, et nichil confuse sed distinctissime. Igitur, *esse hominem* predicatum sit de Sorte; sed deo non solum est communis sua, sed et aliorum, humanitas.

God says: 'A and others are men': what does 'to be men' signify in God's mind, save Universal humanity?

Item, si nichil esset commune essenciale intrinsecum Sorti et Platoni, sed in quolibet solum esset essenciale singulare, tunc Sor non plus essencialiter differt a lapide quam a Platone, et econtra Plato a Sorte. Nam per omne illud per quod differt essencialiter a lapide, per omne illud essencialiter differt a Platone, et econtra. Nec plus convenit essencialiter cum Platone et econtra quam cum lapide, cum albedine, cum quacunque re
205b mundi; nec plus vel minus | essencialiter ab eodem different. Item, per quid Sor esset essencialiter similis Platoni? Non per humanitatem suam singularem, quia per illam differt essencialiter a Platone. Nec per racionabilitatem suam singularem, quia per illam essencialiter differt, et per consequens est dissimilis; cum per illam sic singulariter essencialiter est racionalis, et Plato nequaquam sic singulariter essencialiter est racionalis.

If A and B had nothing really in common, they would each differ from the other as essentially as from a stone; there would be no resemblance at all; for it could not proceed from their individuality, by which A and B necessarily differ.

Et sic tolleretur omnis essencialis conveniencia et similitudo intrinseca rerum ad invicem, cum tamen dicatur Gen. primo: "Creavitque cete grandia et omnem animam viventem ac motabilem quam produxerant aque in species suas, et omne volatile secundum genus *suum*." Et infra: "Et fecit deus bestias terre secundum species suas, et iumenta, et omne reptile terre in genere suo." Non possunt autem ibi intelligi per genera et species

Now this contradicts Genesis, saying that animals were created in their genera and species: which cannot mean the Divine Ideas of these beings, nor the successive

7. $\overset{\circ}{9}g^{tme}$ = congregative? *MS.* 39. fis *MS.*

multitude of them all, from then to the end of the world.

ydee rerum in mente divina; quia aque non produxerunt animam viventem et motabilem in illas ydeas. Nec possunt intelligi conceptus noster vel nostra signa, que dicimus genera et species. Nec possunt ibi intelligi multitudines successive bestiarum a principio mundi usque in finem; quia aque in principio mundi non produxerant bestias terre secundum aliquam talem multitudinem omnium leonum vel omnium equorum etc.

We must understand by *genera* and *species* their essential resemblances by which they are thus classed.

In fact, if the words do not mean this, they mean nothing,

for they cannot stand for the mere logical conception of classes, but for the intrinsic reason from which the classification springs.

Intelligende ergo ibi sunt rerum illarum magis et minus communes quidditates et naturales, ac essenciales rerum similitudines per genera et species. Nam videtur quod in illas et secundum illas quidditates et similitudines essenciales intrinsecas ille bestie producantur. Et queritur ab adversariis quid pertinenter intelligitur per genus et speciem, cum dicitur: "illa sunt eiusdem generis," si non quiditates generales et quiditates speciales intelligantur iuxta diffinicionem generis et speciei, ubi dicunt logici quod genus est quod predicatur de pluribus specie differentibus, in eo "quod quid hoc est" secundum quod est quiditas predicata de pluribus specie differentibus in eo "quod est quid": quod non convenit signo loycali, ut huiusmodi, nec alicui quiditati singulari quantumcunque per communem conceptum concipiatur quiditas. Igitur generalitas predicatur, quia manifestatur, dicitur, et significatur de pluribus differentibus specie 2^{m} quod est eorum quiditas. Et ita de specie respectu eorum que numero differunt.

16. quidatis generalis et quiditatis specialis intelligantur *MS.*

CAPITULUM SEXTUM.

206a | Item, cum substancie materiales possunt habere causam efficientem agentem eis communem, causam per se finalem eis communem, causam materialem eis communem (ut quando ex stramine fit ignis vel ex igne aqua), quare non potuerunt substancie huiusmodi habere eandem racionem formalem substancialem communem, cum habeant supremas, scilicet agentem et finalem communes, et habeant infimam, scilicet materialem communem, qualiter non possunt mediam, scilicet formalem substancialem, habere communem in qua conveniret substancialiter? Et si talem habuerint, iam erit forma, substancialis, et per consequens quiditas substancie communis multis suppositis. Et hoc est universale a parte rei.

Why should not many beings have the same formal intrinsic cause, one common to them all, if they can have the same efficient, final, and material cause?

Nec valet dicere quod forma substancialis est actus substancialis rei, et actus separat et distingwit (1mo methaphysice). Nam cum partes continui sunt in actu perfecto per se standi, tunc sunt separate; quando non, tunc non; quod non valeat hoc dicere ad propositum. Nam res plures non bene separantur et distingwuntur ab aliis, nisi fuerint congregate et in unum collecte per formam; et virtus vivendi et congregandi 2^{m} se est appetibilior quam virtus separandi et distingwendi. Igitur forma, etsi habet virtutem separandi et distingwendi, habet tamen aliam nobiliorem virtutem, scilicet uniendi et congregandi; sic namque forma mixti, propter quod sunt elementa, manutenet elementa ne ab invicem dissolvantur. Superveniente autem violencia corrumpente formam mixti, in materia dissolvuntur ab invicem elementa; sicud videmus, igne applicato ad lignum ad

Objection: The Form, according to Aristotle, is that which separates.

True, but it separates from things which have it not; and its function is on the contrary to unite those things which have it. Separation ensues upon the destruction of a form.

1. Capitulum Sextum *deest.* 2. *Blank space for initial I MS.*
14. E1oc *MS.* 16. quia *MS.*

18—20. *Nam . . . propositum.* This sentence is marked (!) in the copy of the MS. 28. Manutenet = *maintient* or *maintains.*

corrupcionem forme ligni, distrahit materia tota ligni. Nam partim ignis in flamma sursum tendit ad speram ignis; fumus aereus ad speram aeris dispergitur; aqua fugiens ignem contrarium in locum adversum igni decurrit; terra in cinere ultimo residet. Sic quod, licet forma materias suas ab aliis separat et distingwat, plus tamen unit et adunat easdem. Plus enim pro subsistencia rei est materias suas rei unitas et adunatas esse, quam ipsas ab aliis superatas et districtas.

It seems therefore that we have no reason thus to limit God's power, saying that a form must inform only one being.

Videtur enim multum derogare deo et generi esse formalis substancialis quod ipse deus potest facere causam agentem divisim et communiter agere plura supposita et ante materialem divisim; (et consequenter | materiare plura supposita), et non posset facere causam 206b formalem substancialem communiter indivisim formare substancialiter plura suppisita, ymmo, cum qualitas symbolo manens vicissim in utroque elementorum habencium ad invicem symbolum et transmutatorum in se invicem, ne supervacue qualitas eiusdem racionis corrumperetur et iterum generaretur; cum, inquam, talis sic vicissim informat plura supposita, quomodo forma substancialis pocior non poterit communiter plura supposita, sed solum proprietorie unicum suppositum substancialiter performare? Derogacio magna videtur quod non poterit causa formalis communiter, sed solum proprietorie, causare suppositum unicum causacione, que est informacio. Nec tamen materia possit communiter materiando plura supposita causare; nec communis causa formalis substancialis plurium suppositorum divisim est ita latens et abscondita; cum nedum philosophis sed et ydiotis et grossis rusticis sit manifestum et valde certum quemlibet ignem esse ignem.

A peasant knows that all fire is fire; this is a tacit admission of the one Universal form of gneity.

Et valde extraneum est dicere quod talis proposicio mentalis, "quilibet ignis est ignis" [non] est eis manifesta et valde certa, cum eciam *esse* quod est manifestum et certissimum de re manifesta et certa non sit eis notum, manifestum, et valde certum de aliquo tali signo, proposicione, vel disposicione, in mente scilicet "quilibet ignis est calidum". Nam, quesito ab aliquo tali ydiota

To answer that he knows nothing about the mental proposition concerning it is quite irrelevant;

he knows and will swear that

9. quam ipsas esse *MS.* 6. materialis *MS.* 10. gnī' *MS.* 11. for ⁀l *MS.* 13. aη *much blurred MS.* 14. mate'are *MS.* 17. hnciu *MS.* 34. non *deest MS.* 36. mata *MS.*

vel simplici, si constet sibi quod quilibet ignis est ignis, fatetur quod sic. Ymmo per iuramentum secure hoc assereret quod omnis ignis est ignis. Si autem queritur ab eo si constet sibi alio de tali signo tali proposicione vel tali disposicione in mente sua, scilicet "quilibet ignis est ignis", respondebit se nescire. Et sicud simplex laycus affectans quodlibet membrum sui corporis esse sanum, non affectat illam proposicionem mentalem "quodlibet membrum corporis mei est sanum", sed affectat sanitatem in quolibet membro corporis. Sic, cum manifestum est sibi, et valde certum, quod quilibet ignis est ignis, non est sibi valde certum quidquam et manifestum de illa proposicione: "quilibet ignis est ignis", sed est manifestum sibi et valde certum de 207[a] igneitate cuiuslibet ignis. | Et experiencia docet quod homines sapientes et simplices, negantes universales formas in rebus, sine deliberacione ex instinctu utique naturali prorumpuntur et dicunt: hoc est manifestum, hoc est valde certum quod quilibet ignis est ignis; non intendentes de proposicione mentali sicud dictum.

the fact is so, though he may know nothing about propositions.

And even such as deny the Universals are forced to admit this, and tacitly to admit them too.

Unde videtur magna protervia in negantibus formas communes in diversis suppositis: ex deliberacione animi menti contingit ne tali instinctu naturali, negando hoc esse manifestum et valde certum in toto mundo quod quilibet ignis est ignis, et illud manifestum et valde certum in toto mundo quod est quemlibet ignem esse ignem, et communis igneitas in quolibet igne.

Sicque, cum hoc sit valde manifestum, et valde certum et multum firmum in toto mundo, quod *quilibet ignis est ignis*, sed quod *iste ignis est ignis* est servate notum et non sic manifestum, certum et firmum; manifestum est quod igneitas communis longe plus manifestat se et certificat se esse (quia in toto mundo), cum sit quemlibet ignem esse ignem, quam igneitas singularis se manifestat obiective et certificat se esse. Sic eciam, cum sit manifestum in toto mundo et certum, non ut signum, sed ut obiectum quoddam primarium alicuius distincte noticie quod quilibet ignis est calidum, caliditas

The truth is that the Universal fact of *All fire being fire* is better known than the particular one, of *this fire being fire*.

5. menta *MS.* 7. affctans *MS.* 9. sui *MS.* 16. negantes concedentes *MS.* 22. $a^{mi}9t$ ne *MS.*

20. This paragraph seems to be incomprehensible. 30. *Servate.* Perhaps this means: Known in an inferior way, i. e. empirically. 38. *Calidum.* We have already met with this strange form several times. No doubt *aliquod* is understand.

This is true of all universal forms, which are said to be predicated (or manifested) unlike particular forms.

communis cuilibet igni obiective manifestat se et certificat se esse toti mundo; et sic de consimilibus formis communibus substancialibus et accidentalibus in diversis suppositis. Unde et forme communes substanciales et accidentales, quia publicant et manifestant se in toto mundo, dicuntur a philosophis predicari, cum sic in toto mundo publicantur et manifestantur. Forme vero singulares propter ipsarum privatum *esse*, ubi nec sic per mundum publicantur et manifestantur, sed privatim in tempore, vel in loco, vel utrumque, ostenduntur, dicuntur non predicari sed solum dici proprie a philosophis.

Were this not so, there would be no self-evident principles of science.

For if we knew not the proposition, the science of the thing would remain knowable as now.

Item, nisi essent vires tales communes a parte rei, tunc non essent propria per se principia in scienciis per se manifesta. Si enim non est hoc principium per se notum a parte rei quod *omnis motus est*, sed solum talis: "proposicio, *omnis motus est* est principium in sciencia naturali"; . . . . . . et quia, quacunque tali proposicione existente, vel non existente, non minus esset et maneret sciencia naturalis | de quibuscunque veris 207b scibilibus et proprie naturalibus.

These self-evident principles are so, independently of their being or not being enunciated in set terms.

Similiter, quocunque termino tali, ens mobile vel ens naturale, existente vel non existente, non minus manet ipsa sciencia naturalis. Ubi ergo remanent propria per se principia per se manifesta, science naturalis (et sic de aliis) communissima ergo et stabilis ac firma in omnibus rebus naturalibus naturalitas vel eciam mobilitas in toto mundo [est] per se manifesta; et similiter illa firma et stabilis a parte rei. Et in toto orbe manifesta veritas, scilicet, "omnis motus est", sunt propria principia per se manifesta sciendi, et demonstrandum philosophice occultas et necessarias veritates naturales: et ita de aliis.

There is really no need to prove this: if the adversary denies the objective existence of things in

Et quid necesse est temptare ostendere, ex nocioribus secundum intellectum vel secundum sensum, veritates vel formas universales in rebus? Nam sicud manifestum et apertissimum in toto mundo secundum intellectum est *esse ens*; ymmo, quod *omne ens est ens* (alioquin

8. puatū *MS.* 13. vīs *MS.* 14. eſſз *MS.* 15. manifestum *MS.*
20. vels *MS.* 28. est *deest MS.* 28. ſſr *MS.* 30. vīs *MS.*

18. *Et quia.* Some words must be wanting before these.

nichil erit apertum et manifestum in toto mundo); et sicut manifestissimum et apertissimum secundum sensum est per se sensibile: ut *esse lucidum, coloratum, sonans, sapidum, olficiens, calidum, frigidum, humidum* vel *siccum:* si ergo negans universalia in rebus proterviendo wult negare istam veritatem, scilicet *esse ens* per se manifestum secundum intellectum toto mundo; vel istam: *esse sensibile* per se notum secundum sensum per totum mundum, quid ultra est contra eum disputandum?

general, or of such things as strike the senses, he is beyond reasoning with.

Si autem concedit ultra signum per modum obiecti esse ens, sicut per se notum secundum intellectum toti mundo, queritur ab eodem si talis sit veritas singularis vel communis pluribus? Primum dare non poterit; igitur dabit veritatem communem per se manifestam secundum intellectum apud totum mundum. Sic eciam arguitur de *esse* sensibili quo ad per se notum toti mundo secundum sensum. Si autem adversarius ultra signum noluerit concedere per modum obiecti esse ens, sicud per se manifestum toti mundo secundum intellectum, nec est sensibile sicud per se manifestum secundum sensum in toto mundo, quid cum illo de rebus est disputandum doctrinaliter?

If he admit the objective existence of Being, he must admit it as a general truth; and the same may be said of sensible being. If not, discussion is useless.

Licet enim tales concedant signa per se principiorum sciendi per se manifestorum, ultra tamen talia signa |
208a vocibus constanter negant per se principia sciendi per se manifesta; et cum habeant instinctum naturalem, sicud quicunque alii homines, ad profitendum eciam indeliberate in corde talia per se principia per se manifesta ipsi cordi, profitentur veritates in formas communes per se manifestas in rebus, vocibus autem negant: sicud illi qui ore negabant illud principium negativum, *impossibile est idem secundum idem et simpliciter et pro eodem inesse et non inesse.* Corde autem negare non poterant, cum non possint opiniones contrariorum adinvicem contrarie eidem simul inesse. Omnis ergo qui ex instinctu naturali ultra signa in corde profitetur hoc, quod *omne ens est ens,* et profitetur hoc quod *omnis motus est,* et profitetur hoc quod *omne totum*

They deny verbally that our principles of knowledge are anything but signs; they admit this in reality, like those whose lips deny the Principle of Contradiction

4. olfcūs *MS.* 16. sensibile (!) *MS.* 17. pro adversarius vlis *MS.* 18. voluerit.

4. *Olficiens.* The MS. has something more like *olfactus*, but perhaps this guess is nearer the sense.

integrale est maius sua parte integrali (et sic de aliis) corde profitetur universales veritates quomodocunque vocibus eas negaverit. Si enim in corde ultra signa profitetur per signa quod in omni enti convenit esse ens, tunc profitetur, eo ipso, quod omni enti convenit esse ens, istam veritatem.

There are thus two sorti of men, the first whose mind agrees with their words, and the second whose mind does not thus agree,

Et ecce, cum concedentes veritates communes corde et ore profiteantur, sicud manifestissimum et certissimum a parte rei, quod omne ens est ens, negantes autem communia talia in rebus vocibus, constanter ultra signa negant esse a parte rei quod quodlibet ens est ens. Quis ergo illam altercacionem tollet? Sed cum primi videantur ex instinctu naturali profiteri sicut et totus mundus prorumpit indeliberate, et profitetur hoc esse manifestissimum et certissimum quod omne ens est ens; secundi autem videntur hoc negare voce ex deliberacione contra instinctum et pulsum naturalem, ne cogantur ex vocibus propriis concedere formas et veritates in rebus communes, videtur quod secundi debent se vincere, et cum primis, ymmo, cum toto mundo concordare: quoniam ex impulsu naturali indeliberate prorumpit in verba et dicit quod hoc est manifestissimum, et certum valde, quod omne ens est ens. Eciam cum tales non possint in seipsis tollere vel in illis aliis quibuscunque, sapientibus vel simplicibus, doctis vel indoctis, illiteratis vel literatis, | tales instinctus vel impulsus naturales, quibus indeliberate (208b) prorumpunt in professione, et profitentur quod hoc est certum et manifestum a parte rei quod omne ens est ens, et ultra signa profitentur quod hoc est manifestum et notum quod quilibet ignis est calidus: videtur quod debeant in formas universales, postposita contencione, consentire. Nobilitas autem, honestas, et utilitas talium communium formarum in rebus, inferius exponetur.

and who deliberately deny what their nature impels them to confess. They ought to yield to nature;

they will never be able to destroy, either in themselves or in others, this natural instinct of the truth.

6. ista veritas *MS.* 19. vinc'e *MS.*

CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM.

Quia igitur ultra signa a parte rei est nobis intellectualiter hoc valde certum, et sicut per se manifestissimum, quod omne ens est ens; alioquin ultra signa a parte rei ex eadem racione nichil intellectualiter vel sensualiter est nobis certum et manifestum; et quia hoc certum, "omne ens est ens" est entitas communis; de necessitate omnis entitas (sicut *esse hoc ens*) est entitas huiusmodi, et *hoc*, et *esse hoc ens* est huius entitatis (et ita de aliis) constat quod est forma communissima in rebus, que est quid valde certum, et sicud per se manifestissimum. Quam si voce negare [quis] vellet, corde nos eam profiteri oportet, cum sit per se primum objectum intellectus per se manifestissimum apud eundem maxime et communissime per modum forme essencialis prime; et per consequens per modum lucis spiritualis prime omnium simul intelligibilium in ipsis vise formaliter.

We have then this Universal, Entity, which cannot be denied except verbally,

and which is the first object of the mind which thinks.

Et licet illa sit forma communis in multis, et de multis quodammodo, non tamen est universale de quinque universalibus que dicuntur genus, species, differencia, proprium et accidens communis; tamen poterit vocari universale vel universalis, cum sit universorum entitas. Verumtamen forma communis inexistens est in plus quam proprie universale reale, vel universalitas realis inexistens. Est autem inexistens forma communis, ad differenciam forme communis exemplaris, que non pluribus divisim potest formaliter inexistere.

It is in many and said of many, yet not like those other Universals, the Genus, the Species, the Difference, the Property and the Accident; nor yet like the Exemplar Form which does not exist formally in many;

Sic videtur quod deus sit inexistens forma communis tribus divinis suppositis, et entitas transcendens forma communis in existens omni enti. Nulla tamen est formaliter universale inexistens vel universalis inexistens, prout universale dividitur in illa quinque, genus, species, etc.

but somewhat like the Deity in the Three Persons, that are all God.

1, 2. Septimum *deest; blank space for Initial Q MS.* 13. quis *deest MS.*

We must premise that as there is metaphysical, logical, and grammatical truth, so there are three corresponding sorts of Universality.

Antequam autem hic ulterius descendatur ad universale inexistente, est advertendum quod universalitas dicitur, sicud et veritas, tripliciter: methaphysice, logice, | et grammatice; sicud veritas methaphysica dicitur mera 209a rei entitas, logica dicitur quoddam ens racionis circa composicionem et divisionem consistens: ut, cum dicitur *esse est*, dicitur verum. Si autem dicatur solum sic: *esse*, non dicitur verum; nec si dicatur solum sic: *est*, dicitur verum. Sed cum dicitur simul, *esse est*, dicitur verum, et veritas (scilicet loyca). A parte autem rei non plus vel minus dicatur, cum dicitur *esse est*, quam si solum dicitur *esse* vel solum *est*. Veritas autem grammatica est contractibilis proposicio, habens significatum suum primarium a parte rei; vel habicio significati primarii a parte rei in ipsa grammaticali proposicione dicitur veritas grammatica.

Metaphysical Universality means a Universal entity, *that which* is common to many.

Sic universalitas methaphysice dicitur, quasi cuiusdam universalitatis entitas, universalitas methaphysica et universale methaphysicum. Sic enim dicunt idem universale et universalitas; nec universale, sic methaphysice dictum, dicit pro formali aliquam intencionem loycalem, sed ipsam entitatem communem universitati quorumdam.

Logical universality is the abstraction (by the power of the mind) from the conditions of individuality; and this has no real entity, except in the thinking mind,

Secundo dicitur universalitas loyce, consistens circa abstraccionem nature per intellectum ab individuantibus condicionibus, ut quoddam *esse* non reale, sed intencionale solum; et loycale debetur nature humane, quando ipsa per intelleccionem abstrahitur ab individuantibus condicionibus intellectu; sic non realiter sed solum intencionaliter circa eam agentem: propter quod non realem rem, sed solum intencionale quoddam seu loycale causat circa ipsam naturam. Et hoc vocatur universalitas loyca;

though it denotes and makes known the Universal and real entity.

et secundum illam ipsam naturam ab extrinseco denominat universale, de quanto habet *esse* abstractum a condicionibus individui, et sic esse indifferens ad *esse* in isto vel quocunque alio supposito. Et illud *esse* abstractum est illud *esse* secundum hoc indifferens ad *esse* in hoc vel quocunque alio supposito; est solum *esse* loycum et intencionale, non in natura humana

For it cannot either stand for the act of abstraction which produces

subiectatum, sed est ens circa abstraccionem activam intellectus, denominans nichilominus ab extrinseco, non ipsam abstraccionem activam intellectivi, nec ipsum

18. entitas dicitur *MS*.

intellectum esse universalem, sed naturam circa quam versatur illa abstraccio. Et sic "universale" dicens [dicit] duo simul, scilicet naturam per modum subiecti, et ipsam universalitatem, que est intencio loyca circa
209b abstraccionem | activam, consistens in anima. Ipsum universale sic dictum aggregatum est partim in anima, scilicet 2m universalitatem, et partem extra, scilicet 2m naturam que abstracta est; sicut veritas logica, consistens circa composicionem et divisionem in mente, denominat ab extrinseco id quod primarie per composicionem vel divisionem dicitur.

it, or for the intellect which is not Universal. Thus Universal means both a nature which is such, and the act of abstraction which takes place in the mind.

Et sic 2m multos famosos, sicud materia dicta solum a parte rei, habet *esse*, nequaquam est materia prima (quia 2m eos, dum solum est a parte rei, nequaquam est separata a disposicionibus eciam accidentalibus; sed dum per intellectum in hoc subtiliorem quam sit natura abstrahitur et deprivatur, non realiter sed intencionaliter ab omni forma accidentali et eciam substanciali quantum neutra est de eius mera racione essenciali, tunc ipsa est materia prima): sic eciam dicunt quod nec natura hominis, nec asini, nec cuiuscunque creature, dum solum habet *esse* a parte nature et rei nequaquam est universalis, quia sic non habet *existere* separatum et depuratum ab individuis condicionibus, sed dum intellectus nature abstrahit eas a condicionibus individuantibus, tunc habet *esse* abstractum et *esse* in divinis, intencionaliter, non realiter a parte rei; et sic *esse* universale. Et per consequens intellectus per sui abstraccionem fabricat universalitatem in rebus que dicuntur universalia.

Theory of those who say that as matter, if it has determined existence in any way, cannot be primordial matter, but this indetermination accrues to it from mental abstraction; so a given being cannot have universality in itself, but only by means of the same mental faculty of abstraction.

Quamvis autem verum sit quod creatus intellectus fabricat talem universalitatem circa res per activam et intencionalem suam abstraccionem nature a condicionibus individui, sicud creatus intellectus per sui activam composicionem aut divisionem fabricat verum seu veritatem logicam denominantem autem ab intrinseco ad quod primarie per composicionem vel divisionem dicitur; et sic intellectus dicit tunc verum, id est, rem primarie significatam per composicionem vel divisionem que dicitur verum vel veritas logica; et sic 2m philosophum et multos alios "Universale est dum intelligitur",

But, although it is true that we form the Universal in our minds by our act of abstraction,

3. dicit *deest MS.* 12. dicitur *MS.* 24. depu'atū *MS.* 40. intelliguntur *MS.*

yet the comparison as to primordial matter fails, for neither this depends on a mental operation, nor does the Universal, as existing, depend thus. For primordial matter is in itself a pure capacity for receiving forms, and though never formless in time, still this capacity is naturally prior to any form receivable.

scilicet sic abstractive: non tamen est verum quod materia sit materia prima, circumscripta operacione intellectus creati, nec quod natura sit universalis a parte rei, inscripta operacione creati intellectus. Nam cum materia, prius naturaliter capax forme cuiuscunque quam habeat illam, pro illo vero gradu essendi vel durandi materia a parte rei est informis, nuda, et pura, et abstracta | a qualibet forma substanciali vel acciden- 210a tali que potest sibi inesse et non inesse; per consequens pro illa mensura vere est materia prima a parte rei solum, et intellectus divinus (qui intelleccione sua non solum intencionaliter sed realiter agit circa materiam et ordinem in materia) ipse intelligit vere materiam prius esse capacem et pro illo prior, esse denudatum et deprivatum ab omni forma quam potest post illum gradum prioritatis recipere, et intelligit eam posterius esse formatam forma accidentali et substanciali; et ipse intellectus secundum sui intelleccionem ponit materiam ·in ordine ut ipsa prius naturaliter a parte rei sit prima materia nuda et depurata a qualibet illa forma, et post illum gradum mensure essendi vel durandi ponit eam inesse formato forma substanciali et accidentali. Et sic materia prima pro aliqua mensura essendi vel durandi a parte rei est materia prima, pura et denudata ab omni forma non essenciali illi prius materie, licet non sit postea in aliquo tempore vel in instanti temporis informis vel nuda absque forma.

And this priority is real, not notional, and exists independently of all forms.

In like manner the Universal man, &c. is naturally, not temporally prior to any individual man, whether it be arrived at by abstraction, or not. God is the Author of this, as He is the author of metaphysical truth, prior to logical truth.

Sic humanitas simpliciter, vel equinitas simpliciter, prius (quo ad naturam et consequenciam) a parte rei est quam quicunque singularis homo vel singularis equus et sic pro illo "priori a parte rei" humanitas est communis et non singularis deo per intelleccionem suam, sic ordinante; et per consequens natura humana ex communius et realis a parte et natura rei absque hoc quod intellectus fabricat universalitatem logicam. Et sic deus, 2^{m} intelleccionem suam in rebus, fabricat universalitatem methaphysicam, que est universitalitatis cuiusdam entis formalis, sicud et ipse ante verum loycum veritatem methaphysicam fabricat in rebus universi. Et sic universalitas metaphysica equorum, cum

1. non est *MS.* 22. formatum *MS.* 30. qu̅am *MS.*

sit tantum equinitas, ipsa est pura et nuda ab omni condicione individuali; et ita de aliis.

Nec sunt audiendi philosophi quicunque qui negant in rebus universalitatem metaphysicam, ponentes solum universalitatem loycam circa naturas rerum, modo quo dictum est. Sic forte voluit philosophus primo de Anima et 7mo methaphysice; cum primo de anima dixit: "Universale animal aut nichil est universalitate metha-physica"; cum forte videbatur | 210ᵇ sic sibi quod impossibile esset esse animalitatem separatam, nudam, et puram a condicionibus individuantibus a parte rei solum ex ordinacione intellectus divini, "aut universale animal posterius est", scilicet animali singulari in natura sic quod universalitas logica animalis fabricata sibi per intellectum abstrahentem animalitatem a condicionibus individuantibus est posterior animali singulari in natura. Et tale universale seu universalitatem talem logicam, quam solum forte dixit in rebus reperiri 1mo methaphysice, vocat accidens in natura rei, cum per abstraccionem intellectus accidit nature rei, et de existente tali abstraccione de *esse* huiusmodi universalitas.

Such philosophers as deny metaphysical, and only admit logical Universality should not be listened to.

Aristotle was perhaps of these, when he said: *The Universal is either nothing, or is posterior to its singular;* "nothing", because he believed it could not exist without its singulars; "posterior", meaning the logical Universal.

Sed, ut dictum est, non est standum tali sentencie, cum tunc oportet dici quod intellectus divinus intelleccione sua non diceret nec fabricaret hanc veritatem methaphysicam a parte rei, scilicet, omnem hominem esse animal; et ita de aliis dicendum est. Ergo pro gloria domini veritatis, quod sicud ipse preter veritatem logicam in mente creata fabricat ex parte rei veritatem methaphysicam illam quod omnis homo est animal, sic preter universalitatem loycam quam concedit ipse fabricare intellectum creatum, fabricat idem dominus a parte rei universalitatem methaphysicam simpliciter, que est, omnem hominem esse animal et unumquodque animal esse animal. Et illi qui ponunt universale solum secundum universalitatem logicam non possunt dare quod genus predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie secundum quod est quiditas uniuscuiusque earum: quia non possunt dare simpliciter que res et que natura a parte rei est quiditas plurium specie differencium; nisi forte, more trutannorum, darent quod (simpliciter loquendo) nulla res est quiditas, nec aliqua natura est

But we must not admit this, for as the Lord created metaphysical truth, yet gave man the faculty to arrive at truth that is logical; so He also created the metaphysically Universal, yet gave man the power to produce the Logical Universal.

And indeed, such as maintain no other Universal but the latter, are obliged to deny that anything has an essence common to many species, except it be that very

20. assit *MS.* 40. trutānor *MS.*

abstraction made by the mind.

quiditas hominis et asini, sed animalis, ut est abstracta per intellectum a condicionibus individuantibus, sic predicatur de homine et de asino. Sicud eciam, quando queritur ubi vel quomodo materia est materia prima a parte rei, dicunt quod non simpliciter a parte rei materia est prima materia, sed [non] nisi in quantum per intellectum abstrahitur ab omni forma; ita quod sine addita replicacione nesciunt dare nec exprimere quid predicaretur | de pluribus differentibus specie in "eo quod quid est", nec sciunt dicere et exprimere quomodo materia est materia prima, vel que, nisi cum reduplicacione. 211ᵃ

Qui autem innituntur abstractioni intellectus divini et abstractioni methaphysice a parte rei et depurative ac denudative in ordine non temporali sed methaphysico, illi simpliciter sciunt dicere et exprimere quod illa [essencia] animalis, communis a parte rei, circumscripta eciam universalitate loyca quam creatus intellectus fabricaret, predicatur per intellectum divinum et ipsa seipsam predicat de qualibet specie animalis, ut ipsa est quiditas uniuscuiusque earum. Sic eciam sciunt dicere quod illa materia pro quadam sua certa mensura essendi et durandi est penitus nuda ab omni forma cuius est capax per transmutacionem substancialem vel aliam accidentalem mutacionem; et ponere universalitatem methaphysicam separatam, depuratam, et denudatam a condicionibus individuantibus, sic quod nulla talis possit sibi formaliter competere, est multum racionale. Nam pura humanitas non potest esse alba, nec calida, nec frigida, cum tunc esset formaliter huiusmodi; et cum humanitas formaliter sit esse hominem, igitur humanitas et *esse hominem* formaliter esset *esse hominem album*, sicud humanitas formaliter esset alba humanitas. Sed quidquid est formaliter *esse hominem hoc album* est albedo hominis, qua sola est formaliter homo albus: igitur, humanitas esset albedo hominis: quod non convenit. Ponere autem universalitatem methaphysicam separatam ab individuis, sic quod ipsa non posset inexistere formaliter alicui individuo, hoc est impossibile, cum illa 2ᵐ propria sui condicione apta sit esse cuiusdam viventis formalis intrinseca entitas. Et forte

In our theory, it is easy to show how a universal essence exists and belongs to its inferior species; and how it can be truly said that matter is in some measure really denuded of all form, and the universal likewise is apart from individual determinations.

But a Universal which does not exist in each of its individuals is impossible.

6. non *deest MS.* 12, 13. abstractivi? *MS.* 16. essencia *deest MS.* 23. tūfūmcōne *MS.* 29. ho ⁰3 *above* huiusmodi *and in another hand MS.* 31. est pro et *MS.* 40. vui n̂tis *MS.*

in tali equivocacione abstraccionis laboraverunt Aristoteles cum Platone.

Utrum autem deus posset servare in puro *esse* methaphysico universalem equinitatem, absque hoc quod 2^{m} eam aliquis individuus equus esset equus, sicut creditur per ecclesiam in sacramento altaris salvare quantitatem absque hoc quod 2^{m} eam aliquid sit subiective formaliter quantum, est alterius negocii. Verumtamen deus servat equinitatem universalem pro sua prima et propria
211b mensura essendi, que est alcior, nobilior, et | amplior longe quam mensura temporalis cuiuscunque individui equi temporaliter existentis; servat, dico, pro illa mensura, sic quod equinitas nequaquam pro illa sua prima mensura est *esse aliquem equum individualem*, cum secundum talem mensuram sit ante omnem equum individuum. Quod si deus potest ea servare in illa sola mensura sua prima, nullam mensuram durandi vel essendi equum posteriorem sibi superaddendo, tunc superioris questionis pars affirmativa est vera. Si non potest servare equinitatem illam in illa sola mensura sine superaddicione posterioris mensure equi, sicud non potest servare substanciam creatam sine sui dependencia a deo, qui est veritas relativa posterior illa substancia, tunc aliter sumendum est.

Whether God could make it to exist without them (as quantity exists in the Sacrament without any subject) is another question. At any rate, God makes it exist in a way different from, and nobler than, its subjects, whether this existence can or cannot possibly be maintained alone and without any other.

Universalitas autem grammaticalis est signum grammaticale, significans primarie universalitatem methaphysicam; vel modus significandi grammaticalis, secundum quem primarie et universaliter significat ipsam universalitatem methaphysicam, est universalitas grammaticalis. Et sic intencio methaphysica, que est universalitas methaphysica, et intencio loyca, que est loycalis universalitas, et intencio grammatica que est universalitas grammatica, pulchre sibi correspondent. Et has tres intenciones, quantum loyca appropriate respicit dici, grammaticalis vero significare, et methaphysica respicit *esse*, philosophus videtur mira subtilitate fuisse complexus cum dixit quia "univoca dicuntur, quorum nomen est commune et racio substancie secundum nomen est eadem".

The 'Grammatical Universal' is *a word which stands for* the Metaphysical,

so that the latter is Universal in *being*, the Logical in affirming, the Grammatical in signifying, each beautifully corresponding to the other. Aristotle's general definition of them all shows marvellous acumen.

Et antiqui soliti sunt dicere quoddam universale *ante rem*, ut ydeam in mente dei; et universale *in re*, ut

Another ancient division:

18. eq^{m} *MS.* 37. q̃ *MS.*

Universals *prior to*, *in*, and *posterior to*, their singulars. Grosseteste's quintuple division of the same.

animalitatem communem in individuis Et universale *post rem* ut vel animalitatem logicam vel universalitatem grammaticam. Et Lincolniensis super primum posteriorum ponit primum universale rerum materialium, *esse* ipsarum ydeale in mente divina, secundum universale *esse* ydeale in mente intelligente. Et 3^{m} universale racionem communem 2^{m} quam sunt in corporibus celestibus, et 4^{tum} universale formam communem eis insitam. Et hoc universale, dicit, Aristoteles vocat universale *unum in multis et de multis*. Quintum autem genus universalium pro signis nostris grammaticalibus abicit sicud sibi impertinens, cum hoc nomen, "animal", dicitur universale, sicud urina dicitur sana.

CAPITULUM OCTAVUM.

Supposita autem illa descripcione universalis quod "universale est quod aptum natum est esse unum in multis et de multis" tanquam bona et adequata, difficile 212a videtur quomodo universale solum dividitur | in hec quinque, scilicet, *genus*, *species*, *differenciam*, *proprium*, et *accidens*. Videtur enim quod deus sic sit universale; videtur eciam quod ens transcendens sic sit universale, et neutrum horum est genus, species etc. Videtur eciam quod instans commune ad hoc et hoc instans etc. sit universale. Et tamen nec sic est genus nec species etc. Sic racionalitas communis respectu huius et huius racionalitatis videtur universale; et nullum eorum. Sic et risibilitas respectu huius et istius risibilitatis videtur universale; et nullum dictorum. Sic eciam materia respectu huius et illius materie videtur universale; et nullum horum. Sic eciam substancia, dicta secundum analogiam de composita forma et materia, videtur universale; et nullum istorum. Item, cum universale sit proprie predicatum, quid igitur videtur primo et proprie subiectum respectu universalis? Item, ad quid valet universalitas methaphysica in rebus, ut ad quid valet communis humanitas, si non potest currere laborare feliciter vivere, etc. Et videtur quod singularis homo sit melior et dignior humanitate tali communi. Item, si natura universalis superior sit alia natura quam natura inferior? Item, si illa quinque universalia a parte rei, genus, species etc. ponunt in numerum. Item, si sit dare singularitatem communem, et universalitatem vel communitatem penitus incommunicabilem multis. Item, si species humana est risibilis, et equina humibilis,

Difficulties: According to the definition, God, Being, the shortest period of possible duration, rationality, risibility and matter in a general sense, would seem to be Universals: yet they do not enter the division into genera, species, &c.

The Universal must be properly a predicate; what will its subject be? Of what use is a Universal man, who can do nothing? Is the Universal of another nature than its singular? Can any member of the five Universals be counted, and thus possess individuality?

1. Capitulum &c. *deest MS.* 2. *Blank space for initial S.* 20. igr *MS.*

13. *Eorum.* Understand: "est genus, species &c.", and so likewise for the ends of the next three sentences.

Is 'Mankind' capable of laughing? How does Universal Substance belong to its class? Are there three divisions of Universals? How can the same Universal thing be an ass and a man? Do essential generic perfections belong to the species and the individuals? If we take the usual definition, these difficulties are grave. We must consider the Universal as a form which exists in many beings, and consists of many.

asinina rudibilis. Item, si substancia dividitur in communem *et* singularem, utrum communis *aut* singularis. Item, si sit universale quoddam actuale, potenciale, et intellectuale, et aliquod potenciale tantum et intellectuale, et aliquod solum intellectuale. Item: si genus animalis est asinus, igitur est non homo; et per consequens genus animalis non est homo. Item, si essencialis perfeccio generis sit essencialis perfeccio sue speciei. Item, si perfeccio essencialis speciei sit perfeccio essencialis sui individui.

Ista et alia materiam universalium circumstancia sunt satis difficilia, accepta illa definicione universalis, quod "universale est quod aptum natum est esse unum in multis et de multis". Intelligenda videtur sic: quod universale sit *res* quod apta est esse unum *per modum forme in* multis divisim, et *de* multis *materialiter* subiective; ita quod universale in sua unitate aptum sit inexistenter performare | multa divisim, et econtra 212b materiari subiective ab eisdem. Sicud enim materia et forma reciproce se causant, ita ex hac et superius [dictis] argutis supponitur esse formas communes que in unitate sua inexistenter performant multa divisim, et econtra materiantur subiective ab eisdem, ut equinitas communis in unitate sua performat inexistenter multos et ab eisdem causatur materialiter subiective, quamvis nullo equorum singularium causetur per se materialiter subiective.

From this definition we may easily infer our proposition. We take the Individual Substance as the proper subject of the Universal, which may inhere in it either essentially or not.

Tunc iuxta hoc potest dici quod omne universale, quod sic actu vel aptitudine est unum in multis et de multis, est genus, species, differencia, proprium et accidens. Nam, cum solum individuum predicamenti substancie sit proprie, principaliter, et maxime subiectum (non potenciale sed actuale respectu universalis, sicut predicatum est in multis et de multis existentibus); respectu ergo prime substancie potissime distincte huiusmodi universalis debet accipi. In prima ergo substancia potest esse universale duobus modis: aut ut substanciale sibi, aut non ut substanciale sibi. Si primo modo potest esse tripliciter. Nam substancia dicitur 3bus modis, aut quia per se stat (sicut compositum), aut quia substat (sicut materia), aut quia superstat (sicut forma). Sic

If the first, the Universal either comprises the

3. potencionale *MS.* 21. dictis *deest MS.* 23. materiari *MS.*

universale substanciale in prima substancia aut est in ea universale substanciale sicud per se stans respectu alterius universalis substancialis (et sic est species); aut est sicud substans respectu alterius universalis in ipsa substancia prima (et sic est et vocatur genus); aut est sicud superstans in prima substancia respectu alterius universalis substancialis (et sic est et dicitur differencia). Si autem est universale in prima substancia non sibi substanciale, hoc est duobus modis: quia oportet quod tale insit sibi post et secundum completum *esse* essenciale commune, vel post et secundum completum *esse* essenciale vel individuale. Et alii dicunt sub aliis verbis, videlicet: aut inest 2^m principia speciei aut 2^m principia individui, sicud dicitur X^o metaphysice. Si primum, sic est proprie proprium; si secundum, sic est accidens.

whole essence of the individual, and is a *species*; or it underlies another Universal in the given individual (*genus*); or it determines another (*difference*).

If it is not essential, either it supervenes to the abstract essence and is a *property*; or to the concrete individual, and is an accident.

Et quemadmodum in prima substancia primo et potissime solum quintuplicia universalia distingwi habent, et cum deitas non sit genus, nec species, nec differencia, nec proprium, neque accidens per formalem inexistenciam (quia ipsa non potest unum in multis et de multis dici) non potest esse [universale] quia non potest esse de aliquibus materialiter subiective, vel 2^m alios,
213a quia non potest | esse unum in multis diversis essencialiter; vel eciam quia philosophi gentiles non crediderunt quod Deus posset esse formaliter in pluribus suppositis, cum tamen sit formaliter in talibus. De predicatis transcendentalibus potest dici quod non sit unum in multis et de multis, ita quod non sit de multis ad sensum expositum, quia non materialiter subiective est ens transcendens de multis. Et eciam beatitudo formalis communis, cum non sit genus neque species, nec differencia, nec proprium, nec accidens, non est universale, quia non est sic de multis. Alii autem dicerent: quia non potest esse eadem entitas formaliter in omnibus rebus. Videtur tamen, sicud tactum est, quod universale unum versans circa singularia, debet illa respicere sic quod illa inexistenter performaret et

Now Deity is none of these, and therefore cannot be a Universal, according to our modified definition.

Entity again is not predicated of all things in the sense given. Nor is Bliss a generic or specific term, or any other of the five. Some say that the same entity cannot be in all its subjects; but I think the reason is because the Universal should be to its singulars as Form is to Matter.

8. p'a *MS.* 21. universale *deest MS.* 24. phy *MS.*

35. In other terms, the Universal must determine all its singulars, and belong to them, in the *same way*. Now God is a Being; but Entity belongs to Him in a different way from that affirmed of creatures.

econtra, quia ab eis materietur subiective. Et talem debent habere ad invicem colliganciam universale et singulare. Et debet universale inesse singulari suo ut quoddam in ipso formale et substanciale principium. Et hoc vel ut per se stans, comparative ad aliud universale substanciale, vel ut substans, vel ut superstans, vel universale debet inesse singulari ut quoddam formale in ipso principiatum post et secundum *esse* completum commune essenciale vel post et secundum esse completum essenciale singulare.

Besides, if the Universal is a Form, it limits; and both God and Entity are unlimited: and heavenly bliss, transforming and deifying intellectual creatures, is too near the Godhead to be called a Universal.

Item, universale debet esse unum in multis et de multis, ut actus formalis limitatus; quia materiatus subiective et limitans et determinans, separans et distingwens. Propter quod deus et ens transcendens non possunt esse universalia sic in multis et de multis; nec beatitudo formalis communis pluribus in propria; propter hoc quod res vere potissimas, scilicet substancias intelligibiles creatas, ipsas totaliter et formaliter deificando et transformando in deum, nimis transcendit et nimis vehementer ad primum purum actum, qui limitibus predicamentorum subesse non potest, accedit. Eciam materia prima, communis multis particularibus, non est sic universale; quia non inest particularibus materiis ut actus formalis, sed ut materia; nec videtur convenienter dictum quod ista materia formaliter est materia, sed quod ipsa materialiter est materia; et ita de aliis. Materia ergo prima, quia est pura passiva potencia, non potest per se cadere in limitibus predicamentorum, sed est inhabilis per se ad illos limites sicut econtra purus actus (puta deus) | nimis auffugit 213b
propter sui activitatem infinitam limites predicamentorum.

Again, as God, a pure act, is beyond the limits of the predicaments, so is also matter, as pure potentiality; and therefore it is in no wise form, determines nothing, and is not a Universal.

The unit, the point, the instant, which are that of which number, time, and space consist, are like primal matter, and for the

Et quia unitas que est principium numeri, punctus, et instans, nimium accedunt ad materiam primam, cum sint solum *esse* materialia, numeri, linee, et temporis, quamvis illa sint universalia minus proprie accidentes, sic quod quodlibet illorum sit quodammodo universale accidens; ut unitas substancie unius, punctus substancie

17. potissimas *quite plain MS.* 30. puros *MS.* 35. accidñtis *MS.*

32. *Punctus et instans.* A short explanation may be useful here. Every point is the beginning of one line and the end of another; likewise, every instant begins one period of time and ends another. They are thus in a sense 'unum in multis'.

punctalis, instans corporei; respectu tamen illorum est genus, vel species, vel differencia. Nam instans individuum non est res alicuius predicamenti, cum nullum instans sit quiditative substancia, vel quantitas, vel relacio. Nec proprie hoc instans formaliter, sed pocius materialiter, est instans: contingit enim materiale per modum materie vel materialis multiplicari particularia, sicud formare per modum forme. Vel forte potest dici quod universale debet esse in aliquo individuo forma, et per modum forme, ut sit universale. Et sic, licet instans commune esset in instanti individuo per modum forme, non est tamen ipso forma. Et [sic] de materia communi respectu particularis. Nam licet genus habeat se per modum substantis in individuo respectu differencie, et differencia per modum superstantis, et species per modum in se stantis; non tamen in individuo genus proprie est substans, nec differencia superstans, nec species per se stans. Sic instans commune habet se per modum forme in instanti particulari; non tamen in eo est forma proprie, cum in instanti in individuo materialiter principietur tempus, licet instans sit forma in isto mundo corporeo accidentalis. Ubi ergo proprie debet esse forma in eo cuius est universale et per modum forme, debet esse eciam in illo qualiter non est demonstranti communi respectu singularis. Nam cum instans commune in particularibus instantibus secundum se materialiter principiet tempus, non est in eis proprie forma et per modum forme.

same reason, excluded from the Universals.

They may be like *forms as regards their singulars, but they* are *not forms.*

De racionalitate communi posset forte dici uno modo. Dato quod sit eciam racionalitas singularis non solum quo ad subiectum sicud singulare quo ad subiectum est *me esse racionale*, sed eciam sic singularis quo ad materiam vel condicionem forme; tunc, inquam, forte dici potest quod racionalitas singularis non proprie materialiter subiectatet racionalitatem communem, nec proprie potest esse subiectum quemadmodum materians 214a communem racionalitatem, sed esset pure forma | et haberet se solum in racione forme; igitur racionalitas communis non est universale ad singularem racionalitatem. Vel potest dici forte quod non est singularis

The difficulty as to singular rationality may be solved by saying that it is a pure form, and by no means the matter of universal rationality;

7. $\widehat{ml}^{ri}$ *MS.* 12. sic *deest MS.* 20. principiet *MS.* 24. enim *pro* eciam *MS.* 30. dato eciam *MS.* 31. 'ad subiectum' *MS.* 35. subiective *MS.*

or that there is no such thing as singular, but only universal specific rationality, which at the same time is singular as concerns its subject;

racionalitas quo ad materiam forme, sed solum communis specifica; quamvis esset bene singularis quo ad subiectum. Et causa esset, quia tunc species specialissima, humanitas, contraheretur per racionalitatem singularem ad individuum humanum, sicud genus animalis contrahitur per racionalitatem ad humanam speciem. Et sic ex specie humana et racionalitate singulari fieret per se unum suppositum, sicud ex genere et differencia specifica fit species, et per consequens humanitas communis esset pars quiditativa humanitatis singularis vel homines singularis, sicud genus est pars quiditativa speciei; quod non convenit; cum tunc diffinicio quiditativa speciei humane completa non indicaret totam quiditatem individui humani. Non ergo videtur quod racionalitas quo ad naturam illius forme singularis superaddatur speciei per *esse* individui humani, sed quod solum communis racionalitas in sorte existat, vel alio individuo homine, et quod illa in se et secundum se et quo ad naturam sue forme sit communis, sed in *Sor*, quo ad illud subiectum, sit singularis, quia *Sortem esse racionalem* sicut *Sortem esse accidentatum* est singulare quo ad subiectum; quia nulli alii subiecto a Sorte convenit quod ipsum sit *Sor accidentatus;* et per consequens nulli alii tali convenit. Ipsum *esse Sor accidentatum* est multum commune quo ad formam, quia est quantitas, qualitas, relacio, accio, passio, ubi, quando, posicio, et *habere* Sortis. Sic eciam humanitas specifica non videtur universale quo ad humanitatem singularem quo ad formam, sed est universale quo ad suppositum vel individuum humanum, quia non videtur primo aspectu esse aliqua singularis humanitas quo ad formam distinctam formaliter ab individuo humano; sicut natura vel quiditas, distingwuntur formaliter a supposito, cum suppositum sit album formaliter vel calidum etc.: nuda autem quiditas rei non sic. Unde videtur quod nulla sit humanitas singularis quo ad formam, cum talis formaliter esset individuum substanciale communis humanitatis: sicud albedo singularis est formaliter individuum communis albedinis. Consequens inconveniens, cum quiditas et natura, eciam natura divina, formaliter a supposito distingwatur. Humanitas igitur secundum se, et quo ad formam substancie communis in supposito | et quo ad illud, redditur singularis quo ad illud [214b] subiectum. Eciam sit, gracia exempli *Sortem esse hominem;*

But this cannot be; for then the essential definition of a man would not stand for the essence of any individual man.

The individual essence has many accidents.

It may be said that Universal Humanity is simply Universal as to the persons it contains.

It would follow that there is no distinction between Nature and Person: an absurd conclusion.

Humanity, universal in itself, is singular in each of its persons.

et sic in se communis est multipliciter singularis quo ad subiecta multiplicia.

Et sic videtur venerabilis Anshelmus in libello suo de incarnacione verbi sentire; quod filius dei assumpsit humanitatem communem et non humanitatem quo ad formam singularem. Nam, si qua talis est, ipsa est formaliter individuum formalitatis humanitatis. Et per consequens assumpsisset individuum humanum, et sic individuum suppositum; quod nephas est dicere.

Anselm seems to hold the view that the Word assumed Universal, not singular humanity; for it were blasphemous to say He took the person of a man.

Iuxta ergo hec dicta videtur quod non sit humanitas singularis quo ad formam, que forma esset individuum humanum, nec quod sit humanitas singularis quo ad formam, que formaliter distingweretur ab individuo humanitatis, et per consequens a supposito humano, sicud nec singularis albedo quo ad formam distingwitur ab individuo albedinis; et per consequens non sit singularis humanitas quo ad formam, sed quod humanitas abstractive dicta solum sit communis quo ad formam, multipliciter singularis secundum subiecta multiplicia. Est humanitas in me; est singularis quo ad subiectum in me, cum sit *me esse hominem*, sicud *me esse qualem*, cum sit *me esse calidum*, *me esse humidum*, *me esse coloratum* etc. est singulare quo ad subiectum, et quo ad formam, commune.

There is no singular humanity which is the individual, and yet which is distinct from the individual; Universal humanity is such, in so far as it is a form; in its many subjects it is singular.

Verumtamen contra istam sentenciam arguitur sic: quia tunc humanitas in suppositis humanis est alia et alia quoad suppositum, sicud deitas est penitus eadem quo ad formam in tribus suppositis divinis, que tamen esset alia et alia secundum aliud et aliud suppositum, ut quod aliud esset suppositum primum patris esse deum, et aliud suppositum secundum, scilicet filium, esse deum, et aliud esset suppositum 3^m, puta spiritum sanctum, esse deum, sicut assumitur de suppositis humanitas quo ad *esse* hominem. Quod si hoc esset verum, tunc, sicud supposita divina non sunt plures dii propter deitatem penitus eandem quo ad formam in illis tribus suppositis divinis, sic supposita humana non essent plures homines (quod est inconveniens); cum nec differrent inter se intellectualiter essencialiter, et sic esset unus et idem intellectus, et non alius et
215a alius in alio | et alio homine. Et multa inconveniencia heretica sequerentur; ut si unus salvaretur, tunc et quilibet.

Objection: you say that the Universal Man is each of its individuals; but since Deity is in the same way each of the Persons, yet there is but one God, just so there would be but one Man and many human persons. Which is absurd.

30. ptis͡ *MS.* 36. tandem *pro* eandem *MS.*

CAPITULUM NONUM.

We say then that the humanity of every man is singular in the subjects it informs; is the individual nature of a person, but is not that person. As to the difficulty which supposes two sorts of whiteness, one universal, comprising all white things, the other singular, belonging only to one, we may deny it, admitting only a formal distinction between the white individual and its individual whiteness; and this can be applied to all similar cases, so that each individual man has his own individual rationality &c. The parts of the individual essence make up the whole individual. Yet there can be no knowledge of such essences as individuals.

Sic igitur videtur secundum veritatem theologicam et methaphysicam dicendum quod unusquisque homo habet suam humanitatem, quo ad formam, singularem; nec illam oportet esse formaliter individuum humanitatis, sed individuam vel singularem naturam individui humani. Et quod obicitur de albedine singulari quo ad formam qua illa est individuum albedinis . . . . . Potest tamen dici quod est distinccio formalis inter individuum albedinis, et eius singularem naturam, sicud distinccio est inter individuam substanciam et eius singularem naturam. Et tunc humanitas communis non habet racionem informantis et materiati subiective respectu humanitatis singularis quo ad formam, nec humanitas talis singularis habet racionem materiantis subiective et informati respectu humanitatis communis. Ideo non sunt ad invicem universale et singulare.

Et sic eciam de risibilitate communi et singulari, et de racionabilitate communi et singulari, si sunt in homine. Et videtur utique quod alia singularis humanitas habeat aliam racionalitatem singularem, et maxime aliam risibilitatem consequentem. Et sicut ex animalitate generali et differencia specifica constituitur quiditative species humana, sic (ut videtur) ex animalitate singulari et racionalitate singulari quiditative componitur humanitas singularis. Si enim, ut videtur prima facie, singularis animalitas et singularis racionabilitas non sunt partes quiditative humanitatis singularis, quomodo communes erunt partes quiditative communiter humanitatis? Nec oportet propter hoc esse individui diffinicionem quiditativam facientem scienciam habitualem, cum singulare non fixe maneat de quo haberetur firma et certa sciencia

1. Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *Blank space for initial S MS.* 8. *After* albedinis, no *gap MS.* 10—12. sicud—naturam *twice MS.* 22. ɋ̃nte *MS.* 30. individuum *MS.*

habitualis, sed quando singularia corruptibilia sunt extra sensum nescitur si tunc existant an non.

Et oportet sic dici ulterius quod, sicut substancia dividitur in primam et secundam substanciam, et prima substancia formaliter est substancia sed non formaliter est substancia 2^a vel communis, sic humanitas dividitur in communem et singularem. Et similiter animalitas, racionalitas, risibilitas; et singularis racionalitas formaliter est racionalitas, sed non est formaliter racionalitas
215^b communis; | et ita de aliis.

Individual substance is such formally, but is not formally universal; therefore there are two different sorts of humanity, &c.

Si tamen posset salvari quod supposita humana secundum seipsa et non 2^m humanitates differant a se essencialiter, tunc supposita humana essent plures homines, et tamen non solum una humanitas quo ad formam esset, et non essent plures humanitates formaliter singulares. Verumtamen, quia unus homo habet aliud corpus numerale quam alius, et aliam animam quam alius (iuxta illud psalmi de anima: *Qui finxit sigilatim corda eorum*) homines habent alias et alias humanitates quo ad formam, et nedum quo ad subiectum singulares. Cum enim anima intellectiva in Sorte sit eius singulare principium substanciale et formale vivendi intellectualiter [et] sensualiter, igitur unus homo habet aliud principium formale substanciale singulare quam alius; et per consequens aliam quiditatem singularem, et sic humanitatem. Et oppositum antecedentis est hereticum. Et cum natura corporea sensitiva, in Sorte, gracia exempli, sit sicud sensualitas, et anima intellectiva sicud racionalitas; igitur Sortis singularis humanitas habet in se singularem animalitatem et singularem racionalitatem; nec racionalitas singularis in individuo addit aliquam perfeccionem essencialem ultra racionalitatem communem, sicut racionalitas communis addit super animalitatem communem; nec singularis animalitas addit ultra communem animalitatem, sicud nec pars singularis integralis, cum non sit ultra suum totum quantitative, non addit ultra suum totum quantitative; racionalitas autem singularis non est pars subiectiva racionalitatis communis proprie, licet racionalitas formaliter dicatur de racionalitate singulariter, sic dicendo: Racionalitas ista est racionalitas; sed est pars eius talis

If we could suppose that the persons A, B, C, differ independently of their humanities, we might admit one for them all; but this is against Scripture,

and would land us in a heretical conclusion. These attributes, when singular, do not add anything to the perfection of the whole, as they do when Universal.

18, 19. Ps. XXXII, 15. 23. et *deest MS.* 37. quāte *MS.* 38. quāte *MS.*

2^m quam individuum racionale parcialiter subicitur communi racionalitati. Sic eciam de animalitate singulari respectu communis, et de humanitate singulari et risibilitate singulari respectu singularium quas individuum participat in talibus singularibus, animalitate, racionalitate, et humanitate.

A given man is identical with any of his attributes, but these are not identical with each other.

Every compound being *is* thus matter, form and compound; whilst these differ from one another, they must yet have the same essence.

Matter indicates a given thing, inchoatively such; form is the same nature, terminatively such; and the idea of the compound embraces both; but in all three cases the subject is the same.

Et licet homo sit sua animalitas [et] racionalitas, sicut et sua humanitas, cum in dictis secundum se est idem *ipsum* et *ipsum esse*, non tamen aliqua illarum naturarum est reliqua, ut videtur puta false; sicut in essencia singulariter corporea tres nature multum | dispares, scilicet: materia, forma, altera pars compositi, 216a
et totalis essencialis natura compositi, quarum prima inperfectissima inter eas est, 2^a perfeccior, et 3^a perfectissima, omnes sunt tamen eadem essencia singularis corporea. Nam cum quelibet earum sit essencia aliqua, sicud et est realis et essencialis entitas, non alia essencia erit materia, alia forma. Cum enim forma (sicud, gracia exempli, igneitas) sit essencia corporea *esse ignem actualiter*, si essencia illius forme que, sicud est illa forma, ita est *esse ignem;* si, inquam, illa essencia esset alia ab essencia materie, cum illi essencie ipsius forme conveniat *esse ignem corporaliter et actualiter*, tunc (illa essencia circumscripta) eciam materia esset ignis corporaliter. Quod est impossibile. Cum igitur prima illarum naturarum sit materia, sit *essenciam corpoream esse iniciative ignem*, et secunda, scilicet forma, altera pars compositi, sit *eandem essenciam corpoream esse terminative ignem* et 3^a natura sit illam *eandem essenciam esse complete et totaliter tam iniciative quam finitive esse ignem;* et quelibet illarum est aliqua essencia corporea: quelibet illorum erit una et eadem essencia corporea.

They are not only the same essence, but one and the same individual thing, since the essence *is* singular.

Ille eciam res nature sic dispares sunt omnino, simul et divisim, idem suppositum corporeum, ut videtur. Nam cum prima natura (scilicet, materia) sit suppositum ignis, gracia exempli, est iniciative ignem; quod est dictum 2^m se de illo supposito ignis. Igitur secundum auctorem ex 7mo methaphisice superius allegatum, ipsum suppositum ignis erit illa natura, et econtra, eciam

3. hũati *MS.* 4. riti *MS.* 7. et *deest MS.* 10. fae *MS.* 38. aucte *MS.*

10. *False.* I confess I can make nothing of the abbreviation in the MS. Perhaps it should be *facile.*

cum quelibet talis singularis natura sit individua natura substancialis, et substancie sit esse individuum substancie; igitur quecunque talis existens in individuante substancie, ipsa 2^{m} hoc erit individuum substancie. Et cum omne individuum substancie sit suppositum substanciale, igitur quelibet talis natura corporea [habens] super se individualitatem sive ydemptitatem supponibilem substancie, erit suppositum substancie.

Et sic videtur quod spiritus racionalis sit ymago trinitatis beate et increate, cum videatur esse 3^{es} res collectim et divisim penitus eiusdem nature, scilicet, intellectualis. Suppositum autem corporeum irracionale, ut lapis, vel essencia corporea, videtur sic esse vestigium sancte trinitatis que est 3^{es} nature dispares collectim et
216b divisim, | sicut deus est tres persone divisim et collectim; non autem est ymago dei, vel eciam ad ymaginem; quia non est 3^{es} res collectim et divisim que essent penitus eiusdem nature, et penitus — nedum pares — sed eiusdem substancialis intellectualis perfeccionis, sicud videtur esse in spiritu racionali creato. Sic in accidentibus quelibet completa res videtur vestigium trinitatis sancte; quia videtur quod illa res sit natura sui generis, natura sue differencie, et natura sue speciei divisim et collectim; quartum nulla est reliqua. Sed hec communiter evidencia . . . . quod gracia exempli in supposito humano animalitas sit una natura universalis, et racionalitas alia; et quod ille due simul constituunt quiditative terciam completam, scilicet humanitatem; et quare prima in supposito humano habet se ut universale substanciale substans, et quare racionalitas ut superstans, et quare humanitas ut per se stans. Videtur enim quod humanitas sit animalitas communis. Nam cum *esse hominem* sit formaliter *esse animal*, sicud est formaliter *esse substanciam* (et per consequens substanciam sensitivam et quidquid formaliter est), *esse substanciam sensitivam* est animalitas. Ymmo sufficit nobis, cum humanitas formaliter sit *esse substanciam*, ipsa erit substancialitas, et per idem substancialitas generalissima; tunc operi est animalis.

Thus intelligent beings, made up of three things of the same nature, are images of the Trinity; corporal beings have only a vestige of the Trinity, because all in them is not of the same nature.

In all things there is genus, difference, and species; these, too, are vestiges of the Trinity. In man, animation is one thing, rationality a second, and both together make up a third, humanity;

one of these underlying the other, the other determining the first.

3. quiqʒ *MS.* 7. habens *deest*: *ib.* fr' fe individuate fme ydeptite fuppoile *MS.* 20. create *MS.* 25. *after* evidencia *a gap filled up with* ⁀ *MS.* 29. qr' *MS.*

Discussion as to the relative differences between animality, ationality and humanity.

Sed posset hic dici, cum substancialitas, sicut et animalitas, dividitur in substancialitatem communem et individuam; et communis substancialitas in communissimam et minus communem, et animalitas in generalem et specialem; quod, licet humanitas sit substancialitas, sit eciam animalitas, non tamen ipsa est communissima substancialitas, sed specialis; nec generalis animalitas, sed specialis; ut oportet, si humanitas, cum sit entitas, est et entitas transcendens; quod sic ipsa, cum sit substancialis, sit substancialitas communissima, cum substancialitas communissima in hoc sit limitata natura, et per consequens habens limitem quo secernitur a particulari vel minus communi substancialitate. Entitas autem transcendens non habet huiusmodi limitem, sed est omne ens et *omnem entitatem esse ens.* Sed contra, cum omnis substancialitas sit substancialitas, est *omnem substancialitatem esse substancialitatem;* et que nisi communissima substancialitas, est quelibet substancialitas, et econtra?

Sed poterit hic dici quod substancialitas dicitur dupliciter communis, scilicet per modum forme, scilicet, qua omnis substancia formaliter | est substancia. Et loquimur 217a
hic, tollendo equivocacionem de sola substancia predicamentali. Isto ergo modo substancialitas communis est genus generalissimum, et natura generalissima predicamenti substancie, et substancialitas isto modo communis non esset *omnem substancialitatem esse substancialitatem*, sicud nec substancialitas illo modo communis dividitur in secundam et primam substancialitatem, vel in substancialitatem formaliter communem multis et incommunicabile multis formaliter. Alio modo substancialitas dicitur communis per modum materie, sicud suppositum est commune suis naturis non per modum forme, sed per modum materie; ut cum suppositum est natura corporea sua, singularis est, et sua natura intellectualis singularis. Et sic substancialitas divisibilis per illas duas intenciones logicales, scilicet incommunicabilitatem forma-

16. substancialis (?) *MS.*

1. In this and the following paragraphs the writer plunges into a very crabbed discussion which I have not been able to follow sufficiently. The clue is probably in the position (first made by Duns Scotus) of 'formal distinctions *a natura rei*'. But very few, even amongst Scholastics, are now acquainted with that theory.

liter pluribus substanciis, dicitur communis per modum materie, et est ut totum in modo. Sed substancialitas primo modo dicta, ut totum universale, et substancialitas communis 2° est omnem substancialitatem esse substancialitatem, sicut et dividitur in omnem tam communem quam singularem substancialitatem. Sic ergo videtur quod humanitas, etsi est animalitas, sicud est substancialitas, non tamen est animalitas generalis. Sed statim hic sequitur quod, si aliqua humanitas est animalitas, tunc humanitas singularis est animalitas sua singularis. Et sic in supposito humano singularis humanitas non differt realiter ab animalitate singulari, que esset una sua pars quiditativa, et singularis racionalitas alia pars, et non tota natura quiditativa vel tota quiditas.

Conclusion: that those differences, though not real but only modal, formal, or notional, are yet true *a parte rei*.

Propter quod videtur verius dicendum est quod, sicut essencia est persona, et econtra (licet inter eas sit differencia formalis racionis, sive modalis) sic quiditas generalissima hominis est quiditas subalterna et est quiditas specialissima, est quiditas individua et est qualitas essencialis hominis, licet quiditas generalissima sit amplior perfeccionaliter (et sic prior naturaliter) quam quiditas subalterna, specialissima, vel individua. Et sicut est differencia, non realis sed modalis, formalis, seu racionis, quiditatis superioris a qualitate essenciali contrahente ipsam quiditatem superiorem, et a quiditate inferiori, sic eciam videtur non realis composicio generis ad differenciam, nec realis composicio speciei ex genere et differencia, sed composicio formalis, modalis, seu 2^m racionem; licet illa composicio racionis sit vere et vera a parte rei composicio, circumscripto |
217b quocumque actu intellectus creati, sicut differencia racionis seu formalis essencie a supposito est vera et vere a parte rei differencia. Et illa differencia est realis; et illa composicio est realis, licet non sit differencia realis, nec composicio illa sit composicio realis; sicut aliquis tyrannus est bonus, licet ipse non sit bonus tyrannus.

37. tyrandus (!) *MS.*

31. *Vera a parte rei.* This is just the most unintelligible point in Duns Scotus' Theory. How can the formal differences between animality and rationality be true *a parte rei*, if the two are not different *things*? Wyclif boldly makes them so; Duns Scotus hesitates.

Thus God first produces the more universal essence, then the less, joining them in identity;

Et videtur ulterius quod deus constituat primo quiditatem generalissimam, et postea quiditatem essencialem inmediatam, et illi qualitati essenciali communicat ydemptitatem ipsius quiditatis generalissime. Et sic redditur illa quiditas eadem cum quiditate generalissima, ut hec sit illa; non tamen formaliter sive secundum per se primum modum essendi, constituitque inter istam et illam non differenciam realem (que dicet hanc esse et illam, sed neutram esse reliquam) sed differenciam racionis que dicit hanc esse alicuius sui per se primi modi essendi et non illam; et econtra componit illas duas naturas, non duas secundum rem, sicud nec differentes secundum rem, sed duas dualitate racionis sive modi per se primi essendi; componitque, dico, non composicione reali sed composicione secundum racionem sive secundum modum per se primum uniuscuiusque earum, sicud et distingwit eas non secundum rem distinccione sed distinccione formali.

leaving them, however, different by an essential mode of being; in other words 'formally'.

And of these He makes the species, lower and less universal, to the lowest of all,

Et tunc ex illis duabus naturis dualitate racionis componit speciem subalternam sive quiditative subalternam, composicione vera, sed modali a parte rei; postea illi quiditati eciam ydemptificat inmediatam ultimam differenciam essencialem; et distingwit, et componit sicud prius. Et sic usque ad speciem specialissimam inclusive, postea deus, cum causis aliis correquisitis quas ipse ordinat ad principiandum individuum hominem et eius individualitatem, que est eius personalitas et ydemptitas personalis, principiat sic hominem et eius personalitatem humanam et inprimit ei essencialiter ultimam quiditatem specificam cum omni quiditate et qualitate essenciali precedente; inprimitque sibi nichilominus quiditatem individuam sibi propriam | ut Sorti Sorteitatem etc., qua quiditas individua, 218[a]
ut videtur, non componitur ex aliqua quiditate singulari et qualitate essenciali similiter singulari, eo quod nulla ad reliqua habet excessum in communitate, sicud est in composicione speciei. Sed quilibet existens pure singularis non reddit aliquam composicionem quiditativam, cum insit pure singularibus, non insit aliqua naturalis et essencialis prioritas et per consequens nec essencialis ordo composicionis quiditative.

and to the individuals immediately contained under it;

so that the individuality of a given person is not made up of any partial essences, one prior to another in any way.

1. ꝯfi[ut] *MS.* 27. individua[te] *above MS.* 31. inprimunt *MS.* 33. quiditatem individuam *MS.* 38. r'ddnt' *MS.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM.

Quod autem sit quiditas proprie dicta in homine, vel asino, vel alia re, patet; quia alias in toto periret questio querens quid proprie res est: cum tamen et sapientes et indocti ex instinctu naturali solent sic querere. Quod autem sit quiditas proprie dicta communis in re, patet, quia querendo quid est homo omnes famant quod sit substancia, quod sit animal etc. Et cum non unico homini individuo conveniat esse animal, sed sit commune omni homini esse animal, patet quod sit quiditas communis in re, ymmo et quiditas magis communis et quiditas minus communis, si convenienter ad questionem "quid est homo?" querentem respondetur quod est substancia, respondetur eciam quod est animal. Et cum quiditas rei sit eius essencialis bonitas, et quiditas rei communior est amplior quam minus communis; igitur et quiditas communior est amplior bonitas essencialis in re quam minus communis quiditas; et per consequens est natura essencialis perfeccior, que est communior, et minus perfecta essencialiter, que minus communis est.

Every creature must have its quiddity, i. e. that in it which answers to the question: 'What (*quid*) is this?'

This essence must be common, not singular. What is man? An animal. This is true of *every* man, not only of one.

The more universal the essence, the more perfect it is.

Nec oportet in infinitum ascendere vel in infinitum descendere in ordine essenciali minus communis et magis communis quiditatis, cum tunc nulla esset prima nec aliqua ultima, et per consequens omnes essent medie. Et sic ante omnes et post omnes simul esset, prior et posterior; quod contradiccionem implicat.

There must be a first and a last amongst these, in order of universality.

Quod autem deus possit ydemptitatem quiditatis communioris essenciali ordine communicare quiditati minus communi, et sic eas inter se ydemptificare, videtur uno modo *a simili* vel *maiori* patere; quia, secundum multos, spiritui racionali hominis in quo primo (ut dicunt) personalitas reservatur, illi unitur

God can identify a less general Universal entity with one that is more so, just as He unites an inferior being,

1. Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *Blank space for initial Q MS.* 7. om̃s famãt *MS.* 30. ꝯn̄is *MS.* 32. ſpūi *MS.* 33. ꝑ̃litas *MS.*

the body, to one superior, the soul, to make the compound, a Man.

probabiliter per deum corpus animatum sensitivum, ut idem suppositum sit spiritus racionalis et sic | corpus 218b animatum. Igitur hic, quiditates, quarum una est essencialis et intrinseca, alteri sic poterit adonare: *[ergo]* a maiori. Ymmo, cum quiditas superior sic intrinseca essencialiter quiditati inferiori est, eius amplior essencialis bonitas quam sua propria bonitas est, que est formaliter ipsamet. Et per consequens est sic magis eius tota essencialis bonitas. Et per consequens quiditas minus communis est quiditas magis communis, et econtra. Cum autem qualitas essencialis speciei sit intrinseca et essencialis quiditati inferiori, si illa non esset quiditas magis communis, et econtra, sed esset aliena ab illa, et tamen illa superior quiditas sit tota quiditas inferioris plus quam ipsamet sua sit quiditas vel bonitas essencialis; illa qualitas esset aliena a tota quiditate et bonitate essenciali ipsius rei.

If the specific part of two essential properties were not more universal than the other, it could no longer be essential.

General and specific quiddities are not separate parts of the being, but the whole modified, and therefore no universal quality which is a separate part can be an essential, either generic or specific.

Item, si qualitas illa essencialis non esset quiditas specifica quam constituit cum quiditate generali, sed esset eius pars realis vel essencialis, igitur esset dare aliam partem essencialem vel realem, cum qua constitueret speciem. Sed, sicud argutum est, quiditas generalis non est pars realis vel essencialis quiditatis specialis, sed eius ampla tota essencialis bonitas, quam ipsa specialis quiditas sit sua propria et adequata essencialis bonitas. Igitur nec quiditas generalis vel qualitas essencialis est pars naturalis vel essencialis quiditatis specifice, vel specialis; sed quelibet illarum est eius pars modalis, sive secundum racionem. Et ipsa est totum 2^m racionem respectu cuiuslibet illarum duarum.

There are three differences amongst things; the greatest, which is real and essential; the less, which is real but not essential, and the least, which is merely formal.

Unde sicud triplex in re invenitur distinccio et distancia, maxima, media, et tenuissima vel minima; maxima, essencialis et realis qualitas, est inter deum et creaturam puram, media que est realis et non essencialis, que est inter 3^{es} personas divinas. Et 3^a formaliter sive secundum racionem que est tenuissima et non realis, sicud est inter personam divinam et essenciam dei. Et primam illarum eciam grossi percipiunt, nec illam putant esse nisi in divinis. Secundam subtiles et medii philosophi percipiunt et theologi. Terciam autem

1. plis *MS.* 4. pot'r *MS.* 5. ergo *deest MS.*

24. *Quam* is probably a mistake. I would substitute *quoniam*, which agrees with the sense, but for *sit* in the next line.

altissimi philosophi et theologi deprehenderunt. Et has
219a tres distincciones et distancias, | differencias et divisiones a parte rei esse non licet cuiquam nec katholico nec infideli negare.

Proporcionaliter ad has differencias, distincciones, et divisiones seu distancias, est ponenda triplex in re composicio: grossa, media, et tenuissima. Prima, sicut realis et essencialis. Secunda, realis et non essencialis; 3^a non realis et essencialis sed secundum racionem seu formalis. Prima est quantitativa ex partibus quantitativis inter se essencialiter et realiter differentibus, sicud ex corde, capite, etc.; et illam eciam grossi percipiunt et populares. Secunda est subtilior que potest dici realis non essencialiter, scilicet qualitativa, que est ex materia et forma substanciali in eadem essencia corporea que materia et forma, ut superius fuit tactum, realiter sed non essencialiter differunt. Et partes prioris composicionis possunt dici essenciales et reales; cum componendo essencialiter et realiter differunt, partes autem 2^e composicionis poterant dici partes reales sive secundum rem, et non essenciales sive 2^m essenciam; et hanc composicionem qualitativam mediocriter subtiles philosophi percipiunt. Tercia est composicio in re quiditativa minima et tenuissima, correspondenter ad terciam differenciam. Et hec potest vocari composicio formalis, seu secundum racionem, vel secundum modum per se primum, et partes huius composicionis dicuntur partes non secundum essenciam nec secundum rem sed secundum racionem sive secundum formam vel modum. Et hanc composicionem tenuissimam acutissimi philosophi deprehenderunt vi huius vel consimilis argumenti moti et adiuti: Ad *hominem quemcunque esse quiditative hominem* requiritur quiditative esse animal; et non sufficit 2^m se in propria forma *esse animal* ad *esse hominem;* cum tunc et equus esset homo. Igitur requiritur aliquid essenciale homini superaddi ad *esse animal*, ut resultet quiditative *esse hominem*: quod ponitur racionale, sive racionalitas specifica. Cum igitur *esse animal* (sive animalitas) 2^m se sit quiditas et natura essencialis prior requisita intrinsece, sed non sufficiens ad *esse* quiditative *hominem*, cui oportet

So likewise there are three sorts of composition; *quantitative*, that is, made of parts really and essentially different;

qualitative, of matter and form, really distinct, but forming one essence;

and a third, the most subtle of all, a merely formal composition, of things that differ neither really nor essentially.

Rationality is something essential to man, which, added to sensitivity, makes man.

18. cum igitur *MS.* 27. hij *pro* huius *MS.* 29. rem *pro* racionem *MS.* 32. quidi^{te} *MS.*

Here we have a compound and components, which differ neither really nor essentially, and therefore this is the third kind of composition.

superaddere ab intrinseco racionalitatem, ut resultet ab intrinseco *esse hominem* sive humanitas; igitur est ibi ab intrinseco composicio animalitatis | ad racionalitatem, 219b ut resultet humanitas. Igitur ibi sunt componencia et compositum, et cum non differant talia a se realiter nec essencialiter, sed 2^{m} racionem tantum, erit ibi composicio 2^{m} racionem tantum. Cum igitur hec tria: animalitas, racionalitas, et humanitas, insint per ordinem essencialem supposito humano, quodlibet eorum insit ei sicud commune performans ipsum humanum suppositum, et e converso subiective ab eodem. Et per consequens, cum quotlibet illorum sit sic universale, alias nullibi daretur ubi forma essencialis performaret suppositum et reciproce subiectaretur ab eodem. Et cum quodlibet illorum trium sit universale substanciale in supposito humano, primum (scilicet animalitas) cum sit sicud materiale et sicud substratum, cum superadditur racionalitas sicut forma superstans, et ex hiis resultet humanitas, sicud per se stans; nec daretur substanciale nisi aut ut substans, aut ut superstans, aut ut per se stans, patet tria et solum tria esse universalia substancialia in individuo: scilicet genus, differenciam, et speciem.

It has a striking analogy with matter, form, and the compound resulting from these.

Proof of this analogy. Animality is the principle of feeling; rationality, of reasoning; humanity, of both.

Quod autem animalitas habet se ut materiale, et racionalitas ut formale, et humanitas ut compositum [patet sic]. Nam animalitas appropriate est principium substanciale formale senciendi, racionalitas raciocinandi, humanitas vero senciendi et raciocinandi simul, vel eciam principium appropriate ex sensatis et sensacione raciocinandi et intelligendi, *sentire* autem ex quo fit *raciocinari* vel provenit, est sicud materiale, et *raciocinari* sicud formale; et *raciocinari* (vel discurrere racionabiliter) ex sensatis et sensacione, sicud compositum: igitur consimiliter de principiis sibi appropriatis est iudicandum; sic quod patet quod illa tria universalia, genus, differencia, et species, in eodem supposito non ponunt in numerum realem, sed ponunt in numerum racionis seu modi per se primi.

We count these as modes, but as modes of the same being.

We can say that rationality is substantiality, but improperly so; nor can

Et quamvis genus predicetur de differencia, dicendo quod racionalitas est substancialitas, hoc tamen non poterit esse formaliter, cum genus non poterit se habere in modum forme respectu differencie; nec possunt esse

7. 1η̄ *MS.* 24. se ut se (!) *MS.* 24. patet sic *deest MS.*

quiditative, cum differencia sit pura qualitas essencialis. Et sic differencia essencialis non poterit esse per se in predicamento aliquo, cum nullum generalissimum possit de aliqua tali differencia formaliter et in eo 'quod quid
220ᵃ est' predicari: | quod tamen requiretur. Nec potest differencia predicari qualitative essencialiter de genere, quod contrahit et dividit; quia non potest illi inesse actualiter ut qualitas eius essencialis. Sed differencia est in genere potestate, actualiter vero non. Si enim differencia aliquando esset actualiter in genere superiori, oportet quod esset sibi actualiter et per consequens formaliter, non accidentaliter, sed substancialiter. Et sic animal secundum se ipsum ut huius[modi] esset qualitative essencialiter racionale et sic hoc omni animali conveniret: quod est inconveniens.

we properly predicate any of these of each other.

For if, v. g. the difference *reasonable* were actually included in the idea *animal*, then every animal would be reasonable.

Philosophus tamen, tercio methaphysice, videtur sonare (et plures post eum) quod nequaquam genus predicatur de differencia, vel econtra; cum utrumque sit pars speciei, et una parcium non predicatur de reliqua. Unde ex hoc wult probare quod ens non potest esse genus, quia, si sic, tunc nulla differencia essencialis erit ens, quia genus non predicatur de aliqua essenciali sua differencia. Sed tamen, quidquid philosophus ille vel alii in hoc materia intenderunt, videtur pro argumento sufficere quod ens non possit esse genus, quia tunc aliqua differencia essencialis non esset formaliter ens: quod est inconveniens. Et tenet consequencia, cum non possit genus predicari formaliter de sua specie essencialiter inferiori differencia.

Aristotle even says that the genus cannot be in any sense predicated of the difference.

At any rate, Entity is not a genus, or the specific difference would be nothing.

Et patet [quod] genus est universale quod de pluribus predicatur specie differentibus 'in eo quod quid est' id est, 2ᵐ quod est quiditas predicatur 'in quid', id est, precopulatur (sive ab ante copulatur) speciei sicud prior forma essencialis, vel predicatur, i. e. publice vel manifeste dicitur, ostenditur, vel manifestatur de speciebus

A genus is a universal which is predicated of the essence of anything, not individually but in general.

13. modi *deest MS.* 23. illi *MS.* 30. quod *deest MS.* 32. i *pro* id est *MS.*; *ib.* i. *pro* id est *MS.*

9. *Potestate.* This may be a mistake for *potestative*; at any rate it means the same as the ablative *potenciâ.* 27. *Inconveniens.* The idea of the difference is not included in that of the genus; *animal* does not imply actually *reasonable.* If now Being or Anything were a generic term, you must divide it by a term that is not implied by Being. But every difference must be *something.*

suis, cum habeat non privatum *esse* sicud individuum, sed publicum et aptum. Species autem habentes in se genus predicant hoc *esse*, publice dicunt et ostendunt ipsum de seipsis sicud materiatum et subiectatum. Eciam deus predicat genus de suis speciebus. Eciam nos predicamus genus de suis speciebus; et recte, compendiose, et sufficienter sine briga dictum est, quod genus predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie 'in eo quod quid est' nec oportet aliquid addi, deponi, vel variari, ad corrigendum illam descripcionem.

Note that every genus must at some time or other have all its possible species in existence; if not, it would be mutilated and incomplete.

Et videtur quod genus oporteat habere, licet non simul, omnes suas species possibiles. Nam si aliquod generalissimum | caret a principio mundi usque in 220b eternum quacunque sua specie possibili, cum species sint sicud partes formales ipsius generis, individua vero sicud partes materiales, iam tunc tale generalissimum est colobum, sicud corpus aliquis carens aliqua sui parte formali. Et licet post diem iudicii multe species rerum non erunt, nisi quis dixerit corpus humanum ex omni specie carnis animati non humani componi perpetuo, et sic in eo salvari speciem leonis secundum minimum sui naturale, speciem equi, et sic de aliis singulis animalibus et plantis (quod tamen non videtur verum de istis nec de cete grandibus), ubi forte minimum naturale est ante vel amplius in quantitate, sicud corpus humanum supposito quod multe tales species non erunt post iudicii diem; tamen adhuc, quando oportet tempore suo habere genus speciem aliquam, tunc eam habet, et hoc sufficit ad perfectum et completum *esse* generis, sic enim totum tempus mundi est perfectum et completum, et tamen in nullo die nec in aliqua hora habet tantum de tempore quantum sibi ad *esse* deest.

And though many species will not exist after Doomsday, they will have existed at the right time, so that every genus will have all its species.

A genus is either the most general of all, or specialized to some extent.

Et genus bene et sufficienter dividitur in genus generalissimum et genus subalternum.

Species is predicated essentially of things that are included in the same genus and differ as to number;

Et species est universale predicabile de pluribus numero differentibus in eo quod quid est positum sub genere; et (quodammodo equivoce) species est quiditas ut per se stans in differentibus numero, genus vero est quiditas ut substans in differentibus specie; et, limitando

2. pu^cu *MS.* 17. colobu^cu *MS.* 24. decete gra'dibus *MS.* 32. det^e 1pis *MS.*

17. *Colobum.* I have substituted this word because it is to be found in Du Cange, whilst the other is not.

"in eo quod quid" ad primum sensum, videtur illa descripcio speciei sufficere: "Species est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid est." Nec descripcio talis sensus competeret generi generalissimo, cum talis non possit predicari ut quiditas per se stans, sed solum ut substans.

Et species dividitur satis in speciem specialissimam et subalternam. Et species specialissima est que predicatur in eo quod quid est de solis numero differentibus, intelligendo quod *ly* 'solis' dicat sensum exclusivum et non sophistice exclusum predicatum. |

it is divided into 'most special' and 'more general', the former comprising no other species under it, but only individuals.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM PRIMUM. 221ª

A specific difference is a difference of essential 'howness' affirmable of many things which differ in kind.

Differencia autem specifica est universale predicatum de pluribus in eo quod quale essenciale. Videtur autem quod debeat addi 'specie', ut dicatur: differencia specifica est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus *specie* in eo quod quale essenciale; ut dicit Porphyrius. Nam, cum differencia specifica sit universale (et sic quoddam commune essenciale respectu speciei, sicud est constitutiva speciei) sed nihil est commune essenciale respectu alicuius nisi sibi et alii ab illo possit essencialiter communicari. Videtur prima facie igitur quod omnis vera et proprie dicta differencia specifica sit predicabilis de pluribus specie differentibus.

No genus can be divided sufficiently with only one difference, it must have several. Quantity is divided into 'continuous' and 'non-continuous', into 'having position' and 'not having position of parts'.

Et sic videtur ulterius quod nullum genus cum unica differencia specifica aliquam suam speciem adequate constituat, sed oportet ipsum habere in adiutorium duas aut plures differencias specificas. Et tunc forte oportet ulterius dici quod sicud illud generalissimum 'quantitas' habet differenciam essencialem, differenciam immediatam, scilicet: in quantitatem *continuam* et quantitatem *discretam*, et iterum in quantitatem habentem *posicionem in partibus* et non habentem. Et habet duplices differencias essenciales oppositas et annectas (illas quidem que dividerent genus secundum *esse* suum quodammodo materiale per respectum ad formale est genus, et econtra alias que dividerent ipsum genus 2^m quoddam suum *esse* formale per respectum ad materiale. Et sic forte quodlibet genus, nedum subalternum, de quo leviter apparet, sed et

These may be considered as dividing the genus formally (though with

1. Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *Blank space for initial D MS.* 10. mſi *MS.* 17. dra ſſcas *MS.* 25. g^r *MS.*

10. *Nisi.* I have already noted this MS. form which has puzzled me not a little: neither here nor elsewhere can I make any sense of it. 22. *Habentem.* This requires some explanation. *Number* is non-continuous quantity; all other is continuous. *Time* does not imply position, nor does humber; but all other sorts of quantity do.

generalissimum, habet quodammodo *esse* materiale essenciale, et *esse* quodammodo formale essenciale. Et 2^m hoc quodlibet tale haberet duplicem divisionem essencialem immediatam; et per consequens duplices differencias essenciales immediatas illas oppositas, sicud materiales, que dividerent genus 2^m *esse* suum quodammodo materiale (sub respectu tamen ad formale); et alias oppositas sicud formales, dividentes genus secundum *esse* suum formale per respectum ad *esse* materiale. Et sic differencia specifica materialis et differencia specifica formalis mutuo se iuvarent et ipsum genus, et quodammodo se contraherent ad constituendam speciem specialissimam adequate. Quamvis tamen inter eas aliqua sit
221b ultima | simpliciter, non tamen adequata speciei.

regard to its matter) and materially (though with regard to its form), these divisions mutually supporting each other.

Ista est sentencia Linconensis super secunda priorum. Et philosophus in textu dicit ibi quod diffinicio debet dari per ea quorum quodlibet est in plus, totum tamen in eque cum diffinito; sicud exemplificat de diffinicione ternarii: ternarius est numerus *impar*, *primus*, *incompositus;* totum est in eque et quelibet pars in plus.

This is Grosseteste's explanation of Aristotle's saying concerning definitions.

Egidius autem Romanus et glosator dicit ibidem super textu illo quod diffinicio quedam est bona in casu, et de tali intelligit philosophus. Diffinicio autem quiditativa simpliciter non sic debet dari per ea quorum quodlibet sit in plus, cum ultima differencia specifica constituens speciem specialissimam non sit in plus nec per aliam differenciam contrahibilis; et arguit quod oportet naturam ordinate procedere in constitucione speciei, quousque deveniatur ad actum seu differenciam adequatam illi speciei specialissime. Et pro illa sentencia sic arguitur; capto generalissimo, addatur sibi una differencia tantum; illa cum genere faceret speciem. Et illa differencia de illa specie, et nulla alia (nisi forte de sua inferiori), predicabitur. Et iterum ad illam subalternam speciem sit constitutiva; sic eciam, una essencialis differencia addita, iterum cum illo genere constituet speciem sic specialissimam. Tunc illa solum de illa specie specialissima predicabitur, alias genus illud proximum cum

But others say that such definitions cannot be really essential, although they may have their uses; for the last difference which makes up the ultimate species cannot be anything outside of the essence of the genus, and all other essential differences should be like it.

17. quarum (!) *MS.* 21. Ronus et glosar *MS.* 37. fi ffama *MS.*

19. *Impar, primus, incompositus.* Each of these determinations separately belong to other numbers than 3 (*in plus*); but together only to it (*in eque*).

illa differencia non adequate constituent illam speciem; quod est contra assumptum. Si autem iterum constituitur species subalterna, addatur iterum unica differencia specifica, et cum non sit procedere in infinitum, devenietur tandem quod aliquod ultimum genus, cum unica ultima differencia, adequate speciem specialissimam constituet; et tunc illa differencia de illa sola specie predicabitur, eo quod aggregatum ex illo genere et illa differencia cum specie convertitur, nisi fingeretur quod illud genus et illa differencia mutuo et reciproce se contrahent ad quantitatem cum illa specie: quod est inconveniens.

It may be answered that a difference must be a universal, intrinsic principle of division; which is impossible unless it belongs to more than one species.

Hic forte dicetur, sicud prius, cum quecunque differencia specifica insit speciei quam constituit sicud universale eius intrinsecum | et per consequens sicud 222a sibi commune intrinsecum principium. Sed non est possibile aliquid esse ut commune intrinsecum principium alicui, nisi sibi et aliis poterit sic esse principium. Alias esset proprie proprium et non ut universale principium, et ut universalis et communis eius forma; cum tamen de racione differencie specifice sit quod predicetur de sua specie ut universale.

It is said, further, that you cannot divide a genus only into 2 species by means of one difference only.

Unde dicetur ulterius quod non est possibile sub aliquo genere constitui duas solas immediatas species et quamlibet earum per unicam differenciam essencialem sibi debitam; sed constituuntur sole due species inmediate ex opposito quo ad *esse* quodammodo materiale ipsius generis appropriate per duas differencias quasi materiales.

Two differences in a genus make four species in the same.

Et constituuntur due species inmediate ex opposito quo ad *esse* quodammodo formale ipsius generis appropriate per differencias quasi formales. Eciam et prime inmediate species due, et secunde inmediate species due, per respectum vel sub respectu *esse* quodammodo materiale ipsius generis ad *esse* quodammodo formale generis eiusdem et econtra constituuntur. Et sic differencia quasi materialis, appropriate constituens unam speciem quasi materialem, convenit alicui de speciebus quasi formalibus, licet non appropriate; et econtra quelibet

14. constituunt *MS.* 26. de͡ta *MS.*; *ib.* ı͡ mte *MS.* 29. ı͡ mete *MS.* 33. materiales *MS.*

18. *Sibi et aliis.* Thus *impar* is a difference which belongs not only to 3 but to 5, 7 . . . .: *primus*, not only to 3, but to 2, 5, 7 . . . . — Evidently, these differences are not of the same character as 'Animal *rationale* aut *irrationale*'.

differencia quasi formalis, constituens quasi speciem formalem appropriate, convenit alicui specierum quasi materialium non appropriate.

But these arguments can be shown to be worthless.

Sed quod iam dictum non probet intentum quod per illud quis vellet sic ostenditur. Nam, capto quocunque genere generalissimo vel subalterno, et admisso quod habeat duplicem talem divisionem inmediatum in quatuor species, puta a b ex opposito et in c d ex opposito, tunc oportet unam de secundis speciebus esse sub aliquam de primis speciebus; et econtra oportet aliquam de primis duabus esse sub aliqua de secundis duabus, et unam de primis duabus universaliter negari de una aliqua secundarum, et econtra. Hoc nunquam potest fallere si diccio utrobique fuerit inmediata, ut in uno exemplo sint ille dicciones inmediate et essenciales quantitatis: in *continuam* quantitatem et *discretam* ex opposito. Item, si in quantitatibus *habentibus posicionem* 222[b] in partibus et quantitatem | *sine posicione* in partibus; tunc quantitas discreta universaliter sicud species continetur sub 4ta specie, scilicet quantitate sine posicione in partibus. Et 3^{a} species, scilicet quantitas habens posicionem in partibus, universaliter continetur sub prima specie, scilicet quantitatem continuam. Et secunda et 3^{a} species, scilicet quantitas discreta et quantitas habens posicionem in partibus de se universaliter negatur. Si est divisio realis et essencialis modo, tunc nulla differencia appropriate constituens secundam speciem potest competere prime speciei, cum propria et appropriata racio distincte quantitatis repugnet quantitati continue. Et econtra. Ymmo sic oporteret econtra appropriatam differenciam quantitatis continue econverso competere quantitati discrete. Et sic ille due appropriate differencie, quantitatis continue, et quantitatis discrete, cum generalissimo [genere] quantitatis in utroque illarum specierum, scilicet, continue et discrete quantitatis, solum unam speciem constituerent: quod est inconveniens. Nec appropriata differencia vel appropriate constituens secundam speciem potest competere 3^{e}, vel econtra, cum illa secundum proprias raciones distingwatur. Ymmo, sicut iam argutum est, ille due appropriate differencie in illis speciebus cum eodem

For each of the differences in question *taken together* with the genus, forms a genus which is determined by the other difference and becomes a species. Thus we have the genus divided into 2 species by one difference, but twice divided.

If not, you suppose that, until the four species are constituted, all the other partial divisions form only one genus; this is impossible.

8. m *pro* in *MS*. 14. di'° *MS*. 26. ajo; aj = M? *pro* modo *MS*. 29. disticte *MS*. 34. genere *deest MS*. 39. ille *MS*.

genere eandem solam speciem constituerent; nec differencia constituens appropriate secundam speciem potest ut differencia competere quarte speciei, cum secunda species (scilicet quantitas discreta) sit species 4te speciei, scilicet quantitatis sine posicione.

Let us take any one of these four species, as existing, and ask whether it has a proper difference which belongs to no other. If so, this difference is sufficiently universal because it exists in many individuals, and we require no more. If not, to what other species does it belong? None can be found but such as belong to the same genus.

Et breviter, sicud 4^or^ immediate species, vel solum due, capta quacunque tali vera inmediata specie, queritur si habet differenciam sibi soli debitam, ita quod non alii speciei, vel non? Si primum, habetur quod non oportet differenciam esse sic universalem respectu speciei et communem quod eciam alii speciei sit communicabilis; sed sufficit eam sibi esse universalem, quia universaliter pro suis suppositis sibi inest sicud proprie proprium est universale; quia universaliter pro suppositis speciei inest, et non respectu alterius speciei potest competere tale proprium. Si dicatur quod nulla est sibi propria, sed quelibet sua convenit alii speciei: capiatur ergo, gracia exempli, prima species (quantitas continua) cuius quelibet specifica differencia conveniat alii speciei. Queritur cui alii, non tercie alii, scilicet *posicionem habere in partibus?* Illa non est alia, cum sit species prime speciei, scilicet *quantitatis continue.* Nec eciam convenit secunde, quia tunc e converso eciam quelibet 2^e^ speciei conveniret prime; | et per consequens omnes 223^a^ ille differencie simul cum generalissimo non aliam speciem in prima specie constituerent quam in secunda;

But this would not suffice to constitute a properly different and independent species.

et e converso, cum, positis per totum omnibus eisdem causis intrinsecis, idem causatum ubique poneretur sibi proprium, sicud apparebit; tunc talis cum generalissimo sufficienter illam speciem constituet. Unde cum sub quolibet genere possit esse, nisi [sint] due species inmediate, quarum neutra de reliqua predicaretur et in quas universaliter et sufficienter illud genus divideretur, quelibet illarum specierum habebit sub illo inmediato genere differenciam sibi universalem et propriam, que solum illi speciei et sibi inferioribus poterit competere. Et per consequens illa differencia, cum illo inmediato genere, sufficienter constitueret speciem illam. Et iterum illa species subalterna cum differencia una superaddita constituet sufficienter speciem, et sic usque ad specia-

25. alium *MS.* 31. n' *MS.*; *ib.* sint *deest MS.*

5. *Sine posicione.* What sort of quantity is without position? No doubt Wyclif is here alluding to time, or duration.

lissimam inclusive; et illo consimili argumento habebit differenciam constitutivam sibi propriam.

Videtur ergo quod differencia specifica sit universale predicabile de specie 'in eo quod quale essenciale'. Quare autem Porphyrius dicit quod differencia est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie 'in eo quod quale?' Potest forte dici quod Porphyrius fuit illius sentencie quod quamlibet speciem oporteat sub suo inmediato genere per differencias sese mutuo contrahentes constitui; sicud putavit "racionale" esse differenciam substancialiter convenientem hominibus qui essent substancialiter mortales cum bestiis, et convenientem diis qui sunt substancialiter inmortales, cum intelligenciis. Et Albertus Magnus in commento suo super Porphyrio sentenciat quod differencia speciei specialissime, considerata ut constituencia, sic de una illa sola specie predicatur. Alio modo, considerata ut divisiva generis, sic oportet quod sumatur sub distincione ad differenciam sibi oppositam; ut, cum dicitur "omne animal aut est racionale aut irracionale", et secundum hoc dicit ipse differenciam predicari de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quale. Et cum differencia non retineat proprie racionem differencie ut est constitutiva, sed ut est divisiva, inde est 2^m eum, quod differencia specifica (ut est differencia) predicatur
223b de pluribus specie | differentibus in eo quod quale; et hoc essenciale.

But if the specific difference is an essential predication concerning thusness in one species, how can it be said to affect different species? It may be that Porphyry was of the preceding opinion, as seems from his famous 'tree'. Albert the Great thinks that a difference (without the consideration of its opposite) belongs only to one species; with that consideration, it belongs to many. In the former sense it consitutes a species, but is not properly a difference.

Posset forte eciam dici quod differencia potest accipi uno modo ut est distancia inter unam speciem et aliam sibi oppositam, et 2^m hoc non plus respicit unam speciem quam aliam sibi oppositam. Et sic racionalitas, ut esset distancia inter hominem et animal, *racionale* non plus respiceret unum distancium quam reliquum, sicud distancia inter corpora non plus unum quam alterum respicit. Alio modo recipitur differencia ut esset *distare unam speciem ab alia sibi opposita;* ut de quanto racionaliter esset distare substancialiter hominem a bestia. Et illo modo convenit homini et non bestie.

Again, we may say that *difference*, taken as a distance between two species, does not belong more to one than to the other. But if taken as the distance *from* one to the other, it would belong to the first only.

13. ẽ *pro* sunt (!) *MS.* 34. fnt' *pro* inter *MS.*

13. In Porphyry's 'Tree', we find *animal* divided by the two cross differences, *reasonable*, and *mortal*. Animal reasonable, mortal = man; animal reasonable, immortal = a god; animal irrational mortal = a brute.

But this does not agree at all with Porphyry's view; besides, a difference which only answers a question ambiguously, by means of a distinction, cannot satisfy.

Verumptamen nec dictum Alberti Magni nec dictum sequens videtur esse ad intencionem et de mente Porphyrii, cum similiter exemplificet quod "racionale" predicetur de diis et hominibus in eo quod quale. Et ita de aliis differenciis ymaginatur. Et quo ad dictum Alberti, si "racionale" sub distinccione deberet predicari in eo quod quale essenciale (ut videtur ipse exponere) tunc, querendo qualis est homo essencialiter, si respondebitur: Est racionalis vel irracionalis, in hoc nunquam satisfiet questioni; et querenti cum respondens sub distinccione diversorum non satis certificat querentem.

Rationality is not the distance between man and brute, but is *man's being distant from a brute;* and vice-versâ; the opposite difference, *irrationality,* being as positive as the first, though in the form of a privation.

Et quo ad sensum dictum, videtur quod racionalitas non sit distancia inter hominem et bestiam, sed sit *distare hominem a bestia*, et non est *distare bestiam ab homine;* et nulla res in medio interiacens est realis que esset distancia essencialis inter hominem et bestiam sub genere animalis; sed in hominem est unum *distare* essencialiter hominem a bestia; et illud *distare* est racionalitas hominis; et *bestiam essencialiter distare ab homine* est irracionalitas in bestia; non quod irracionalitas sit privacio, sed qualitas substancialis positiva, nominata sub privacione per respectum ad oppositam differenciam substancialem.

15. r̂al' (racionalis?) *MS.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SECUNDUM.

Eciam *esse genus* et *esse speciem* convenit simpliciter et proprie disposicionibus substancialibus in prima substancia, inproprie autem et secundum quid convenit
224[a] accidentibus; ut humanitas proprie et simpliciter | est species hominis et animalitas eius genus; albedo autem est species huius albedinis, et color genus, sed inproprie et secundum quid. Nam si albedo vel color est solum 2^m quid, est inproprie quiditas vel entitas cuiuscunque simpliciter et non proprie; tunc eciam, cum albedo sit species vel color genus, solum 2^m quid et inproprie sunt huiusmodi. Sed albedo et color, cum sint eque vel plus informative in propria substancia quam in illa albedine, cum finaliter sint ad informandum substanciam, non plus albedo vel color sunt quiditas vel entitas huius albedinis quam istius substancie in qua sunt informative; ut, gracia exempli, Sortis. Sed albedo non est simpliciter et proprie quiditas vel entitas Sortis, cum Sor 2^m albedinem nec sit *hoc quid* vel *hoc ens* (demonstrato Sorte et quacunque natura essenciali Sortis), nec secundum eam est aliud quid vel ens, ut per totum est notum, sed secundum albedinem Sor solum est alicuiusmodi vel aliquale ens; igitur albedo non est simpliciter entitas nec quiditas: igitur [nec] substancia prima; et per consequens in nulla re est simpliciter et proprie sed 2^m quid et inproprie est entitas et quiditas.

Accidents may belong to genera and species, like substances, but improperly.

Whiteness is the species to which *this* shade of whitenes belongs; and colour is its genus; but these determinations affect the substance in which they inhere at least as much as they do the genus *colour*. They do not make their substance to be *this* something, but to be *thus*.

Similiter, idem est "generari albedinem in Sorte" et "Sortem generari album". In hoc enim ipse quid generatur? albedo in Sorte generatur, Sor albus, et econtra. Sed quia "Sortem generari album" non est simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid generari, sicud in hoc quod "Sor generatur albus" non simpliciter

Again, if whiteness appears in A, it is the same as A turning white; this is not simply the production of A, but the production of 'white A'; thus whiteness,

1. Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *Blank space for Initial E MS.*
13. ifor^{ve} *MS.* 24 nec *deest MS.* 29. ipe qb' *MS.*

abstracted from A is only a partial entity.

generatur, cum in hoc non fiat aliquid, sed solum 2^m quid generatur, cum fiat solum alicuiusmodi vel aliqualis qualis non fuit: igitur "generari albedinem in Sorte" non est simpliciter sed solum secundum quid generari. Et cum "generari Sortem in albedine" sit passiva generacio ipsius albedinis que fit in Sorte, igitur generacio ipsius albedinis solum 2^m quid est entitas et ens et per consequens 2^m quid solum habet genus, differenciam, et diffinicionem; sicud et ostenditur 7mo methaphysice.

Yet, though partial, I still maintain that the entity is real, and accidents therefore really have species and genera, in a sense.

Verumptamen quamvis color non simpliciter et proprie sed | [224b] solum 2^m quid et inproprie est genus et species; nichilominus tamen est genus et species. Albedo enim est ens et entitas, licet non simpliciter sed 2^m quid sit ens et entitas. Et simpliciter et sine addito dico quod color est ens et color est genus; sed non dico quod color simpliciter est ens; nec dico quod color simpliciter est genus; sed dico quod solum 2^m quid est genus, et solum 2^m quid est ens vel entitas, iuxta superius arguta ex intencione philosophi 7° methaphysice, et primo de generacione.

But why is there a species of whiteness in respect to shades of that colour, and not a species of risibility in respect to individual risibilities? Because "risibility" has not an essence separate from „man", it is too closely connected with his essence, and there is no real difference between them; whereas this is not the case for whiteness.

Sed forte queritur qualiter albedo est species respectu huius et huius albedinis et non risibilitas respectu huius et huius risibilitatis. Potest forte dici pro una causa quod risibilitas non habet essenciam propriam aliam ab essencia hominis cuius est proprium, et cuius quiditatem de per se consequitur. Alias videtur quod non esset homo per se secundario tamen risibilis, sicud ipse per se primo est animal racionale; sed ipse per aliud et extraneum secundario esset risibilis. Ymmo videtur quod sicud veritas, unitas, et bonitas, non realiter sed solum modaliter distingwuntur ab entitate seu ab ente cuius sunt per se passiones; sic risibilitas solum 2^m modum ab homine distingwatur et non realiter. Sed quia albedo et essencialiter et realiter ab homine vel alia substancia in qua est distingwitur, igitur poterit habere quiditatem propriam, qualiter non risibilitas.

And every man is necessarily capable of laughing, but not necessarily white, which colour is variable and

Eciam quia de per se risibilitas unitur homini, albedo autem non, sed de per accidens; et illud invariabiliter, hoc variabiliter: propter ergo illam nimis vehementem unionem per modum forme per se et proprie non relinquitur sibi propria essencia et

20. philosophorum *MS.*

propria quiditas, sed essencia hominis et quiditas hominis sunt sibi pro essencia et quiditate. Si enim risibilitas haberet propriam essenciam et quiditatem, iam non esset per se prima forma hominis, cum esset formaliter, et formaliter in sua propria essencia, et sic forma, et in alio. Albedo autem, cum sit realis forma et non per se propria alicui substancie, sed vaga, variabilis, nedum secundum speciem suam potens existere, nunc in uno supposito substancie et postea in alio alterius generis vel speciei, sed eciam quandoque eadem materialis forma accidentalis eadem duo quo ad naturam forme potest vicissim esse nunc in uno |
225ª supposito et nunc in alio alterius generis: sicud patet de situ materiali meo in quo iam ego sum; et quia eciam forme tales quandoque gradualiter possunt variari, propter quod deus et natura providerunt talibus proprias essencias, naturas, et quiditates.

may exist in many species of substances; and the same accident of position, for instance, may in turn belong to many different subjects.

Et argumentum a posteriori est quod risibilitas non sit species; cum aut componeretur ex genere et differencia et illa principia intrinseca in eo causarent iterum propriam passionem que a pari iterum esset species, et sic fieret processus in infinitum in per se passionibus: quod est inconveniens; igitur, etc.

Besides, risibility is not made up of genus and species.

Quod autem sit quoddam universale, quod sit proprie proprium, sicut dicunt loyci et supra factum fuit, videtur constare ex hoc. Nam quoddam universale inest post completum et secundum completum *esse* individuum: ut "esse marem", "esse feminam" sunt universalia que insunt post completum *esse,* cum alias essent substancialia. Et per consequens mas et femina in eadem specie different substancialiter universaliter; quod non convenit. Insunt eciam 2^m completum *esse* rei, quia non indifferenter cuicunque, sed solis animalibus conveniunt, et insunt secundum *esse* non specifico (cum tunc non plus mari inesset esse masculum quam femine, et econtra esse feminam non plus mulieri quam masculo inesset); igitur 2^m completum *esse* individuum et secundum principia individui. Si ergo res post completum et secundum completum *esse* individui et secundum principia individuancia, tenet in se universale quoddam posterius; a pari, ymmo pocius a

That there are Universals, called properties, is certain, for there are attributes which exist outside of the complete abstract essence, and exist in many within certain fixed limits: as sex in animals.

Now this is a universal which is constant in individuals;

a fortiori, the specific essence

5. forlr' & forlr' *MS.* 8. vai'lls *MS.* 28. individua (!) *MS.*
40. tunc *pro* tenet *MS.*

or species, may have properties which are constant, being in all individuals of that species, only in them, and for ever; so may genera and even Transcendent determinations have such properties.

forciori, res post et secundum completum *esse* specificum et secundum principia specifica tenet in se quoddam universale; et illud inerit *omni*, *soli*, et *semper*, sicud *esse* completum, specificum, et adequatum, principia specifica secundum que adequate illud universale causatur in *esse*, omni, soli, et semper insunt; et tale universale, cum sit post completum *esse* et secundum completum *esse* commune insit, cum soli et semper, ipsum erit proprie proprium et per consequens universale quod per se 2° convertibiliter inest, sicud quiditas specifica est universale quod per se primo convertibiliter inexistit. Et nedum 2^m *esse* completum specificum, sed et generalissimum. Ymmo et secundum *esse* transcendens insunt per se secundario quedam passiones.

These properties do not differ really, but only modally, form the essence of the thing itself. Risibility is humanity from a certain point of view; for we cannot conceive it as anything superadded to humanity,

Et sicud superius argutum quod illa 3^a universalia, genus, differencia, et species, ex hiis non differunt ab invicem realiter in eorum . . . . . | sic nec propria passio 225b
differt realiter sed solum modaliter a quiditate completa rei; ut, si risibilitas est propria passio hominis, non realiter sed 2^m racionem differt ab humanitate. Nam cum talis propria passio sit eiusdem essencie cum humanitate, non habens aliam sibi propriam essenciam (alioquin non esset proprie proprium homini, ut superius fuit argutum), cum autem in essencia propria hominis genus animalitas sit sicut materia, racionalitas sicud forma, et humanitas sicud completa tota natura in eadem propria essencia; risibilitas non poterit poni res alia ultra humanitatem in essencia propria hominis. Alioquin in illa essencia ex humanitate et risibilitate aliqua tercia res per se una componeretur sicud ex per se subiecto et per se forma, realiter condistinctis.

for then there would be two distinct natures in one compound and that compound would not be humanity, but something else.

Si enim risibilitas est per se nature alicuius sic incomplete, tunc cum alia, et sic maxime cum humanitate, componeret, si est natura completa; due nature complete erunt simul eiusdem essencie penitus: quod non convenit. Non poterit ergo risibilitas esse res alia,

2. tunc *pro* tenet *MS.* 7. *esse deest MS.* 15. argū *MS.* 17. per se *pro* propria *MS.* 25. a͞lis *MS.* 31. $\widehat{\mathrm{ra}}^{\mathrm{r}}$ *MS.* 32. si *pro* sic (!) *MS.*

17. *Eorum . . . sic.* There is no gap, but some word is evidently wanting to make sense. The MS. is a very bad one; the copyist, as we have seen, makes extraordinary mistakes of grammar, and omissions which often render the sentence impossible to construe.

sicud nec alia natura in propria essencia hominis. Alia dico ab humanitate; sed humanitas est sibi pro quiditate et essencia hominis pro essencia, sicut dictum fuit superius, sicud mundo architypo, puta, multitudine ydearum, deitas est pro essencia. Nec mirum quod supra completam quiditatem hominis, puta humanitatem, ponitur proprietas per se, eiusdem tamen essencie et nature cum ipsa humanitate, cum "posse deum efficere creaturam" ponatur per se passio formaliter inexistens deo 2^{m} eius deitatem, que non posset essencialiter vel realiter a deitate differre; sic quod videtur ista quatuor universalia, genus, species, differenciam, et proprium, in eodem supposito non differre realiter. Unumquodque tamen secundum suum proprium (et proprium per se) modum essendi differt a reliquo. Quintum autem universale, puta accidens, a quolibet predictorum in eodem supposito realiter et per essenciam differre videtur.

We may say that God's creative power is His property, which is essentially the same as God. Thus the foregoing 4 Universals differ only modally whilst the fifth, the Accident, differs really from these.

Et secundum Porphyrium proprie proprium est quod inest omni, soli, et semper; inest autem sicud forma communis, non essencialis, nec accidentalis, sed sicud media inter has per se 2° inexistens. Inest autem *omni*: 226ª cui "omni" (scilicet, universitati rerum ipsius | speciei, vel ipsius generis, vel ipsius analogi, vel alterius communis) sic quod universis rebus ipsius speciei vel generis etc. sic insit. Et inest *soli* rei eiusdem speciei vel communis etc. Et inest *semper*, scilicet, universitati rerum eiusdem speciei vel generis, etc. Hoc est quod semper, dum manet universitas illa, sibi sic insit. Unde proprium de quinque universalibus est universale quod inest rei post et secundum *esse* essenciale suum commune. Et hoc oportet inesse modo iam dicto omni, soli, et semper.

The Property belongs to every individual of the species without exception, only to those, and invariably, so long as the species endures.

Accidens autem (dicit Porphyrius) est quod adest vel abest preter subiecti corrupcionem. Et cum triplex sit forma rei: essencialis, accidentalis, et media; inter has prima est forma que appropriate preest rei. Media autem que appropriate inest rei. Tercia autem que appropriate adest rei. Videtur autem intelligendus Porphyrius quod accidens est quod aptum est adesse per modum forme, et aptum est abesse 2^{m} eius absenciam in subiecto suo preter ipsius subiecti corrupcionem ex tali absencia vel ad talem absenciam, ita quod ad talem absenciam subiectum corrumpi non oportet.

Definition of the accident: what may come and go, without destruction of the subject.

Et Porphyrius sentenciat quod, licet sit accidens quod non sit separabile a subiecto per naturam et

Some are in reality inseparable

from their subjects; but they are separable by the mind, and that suffices.

virtutem eius, quia tunc separaretur a subiecto suo realiter quod de multis accidentibus (sicud de potenciis naturalibus in specie secunda qualitatis, de numero, quantitate continua, et sic de aliis infinitis) nobis est impossibile. Intellectus tamen, qui est agens sepe solum intencionaliter, sicud natura semper est agens naturaliter et realiter, ipse intellectus separando potest separare intencionaliter et sic causare intencionalem absenciam accidentis in subiecto. Et secundum talem intellectualem et intencionalem, non autem realem et naturalem absenciam, accidens naturaliter et realiter inseparabile aptum est abesse preter subiecti corrupcionem eciam intencionalem.

A raven is always black; but we can think it losing that blackness, and therefore blackness is an accident. Such is the power of reason, given to us by God.

Unde, dato quod non posset intelligi albus corwus, potest tamen corwus intelligi albus. Nam, si intellectus circa corwum intellectum potest facere absenciam nigredinis intencionalem, ipse | poterit facere circa corwum 226[b]
intellectum presenciam albedinis intencionalem creato intellectui. Ergo deus concessit et reservat virtutem faciendi circa formas rerum intellectas presencias vel absencias intencionales, ubi natura non concessit vim efficiendi circa illas res absencias quascumque realiter et reales.

Our faculty of conceiving primordial matter clear of all determinations is a case in point.

Sic eciam 2^m philosophos, intellectus humanus potest intencionaliter separare et depurare materiam primam a quibuscunque formis substancialibus vel accidentalibus, cum ipse sciat dicere quod "materia prima nec est quid, nec quale, nec quantum", etc. Sed natura non potest sic realiter separare et depurare primam materiam a morpheiis et passionibus pro aliquo tempore vel instanti temporis.

Thus, though an accident may inhere inseparably in its subject, we may think of it as not inhering; which is impossible for the first three Universals, which make up the very essence of the thing thought,

Et sic, 2^m Porphyrium, licet accidens quoddam non possit abesse absencia reali preter subiecti corrupcionem realem ad talem absenciam, potest tamen abesse absencia intencionali, cum non *per se* insit rei preter subiecti corrupcionem; sed genus, species, et differencia, cum per se et primo insint rei proprie, proprium autem cum per se 2° inest rei nec reali absencia nec intencionali possunt abesse preter subiecti corrupcionem. Genus enim, differencia, et species, sunt de intellectu essenciali et quiditativa eius, cuius sunt talia. Non ergo contra essencialem et quiditativum intellectum rei potest ipse intellectus fabricare absenciam intencionalem alicuius

1. v'to *MS.* 31. ibi' *MS.*

talium Proprie autem proprium, cum non habeat propriam essenciam et quiditatem aliam a subiecto (sicud habet accidens), sed essencia et quiditas subiecti sunt sibi sicud pro essencia et quiditate 2^m quas debet sicud essencialiter et quiditative saltem materialiter intelligi, non potest intellectus fabricare absenciam intencionalem proprie passionis a subiecto, essencia et quiditate eius. Eciam quamvis vis nature non possit accidens inseparabile realiter et naturaliter a subiecto [separare], intellectus tamen divinus sufficiencie omnis simpliciter infinite, qui potest creaturam racionalem eciam supra seipsam elevare graciose, sicut summe precipue patet de homine in Cristo; ille eciam poterit rem quamcunque in sui puritate sine accidente realiter condistinctim conservare, licet non temporaliter vel
227a instanter; sed instans | tunc est in accidente sibi realiter condistincto. Potest autem rem in qualibet sua per se mensura essendi vel durandi pure conservare, nullum accidens realitatis condistinctum admiscendo. Ymmo ille intellectus divinus, cum mere graciose communicet causis infra et extra se existentibus vim, efficaciam et exercicium causandi, ipse existens undique omnis sufficiencie infinite forte poterit causare, componere, et constituere eciam compositum quantificatum, qualificatum, et quiditativum, et conservare absque ulla concausacione parcium quantitativarum, qualitativarum, vel quiditativarum eiusdem compositi, quamvis ille partes de necessitate illi composito inexistant, si ipsum sic sit compositum. Nec videtur oportere sequi de necessitate, si alique tales partes sint ordine essenciali priores illi composito, quod igitur dent sibi *esse*. Omnes enim materie prime, quarum nulla est pars alterius, videntur eque prime esse in ordine; et tamen non, si una illarum alicui composito materialiter dat *esse*, quod ergo quelibet illarum. Propter quod, si ordine essenciali genus sit prius sua specie, quia forma eius essencialis nobilior

and also for the fourth (property) which has no essence distinct from the subject.

But God has the power of really separating the essence of a substance from its accidents and of preserving its being without any quality or quantity or even essential parts.

For the parts of a being do not necessarily give it existence.

Why should not God be able, even without

10. separare *deest MS.*; *ib.* suffi^e *MS.*; *ib.* omis (omnipotens?) *MS.* 12. grose *MS.* 14. puite *MS.* 15. 9distncti *MS.* 16. p instans *under line MS.* 22. omis (omnipotens?) *MS.*

8. Here the author begins to develope a theory of which not a trace has yet been found in any other of Wyclif's works already published, and which seems contrary to his well-known doctrine — the denial of absolute accidents.

the concourse of the genus, to create a species? His power is infinite.

quam propria forma essencialis speciei, non videtur oportere quod deus — qui est undique et per consequens ante genus et post genus alicuius speciei, simpliciter infinite sufficiencie, et in ipso genere — quod talis non possit sine exigua et velut nulla concausacione generis possit et ante genus et in genere et post illud genus dare ipsi speciei *esse* post genus ordine essenciali. Quid enim mille milia equorum fortissimorum bene applicati ad trahendum aratrum in agro requirerent contraccionem unius musce? Quanto minus deus requirit contraccionem alicuius creature diminute et parvule comparacione sui ad causandum quemcunquelibet effectum! Quod si sic est, poterit et substanciam sine quocunque accidente sibi realiter condistincte conservare; quamvis non possit esse aliqua substancia post deum nisi habeat relacionem | causati ad deum illi substancie condistinctam, nec illam (227[b]) oportet esse relacionem realem et spiritualem de genere relacionis, cum illi non correspondeat relativum in deo consimilem. Cum enim non possumus videre omnes angulos in quibus iacent veritates abscondite, et deus [sit] undique et in omni angulo omnis sufficiencie simpliciter infinite, quid de infinitis pocius diffinire quod deus talia non possit?

A million of powerful horses do not need the help of a fly to draw a plough.

Thus He might create a substance without accidents; there would indeed be relation — that of the creature to God; but this is only fictive, not real.

We must be equally in guard against denying God's power, and ascribing to Him what is absurd.

Verumptamen utrobique cavendum est ne omnipotencie dei fiat blasphemia, ascribendo sibi quod est simpliciter impossibile, et per consequens omnino irracionabile, vel denegando sibi quod ipse scit sibi possibile. "Noli" ergo "altum sapere", sed time, stans contentus in qualicunque noticia, quod accidens, ut est unum de quinque universalibus, est forma universalis inexistens rei post et secundum completum *esse* individuum; et quamlibet talem potest deus (si sibi placuerit) extra substanciam in sua puritate et sua pura manencia conservare. Nec videtur sequi, si albedo seipsa et nulla alia forma est *substanciam esse albam* (et ita consimiliter de aliis accidentibus realibus) quod igitur non possit esse albedo nisi ipsa sit *substanciam esse albam*. Sic enim situs meus

An accident is a form which has a different essence from its subject, and can be separated therefrom.

Whiteness *is* the being white of a substance;

5. gꝑ *MS.* 7. quo *pro* quid *MS.* 11. cāe *pro* creature *MS.*
12. ꝙ cūqlibꝫ *MS.* 21. sit *deest MS.* 26. racōnalᵒ! *MS.*

15. *Relacionem.* Relation was considered by Schoolmen to be an accident, but only relation of a certain sort. 33. *Conservare.* See *note*, p. 77.

seipso est *me esse situatum*. Nisi forte dicatur quod albedo per informacionem sibi quodammodo distinctam sit *substanciam esse albam*, quamvis illa informacio nequaquam possit esse *substanciam esse albam*. Et licet albedo possit esse sine substancia quam informaret propter ipsum albedinis absolutum *in se esse*, tamen informacioni illa albedo (cum sit per se respectivum) non poterit sic sine albedine subsistere.

but may it not be otherwise? Whiteness in a subject gives it a certain determination; but if the determination should not take place, there would still remain the essence of whiteness.

3. infe *MS*.

CAPITULUM DECIMUM TERCIUM.

The first three Universals are said to be predicated, the others to inhere; because those are deeper and greater in importance; and yet the reality of their existence is doubted; whereas the others are more striking and yet might be conceived as merely fictions of the mind. And it may be that Porphyrius only thought the 3 former to be also logical entities, and so used the word predicate.

Cum autem universalia quinque insint et predicentur de hiis quorum sunt universalia, quorum prima tria per *predicari* sunt descripta et non per *esse*, ultima vero duo per *inesse:* igitur factum est, quia ultima duo universalia sunt sicud exterius in superficie rei apparencia, prima autem tria sicud interius in profundo latencia; igitur ultima duo per *inesse* sunt descripta. Sed quia de primis tribus multum fuit dubium si subsisterent vel si essent in solis a mundis purisque intellectibus posita, igitur non per *esse* sed per *predicari* illa descripsit; vel quia prima tria habuerunt magnam, licet nimis latentem, | existenciam; ultima autem duo pura, licet apparentem 228[a] existenciam. Ideo ultima duo, ne videntur solum esse in nomine, [non] per *predicari*, sed per *inesse* descripsit. Prima autem tria, ne propter sui magnam existenciam viderentur auffugere deminutum *esse* logicale, per *predicari* sunt descripta, iubente vel permittente deo, vel quia putavit prima tria solum et pure esse in intellectum universalia.

Et cum mencio facta est et nunc et prius de *predicari*, videtur dicendum quot modis est predicacio, et quotupliciter aliquid de aliquo predicetur.

There are three sorts of predication, the greatest, the medium, and the least, according to the intensity with which subject and predicate are united.

Cum autem hoc verbum *predico*, *predicas*, componatur de *pre* et *dico*, *dicas* (quod est copulare), *predicacio* tantum videtur uno modo sonare, sicud precopulacio. Igitur sicud differencia vel distancia est triplex: maxima, scilicet essencialis et realis, media, scilicet realis et non essencialis, et minima, videlicet differencia racionis: sic videtur quod predicacio, ut est copulacio vel unio alicuius ad aliud, est triplex: maxima, que diceretur essencialis et realis, media, que diceretur realis et [non] essencialis, et minima, que diceretur predicacio secundum

1. Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *Blank space for Initial C MS.* 3. qr (tro) *MS.* 10. a[uidis] *MS.* 15. non *deest MS.* 31. esse *MS.* 32. non *deest MS.*

racionem, quam alii dicunt predicacionem secundum habitudinem.

The greatest is predication of something essential to the subject; as: "Man is an animated being."

Et 2m hoc, illud quod per se primo est res ipsa, vel in ipsa re, ita quod est essenciale intrinsecum rei, maxime unitur rei. Et sic maxima predicacione de re predicatur: sicud, "Homo est animal".

The next is the predication of something real in, but not essential to, the subject; as, "A is white"; this predication is real but not essential else.

Illud autem quod realiter intrinsece, sed non essencialiter sed accidentaliter, unitur rei, qua res, non est simpliciter ens vel simpliciter quid, sed est res realiter intrinsece *esse aliculusmodi*; illud predicatur de re realiter, sed non essencialiter; sicud dicendo "Sor est albus", predicatur albedo de Sorte realiter non essencialiter, cum realiter intrinsece uniatur sibi sicud modus suus realis, intrinsecus, non autem essencialis, et est realiter intrinsece ipsi Sorte esse Sortem album. Et talis predicacio est realis, non essencialis, et media; et unio huiusmodi rei ad rem est unio media.

The third is logical predication, neither essential nor real, but in which something *is* truly predicated of something.

Tercia autem et minima predicacio diceretur predicacio secundum racionem, sicud est quedam non maxima, essencialis et realis, nec media realis non essencialis, sed minima unio secundum racionem (rei tamen ad *esse*); et illo modo quod non ab intrinseco essencialiter vel
228b accidentaliter, sed penitus extrinsece | et ab extrinseco adiacet rei et unitur rei, secundum racionem tantum predicatur de re minima predicacione. Et sic encia logicalia predicantur de re reali, ut: "*deum amari a me, deum diligi a Sorte, deum significari per talem terminum, deus.*" Et sic de aliis; ut, *lapidem videri a me, bonum vel malum hominis divulgari per mundum* etc. predicantur ista minima predicacione secundum racionem.

Thus when we say, "God is loved by me", "this stone is seen by me", these argue nothing real in God or in the stone.

Examples of various true predications of this kind in Holy Scripture.

Et istiusmodi predicacionis sunt iste vere predicaciones scripture sacre: "Johannes Baptista est Helias", Cristus enim unigenitus dei omnipotens dixit: "Si wultis recipere, ipse est Helias." Igitur verum est hoc dictum: "Johannes est Helias." Sic a simili spiritus sanctus per Joseph dixit, Gen. 41°; "Septem boves pulchre et septem spice plene septem ubertatis anni sunt." Igitur hoc est verum dictum ad sensum quem spiritus sanctus wult esse verum in hiis verbis.

The subject and predicate are here joined

Et sicud ens logicum (ut, gracia exempli, *deum cognosci a me*) penitus ab extrinseco unitur et predi-

27. ẟrl *MS.* 16. sed unio *pro* et unio *MS.* 20. nec *pro* non *MS.*
33. vm9 *MS.*; *ib.* accipere *MS.*

36. Gen. XLI, 26.

by a copula which is quite extrinsical; it makes no real difference to God whether He be known by me or not; and He is certainly not known essentially.

catur de deo secundum racionem et non essencialiter, cum tunc deus essencialiter cognosceretur a me, nec secundum realitatem; cum autem reale accidens adiacet deo, cum possit deo deesse quod ipse cognoscitur a me; sic deus verbo suo omnipotenti dicendo potest addere rem realem alteri penitus extrinsece et ab extrinseco unire et facere predicari de illa non 2^m quod esset ens aliqua intrinseca essencialis vel accidentalis realitas, vel quod 2^m aliquam essencialitatem vel realitatem esset sibi unita, sed quod solum 2^m modum quemdam vel racionem unitur sibi; qui modus vel que racio sufficit ad hoc ex ordinacione dei omnipotentis, ut hoc de illo minima predicacione predicetur. Et ubi talis modus inter rem et aliam rem realem tenet, vel eciam circa rem realem et rem racionis, ibi predicacio illa habet locum; et ubi non, ibi non erit talis predicacio. Et sicud alicuius ad aliquid—puta, alicuius a se ipso, — nulla penitus est differencia, ita eciam alicuius de aliquo nulla penitus est predicacio.

When this is the case, we have logical predication.

Why is it more true to say that John is Elias, than that Peter is Paul? Because Christ's Word has effected this union, and we know not if it exists in the other case. This identity, besides, is not personal, but figurative.

Quod si queratur quare pocius verum est dicere quod "Johannes est Helias" quam quod "Petrus est Paulus", vel "lapis est lignum", vel "deitas est humanitas"; respondetur quod ex efficaci verbo, quod Cristus est, "per quod facta sunt omnia", inter Johannem et Heliam currit unio | secundum racionem, que racio pertinens et [229a] sufficiens est ex ordinacione dei ut Helias de Johanne minimo genere predicacionis predicetur. Sic autem non factum est inter Petrum et Paulum; vel si, nobis insciis, inter eos factum consimiliter 2^m talem non essencialem, non realem, sed racionalem unionem de se predicantur; et ita de aliis. Et Joannes non personaliter est Helias; et similiter septem boves non suppositaliter vel secundum ydemptitatem numeralem sunt septem anni, sed figuraliter.

Can we say: The goat Abraham offered was figuratively Christ; therefore it was Christ? No, for not every figure suffices for this figurative

Et si dicatur: "Hircus quem immolavit Abraham pro filio suo Ysaac figuravit Cristum; igitur fuit figuraliter Cristus, igitur hircus ille fuit Cristus; respondetur quod non quecunque figuracio inter rem et rem reddit unam illarum esse figuraliter reliquam, et sic in predicacione secundum racionem vel 2^m habitudinem illam esse illam; sic enim quodlibet de quolibet predicaretur. Sed sicut

7. em'e (vivere?) *MS.* 14. t̂t *MS.* 25. ĉt *MS.* 28. nob̂ ıſcie *MS.*

17. *Ad aliquid.* I have let the text stand, but I think it ought to be *ab aliquo.*

differencia 2^{m} racionem tantum habet suum per se primum et proprium modum qui non ubique, sed alicubi, et alicubi non currit, sic predicacio 2^{m} racionem tantum habet consimiliter modum suum primum et proprium non inter quaslibet res, sed inter aliquas et aliquas non currentem. Et volens investigare quare inter illa et non inter ista currit predicacio 2^{m} racionem tantum, querat, si potest, in secreto et abscondito consilio dei.

Nec est novum significatum de tali predicacione 2^{m} habitudinem sive 2^{m} racionem, sed est antiquum sacramentum, cum et patres (ut Sanctus Thomas, Egidius, et ceteri doctores) concedant quod *rosa est flos*, nulla rosa existente in tali predicacione; et in tali predicacione dicit Ewangelium Johannis primo, "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat," iuxta lecturam et pausam sancte Romane ecclesie. Et sicut supra dictum est quod grossi solum differenciam essencialem et non 2^{am} vel terciam racione percipiunt sed fide, et tamen sapientes ultra fidem omnes illas 3^{es} 2^{m} plus et minus eciam racione capiunt; sic et hoc de triplici supradicta predicacione. Nam et multi non capiunt quod albedo predicetur de substancia, cum tunc (ut estimant) substancia esset albedo! Sed tamen albedo, sicut et sanitas, vere predicatur
229b de substancia; | ut, querenti quid dicis de amico meo, respondetur quod dico esse sanum. Ecce *esse sanum*, quod est sanitas, dicitur de substancia *amico*. Et secundum [hoc] cum sic dicitur, vere et naturaliter est ita quod deus diligitur a regina mundi. Unus sensus est quod in veritate et a parte rei circumscripta nostra affirmacione est quod deus diligitur a regina mundi. Et ille sensus est verus. Si autem intelligeretur quod *deum diligi a regina mundi secundum unionem realem uniretur et predicaretur de deo*, et per consequens secundum predicacionem realem, non est sensus ille concedendus; et sic de aliis loqucionibus, ubi predicacio secundum racionem tantum habet veritatem et locum et non realis vel essencialis. Et sicut differencia racionis tantum ad *ab aliquo* vere differt, licet non essencialiter nec realiter, sic predicacione secundum racionem tantum ad *de aliquo* vere predicatur licet non [essencialiter], ut iam dictum est. Et sicut nemo potest negare quin *deum*

identity; some do, and some do not; who will know the reason why, let him search in the hidden counsels of God.

This is no new doctrine, but one admitted by all the Fathers and Doctors; they explain many things thereby.

Many of the unlearned do not know this; nor will they admit that whiteness can be predicated of a substance, for then the substance would be whiteness! This abstract noun only stands for the affirmation of something concrete.

Of course, this predication is true only when taken in its proper sense; if made to mean another sort of predication, it becomes false. God is loved by St. Peter; this is undeniable; but though true, it is a predicate of mere reason. As the Father

21. p̂dicat^{r} *MS.* 27. hoc *deest MS.* 28. r'gia *MS.* 30. r'gia *MS.*
40. essencialiter *deest MS.*

differs truly, but not really, from the Godhead, so Elias is truly John, but not really nor personally so.

diligi a sancto Petro, quod est inter ens racionis vere et tantum solum secundum racionem, sicud solum est ens racionis, predicatur de deo qui summe et maxime est ens; sic non est negandum quin res realis vere (sed 2^{m} racionem tantum) differt; ut patet de patre in divinis et divina essencia. Unde, ut dictum est, cum Cristus dixit, "Si wultis recipere, Joannes et Helias," vere predicatur Helias de Johanne, sed non personaliter, realiter, vel essencialiter, sed 2^{m} racionem.

However this may be explained, few are able to conceive of such predication, in matters not of faith, as few can conceive of the corresponding difference.

Illam autem specialem racionem dicunt aliqui figuralitatem non quamcunque, sed que inter illos constituta est, reddens vere unum esse reliquum, non realiter sed 2^{m} racionem tantum. Verum, sicud rei realis ad rem realem differenciam secundum racionem tantum, ut dictum est, pauci possunt capere, saltem preter vel ultra fidem, sic et predicacionem 2^{m} racionem tantum propter sui minimam tenuitatem.

Yet the difficulties made are mere sophisms, confusing the meanings of 'truly' and 'really'.

Nec valent sophismata, ut: "Si Joannes est Helias, et Helias fuit et vixit humanitus pluribus centennis annorum ante Cristum, quod igitur sic Joannes." Et: "Si Joannes vere est Helias, igitur realiter est Helias"; nisi *ly* "realiter" dicat sensum talem quod preter nostram affirmacionem a parte rei est quod Johannes est Helias.

What is true, is true in a certain way, and this way is real; but if it followed that 'truly' meant 'really', then the Father, truly different from the Godhead, would be really so.

Nec: "Si Johannes est Helias, igitur substancialiter vel accidentaliter realiter"; sed sufficit quod modaliter | sive secundum modum; et sic tamen vere est Helias. 230ª
Et dato quod omnis veritas sit realitas, et omnis modus sit realitas, cum tamen non omnis veritas 2^{m} suum primum per se modum sit realitas, sicud nec omnis modus 2^{m} suum per se primum modum essendi est realitas, non sequitur: "Si vere et modaliter Johannes est Helias, quod igitur realiter", nisi equivocando in *ly* "realiter", ut est dictum: quia sic argueretur quod persona patris in divinis realiter differret ab essencia vel distinguitur, quia aliquid predicaretur de divina essencia et non de persona patris; et econtra.

We need not be ashamed to adduce instances taken from Theology. Two sorts of notional predication a notional entity

Nec erubescimus hic exempla theologica inducere; quia finem nostre cognicionis in scriptura sacra constituere debemus. Et 2^{m} iam superius dicta, predicacio 2^{m} racionem tantum videtur habere sub se duos modos: aut quia res racionis tantum predicatur de aliquo, et illa, sicud non potest esse nisi res racionis tantum, sic

19. ce te^{nis} *MS.*

non potest predicari nisi secundum racionem tantum; aut quia res realis de se de re essencialiter et realiter alia vere predicatur, et hoc 2^{m} racionem tantum, quam deus scit. Et potest constituere inter rem unam et rem aliam 2^{m} quam inter se unirentur et de se predicarentur, non minus quam ipse scit; et potest constituere differenciam racionis tantum, vel ens racionis tantum, quod tamen vere et concretive de re realissima predicatur.

predicated of another, or a real thing truly predicated of another real thing, this truth depending upon God's ordinance. For He can make a difference to exist, or a notional entity to be true of a real thing.

Et vocando predicacionem essencialem, modo quo dictum est, maximam, et realem non essencialem aproprietate mediam, et 2^{m} racionem tantum minimam, tunc res realis de se ipsa predicacione essenciali predicatur sed nequaquam predicacione 2^{m} racionem tantum, nec predicacione reali non essenciali. Forma autem realis in re, condistincta realiter ab ipsa re in qua est, predicatur predicacione non essenciali, sed reali non essenciali. Res autem racionis tantum de se ipsa et de quocumque probabiliter solum secundum racionem predicatur. Et prima divisio predicacionis est in realem et in predicacionem 2^{m} racionem tantum. Et realis in duo dividitur: scilicet, in essencialem realem, et in realem non essencialem. Et materia de istis predicacionibus diligenter videtur pensanda; et quidem hoc nimis modicum dictum est supplendum, et si quid
230b falsum admixtum | est reiciendum. Et sic predicacio, ita et differencia, dividitur in realem et racionis tantum; et realis in realem essencialem et in realem non essencialem.

A real thing is predicated of itself essentially; a form in a real thing, really but not essentially; a notional entity can only be predicated notionally. Thus predication is divided into real and notional; real, into essential and non-essential. This very inadequate sketch of the matter requires much consideration, development, and possibly correction.

Quod si queratur argumentum faciens fidem quod debeat esse talis triplex predicacio, respondetur supponendo quod completus et perfectus ascensus gradualis, et similiter descensus, debet habere minimum, medium, et maximum. Propter talem perfectum gradualem ascensum et descensum in perfeccione angelorum in celo ponitur triplex ierarchia: maxima sive suprema, media, et minima sive infima; et quelibet illarum adhuc dividitur in ordinem illius ierarchie, supremum, et medium, et infimum. Et sic sunt novem chori angelorum. Sic quod predicacio essencialis realis: ut, "Sor est homo", est maior quam predicacio realis non essencialis, ut dicendo: "Sor est albus"; et quia talis descensus gradualis ipsius predicacionis debet esse perfectus et

How do we prove these three degrees of predication? Thus: if there is any difference in perfection, we must admit a greater, a less and a least. This order obtains amongst the Angels, and the three hierarchies being again divided into

10, 11. app'ete *MS.* 15. ipsi re *MS.* 17. ipso (!) *MS.* 18. pb'r *MS.*

three, we have the nine choirs of Angels.

completus, igitur ex supposicione debet habere predicacionem maximam (que est realis essencialis), et mediam (que est realis non essencialis) et infimam (que est secundum racionem tantum).

Each of these orders of predication is also divided into three.

Examples.

Et quelibet illarum trium predicacionum debet habere adhuc tres gradus, maximum, medium, et minimum. Maximus gradus predicacionis realis essencialis esset predicacio essencialis formalis tantum: ut, "pater est deus". Medius gradus predicacio realis essencialis sicud materialis tantum: ut "pater est deitas". Sic in predicacione reali non essenciali prima formalis tantum, ut: "Sor est albus", secunda mixtum ut, "Sor est pater", tercia, ut pure materialis ut, "Sor est quantum". Sic igitur, predicacione secundum racionem tantum, quedam est sicud formalis tantum: ut, "Sor est singularis", "homo est universalis", "deus diligitur a petro", etc. Quedam, sicud mixtum formalis et materialis: ut "communitas speciei humane est singularis". Sicud enim humanitas, communis homo individuus est, sicud materia sic singularitas videtur esse sicud materia communitatis speciei humane, uno modo; et alio modo, sicud forma quedam penitus extrinseca. Quedam autem est sicud materialis tantum: ut, "Johannis est Helias". Sicut enim in re quoddam est sicut essenciale pure formale, quoddam sicud pure materiale, | quoddam sicud mixtim; sic et 231[a] in predicacionibus est iudicandum.

Other divisions.

Eciam est sciendum quia est predicacio realis essencialis rei realis de re reali, et est predicacio realis non essencialis rei realis de re reali; et ille gradus est minor priore; igitur pro complemento talis gradualis descensus predicacionis rei realis de re reali oportet esse predicacionem secundum racionem tantum: ut, "Dies est lacio solis super terram", "Johannes est Helias", "quod factum est in ipso vita erat", etc. Et predicacio 2m racionem tantum rei realis de re reali habet suam propriam materiam, sic quod non cuiuslibet rei de alia est predicacio 2m racionem tantum, sicud et alie predicaciones suam habent materiam propriam in qua versantur. De differencia eciam maxima, media, et minima, est arguendum sicud de predicacione.

23. et *pro* est (!) *MS.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUARTUM.

Ulterius secundum quod silogisacio expositoria videtur fundari super predicacione. Ideo pro presenti apparet quod, si medium fuerit singulare, si tunc aliquid predicatur de illo medio predicacione essenciali et formali, quidquid tunc affirmabitur vel negabitur proporcionabiliter de illo quolibet quod sic de medio predicatur: ut, si *a* singulare fit predicacione essenciali et formali *b*, et *a* sit *c* vel *d* (vel non sit) tunc erit: *b* consimiliter est *c* vel *d* (vel non sic est). Verumptamen, quia ars silogisandi expositorie vel aliter, requirit diffusum tractatum, ideo ad presens de illa arte ulterius supersedemus, et he sophisticaciones contra universalia possunt tolli.

The expositorial syllogism is that in which the middle term is a singular. This requires a long tractate, but setting aside other questions for the present, we need only refute objections to the Universals brought forward under the name of this syllogism.

Nam cum arguitur, "Omnis res est singularis; species humana est res, igitur est singularis", negatur maior. Et si dicatur quod inductive patet, dicitur quod non, quia ibi est distribucio tam pro rebus communibus quam singularibus; modo de nulla re communi demonstrata verum est dicere quod ipsa est singularis. Et cum dicitur: "Omne genus generalissimum substancie est asinus; sed homo est genus generalissimum substancie; igitur homo est asinus", negatur consequencia. 231b Hoc | enim medium (scilicet, "genus generalissimum substancie"), non distribuitur pro aliqua speciali substancia, sicut nec supponit pro aliqua speciali substancia, sed solum pro substancia generalissima; nec est ille terminus, "genus generalissimum," distribuibilis, sicud nec ille terminus "Sor"; igitur quo ad formam arguendi idem est in toto ac si argueretur: Genus generalissimum substancie est asinus, et homo est genus generalissimum substancie; igitur homo est asinus". Et consimiliter non valet argucio: "Omnis essencia divina

"Every *thing* is singular; mankind is a *thing*: therefore mankind is singular. Major denied. Proved by induction. Induction denied, because it evidently cannot apply to Universals.

"The Genus Substance is identical with an ass; man is identical with the genus substance: man is an ass."

Here again we have a fallacy, for 'Genus Substance' is not taken distributively. A like fallacy

1. Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *Blank space for initial U MS.*

9. *Tunc erit.* "Then this will be true." Supply *verum quod.*
18. *Modo.* Perhaps a mistake for *quomodo,* itself a mistake for *quoniam.*

as regards the Trinity.

est pater in divinis; filius dei est essencia divina; igitur filius dei est pater in divinis". Nec sequitur: "Nullus homo est asinus; genus generalissimum substancie est homo; igitur genus generalissimum substancie est asinus." Non enim subsumitur sub medio distributo, sed suprasumitur magis commune; et hoc viciat formam arguendi. Sic non sequitur: "Nulla persona divina est trinitas; essencia divina est persona; igitur essencia divina non est trinitas."

But, says our opponent, how then can we form any argument with these three terms in Celarent, man being the middle term? We should have to assume that the genus substance is identical with every particular man. We cannot conclude anything from: Every horse feels; now the Universal Horse is a horse; unless we added that it is a particular horse.

Sed querit adversarius: quomodo ergo in illis 3^bus terminis, *homo, genus generalissimum substancie*, et *asinus*, debent argui in Celarent, ponendo *ly* "homo" pro medio? Dicitur quod in minori ad designandum quod genus generalissimum subsumeretur sub homine deberet sic dici; "Sed genus generalissimum substancie formaliter est homo eciam particularis," vel quod "genus generalissimum substancie formaliter et particulariter est homo: tunc concludetur. Nec sufficit sic arguere: "Omnis equus sentit: sed species equina formaliter est equus;" sed oportet assumi quod formaliter et particulariter sit equus; alias non fit subsumpcio et subdistribucio. Oportet enim expresse designari fieri pertinentem subsumpcionem, etsi plurimum, causa brevitatis, hoc pretermittitur. Eciam non sequitur: "Iste pater generat, et iste pater est essencia divinas: igitur illa generat". Nisi enim a parte rei res medii sylogismi expositorii sit in prima forma, res minoris extremitatis ipsa erit inpertinens ad coniungendum a parte rei res extremorum. Oportet ergo in syllogismo expositorio denotari quod res medii in prima forma sit res minoris

Example from the mystery of the Trinity.

extremitatis; ut sic sumendo: | "Iste pater generat, et 232a
iste pater in propria sua forma sive proprie formaliter est essencia divina," tunc concluditur quod "essencia divina generat". Sed tunc minor est inpossibilis, cum tunc pater non distingweretur secundum suam propriam formam ab essencia divina; quod est inconveniens, cum iste pater 2^m suam propriam formam sit unica subsistencia divina, et nullo modo potest esse plures persone. Essencia autem divina necessario est 3^es essencie divine.

7. m͡o *pro* non *MS.* 38. c͡e *pro* essencie *MS.*

38. *Essencie.* I have rendered the abbreviation in this way, because I can find no other more likely word to put in its place; but this cannot be correct. Wyclif was never accused of such a heresy as that. The copyist must have made a slip for *persone.*

Sic similiter in alio zophismate arguendo de Sorte et specie humana, et cursum, est dicendum.

Quod autem philosophus et ceteri sequaces non exprimunt talem unitatem, ydemptitatem, vel composicionem medii ad minorem extremitatem [est] quia presupponunt eam denotari usitate in eorum modo loquendi. Unde ad tantum confitetur philosophus primo Physicorum eciam tempore sui predicacionem alicuius de aliquo solum 2m formam viguisse et non aliam, quod ipse dicat: "Non dicimus quod statua est lapis, sed statua est lapidea." Ecce non potuit negare quod statua est lapis, cum lapis sit statua, quia res sic figurata; et tamen dicit "non *dicimus* quod statua est lapis, sed lapidea". Unde quia proprie predicatum est forma, subiectum vero materia (primo physicorum) iuxta usitatam tunc locucionem oporteret quod, si vere dicatur quod "Iste pater est essencia divina," tunc "iste pater in propria sua forma sive proprie formaliter est divina essencia". Quia autem verum et katholicum est quod "iste pater est essencia divina", sed non 2m talem predicacionem vel copulacionem, sicud tempore Aristotelis fuit verum quod statua est lapis, quamvis non soleat dici. Ideo conceditur katholice quod "iste pater generat" et "iste pater est essencia divina", et negatur consequens quod "essencia divina generat". Oporteret autem sumi pro unione extremorum quod: "iste pater *proprie formaliter* est essencia divina, vel 2m formam suam propriam est essencia divina."

Aristotle and his followers do not express themselves thus, but he himself confesses that he uses the popular node of speech.

A statue is of stone, i. e. is *a stone* modified in a certain way.

The Father is God from a certain point of view. This restriction must be understood in both cases.

And when the middle term is understood differently, we have a fallacy, either against faith,

Unde queritur ab adversariis eciam non Cristianis quid dicerent ad talem arguciam: "Ista statua est lapidea, et ista statua est lapis: igitur lapis est lapideus."
232b Argumentum negare | non possunt, et consequens sonaret eis inconvenienter, quod lapis est sibi ipsi materia ex qua esset lapis. Quia ergo ista statua solum sicut materialiter, et non proprie formaliter, est lapis, oportet iuxta eos assumi: "Ista statua est lapidea, et ista statua est *proprie formaliter* lapis: igitur lapis est lapideus."

or against reason,

Ignorancia ergo artis sylogisandi expositorie et secundum universalisacionem medii multos depressit. Et presumitur quod hodie, si non tam per ecclesiam materia benedicta increate trinitatis esset lucide diffinita, multi

and in any case proceeding from ignorance of the expositorial syllogism;

5. est *deest MS.* 15. p. phys. *underlined MS.*

this ignorance might lead many astray, were it not for the dogmatical declarations of the Church. For whatever form of argument is directed against the Universals, attacks the mystery of the Holy Trinity likewise, in one way or another.

graviter deviarent. Sufficit autem quod fides necessitet ad recte credendum. Et a deridentibus datum modum silogisandi, queritur, propositis istis tribus terminis: *iste pater*, *generat*, et *essencia divina*, quod faciant sylogismum expositorium ex eis ad illam conclusionem in forma: "essencia divina generat," quamcunque bonam formam sylogisandi dabunt, sic quod antecedens erit impossibile sicud consequens, eandem in materia universalium retinebunt. Si autem dicunt quod illa in propria forma non est sylogisabilis expositorie, tunc nec illa et consimiles: "Species humana currit." Et dent regulam que indefinite in propria forma sit sylogisabilis, et que non.

It is therefore well to know how to reply to such sophistical subtleties.

Si autem vellent concludere "Quod est Essencia divina generat," sic et "hoc quod est species humana currit," et quodcunque argumentum pretenditur ostensivum vel ad impossibile contra universalia rerum in essendo; videtur consimiliter peccare in materia vel in forma vel in utrisque contra verissimam materiam sancte trinitatis. Ideo utile videtur in materia rerum creatarum videre et scire dissolvere argucias sophisticas contra communitatem rerum in essendo; ut ex hinc materiam altissimam et secretissimam fidei cristiane, exclusis erroribus, valeam secure tenere.

6. quacunque *MS.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUINTUM.

Sed tamen alique instancie videntur difficiles in hac materia. Oportebit enim eodem argumento quo arguitur universalia dare communissimam entitatem deo et omnibus rebus suis; quod videtur multipliciter inconveniens.

Other arguments against the Doctrine of Universals, bearing upon the transcendent entity, common both to God and to His creatures.

Primo, quia tunc quilibet effectus esset ita pulcher essencialiter sicud primum ens, quia pulcritudine essenciali communissima dei et aliorum. Sed certum est
233[a] quod omnis essencialis pulchritudo | dei est simpliciter infinita, igitur quilibet effectus secundum communissimam essencialem pulchritudinem dei et suam esset simpliciter infinite pulcher.

(1) Every being would be as beautiful as God; i. e. infinitely so.

Item, tunc talis entitas vel bonitas formaliter communis deo et effectui esset divinior quam deitas: quod est oppositum in adiecto. Et consequencia videtur tenere, quod illa entitas cuilibet rei formaliter inest; igitur, cum illa entitas sit communior quam deitas, et hec communior non in malo sed in bono, igitur divinior.

(2) Transcendent entity would be more divine than God Himself.

Item tercio: "Ista entitas anologa est deitas, et est effectus purus; igitur est non deitas (ab inferiori ad suum superius vel convertibili) cum omnis effectus purus sit non deitas; et ex consequenti; si ista entitas est non deitas, igitur ista entitas non est deitas." Et sic illa eadem precise entitas est deitas et non est deitas: quod est contradiccio. Ymmo sic dicendo: ista entitas est deitas et ista entitas est non deitas, predicaret contradictoria in connexa de eodem penitus.

(3) This entity would at the same time be God and not God.

Item, 4[to], tunc essencialis bonitas et formalis ipsius rei esset melior quam ipsamet res; cum equus solum finite sit bonus, et bonitas sua transcendens esset infinita.

(4) The goodness and entity of anything would be infinite, though the thing were finite.

1. Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *Blank space for initial S MS.* 15. quia *MS.* 17. cuiuslibet *MS.*

22. After *deitas*, Suppl. *arguendo.* 29. *In connexa.* I have never met with this expression in any book of Scholastic Logic. I suppose *predicatione* is understood.

(5) God would in no wise be better than the lowest of His creatures.

Item, 5to, tunc primum ens nichil haberet formaliter ultra suum quemcunque exilem effectum: quod est inconvenientissimum. Et videtur consequencia tenere. Si enim primum ens, puta deus, habet formaliter infinitam bonitatem, et quilibet suus effectus eciam similiter habet formaliter infinitam bonitatem analogam.

(6) God's entity, being that of any stone, God and a stone would be one being.

Item, 6to, tunc penitus unum et idem esset deus et lapis: quod videtur inconveniens. Et patet consequencia; quia penitus illa una et eadem communissima entitas.

(7) All things would be one being; for each entity would be the same Transcendent one, and numerically the same.

Item, septimo, tunc penitus una et eadem numeralis entitas esset deus, lapis, equus, et sic de singulis. Et sic penitus idem in numero esset deus et omnis creatura; quod est inconvenientissimum. Et videtur patere consequencia; quia, signata quacunque entitate, ipsa est illa una et non plures; ille igitur est bonitas numeralis illa. Consequencia tenet, quia esse unum et non plura est esse numerale, sive unum in numero: igitur esse entitatem illam unam solum et non plures | illas est illam esse illam numeralem. Si igitur entitas 233b
illa est illa numeralis numeraliter et non pluraliter, igitur ipsa est numeralis.

(8) If each entity can be numbered, no one can be common with another.

Item, octavo: Omnis entitas est numeralis entitas: igitur nulla est communis pluribus. Antecedens arguitur, quia quacunque entitate data, ipsa est illamet singularis incommunicabiliter et numeraliter, cum sit illa non pluraliter nec communiter vel communicabiliter, sed ita singulariter et numeraliter est ipsa illamet, sicud Sor est Sor, alias idem possit esse commune sibi ipsi. Et sic a pari singularissimum esset sibi ipsi commune; quod est oppositum in adiecto, cum tunc esset communicabile multis.

(9) Every entity is individual; none therefore are universal. For entity supposes unity; and to be one is to be undivided in itself and divided from any other.

Item, nono: Omnis entitas est individua entitas: igitur nulla est communis pluribus entibus et entitatibus. Et antecedens arguitur; quia quelibet talis est indivisa in se ipso et divisa a quolibet alio, si est aliud ab ea: igitur est individua ex interpretacione nominis. Et antecedens patet; quia, cum quelibet talis entitas sit solum semel et nequaquam pluraliter ipsa illa entitas, igitur est indivisa in seipsa. Non enim est divisa in seipsam, sicud nec aliquid potest esse divisum in seipsum, cum

34. ans^r *MS.* 37. aus3 *MS.*

15. *Ille* no doubt stands here for *deus* in the preceding sentence.

tunc idem possit esse sui ipsius pars et totum: quod est inconveniens. Et quod sit divisa a quolibet alio, si est aliud ab ea, quia alietas divisio est: igitur etc.

Item, X^{mo}, tunc quilibet effectus summa unitate et ydemptitate esset idem et unum cum deo: quod videtur omnino impossibile, quia tunc pater et filius in divinis non essent plus unum et idem quam quicunque effectus, cum eis alias pater et filius maiori unitate et ydemptitate erunt unum et idem, quam effectus erit unitate et ydemptitate unum et idem cum deo: quod est contra assumptum. Et consequencia prima videtur patere, quia effectus unitate et ydemptitate entitatis transcendentis esset unum et idem cum deo; et talis unitas et ydemptitas esset summa entitas: igitur, etc.

(10) The unity of all things with God, being the greatest possible, or identity, there would be no difference between the unity of the Persons with the Godhead and that of His creatures.

Item XI°, tunc consimiliter est dare singularitatem communem hominibus individuis, sicud communem animalitatem. Nam, sicud commune est cum homine individuo esse animal, ita commune est cuilibet tali esse singularem; et si singularitas est communis pluribus, tunc oppo-
234^{a} sita de seipsis predicantur; | ut communitas de singularitate: quod videtur inconveniens: Ymmo, sic esset persona communis, sicud est animal commune. Et sic una et eadem persona divina esset omnis persona divina: quod est absurdum. Ymmo, cum persona ut huius[modi] sit individua subsistencia, et sic individua, et incommunicabilis pluribus personis, repugnat si una eademque persona esset plures persone.

(11) Each man being singular, there would be a universal singularity: which is absurd.

A person would be a universal, and one person would be many.

Item XII°, universalia, cum non agunt nec aliquid boni faciunt, ad quid prosunt mundo? Ymmo, cum homo individuus vivit feliciter et deifice, non sic autem potest communis humanitas, melior est homo singularis quam communis. Substancia enim que potest intelligere, velle, et feliciter vivere, dignior et melior est coram deo, atque accepcior; et que sic vivit quam que non sic potest. Et esset dare syllogismum communem, proposicionem communem, leccionem, cursum, et risum communem, etc. Queritur ergo: quid primo currit cursu communi, legit leccione communi? Non individuum, quia qua racione unum individuum et eadem racione aliud. Non substancia communis, cum illa non possit currere, etc.

(12) Universals have no activity; of what use are they in the world? An individual man may enjoy happiness and union with God; the Universal man cannot. Action is also universal; what is it that produces this universal act? Neither an individual nor the Universal substance.

24. modi *deest MS.* 26. ē *pro* si *MS.* 35. ſy^{m} *MS.* 37. currit currit *MS.*

(13) A property belongs to the species; thus the Universal man should be capable of laughter: which is absurd.

Item, XIII°. Si est propria passio a parte rei, ipsa erit propria passio speciei humane vel alterius; et sic risibilitas esset propria passio speciei humane; et sic humanitas speciei (vel species humana) esset risibilis et sic poterit ridere: quod non convenit, igitur etc.

Answers. (1) It is necessary to admit the existence of Universal Being.

Quantum ad primum argumentum conceditur quod oportet esse ens transcendens communissimum. Nam cum illo communissimo conceptu ens concipiatur in mente humana distincte conceptum, — alioquin nullo communi conceptu conciperetur distincte conceptum tali concepta: — tunc si illo conceptu ens distincte et determinate concipitur conceptum, et non singulare (quia non singulare plus unum quam quodlibet reliquum, nec quodlibet singulare distincte concipitur et determinate tali conceptu, cum tunc quilibet habens illum conceptum omnia distincte et determinate conciperet: quod est notorie falsum). Et consimili argumento arguitur quod non aliquod ens speciale; igitur ens communissimum omni enti.

We cannot say that Being is conceived distinctly, without any particular being distinctly conceived; for even should man not know what the object of his concept is, God must know it, and know that the concept is of a certain object. The same argument holds good of all Universal concepts.

Nec valet hic dicere quod illo conceptu ens concipitur distincte | [234b] singulare, sed nullum "singulare" distincte concipitur illo conceptu; ita quod *ly* singulare stet confuse tantum; quia tunc deus referret illam distinctam concepcionem ad rem conceptam distincte per eam et non possit scire ad quid vel ad que ipsam sic referret: quod est inconveniens. Et patet consequencia; quia deus distinctissime scit quod ista distincta concepcio est distincta concepcio rei concepte, et per adversarium non potest scire cuius vel quorum est distincta concepcio: igitur etc. Et idem argumentum est de primaria et distincta significacione terminorum communium secundum unam racionem essencialem non equivoce, sicud sunt tales, *homo*, *animal*, *lapis;* et sic de nominibus infinitis.

But the objection proves nothing, for the effect possesses the beauty of its cause only in a certain finite

Sed cum infertur ulterius quod effectus esset ita pulcher essencialiter sicud deus, quia haberet in se formaliter infinitam essencialem pulchritudinem, respondetur quod non sequitur; quia effectus etsi habet formaliter pulchritudinem essencialem, que est dei et omnium,

32. nobis *MS.*

17. *Falsum.* There is no doubt something wanting in the preceding sentence, of which I can make nothing. I have supposed that the end is missing.

habet tamen eam sic secundum quid, solum diminutive, et quodammodo tantum participative et equivoce respectu dei. Deus autem habet eam sic simpliciter, totaliter, et infinite perfecte, et omnino simpliciter. Et igitur non solum ex parte pulchritudinis essencialis cuiuslibet habite, sed ex non habendi res debent pulchre essencialiter estimari. Unde beatus Petrus in patria possidet summum similiter infinitum bonum; et deus possidet illud; tamen in possessione infinite est dicior, sicut potencior et sapiencior, quam beatus Petrus, quia infinito perfecciori modo possidet deus summum bonum quam beatus Petrus.

degree, whereas God possesses it absolutely. St. Peter in Heaven enjoys the same infinite happiness as God; but he does not enjoy it to an infinite extent.

Et per idem ad 7^{mum} argumentum hic superius motum potest dici. Nam etsi deus non haberet ultra suum exilem effectum in habito, quia et effectus formaliter haberet infinitam entitatem de gracia dei, tamen in habendo vel in modo habendi simpliciter infinite excedit; et sic plus habet, habendo transcendentem entitatem infinite quo ad modum habendi formaliter, quam quilibet suus effectus. Unde deus est formaliter deus. Et est simpliciter formaliter omnis bonitas simpliciter infinite; quod nullo modo effectis convenit. Vel dicendum quod deus eciam in habito superexcedit quemlibet effectum
235ª infinite. | Ultra enim et preter predicata que sunt perfeccionis simpliciter et analoga deo et creature, habet deus formalia predicata simpliciter perfeccionis que sibi solum possunt competere: ut quod ipse est deus omnipotens, creativus omnium, etc., sic quod, et habitis predicatis, et in modo habendi, infinite plus habet, nedum super exilem, sed super summum et optimum effectum.

This answer will also serve for the 7th Objection. For even if God had nothing beyond the lowest creature as to entity itself, He would still possess it in a way infinitely more perfect.

But we may also say that, beyond simple entity, God possesses special attributes that belong to no creature.

Pro materia secundi argumenti. Sciendum quod deus prius est ens incommunicabiliter quam ipse sit ens communicabiliter cum suis effectibus et causatis; et sic entitate que formaliter est deitas (et econtra) et tali entitate sive deitate precedit causaliter entitatem transcendentem, analogam formaliter sibi et effectibus, qua communicabiliter et non incommunicabiliter est ens cum aliis suis rebus. Unde, sicud deus ex tempore contingenter et graciose fecit se esse hominem aliis hominibus, ita cum deus eternaliter, formaliter, et sic incommunicabiliter cum aliis rebus, esset deus et ens;

(2) God's incommunicable entity precedes that by which He is one with all beings.

As God took flesh upon Himself in time so in eternity, He took this entity upon Himself,

1. du'mte *MS.* 5. q̄alibȝ *MS.* 13. ut si *MS.* 19. forª *MS.* 23. quo *MS.* 29. vltimum et *before* optimum *MS.*

in order to communicate it to the creatures that were to be.

pro gloria magnificencie et virtutis sue communicacione necessario eternaliter reddit se esse ens communicabiliter cum aliis rebus, causando necessario eternaliter entitatem analogam sibi et aliis, in qua formaliter cum aliis posset communicare. Et licet entitas illa analoga predicacione formali sit communior deitate, hoc tamen non adauget ut ipsa sit eciam aliquo modo divinior deitate, sed pocius reddit eam post deitatem esse divinam, cum deitas causacione sit communior illa entitate analoga, quia principiat illam entitatem analogam, que entitas seipsam non potest principiare. Et ultra: quidquid illa entitas causat vel principiat, hoc eciam prius ipsa deitas propter aliquam sui strictitudinem habet hoc quod non possit esse communis predicacione formali alicui post deum; sed propter sui simpliciter primevitatem et summitatem non potest predicacione tali communicari rebus posterioribus post deum, sed causacione. Et 2m aliquos predicacione secundum causam omnibus se communicat, ut volunt ex illo Jo. primo. "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat."

That entity is more universal in predication does not make it more divine than God; for God who is its cause, is more universal in causation, and it cannot be given to creatures but by God's creative act.

Therefore the extension of a predicate does not necessarily prove its perfection.

Et sic non semper maior latitudo predicacionis formalis unius | predicati respectu alterius arguit primum 235b divinius secundo, sicut nec maior latitudo differencie spiritus et corporis in homine, ad differenciam patris et filii in divinis, arguit perfeccius differre corpus et spiritum in homine quam patrem et filium in divinis. [Est] in homine et essencialis differencia inter spiritum et corpus, in divinis inter patrem et filium, realis non essencialis; est tamen infinite perfeccior differencia inter patrem et filium in trinitate deitatis quam inter spiritum et carnem in homine; sicut eciam maior latitudo parvitatis non arguit perfeccius parvum vel maiorem perfeccionem parvitatis, sed pocius minorem. Eciam maior est latitudo predicacionis formalis generis coloris quam speciei humane, cum de pluribus sit predicabilis formaliter ipse color, vel genus coloris, quam species humana. Est tamen species humana dignior genere coloris.

There is a difference between body and soul in man which is greater than that between the Father and the Son, yet the second difference makes for infinite perfection on both sides.

Colour has greater extension than humanity, yet the latter is nobler.

What makes for perfection is universality as to causation,

Sed hoc videtur regulariter verum quod bonum predicatum quanto alio est principiacione vel causacione communius, tanto ipsum origine vel auctoritate precedit; vel bonum predicatum in eodem genere, quanto in illo

12. p̑us *MS.* 15, 16. p̑menit̑o *MS.* 17. p9r℘ pt9 *MS.* 19. Jo. I. 3, 4. 22. wni *or* honi *pro* unius *MS.* 27. Est *deest MS.*

genere ordine essenciali est lacius predicacione formali, tanto dignius; quia tanto pluribus est tota substancialitas, vel totalis quantitas, vel qualitas, accio, vel passio, etc. Vel melius potest dici quod bonum predicatum respectu rei vel rerum non infinite sed finite perfeccionis, de quanto respectu talium rerum fuerit communius predicacione formali, de tanto divinius. Et si fuerit simpliciter per se communius predicacione formali respectu talium, tanto erit simpliciter et per se divinius. Si autem solum secundum quid predicacione formali fuerit communius, tunc eciam secundum quid erit melius. Et sic "esse coloratum", de quanto est communius predicacione formali quam species humana, de tanto est melius; non tamen est melius ac si "esse coloratum" predicacione formali simpliciter per se esset communius quo ad aliquas res finite perfeccionis, quam esset species humana quo ad easdem. Tunc "esse coloratum", sive genus coloris, esset simpliciter divinius quam species humana.

or as to anything good that is predicated; if one thing is simply more universal than another in this sense, it is simply more perfect; if with restrictions, its perfection is also restricted.

Et sic universaliter, si inter duo predicata bona quo
236ᵃ ad easdem res finite perfeccionis, unum fuerit | communius predicacione formali, tanto est divinius. Et si fuerit simpliciter et per se predicacione divinius, respectu autem rei simpliciter infinite perfeccionis, sive bonum predicatum simpliciter et per se predicacione formali, sit primum (sive minus commune sive maius commune) non est divinius vel minus divinum; cum sit undique infinite perfeccionis simpliciter quodlibet universale predicatum. Et sic ista quatuor predicata: ista res (demonstrando personam patris in divinis) *principium spiritus sancti*, *deus*, *ens*, quorum primum est proprium patri, secundum commune patri et filio tantum, tercium commune tribus personis divinis et non aliis rebus, 4^{tum} commune deo et creaturis, neutrum est reliquo magis vel minus divinum vel bonum, sed quodlibet simpliciter infinite bonum. Prima tamen tria sunt sine analogio et 4^{tum} est analogum, simpliciter deo conveniens predicacione formali et effectibus 2^{m} quid.

In general, of two things that are formally predicated of a third, the one which is most universal is most perfect. But in some cases, neither predicate is more perfect than the other as: *The Father*, *Principle of the Holy Ghost*, *God* and *Being*: each successively has greater extension, yet neither makes more for perfection.

Ubi autem predicata finite bonitatis, de quanto unum eorum respectu eorumdem respectuum est communius formali predicacione, de tanto melius. Et si simpliciter

When we have to do with predicates concerning creatures, the

32. q̃ɔ *pro* commune *MS.*

more universal of two, including the other in its extension, will be more perfect, if the predication be formal.

et per se communius, tunc et sic melius. Nec oportet, si genus pluralitate predicacione formali simpliciter et per se sit communius quam species humana, quod illud genus multis speciebus et pluribus individuis quam species humana [consistit], quod ergo genus plante sit simpliciter et per se melius specie humana: sed si respectu earundem rerum finite perfeccionis ita esset, tunc videtur hoc oportere sequi.

2. plu'ace *MS.* 3. humana quia species humana quia *MS.* 5. consistit *deest MS.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEXTUM.

Ad tercium argumentum respondetur quod consimile argumentum est zophisticum: "Illa essencia divina est filius in divinis; igitur non est pater in divinis; igitur est non pater in divinis. Certum quod est sophisticum. Unde negatur illa consequencia: "Ista entitas analoga est effectus purus; igitur est non deitas". Et quando assumitur: "Quilibet purus effectus est non deitas", verum est; "igitur, si illa entitas est purus effectus, tunc est non deitas", negatur argumentum. Et si dicatur hoc, arguitur ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative
236b sine distribucione inferioris | et superioris: "Ista entitas est caliditas; igitur ista entitas est non deitas, cum omnis caliditas sit non deitas, et econtra". Stat enim aliquid probari universaliter de inferiori, et non econtra, et tamen non de inferiori; sicut contingencia ad utrumlibet predicatur de omni humanitate, dicendo, "Omnis humanitas est contingens ad utrumlibet que potest esse et non esse," et non est verum quod entitas analoga est contingens ad utrumlibet. Sic ergo quod si arguatur ab una parte ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative, non tamen ceteris paribus, cum in consequente sit universaliter abnegacio deitatis de entitate analoga sicut fuit in antecedente, non stat universaliter negare aliquid de inferiori et non de superiori.

(3) The argument resembles this fallacy: "The Divine Essence is the Son: . is the Not-Father: . is not the Father." And as this is a fallacy, so is this one too: "Entity is an effect, therefore it is not God." To say: "We rise from particular to general entity, each of which we find to be effects and therefore not God, and conclude the same of Universal Entity", is a wrong process, for we arrive at a total denial of Deity to Entity, which is not legitimate.

Et, si arguitur; "illa entitas est res que non est humanitas; igitur est non humanitas:" dicitur quod non sequitur; sed bene sequitur quod *illa entitas est res*

You have no right, because Entity is something that is not God, to say that it excludes God.

1. Capitulum &c. *deest MS.* 2. *Blank space for initial A MS.* 13. illa *MS.* 14. sce *pro* stat *MS.* 24. mo *MS.*

4. The order of these words is very important. The Son is not the Father, but we cannot conclude thence that the Divine Essence is the Not-Father. 14. *Econtra.* Some words are missing here no doubt, denying the force of the objection; the reasons for the denial follow.

non deitas; et non sequitur, ultra: "est res non deitas," *igitur est non deitas:* cum in consequente sit abnegacio universalis deitatis de illa entitate et non in antecedente.

Other distinctions may be taken.

Alio modo potest distingwi illa: "illa entitas est non deitas"; quia vel *ly* "non deitas" tenetur materialiter significative et infinitanter, ita quod sit sensus: "Entitas est res que non est deitas," tunc illa est vera. Et non sequitur quod "illa entitas non sit deitas". Alio modo quod [si] *ly* "non deitas" teneatur formaliter, significative, et infinitanter, ita quod sit sensus quod "ista entitas sit nequaquam deitas; tunc est falsa. Et sequitur tunc ex illa quod "illa entitas non sit deitas" in tali sensu secundum regulam illam: ab affirmativo de predicato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito est bona consequencia; sed non sequitur 2^m^ primum sensum.

"No stone exists" may mean either the non-existence of any stone, and be true, or the existence of No stone; and be false.

Quod autem *ly* "non deitas" possit sic dupliciter accipi videtur patere *a simili;* quia ista proposicio: "verum et bonum est nullum lapidem existere" habet duos sensus, unum verum et alium falsum. Ut si *ly* "nullum lapidem existere" tenetur materialiter significative pro re que est non existencia lapidis, tunc est illa vera: "verum et bonum est nullum lapidem existere" quia hoc (demonstrando *verum est nullum lapidem existere*, quia *hoc est.* Igitur vel "est lapidem existere" vel "est non lapidem existere"; sed non primum, igitur secundum. Et per consequens | hoc verum et bonum est, *nullum lapidem* 237a
existere, in tali sensu. Alio modo accepitur *ly* "nullum lapidem existere" formaliter significative pro negacione, seu pro forma pure negative a parte rei contradictorie opposita huic veritati affirmative "lapidem existere".

In like manner Non-Deity may be affirmed of Being, but Deity cannot be denied of it without falsehood.

Et consimiliter videtur dicendum de duplici sensu talis proposicionis: "illa entitas analoga est non deitas." Est tamen advertendum quod si *ly* "lapidem existere" et *ly* "nullum lapidem existere" tenentur formaliter significative et non materialiter, tunc non sequitur hoc verum et bonum, puta; deus est: igitur est "lapidem existere" vel est "nullum lapidem existere".

We may also reply that entity may be predicated of non-Deity, but Deity may also be predicated thereof.

Tercia responsio est distingwendo illam: "Ista entitas analoga est non deitas" 2^m^ predicacionem duplicem. Uno modo quod *ly* "non deitas" predicetur sicut formaliter et adiective de *ly* "illa entitas"; et erit sensus

6. ƀ catine *MS.* 9. si *deest MS.* 9, 10. ƀ line *MS.* 20. ƀne *MS.*
23. deum *pro* verum *MS.* 28. ƀ tine *MS.*

quod "illa entitas est nequaquam deitas"; vel quod "isti entitati insit abnegacio deitatis", et hoc a parte rei; tunc sensus est falsus. Et in tali sensu infert quod "ista entitas non sit deitas". Alio modo quod *ly* "non deitas" predicetur sicud materialiter et sicut per se substantivum et substantivatum, ita quod sit sensus: "illa entitas analoga est res que est non deitas", vel, "cui a parte rei inest abnegacio deitatis vel *esse* vel racio deitatis". Et tunc antecedens est verum; et non sequitur ex illo quod ergo "illa entitas analoga non sit deitas". Et consimiliter dicitur de illa "Ista deitas est non filius in divinis". Et patet distinccio iam dicta *a simili.* Nam ista proposicio "Universale est singulare": quia vel *ly* "singulare" predicatur sicud formaliter et adiective, et erit sensus talis impossibilis: "universalitati inest vel convenit per modum forme singularitas et incommunicabilitas multis"; et in tali sensu bene sequitur: "Universale est singulare; igitur universale non potest communicari multis individuis per modum forme." Alio modo *ly* "singulare" predicatur sicud materialiter et sicud per se substantive. Tunc erit sensus: "Universale est res cui convenit vel inest singularitas"; et hoc est
237b verum, | quia universale animal est *iste equus*, cui inest singularitas. Et in tali sensu non sequitur: "Universale est singulare, igitur universale non potest communicari per modum forme multis individuis."

A like distinction may be applied to the question of the Trinity. We may also affirm that the Universal is a singular in the absurd sense of its being so formally (or *quà* Universal) and then the objection would have weight; or say that the Singular merely belongs to the Universal, and then there is no conclusion.

Et ultime due responsiones ad istam: "Illa entitas analoga est non deitas" videntur multum concordare et in eundem sensum tendere. Unde acceptande sunt plus quam prima. Si autem contenciosus aliquis minus expertus in vera logica vellet distincciones illas satis logice fundatas quas non intelligeret deridere et nollet eas admittere, tunc occurrendum videtur tali protervienti satis cum prima via respondendi. Et sic, si hic dicatur quare, loquendo de rebus extra, refugitur hic ad distinccionem terminorum et proposicionum, respondetur quia multiplicitas sensuum et significatorum a parte rei est obiective in terminis et proposicionibus; ideo satis licet et expedit in terminis et proposicionibus per quos illi sensus significantur et feruntur in disputa-

These last two answers seem preferable, but the first will do for such as do not know the right Logic.

If it be asked why, when we have to do with things, we discuss words and propositions, I answer that since we can only deal with things by

6. ſbſtatmū *MS.*; *ib.* ſbſtatmatū *MS.* 15. vlī *MS.*

14. *Quia.* There is again a probable gap before this word.

means of words, and words have many significations, we are forced to explain these. What is predicated of things is made known to us by words, and we must needs use distinctions on that account.

cione, distingwere et dividere multiplicacionem illarum sensuum et significatorum, sic obiective in terminis et proposicionibus existentem. Et si dicatur: "Tamen predicacio est a parte rei, preter terminos et proposiciones," verum est; sed distincta et convoluta, et non involuta et indistincta, sicud est sepe in terminis et proposicionibus. Et dicendum est eciam hic quod cum dicitur: "Ista entitas analoga est non deitas", predicacio a parte rei potest et debet pocius distingwi [quam] ipsa predicacio in terminis et proposicionibus nostris. Verum, quia per terminos et proposiciones obiciuntur et asseruntur nobis predicaciones a parte rei, ideo convenienter in eis illas distingwimus.

We see how to understand the rule of inference from an affirmation with a negative predicate to a negation with an affirmative predicate, so as not to interfere with the Catholic faith, nor with the doctrine of the Universals.

Et patet ex dictis quomodo secundum rectam logicam debet intelligi regula arguendi ab affirmativa de predicato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito, et decet, et necessarium est, logicum katholicum talem logicam contra infideles noscere, ne diceret materiam sancte fidei katholice de trinitate personarum in divinis et unitate substancie esse impossibile, cum | tolleret iuxta 238ª
eos argumentum necessarium ab affirmativa de predicato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito, sic arguendo: Illa essencia divina est non filius; igitur, illa non est filius. Patet autem secundum logicam superius recitatam quomodo ad antecedens et consequens ad consequenciam est dicendum, salvata summe necessaria veritate de trinitate personarum et unitate substancie in deo, et consimiliter in suo ente anologo et in suis universalibus que rebus singularibus mundi indidit.

(4) The essential goodness of a thing is indeed better than the thing itself, because the thing is only partly in possession of it. We may say it is *of* infinite goodness, but not infinitely good.

Ad quartum conceditur quod bonitas essencialis transcendens alicuius rei est melior quam ipsa res sic bona essencialiter pro tanto, quia talis res (sicud equus, gracia exempli) solum secundum quid et non simpliciter habet illam bonitatem analogam sic simpliciter. Individuum alicuius speciei vel generis igitur non habet totaliter, sed parcialiter, tantam bonitatem sue speciei vel sui generis; igitur non est individuum tam bonum essencialiter sicud sua species est bona, vel sicud genus suum est bonum. Et potest hic concedi quod sicut quelibet res habet in se formaliter infinitam bonitatem

1. multiplicate *MS*. 9. quam *deest MS*.

15. *Arguendi*. In ordinary cases, a very plain rule; This *is* a not-apple: ∴ this *is not* an apple.

essencialem transcendentem, ita est infinite bonitatis essencialis. Sed non sequitur ex hinc quod igitur sit infinite bona essencialiter. Et causa, quia solummodo 2^m quid et non simpliciter ac totaliter est infinite bonitatis essencialis, et solum secundum quid habet illam in se formaliter.

Sed contra obicitur: qua racione res quecunque habet in se formaliter bonitatem essencialem infinitam, et conceditur habere, et talem solum secundum quid conceditur habere? Et sic similiter de *esse* bonitatis essencialis infinite, eadem racione debet concedi quod quecunque res est infinite bona essencialiter, sed solum secundum quid et non simpliciter est bona essencialiter infinite. Hic respondetur quod non est simile; nam eo ipso quod res esset infinita bona essencialiter, igitur est oppositum in adiecto quod res secundum quid solum sit infinite bona essencialiter. Sed non eo ipso quod res habet formaliter infinitam bonitatem essencialem, simpliciter habet eam, vel totaliter; sed stat quod solum
238^b secundum quid | vel per partem habeat illam, vel aliam bonitatem essencialem. Igitur non est simile. Sic similiter non videtur sequi, si res est illius bonitatis essencialis infinite, quod igitur sit simpliciter illius bonitatis, sed solum secundum quid; sicut solum secundum quid est in illa bonitate essenciali sicut in sua forma comparative ad deum, qui simpliciter est in illa bonitate, sicud in sua forma. Omne autem aliud a deo mere 2^m quid respectu sui est secum in illa bonitate, sicud in sua forma essenciali.

The adversary insists that this is tantamount to saying it is infinitely good, but only to a certain extent.

We deny the parity; for we do not say that the thing *is* infinitely good, but that it *has* infinite goodness; which is quite another thing. Creatures do not possess this goodness simply, as God does.

Si tamen quis penitus pro eodem wult habere hoc: "esse [in] finite bonitatis essencialis," et hoc: "esse infinite bonum essencialiter," tunc negandum est in tali sensu quamlibet rem esse infinite bonitatis essencialis, sicud et negandum est quamlibet rem esse infinite bonam essencialiter.

But if they will have it that the distinction is worthless, then we deny that any creature has infinite essential goodness.

Ad 6^{tum}. Cum infertur quod penitus unum et idem esset deus et lapis, si *ly* "penitus" determinat solum hoc quod est unum et idem, tunc scilicet "*hoc* (scilicet entitas analoga) est penitus *hoc*"; ita est penitus hoc

(6) If it be meant, one and the same thing absolutely (i. e. Entity) is a stone and is God, we admit this.

3. c͡a *MS.*; *ib.* ſoluc͡o *MS.* 22. Sic similiter sic *MS.* 31. in *deest MS.*

36. *Ad* 6^{tum}. Note that the fifth objection is left unanswered here; it is not a mere numeral-mistake.

unum et idem; et per consequens penitus unum et idem est lapis et deus. Si autem *ly* "penitus" determinat hoc verbum: Est, ita quod sit sensus quod deus et lapis penitus et omnino sint unum et idem, tunc est sensus hereticus; quia tunc deus et lapis unirentur et ydemptificarentur in substancia divina omnino et penitus. Et tamen hec penitus et omnino unirentur et ydemptificarentur in substancia singularis lapidis: quod est summe absurdum. Non ergo deus et lapis penitus sunt unum et idem.

If it be meant that God and a stone are identical, it is heretical and to be denied.

Ad septimum respondetur: si entitas numeralis vocatur entitas que sic est una quod nequaquam est plures res maxime essencialiter distincte, sicut videtur solere vocari, tunc omnino negatur consequencia quod penitus eadem numeralis res esset deus, equus etc., et quod penitus idem in numero esset deus, equus, etc. Si autem vocetur entitas numeralis que sic est una in sua prima et propria forma quod nequaquam est in eadem sua prima et propria forma plures entitates, vel que formaliter proprie est entitas una et nequaquam est formaliter proprie plures entitates, vel que sic est formaliter et proprie entitas aliqua quod nequaquam est pluraliter et multipliciter illa | entitas, vel eciam quecunque plures; 239a
et hoc semper 2m propriam suam formam: tunc in tali sensu concedendum est quod entitas numeralis eadem est deus, equus, et mulus, etc.; et per consequens quod penitus eadem numeralis entitas determinat, sicud fuit consimiliter dictum in argumento priori solito. Et sic similiter ad consimilem sensum quod penitus idem in numero est deus et equus.

(7) If by 'numeral entity' a thing is meant that cannot be more than one, we deny the conclusion.

If we mean a thing which in its own and primary form is one and not many, or whose entity is such that it cannot be multiplied, existing in many: then we admit the inference.

Et per distinccionem iam premissam respondetur ad argumentum 8vum, et conceditur quod omne quod est unum et idem in numero est ad talem sensum, quod omne quod est in sua prima et propria forma est sic unum et idem quod nequaquam in eadem est pluraliter vel multipliciter illud idem, et quecunque plura. Et sic commune in se ipso primo non est plura, sed in suis minus communibus est ipsum illa plura minus communia.

(8) The same reply; a distinction between numerical identity of a thing which excludes others absolutely, or only excludes them from its proper and primary mode of being.

Ad nonum argumentum respondetur: Si individua entitas dicatur, quia non potest dividi inter plures res, eciam essencialiter distinctas, quarum quelibet est entitas

(9) If you mean by 'individual' that which cannot be

1. onū *MS.* 17. in sua *twice MS.*

illa, vel quarum cuiuslibet ipsa est entitas, tunc negatur assumptum; nec apparens ulterior probacio contra hoc in aliquo procedit. Si autem placet vocare individuam entitatem que est formaliter entitas una et nequaquam proprie potest esse formaliter et multipliciter illa vel quecunque plures entitates, tunc conceditur ad talem sensum quamlibet entitatem esse entitatem individuam. Et non ex tali sensu sequitur quod nulla entitas sit communis multis entibus et communiter multa encia collectim et divisim.

divided so as to belong to several, we deny it. But if you choose to call individual a thing of which the formal essence cannot be divided amongst many, we admit it.

Pro materia X^{mi} dicitur quod omnino impossibile est quod equus vel aliqua alia talis creatura summe sit unum et idem cum deo. Verumptamen sicud equus est ens cum deo summa entitate, non tamen simpliciter, sed mere 2^{m} quid est ens cum deo illa summa entitate, sic equus est unum cum deo summa unitate et ydemptitate entitatis summe anologe, sed non simpliciter; sed mere secundum quid est unum et idem cum deo illa summa veritate et ydemptitate. Quod si equus totaliter et simpliciter esset unum et idem cum deo illa summa entitate et ydemptitate . . . . . . cum equus summe esset unum et idem cum deo sicut pater in 239^{b} divinis cum suo filio et spiritu sancto. | Sed antecedens est summe hereticum sicud et consequens. Et in responsione iam data suppono quod entitati proporcionabiliter correspondet unitas et ydemptitas; ut maxime entitati, maxima unitas et ydemptitas, etc. Si autem summa unitas et ydemptitas aliquorum vocaretur, que tolleret eorum ad invicem distinccionem et differenciam, tunc nequaquam deus et equus tali unitate et ydemptitate summa essent unum, nec possunt esse. Aliter posset dici pro materia argumenti quod, sicut universale est singulare, non tamen universale aliqua singularitate est singulare, cum non predicacione formali universale sit singulare; sic deus et equus sunt unum et idem ens analogum, nec tamen aliqua unitate vel ydemptitate sunt unum et idem ens analogum. Et sic equus non est unus cum deo, nec econtra, sed equus est unum cum deo et deus est unum (scilicet

(10) We deny that any creature can be absolutely identical with God. It may, however, be partially so; but if it were absolutely so, it would be equal to the Father.

The hypothesis is rank heresy. Entity and unity correspond; therefore a unity which would destroy the necessary difference between God and the creature is impossible.

God and the creature are one and the same Being, they are the same *thing*, but not the same.

19. unitate *MS.* 21. *no gap MS.*

38. *Unus . . . unum.* It is impossible to explain this distinction adequately in the side-notes. Yet it is famous, when applied to the Trinity. *Pater est unum, non unus cum Filio.*

The predication is not formal but material and excludes unity.

ens analogum) cum equo. Nulla tamen unitate, quia non predicacione formali, sed quasi penitus materiali, equus et deus sunt unum et idem, scilicet analogum. Et tunc, sicud perfeccio essencialis speciei vel specifica non denominat formaliter et primo ipsum individuum, cum tunc individuum esset tam perfectum essencialiter sicud sua species, sic unitas vel ydemptitas entitatis transcendentis non denominat formaliter et primo equum vel asinum, etc. Si enim unitas vel ydemptitas illa secundum seipsam denominaret equum vel asinum, tunc videtur quod equus formaliter esset summe unum et idem: quod est inconveniens. Illa tamen unitas et ydemptitas facit equum denominari unum et idem secundum unitatem et ydemptitatem minorem et inferiorem.

(11) We must admit that there is a Universal Singularity; and there is nothing absurd in that, if understood properly. An angle has no quantity, yet we rightly attribute quantity to it, and truth may be uttered respecting falsehood.

Ad XI^{m} videtur concedendum quod est dare singularitatem communem pluribus individuis. Nec videtur inconveniens quod singularitas et communitas opposite ad invicem predicentur concretive, non autem abstractive predicentur. Dico 2^{m} habitudinem de se invicem, denominacione penitus extrinseca, sicut de angulo mathematico, qui est inextensus et indivisibilis extensive 2^{m} substanciam, predicatur magnitudo respectiva predicacione secundum habitudinem et denominacione extrinseca, cum unus angulus mathematicus dicatur duplus ad alium | vel triplus etc., non 2^{m} quantitatem discretam 240a
sed 2^{m} quantitatem continuam, denominacione tamen penitus extrinseca. Sic igitur veritas videtur predicari de pura falsitate moris, dicendo, "luciferum peccare mortaliter est verum," "esse peccatum gravissimum est verum". Verumptamen, quamvis singularitas, individualitas, et personalitas sint communes pluribus personis divinis, nequaquam tamen est concedendum quod unum individuum sit plura divisim, vel quod una et eadem persona sit plures persone, vel quod sit persona communis, sicut est animal commune. Unde miro modo personalitas in abstracto recipit hoc predicatum *esse commune pluribus personis*, non autem persona in concreto. Personalitas enim, propter sui abstraccionem a re personali et sic incommunicabili pluribus personis, potest recipere huiusmodi predicatum, scilicet esse commune pluribus

But it must never be granted that one individual is many, or that these can be one Universal Person. There is such a thing in the abstract — a Person — but not in the concrete: as soon as it becomes abstract, it

29. pu'a *MS.*; *ib.* mo'is *MS.*; *ib. above* luciferum, pc *in small letters MS.* 30. morl'r *MS.* 36. v'r pro unde *MS.*

personis. Alioquin personalitas non videtur posse vere capere abstraccionem a re personali, sed nomen persone, eo ipso quod concernit rem personalem, et persona, eo ipso quod rem personalem et sic incommunicabilem personis pluribus concernit, nequaquam tale predicatum potest recepere. Nec est simile quod, si est animalitas communis et animal commune, quod ergo sic, si est personalitas communis, quod sit et persona communis; quia animal non concernit 2^m se rem individualem et personalem sicud pater. Quod si sic, tunc, sicud non potest esse persona communis pluribus personis, sic nec animal commune pluribus animalibus. Et sicud dictum est quod singularitas est communis, et communitas est singularis, ita *esse contingens ad utrumlibet* est absolute necessarium, quia potest esse quod sit contingens ad utrumlibet et non potest non esse quod sit contingens ad utrumlibet; quia, dato quod non sit contingens ad utrumlibet, tunc verum contingens ad utrumlibet est quod non est contingens ad utrumlibet: quod implicat contradiccionem. Igitur simpliciter necessarium est esse contingens ad utrumlibet.

loses its incommunicability. It does not follow, because there is universal Personality, that there is a concrete universal Person.

We grant a universal Singularity and a singular Universal, in different senses, as we grant that the Contingent is necessary.

3. 9c'nit *MS.* 5. 9c'nit *MS.* 10. p *MS.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEPTIMUM.

We admit then that every man is singular; and our opponent urges us: How can the Universal man be singular?

Sed contra prius dicta instatur, quia tunc concedendum est quod quilibet homo est singularis homo. Et sic eciam quilibet homo est aliquis homo. Queritur ergo pro quo supponit ibi "singularis homo", et quis singularis homo est "quilibet homo"? Nequaquam dabitur, nec valet evasio volentibus magnificare universalia et eorum posicionem | quod *ly* "singularis homo" supponat ibi confuse tantum. Et consimiliter *ly* "aliquis homo"; et non aliter ad verificandum illam proposicionem: "Quilibet homo est singularis homo." Et consimiliter: "Quilibet homo est aliquis homo"; tum quia iuxta tales verum est quod quilibet homo est singularis homo, illud oportebit dare, illud verum quod est, "quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem". Et per consequens oportebit quod illud verum quod est "quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem", quod illud sit singularis homo, qui est "quemlibet hominem esse hominem"; tum eciam quia sic consimiliter verificabuntur omnes tales: "Omnis homo est animal, omnis cignus est albus, etc., sic quod predicatum solum confuse tantum supponat et non simpliciter; et peribit tota fundacio universalium. 240b

'Every man is a man' must mean that a man and a singular man are one and the same.

This is answered by our admission of universal singularity, in which sense we admit the proposition, but if 'singular' stands for a particular man with his individuality, we deny it.

Hic dicitur quod in illa: "Quilibet homo est singularis homo," vel *ly* "singularis homo" supponit simpliciter pro "esse singularem hominem"; (et sic est illa vera, quod quilibet homo est singularis homo; nec tunc oportet dare singularem hominem qui sit quilibet homo, vel quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem; sed sufficit quod detur communis singularitas hominum que est quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem). Si autem *ly* "singularis homo" supponit personaliter pro homine cui inest singularitas, tunc illa est falsa 2^m talem supposicionem, "Quilibet homo est singularis homo",

1. Capitulum &c. *deest MS.* 2. *Blank space for Initial S MS.*
10. $\widehat{\mathrm{vi}}^{\widehat{\mathrm{du}}}$ *MS.* 22. sim^r *MS.* 29. quod detur quod *MS.*

quocunque homini singulari demonstrato. Et sic *ly* "singularis homo" quo ad supposicionem personalem est singulare vagum, sicud *ly* "iste homo"; tamen quo ad significatum formale vel de quanto supponit pro singularitate hominis, tunc est terminus communis supponens primarie pro intencione logicali communi pluribus; scilicet pro singularitate communi omnibus hominibus.

Sic similiter videtur dicendum de *ly* 'aliquis homo'; de quanto supponit personaliter pro homine cui inest particularitas sub specie humana, est terminus singularis vagus reddens illam proposicionem falsam "Quilibet homo est aliquis homo," sicut illa est falsa: "Quilibet homo est ille homo," quocunque singulari singulariter primarie demonstrato. Si autem *ly* "aliquis homo" supponeret pro "esse particularem hominem", tunc vera esset illa ad talem sensum, quod cuilibet homini inest particularitas hominis sub specie humana. Tamen, si "aliquis homo" solum supponat personaliter pro particulari homine sub specie humana, et non pro particularitate hominum, propter hoc quod *ly* "aliquis" est
241b purum sinkategorema solum limitans hoc | agregatum "aliquis homo", supponere personaliter et singulariter pro suppositis humanis, tunc illa est falsa, et in nullo suo pertinenti sensu vera, "Quilibet homo est aliquis homo"; nec est tunc consimile, sicud de illa "Quilibet homo est singularis homo", cum *ly* "singularis" sit terminus kathegorewmaticus, supponens per se personalitatem qualiter non est de *ly* Aliquis.

Likewise it is as false to say, "Every man is some man", in the sense of *one only amongst them all,* as it would be to say. "Every man is this man", but true in the sense that every man apart is somebody. It is again false, if 'some man' is used for any man in particular.

Sed adhuc instatur gravius. Ille sunt vere: "Necessarium absolute est aliquid contingens non necessarium existere"; similiter, "Necessario aliquod illorum est verum". Et: "Simpliciter necesse est aliquod illorum esse verum" (demonstrando duas possibiles contradictorias veritates, ut *Sortem currere, Sortem non currere*), alioquin esset possibile quod nullum est contingens non necessarium, et possibile esset quod nec Sor curreret nec Sor non curreret: consequens est inconveniens. Queritur igitur pro quo supponit "aliquod contingens" ad verificandum illam primam proposicionem? Et pro

The adversary continues, asking what "something contingent" and what "one of them" stand for in certain propositions.

1. homi͡ *MS.*; *ib.* sin^ri *MS.* 11. sb͡ se *MS.* 22. si͡ ka^ma *MS.*
28. kathegrew^c9 *MS.*

quo supponit *ly* "aliquod illorum" ad verificandum residuas duas proposiciones.

But there is no need that this should stand for anything in particular. A proposition may be true, although its subject has no real counterpart. The propositions given are true without any such, provided that they are understood *'in sensu composito'*. They would be false *'in sensu diviso'*. 'One of two contradictories must be true'; the *must* belongs to the two together, not separately.

Hic dicitur uno modo quod, sicut illa est affirmativa et vera, "Chymera non potest currere", et tamen subiectum eius pro nullo supponit ad verificandum illam proposicionem, sic quelibet predictarum proposicionum est vera et necessaria absque hoc quod aliquid illorum terminorum 'aliquod contingens', 'aliquod illorum' supponat pro quacunque, requisite ad verificandum aliquam illarum proposicionum. Et hoc est verum, dummodo proposiciones ille teneantur in sensu composito. Si enim in sensu diviso tenerentur, false essent, et pro veritate earum requirerent terminos supponere personaliter pro certo dando contingenti vel aliquo illorum duorum. Unde tamen dicitur; "Necessario alterum illorum duorum est verum" (demonstratis illis possibilibus, *Sor currere, Sortem non currere*). Ille modus necessario determinat composicionem huius 'necessarii', quod est verum non absolute ad aliquod illorum duorum, sed indifferenter ad quodlibet, vel quodcunque illorum sub distinccione ad reliquum; vel pocius et verius ad disiunctivam existenciam illorum. Et tamen existencia disiunctiva illorum, et similiter composicio huius necessarii, quod est verum, sunt simpliciter necessarie, sicut simpliciter necessarium est esse verum. Propter hoc ergo verum est quod necessario alterum illorum est verum; et similiter necessarium est alterum | illorum esse verum. Et similiter, 241b

'Something contingent must exist'; *must* belongs to none in particular, but to all taken together.

cum dicitur "Necessarium est aliquod contingens ad utrumlibet existere", designatur necessaria composicio existencie necessarie ad disiunctivam existenciam omnium possibilium contingencium ad utrumlibet; et talis est simpliciter necessaria. Sed cum dicitur, "Necessarium est hoc contingens, gracia exempli, *Sortem currere*, existere, denominatur composicio necessaria existencie ad hoc contingens, *Sor currere*. Et talis non est plus necessaria quam illud contingens ad utrumlibet. Et consimiliter de aliis est iudicandum.

4. non potest non *MS*. 22. *After* et *a word, very indistinct*; causa, tam, or tamen *MS*. 23. 9poĩco *MS*. 34. denominata *MS*.

2. The difficulty is that the answer *must* be a singular. The reply gets rid of it very cleverly. 11. In sensu composito — diviso. See Introduction. It is impossible to explain the meaning of this either in a marginal or in a foot-note.

Et hic queritur primo que res sit illa disiunctiva existencia illorum duorum possibilium scilicet *Sor currere*, *Sor nôn currere*, et similiter illorum omnium contingencium que possunt existere. Secundo queritur quare pocius in tali proposicione "Necessarium est aliquod illorum esse verum" designatur composicio necessaria huius [modi] quod est "esse verum ad disiunctivam existenciam illorum", dato quod talis a parte rei sit quod ad "aliquod illorum"; cum tamen per *ly* "illorum", plus et principalius recte de vi vocis importetur aliquod illorum quam existencia disiuncta illorum; et ita de aliis.

What is this 'disjunctive existence' of two contradictories, upon which the truth of the proposition depends?

Hic videtur dicendum quod disiuncta illa existencia est indifferens existencia illorum. Et illa indifferens existencia cuiuscunque illorum est sicud materialis et potencialis existencia ad existenciam disiunctivam vel decentem cuiuscunque illorum. Et sicut materia corporalium naturaliter prius est informis quam sit formata aliqua forma cuiuscunque generis predicamentalis, sic naturaliter et necessario prius est indifferens existencia alicuius eorum; et sicud informitas materie prime corporalium necessario precedit formacionem cuiusdam materie, sic hec differencia existencie necessario precedit disiunccionem vel differenciam existencie. Et sicud informitas prime materie est privacio formacionis eiusdem materie, sic hec indifferencia existencie respectu distinccionis et differencie existencie ad existenciam talem. Ergo indifferenter refertur composicio, cum dicitur "Necessario aliquid illorum est verum". Vel eciam ad quodcunque illorum sic nude est sub tali indifferencia existencie; et ita de aliis.

Disjunctive existence is existence that is indifferent to the subjects in which it occurs;

in saying 'One of these must be true', we predicate existence unitedly, but indifferently of either.

Ex istis videtur patere responsio ad secundam questionem. Nam cum indifferens existencia sit prior requisita ante disiunctam alicuius eorum existenciam
242ª | et non possit esse disiuncta alicuius illorum existencia, nisi sit prius indifferens existencia, et non econtra: igitur ad eam et non ad disiunctam existenciam est composicio. Unde et illa signa particularia vaga, "aliquid illorum", "aliquod contingens", etc., propter hoc quod vaga et indeterminata sunt in signo, pocius dicunt in-

7. modi *deest MS.* 10. ipter *MS.* 16. dente *MS.*

16. *Decentem.* Possibly a mistake for *disiunctam.* 31. *Responsio.* As I have failed to understand the second question, I have given no side-notes here.

differentem existenciam individuorum. Signa autem determinata individua disiunctam et differentem individuam existenciam important.

Remarks. (1) The Universal is to the Particular what form is to matter.

In hac tamen materia difficili videtur ulterius aliqua dicenda: primum quod commune est sicud forma respectu sui minus communis et particularis; et minus commune, sive particularis, sicud materia in qua subiective vel informative ipsum commune est.

(2) The Universal is either a contingent or a necessary form.

Secundum, quod commune necessarium est sicud forma necessaria in minus communi, et commune contingens sicud forma contingens in minus communi.

(3) As Matter is at first absolutely indeterminate and well-nigh inconceivable; so the Particular at first belongs to no distinct individual, time nor place, and is so hard to conceive, that some have thought it existed only as an abstraction;

Tercium quod, sicud materia corporalium primo est informis, illimitata, et abstracta ab omni forma predicamentali substanciali vel accidentali, et secundum hoc non est hic tantum, nec nunc tantum, sed ubique et semper, nec huius vel huius corporis materia, nec sic disposita, et difficilime eciam a philosophis sic apprehenditur, et ab ydiotis et popularibus sicud impossibiliter sic apprehenditur; a deo autem clare et faciliter summe; et 2^m plures philosophos non potest esse sic in natura nisi sic habet *esse* secundum abstraccionem intellectus; postea autem materia est formata, limitata, et coniuncta cum morpheiis et passionibus, et secundum hoc habet determinate *esse* hic et nunc: sic commune quod est forma necessaria, habet primo minus commune sive particulare, vagum vel indeterminatum, quod est sicud materia intellecta, informis, indistincta, et abstracta a morpheys et passionibus individui, sive a principiis vel condicionibus individuantibus. Et 2^m hoc non est huius vel illius modi cuiuscunque determinati individui vel particularis sub illa forma communis necessaria. Et secundum hoc non habet *esse* contingenter et aliquando, sed necessario et semper sub illa forma communi necessarii. Et difficilime a philosophis et sicut impossibiliter a grossis est 2^m hunc modum apprehensibile; a deo autem clare et a beatis in patria. | Et 242b

3. *Gap of half a line MS.* 10. nccy *MS.* 16. cor^ris *MS.* 22. sic *pro* est *MS.* 23. morpheys *MS.* 32. ncci *and further on MS.* 34. sic' *MS.*

10. *Necessaria.* I have already noticed that the abbreviated form would correspond to *necessarii*; the same recurs again and again. 25. *Minus commune.* Remark that by this term is meant not the Individual, but the vague Universal (Some . . . .).

secundum quosdam philosophos non sic esset particulare vagum a parte rei, sed [non] nisi 2m abstraccionem intellectus; deus tamen per intelleccionem suam reddit sic *esse* particulare vagum a parte rei sub forma necessaria, postea sub eadem forma necessaria redduntur particularia. Et eciam individua determinata que sunt illius forme necessarie, sicud materia limitata, distincta, et coniuncta principiis vel condicionibus individuantibus; et plurima sic particularia et individua non sunt necessario et semper, sed contingenter et aliquando tantum.

God, by knowing it, gives it real entity, but this is vague, until it is conditioned by determinate subjects.

Quartum, quod, sicud non obstat plurimas esse corporalium rerum materias primas primo informes, illimitatas et abstractas a morpheys et passionibus, sic non obstat sub eadem forma communi necessaria plurima esse particularia, vaga, illimitata principia, et abstracta a principiis vel condicionibus individuantibus, vel particularisantibus ad *esse* determinatum particulare vel individuum. Et talia particularia 2m hoc non sunt contingenter et aliquando sub sua forma necessaria, sed necessario et semper sicud materie prime, secundum quod prime sunt informes et abstracte, non hic sunt et nunc tantum, sed ubique et semper, modo per formalem adhesionem ubitatis, loci, temporis; vel quando talibus materiebus vel materiis sic informibus et abstractis; sed 2m quandam similitudinem analogam, sicud deus est ubique et semper. Vel dicuntur ubique et semper, quia 2m hoc ille materie habent *esse* illimitatum ad quodcunque *ubi* vel tempus.

(4.) As there may be several primordial matters, so there may be several vague Particulars, which, abstracting from time and space, have some analogy with God's eternity and ubiquity.

Quintum, dicendum quod commune quod est forma necessaria potest componi vel copulari ad suum particulare vagum et determinatum, vel ad aliqua vel plurima vel eciam omnia sui. Et talis composicio est semper et necessaria, sicud forma illa est semper et necessario. Et similiter particularia eius vaga et indeterminata, propter quod omnes tales sunt vere: "Necessario aliquod contingens existit", "Necessario, omne contingens existit",

2. non *deest MS.* 13. abstracta *MS.* 24. mat'iebg ul matηs *MS.* 33. necη *MS.*

4. *Necessaria.* All along the abbreviation used corresponds with *necessarii.* I cannot understand this genitive. 23. *Ubitatis, loci.* The Predicaments of Aristotle distinguish between *whereabouts* and *position.* 29. *Quintum.* I confess that I am quite unable to follow the subtle hypothesis expounded in this paragraph and the next.

"Necessario omne ens existit", "Necessario alterum illorum est verum", quia contingencia est forma communis necessaria, et entitas est forma communis necessaria, et *esse unum illorum* (demonstratis possibilibus veritatibus contradictoriis) est forma communis necessaria, | propter quod sub illis dantur primo particularia 243a vaga, indeterminata et abstracta simpliciter necessarii, et cum *existere* et *esse verum* sint forme non contingentes sed necessarie, composicio eorum ad illa particularia necessaria eciam erit necessaria et non contingens.

Advertendum tamen: quod est *esse verum* non potest universaliter sed solum particulariter inesse huic communi quod est *esse unum illorum* (demonstratis possibilibus veritatibus contradictoriis). Ideo non potest esse verum quod "Necessario *omne* contingens existit". Et si queratur pro quo vel quibus supponit ibi *ly* "contingens", cum dicitur: "Necessario omne contingens existit"; ad verificandum illam proposicionem, respondetur quod pro omni particulari; primo, vago, et abstracto, huius forme communis necessarie, que est contingencia. Et sic de aliis consimilibus proposicionibus; et intellige quod supponit pro illis vagis et abstractis, 2^{m} quod sic sunt illimitata et abstracta. Et proposiciones in sensu composito, suos terminos supponentes pro particularibus vagis, faciunt pertinenter supponere pro illis ut sunt particularia primo, illimitata, et abstracta; quia ibi minus non distingwit inter extremum et extremum sicud inter materiam et formam, sed determinat vel modificat composicionem nudam et primam extremi ad extremum; que composicio non requirit particularia esse determinata et limitata, sed requirit et sufficit sibi esse primo vaga et indeterminata, cum forma communis primo insit suis particularibus 2^{m} quod primo sunt illimitata et abstracta, et postea inest eis 2^{m} quod sunt determinata et circumstancionata; sed in sensu diviso, quia modus distingwit inter extrema, sicud inter materiam et formam. Et sic quodammodo determinat terminos supponentes pro particularibus determinatis sub *esse* determinato.

Thus such a proposition as: 'Some contingent being must

Unde tales in sensu diviso sunt false: "Aliquod contingens necessario existit"; "Alterum istorum necessario est verum". Ibi subiecta illarum proposicionum retor-

36. mo͡9 *MS.*

quentur ad particularia determinata, cum in eorum contradictoriis fiat distribucio ad particularia determinata. Sic autem non est in sensu composito, ubi in composicione non divisio et determinacio, sed pocius indivisio
243b et indistinccio materie, ceteris paribus, | requiritur. Est autem eciam sciendum quod quedam sunt particularia pure indeterminata 2^m se et quo ad materiam et quo ad formam, sicud "aliquis homo", "aliquis bos"; quedam determinata quo ad materiam tantum sicud "iste homo" "iste bos"; quedam determinata quoad materiam et formam simul, sicud "Petrus", "Paulus". Et licet particulare indeterminatum et quo ad materiam et quo ad formam 2^m se reddat proposicionem in sensu composito veram et in sensu diviso falsam, sicud hec, "Necessario alterum illorum est verum", et "Alteram illorum necessario est verum"; tamen, si fuerit particulare determinatum tantum quo ad materiam, non sic; sed in utroque sensu est falsa. Unde utrumque est falsum, "Hoc illorum necessario est verum", et "Necessario hoc illorum est verum"; et ita de aliis.

exist' is false if referred to any one in particular; but true if understood without any such reference.

Some particulars are quite indeterminate, some partially, others completely determinate; the first only is true in one sense; the others are false in either sense.

Et si queratur pro quo supponat ibi *ly* "alterum illorum", dicendo, "Necessario *alterum illorum* est verum", potest forte dici, uno modo, quo *ly* "alterum illorum" supponit pro quocunque particularium huius quod est "*esse unum illorum* sub *esse* indeterminato, quodcunque libuerit concipere sic". Unde sic *ly* "aliquis", signum particulare, videtur limitare terminum cui additur ad concipiendum quodcunque libuerit particulare, sub *esse* tamen illimitato ad determinatam materiam vel determinatam formam individui.

We can then say that 'one of the two' stands for either particular of *Being-one-of-the-two*, *indeterminately*.

7. et determinata *MS.* 15. alto *MS.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM OCTAVUM.

Alio modo videtur dicendum quod idem valet dicere "Necessario alterum illorum est verum", sicud "Necessario hoc illorum vel hoc illorum est verum". Et tunc, sicud forma communis est in suis minus communibus vel in suis subiectis, copulatim et copulative sumptis, ita quo ad aliquas circumstancias est quandoque solum disiunctim et sub disiunccione tantum in singulari suo, vel singularibus, vel subiecto, vel subiectis; et sicud disiunctiva veritas pro aliqua mensura, ymmo, pro aliquo tempore est pro quo non est veritas alicuius partis disiunctive; — ut ista veritas, "Ego loquor, vel ego non loquor", est pro omni tempore, et illa "Ego non loquor", nunquam est, et ista "Ego loquor", in pauco tempore est; — sic forma communis necessarii de necessitate est in singulari vel singularibus suis sub disiunccione, ubi tamen non | est de necessitate in aliquo illorum. 244ᵃ
Eciam quandoque forma communis solum sub distinccione respectu aliquarum circumstanciarum inest singulari vel singularibus subiecto vel subiectis; et non quo ad tales circumstancias alicui singulari vel alicui subiecto inest. Et sic hic: "Tantum homo ridet"; risus communis denotatur solum sub disiunccione inesse homini vel hominibus singularibus, et denotatur inesse communi homini, nec denotatur alicui sine disiunccione respectu solitudinis importate per *ly* "tantum" inesse, cum tunc tantum "Sor rideret", vel "solum Plato rideret", etc., quod falsum est. Et sicut veritas istius disiunctive: "Ego loquor vel ego non loquor", non est veritas alicuius

We can also break the sentence into two propositions, connected by *or*.

And as you may have such a disjunctive proposition true at a time when *neither of its parts is true*,

so the necessity exists in its singulars when it is in neither of them separately.

If we say "only man laughs",

we do not mean 'Only one man in particular', and it is said of none such;

1. *Gap of half a line.* Capitulum *deest.* 2. *Space for initial* A *MS.*
14. Ego non *MS.* 26. i'ptate *MS.*

2. *Alio.* I have reckoned the chapters by the spaces for initial letters. Here, however, the sense runs on from one chapter to another, without more than a break in punctuation.
14. *Nunquam.* Because, "if I speak, it is never true that I do not speak". Such at least I take to be the meaning.

suarum parcium, nec est collectim, nec veritates suarum parcium, sic forma communis respectu alicuius circumstancie sua singularia vel sua subiecta sub disiunccione esse alicuiusmodi, non est "aliquod illorum esse illius modi" nec illa collectim vel divisim, nec "tantum hominem ridere", nec "tantum illos divisim ridere"; sed est "tantum illum, vel illum etc. ridere", et risus tantum hominis; nec est risus communis tantum, nec est risus singularis hominis tantum; sed est risus communis, tantum illius vel illius hominis etc.

Et sic quando queritur que veritas et que res est "Tantum hominem ridere", dicitur quod est risus communis sub solitudine illius vel illius hominis, etc. Et sicud in illa proposicione, "Tantum iste homo, vel iste homo, vel iste homo, vel iste homo, etc. ridet, *ly iste* vel *iste* vel *iste* homo etc. non supponit communem hominem, vel aliquem singularem hominem cum solitudine et exclusione casus communis; sed respectu talis solitudinis et exclusionis sub disiunccione; et non aliter supponit homines singulares illi cursui, sic et illa: Tantum homo currit". Et sicut aliquando forma communis solum sub disiunccione primarie significatur in *esse*, ita et ipsa 2^m aliquam vel aliquas circumstancias solum sub disiunccione inest singularibus; ut dicendo "tantum Sor vel Plato est unus istorum duorum ridencium" (eis demonstratis). Et non sequitur illa proposicio: "Tantum homo ridet", vel "Tantum iste vel iste etc. ridet", supponit singulares homines sub disiunccione cum solitudine et exclusione risui communi; igitur ipsa aliquid vel aliqua supponit cum solitudine et exclusione |
244b tali eidem communi risui. Et sic, formam communem solum sub disiunccione inesse singularibus, non est ipsam ut sic inesse alicui singulari vel aliquibus singularibus.

Ex quo sequitur quod deus distinctissime sciens formam aliquam communem 2^m aliquas circumstancias vel aliquam circumstanciam solum sub disiunccione singularibus inesse, non scit eam 2^m talem vel tales circumstancias alicui eorum vel aliquibus eorum inesse. Unde forma communis respectu simpliciter necessitatis, respectu exclusionis et solitudinis, respectu indistincte apprehensionis appeticionis signantes et promissionis

nor do we say it of all mankind, but of some men indeterminately.

This laughter is therefore a Universal, belonging to some one or other in particular, not to the whole species.

God sees how a subject is in certain cases affected by such a determination; but He cannot see which subject is thus affected. These remarks concern propositions

2. formam communem *MS.* 18. casui *MS.* 22. ſocar *MS.* 41. ſiges *MS.*

regarding necessity, exclusion, &c.

(et si qua sunt similia) designatur inesse vel inest solum disiunctim sive sub disiunccione suis inferioribus, suis subiectis, vel suis obiectis.

We should note carefully how a disjunctive proposition may be true when neither of its parts are true.

Et pro materia hac multum valet intelligere illud quod tactum fuit superius, scilicet, quod pro aliqua mensura vel aliquo tempore est verum disiunctive solum quod "ego loquor, vel ego non loquor". Et non est tunc verum quod "ego loquor", nec est verum quod "ego non loquor". Et quamvis leve videtur dicere quod formam communem respectu alicuius modi vel circumstancie suis singularibus, suis subiectis, vel suis obiectis inexistere sub disiunccione solum sit solitudo inexistencie, sub disiunccione ipsius forme communis suis singularibus subiectis vel obiectis respectu talis modi vel circumstancie; tamen difficultas maxima videtur que veritas vel que res primarie fuit talis inexistencia sub disiunccione ipsius forme communis in singularibus subiectis vel obiectis suis respectu alicuius modi vel circumstancie.

The difficulty is to say what *thing* corresponds to the disjunctive truth of such propositions.

Here we must point out that as there are three degrees in difference and in predication, so there are also three in this inherence of the Universal in its particulars. The lowest is when it inheres vaguely, in one or another; the next when it is disjunctive (if in one, not in the other); and the highest, when it is in many at once.

Et hic dicendum videtur quod, sicut superius fuit posita triplex pars, triplex differencia, triplex predicacio, scilicet, minima, media, et maxima; sic triplex, minima, media, et maxima, est inexistencia forme communis in suis inferioribus particularibus, vel in suis subiectis particularibus, vel in suis obiectis particularibus. Minima, que est sub disiunccione inexistencia; media, que est inexistencia disiunctive; maxima, que est inexistencia copulative vel inexistencia copulata et copulativa ipsius forme communis. Ad idem veniunt; et inexistencia sub disiunccione est prima, et media est inexistencia 2^{m} racionem tantum ipsis inferioribus; vel subiectis particularibus vel obiectivis particularibus. Inexistencia autem disjunctiva | est media; et sicut partim 245a
realis et partim 2^{m} racionem, de tanto est realis, quia ubicunque est inexistencia disiuncta forme communis, ibi minime uni particularium inexistit realiter et vere. Est autem de tanto 2^{m} racionem, de quanto veritas disiunctive priorem naturaliter et quoad consequenciam quam veritas cuiuscunque suarum parcium. Et pro illo priori est inexistencia 2^{m} racionem in particularibus et non 2^{m} rem. Inexistencia autem copulativa est maxima

9. le^{ue} *MS.* 15. minima *MS.* 36. m͡ime *MS.*

et totaliter realis, quia ubicunque et quandocunque est inexistencia copulativa forme communis respectu aliquorum particularium suorum inferiorum, vel subiectorum, vel obiectorum, ibi semper cuilibet talium particularium ipsa forma communis realiter inexistit sicud inferiori, vel sicud subiecto, vel sicud obiecto. Et sicud differencia secundum racionem tantum est vere differencia non realis, minime perceptibilis a grossis, ymmo, et a sapientibus: sic forme communis inexistencie 2^m racionem tantum, sive sub disiunccione tantum in particularibus, est vera eius inexistencia non realis in particularibus minime perceptibilis propter sui minimam modicitatem.

The lowest is the least perceptible,

Et cum illa inexistencia sub disiunccione tantum, sive 2^m rem tantum, sit solum sicud secundum quid inexistencia forme communis in particularibus respectu inexistencie disiunctive vel copulative, solet dici, sicud fuit superius dictum, quod non sit inexistencia forme communis in particulari vel particularibus. Hoc autem venit propter grossiciem mentis nostre et eius depressionem per ymagines corporales et fantasmata corporalium et sensibilium. Propter illa enim aut non possumus, aut nimis debiliter possumus, apprehendere illam nimis tenuem inexistenciam esse inexistenciam qualemcunque forme communis in particularibus. Et quia loquendum est ut plures, sapiendum vero ut pauci, estimo quod sapiendum sit quod abstractiva et deprivativa locucione dicendum sit quod inexistencia sub disiunccione tantum, vel 2^m racionem tantum forme communis in particularibus est eius inexistencia in eisdem secundum quod intellectu divino abstracta sunt a distincta materia et a distincta forma sue particularitatis, ita quod talis inexistencia respectu modi vel circumstancie alicuius ipsius forme communis | 245b non ponat inexistenciam eius alicui particulari in sua propria forma, respectu talis modi vel talis circumstancie.

and has been denied by minds that lack the requisite acumen.

We are too deeply plunged in the senses, and this hampers us. But we ought to think with the wise minority, and admit that a Universal Form may inhere in its subjects yet in none of them in particular.

Et patet quam racionabile est triplicem esse supposicionem termini communis pro rebus particularibus, scilicet, copulativam, disiunctivam, et de disiuncto extremo, que aliis nominibus vocantur: supposicio distributiva determinata, et confuse tantum. Et oportet esse proporcionabiliter tria signa ad tales supposiciones,

Other names are generally given to these forms of Supposition: *distributive*,

27. sub disiunccione *twice MS.* 41. t'ria *MS.*

determined and *vague*; and they employ appropriate signs.

terminos communes limitancia signa universalia, ut "omnis, quilibet", etc., limitant ad supposicionem primam, signa particularia; ut "aliquis, quidam" etc. ad supposicionem 2^{am}. Et signa modalia et signa exclusiva: ut, "necessario" et "tantum", etc. (et [si] signa sunt similia) limitant ad supposicionem terciam.

In every possible case, we have the Universal existing in its inferiors in various modes.

Et patet eciam quod in hoc veritate, "Necessario aliquod ens est", ens forma communis inest sub disiunccione tantum suis particularibus inferioribus. In hac autem: "Tantum homo ridet", hec forma communis, "risus" inest sub disiunccione tantum suis subiectis particularibus in quibus potest esse, ut accidens in subiecto. In hiis autem veritatibus: "Equus appetit comedere awenam", "Sor wult bibere vinum", "Promitto tibi denarium" (et sic de consimilibus) communis commestio respectu obiecti, communis bibicio, et similiter communis promissio respectu obiecti, insunt sub disiunccione tantum suis particularibus obiectis. Et deus, distinctissime sciens hoc, scit nullam illarum formarum communium 2^{m} illas veritates disiunctive vel copulative inesse alicui vel aliquibus particularibus.

This is the main point we wanted to show; for the adversaries take up a universal proposition, "Every man is an animal"; and say, in what does animality inhere? In *every* man". Then, taking "One of these things must be true", they defy us to point out in what 'must be true' inheres. This I have answered.

Et patet hic ulterius quod volebamus principaliter; quod propter supposicionem confusam tantum termini communis pro rebus particularibus, et propter inexistenciam sub disiunccione tantum forme communis suis particularibus inferioribus, vel subiectis vel obiectis, respectu alicuius modi vel circumstancie; propter illa, inquam, in nullo adiuvantur adversarii ad defendendum quod non sint universalia, vel ad tollendum quod sunt ponenda universalia, cum secundum eos, per supposicionem confusam tantum undique excluderentur supposicio simplex pro rebus communibus et universalibus et motiva universalistarum, ubi ex proposicionibus de terminis communibus volunt arguere universalia. Ista enim est communis veritas: "Tantum homo ridet". |
Et "*tantum hominem ridere*" est communis veritas, et communis risus; et ista est communis veritas: "Necessario aliquod istorum est verum". Et tamen in illis proposicionibus, "*Tantum homo ridet*", "*Necessario* 246a

5. si *deest MS.* 16. 9mestio *MS.* 19. fcis *MS.*

19. *Scil.* It is *scis* in the MS.; but an invocation to the Deity appeared misplaced here.

aliquod istorum est verum", idem termini supponunt confuse tantum, scilicet *ly* "homo", et *ly* "aliquod istorum". Sed, cum sit veritas quod "Omnis homo est animal", oportet dare illam veritatem que est "*Omnem hominem esse animal*". Et talis veritas erit animalitas uniuscuiuscunque hominis. Et ergo in illa: "Omnis homo est animal", non supponit personaliter confuse tantum, sed supponit simpliciter significative pro animalitate communi.

8. ſtine *MS.*

CAPITULUM DECIMUM NONUM.

If we say, "Man's property is being able to laugh", in what subject does the Universal 'risibility' inhere?

Ulterius dubitatur, cum risibilitas sit propria passio hominis, rudibilitas propria passio asini, hynnibilitas propria passio equi, ut communiter ponitur, et suppono hic, gracia exempli, [quod] queritur pro quo supponat ibi *ly* "hominis", et pro quo *ly* "equi" vel *ly* "asini". Vel, dicendo in recto: "Homo habet suam propriam passionem risibilitatem", et: "Equus, hynnibilitatem", etc. pro quo supponunt *ly* "homo", "equus", etc. Et consimiles termini non pro homine simpliciter, quia nullius talis est propria passio risibilitas, nec pro homine communi, quia tunc procederetur in sentencia quod homo communis habet risibilitatem suam propriam passionem, et per consequens homo communis est risibilis. Et sic homo communis posset ridere; et, dato quod sic aliquando homo communis rideret, et species humana, penitus abstracta quiditas hominis, rideret: quod est inconveniens. Et si risibilitas est propria passio speciei humane, tunc inest sibi formaliter; igitur species humana est risibilis, et sic poterit ridere, et sic sepe ridebit. Hic autem solet negari de universalibus.

Not in a particular man, for this is not an individual characteristic; not in mankind, for the Universal man does not laugh.

It may be answered that the property inheres in the species; but it does not follow that the Universal man can laugh, which would be an accidental and variable faculty existing in the individuals.

Hic forte posset uno modo dici quod propria passio 2^m arguta superius non distingwitur realiter, sed solum modaliter a specie rei cuius est propria passio; ideo potest concretive predicari de *esse*. Et sic est verum dicere quod species humana est risibilis. Sed non sequitur quod species humana possit ridere, eo quod sit possibile quod species humana rideat; quia *posse ridere* dicit potenciam materialem, que est qualitas accidentalis, variabiliter et dispariter, gradualiter inexistens individuis, realiter et essencialiter condistincta speciei humane inexistens 2^m principia individua ipsis individuis; qualiter non est de risibilitate. |

1. *Gap of half a line;* Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *Blank space for initial U MS.* 5. quod *deest MS.* 10. homi *MS.* 12. p̃ced'el^r *MS.*

246b Secundo solet dici quod non sequitur: "Risibilitas inest speciei humane sicud sua propria passio; igitur species humana est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis"; quia in antecedente est predicacio 2^m habitudinem vel 2^m racionem tantum, et in consequente inportatur predicacio 2^m rem et realis unius extremi ad reliquum. Modo non oportet, si unius extremi ad reliquum est habitudo 2^m racionem tantum, quod inter ea sit predicacio realis. Unde, quia *inesse risibilitatem speciei humane,* sicud propria passio est quoddam predicatum 2^m habitudinem vel racionem tantum de risibilitate, non videtur quod inferat predicacionem realem unius eorum de altero, eciam concretive. Sed bene sequitur quod homo sit risibilis, vel forte eciam quod homo per se 2° convertibiliter sit risibilis.

Another answer is that the predication being ideal in the first case, and real in the second, this argument proves nothing, except that every man, *quà* man, is able to laugh.

Sed si queritur: "Vel homo specificus, vel homo individuus est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis", potest forte dici uno modo quod homo specificus est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis, sic tamen quod *ly* "homo specificus" sumatur ut tantum non ultimate abstraccionis pro nuda et abstracta quiditate specifica hominis, sed sit terminus sicud medie abstraccionis, non pure pro quiditate, nec pure pro supposito humano supponens, sed pro re quasi media inter nudam quiditatem et nudam naturam substancialem hominis et suppositum humanum; sicud theologi concedunt quod natura humana in X^{to} sit passa, utendo illo termino "Natura humana" in X^{to} sicud termino medie abstraccionis, non pure pro supposito X^i, nec pure et nude pro nuda et pura natura humana X^i, sed pro homine in X^{to}, qui 2^m aliquos theologos est et natura humana X^{ti} et suppositum X^{ti}. Alio modo diceretur quod non sequitur "Homo est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis, igitur vel homo specificus communis vel homo individuus". Nullum illorum, sed homo 2^m se dictus; nec communis specificus, nec individuus est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis.

It is urged that either mankind *quà* mankind, is thus capable, or that every man is, as an individual characteristic.

But 'man' may be taken, not as a pure abstraction nor as an individual, but as something between.

A theological instance.

Or we may reply: Man, neither specifically nor as an individual, but simply quà man, is capable of laughing.

Advertendum tamen hic quod sicud substancia dicitur dupliciter communis, ut dictum est, ita et homo. Substancia enim uno modo dividitur per substanciam

We must note here that Substance, e. g. is divided into

5. iptatr *MS.*

16. *Queritur. Arguitur* would perhaps be better. Only the first part of the argument is given, and the rest understood.
20. *Tantum* is possibly a mistake for *terminus.*

bodily, and *unbodied*,

or into *general* and *individual*.

The former divides substance formally, the other materially. A like division is here adopted for *man;* and we can take the former, admitting that *man*, as a universal considered materially (i. e. in its subjects) is capable of laughter.

corpoream et incorpoream; vel *in* substanciam corpoream et incorpoream. Et illa est divisio qua forma communis dividitur in suas partes subiectivas. Et per consequens substancia 2m illam divisionem divisibilis est communis per modum forme. Alio modo substancia dividitur in substanciam communem communicabilem (scilicet pluribus) per modum forme substancialis, et in substanciam singularem incommunicabilem (videlicet pluribus) per modum forme substancialis. Et substancia 2m illam divisionem divisibilis est communis per modum | materie, 247 quando dividitur per illos duos modos: communitas et singularitas substancie, que sunt encia racionis, ab extrinseco adiacencia substancie. Sic ergo substancia 2m primam divisionem est, sicud totum universale, divisum in partes subiectivas; et sicud commune per modum forme divisum in materias subiectivas. Secundo autem modo, tunc substancia est sicud totum in modo divisum in partes in modo. Et sicud commune per modum materie divisum per modos sicud accidentales, modo potest dici, cum dicebatur: "Hic est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis", quod nec homo communis per modum forme nec homo individuus, sed homo 2m se communis per modum materie.

Other answers. Distinction between the subject *quo* and the subject *quod*. Humanity takes here the place of the former; and the latter is unnecessary.

Vel potest dici quod homo 2m se, abstractus ab individualitate et a communitate per modum forme, et a communitate per modum materie, est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis. Aliter adhuc poterit dici quod duplex est subiectum, scilicet [primo] subiectum *quo* et subiectum *quod* aliquid inest subiective. Secundo, subiectum quod subiectat et in quo est aliquid subiective. Et tunc species humana est subiectum *quo* primum et convertibile 2m *quod* risibilitas inest homini; et ad talem sensum est verum quod risibilitas est propria passio speciei humane. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod species humana est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis, nec quod ipsa est risibilis; sed quod 2m eam convertibiliter homo est risibilis. Et licet species humana, sive humanitas, specifica sit *subiectum quo per se et convertibile* risibilitatis communis, non tamen ex hoc oportet aliquod esse subiectum quod subiectat et in quo per se et convertibiliter est communis risibilitas; quia non videtur aliquid esse subiectum

7. ı ı *pro* et in *MS.* 17. mo *MS.* 18. mo *MS.* 19. mo *MS.*
28. primo *deest MS.* 38. 9'ntible rifitis *MS.*

quod subiectaret et in quo esset subiective communis risibilitas, nisi quod suppositat et est suppositum speciei humane, vel humanitatis specifice. Sed nichil est quod suppositaret et esset suppositum speciei humane convertibiliter; igitur nichil est subiectum quod et in quo convertibiliter esset communis risibilitas. Et quamvis aggregatum suppositum humanum ex omnibus hominibus qui sunt in magno et toto tempore mundi sit via perfeccionis, primum suppositans speciem humanam; vel quamvis forte deus sciat unum simplex et non aggregatum suppositum humanum, quem oportet primum suppositare humanam speciem, non est tamen suppositum simplex vel aggregatum dabile quod convertibiliter suppositaret speciem humanam, sic quod in eo esset convertibiliter suppositum.

Like answers may be given to objections concerning other Universals.

247b Eodem modo est dicendum de | subiectacione cursus communis, risus communis, motus communis, accionis communis; et sic de aliis communibus formis accidentalibus. Et non oportet cursum communem habere subiectum communem adequatum, in quo sit subiective, nec subiectum singulare; sed sufficit quod habeat subiectum agregatum primum via perfeccionis in subiectando cursum communem; et quod forte habeat primum simplex quod oportet primo inter subiecta simplicia cursum illum subiectare. Unde, cum cursus communis sit informative in cursu singulari, et non denominat eum formaliter currere, patet quod in eo est sicut racio essencialis formalis, 2m quam ipse cursus singularis formaliter denominat subiectum suum primum currere.

Singular accidental forms have their individual subjects, but not general forms, because the latter are the very *ratio essendi* of the former.

Et forme accidentales singulares habent subiecta sua prima et adequata, exceptis forte paucis generacionibus formarum accidentalium singularium, ut sitibus singularibus, et forte latitudinibus singularibus. Forme autem communes de predicamentis accidencium non habent subiecta prima et adequata que formaliter primo et adequate denominarent, nec proprie denominant substancias, sicut nec communes substancie agunt, currunt, legunt, vel disputant; sed ille forme communes de predicamentis accidencium pocius sunt raciones essenciales, formales formis accidentalibus singularibus, ut 2m illas denominent proprie primo formaliter et adequate subiecta

31. gmb9 *MS.* 33. lmb9 *MS.*

sua prima et adequata. Sicut ergo non potest dari cursus singularis qui per modum individui proprium convertibiliter et adequate in se subiectaret cursum communem, eo quod talis sit essencialis racio et communis omni singulari cursui; sic non potest dari subiecta que primo et adequate subiectaret cursum communem, vel quam cursus communis ille primo et convertibiliter denominaret; eo quod sit racio essencialis multis formis singularibus accidentalibus denominandi varias et multas substancias singulares; ymmo, quia communis generacio substancialis formaliter inexistens generacioni substanciali individuali non potest eam tam vere denominare generari substancialiter, cum ipsa talis generacio substancialis sit accidens, non substancia. Ideo forte non potest substanciam denominare generari substancialiter, sed est vere racio essencialis communis 2^{m} quam generacio singularis substancialis vere et proprium subiectum denominat substancialiter generari. Et forte idem est iudicium de aliis formis accidentalibus communibus in predicamentis | accidencium. Et vocarentur forme acci- 248a
dentales substancialium seu substanciarum, quia sunt raciones essenciales formarum vere accidentalium, que vere accidunt substanciis et eas accidentaliter denominant.

Thus genera and species are mere abstractions in accidents, which we assimilate to substances, and only their singulars are real.

Unde, cum genus et species accidencium sint quiditates abstracte, modo possunt assimilari substanciis ut racionem generis et speciei possint salvare, non proprie videtur dictum quod talia genera et tales species accedant et sint accidencia substanciarum, sed sunt raciones essenciales eorum, que vere et proprie accidunt. Aliqui ponunt differenciam inter subiectum inhesionis et subiectum denominacionis, ut materiam primam dicunt subiectum inhesionis et non denominacionis formarum substancialium et accidentalium. Compositum autem dicunt subiectum denominacionis; et nescio ad presens si distinccio hec in presenti materia possit efficaciter iuvare. Gauderem tamen, si diccio vera est, quod veritas veritatem fulciret et explanaret.

1. dare *MS.* 25. mo͡ *MS.*; *ib.* a *pro* assimilari *MS.*

CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM.

Adhuc fuit superius dubitatum si est universale reale, non ydeale, aliquod potenciale tantum, et aliquod intellectuale tantum, sicud est aliquod reale et actuale quod actualiter communicatur multis individuis. Et ponuntur sol, luna, mercurius, etc., universalia realia non actualia actualiter pluribus individuis communicata, sed potencialia, quia per potenciam supernaturalem possunt esse plures soles, plures lune, ymmo et plures mundi, ut solet poni, quamvis tales mundi non possunt esse simul, nec successive. Et illi qui ponunt sicud Thomiste qui sanctum Thomam secuntur in hoc quod omnes angeli inter se differunt specie, et quod non ponunt esse plures eiusdem speciei; quia distinccio numeralis rerum in eadem specie debent esse 2^m eos per materiam. Et tales non habent materiam. Videtur igitur secundum hoc quod species angelorum et intelligenciarum sunt universalia intellectualia tantum, et non potencialia, neque actualia, cum non possint tales species per plura individua multiplicari; per intellectum tamen divinum, ymmo, et per creatum separatur quiditas uniuscuiusque angeli a supposito angelico, et 2^m talem separacionem habebit essenciale intellectuale tantum, cum sic sit separatum a condicionibus individuantibus et individui, |
248b nec possit illa quiditas pluribus realiter differentibus communicari, erit ipse universale intellectuale tantum.

Are there Universals which are simply real, others potential, and others merely intellectual? There cannot be more than one sun, one moon, &c., save by supernatural Power, therefore their Universals are potential. St. Thomas holds that each angel is of a different species; and that they cannot be multiplied, but we can conceive their Universal in thought.

Unde videtur hic ulterius dicendum, cum universale actuale sit, ut sic, perfeccius quam potenciale ad complendum talem gradualem descensum, quod est dare maximum universale, medium, et minimum; ista quod universale actuale est maximum possibile universale, potenciale tantum, sicud medium, universale vero in re; intellectuale tantum sicud minimum universale: non

There are three degrees of Universality: Actual, the greatest; potential, intermediate; conceptual, the least of all.

1. Capitulum *deest*. 2. *Blank space for initial* A *MS.* 5. ponũr *MS.*
14. ffe *MS.* 15. dent *MS.*

It takes nothing from the perfection of a creature that its Universal should be of low degree; for in the Deity there is the smallest difference of all, which is merely conceptual.

sic intelligendo quod res que est universalis intellectui tantum sit minus digna et nobilis quam quecunque res que est universalis actu communicata pluribus; sed quod ipsa universalitas 2^m quam res est universale, intellectuale tantum, est sicud minimi gradus. Et universalitas 2^m quam res est universale actuale est sicud maximi gradus; et universalitas 2^m quam res est universale potenciale tantum, sicud medii gradus in graduali latitudine universalitatis. Nec derogaret rei que est species nobilissima 2^m essencialem naturam rei quod illi conveniat universalitas minimi gradus, scilicet universalitas intellectualis tantum; cum essencie divine que est simpliciter dignissima conveniat differencia minimi gradus, scilicet differencia 2^m racionem tantum respectu persone divine, cum essencia divina 2^m racionem tantum differat a persona divina. Et maximus gradus differencie que est differencia essencialis, in divinis ad intra non potest habere locum, licet bene quoad res extra creatas locum habeat.

Thus both the adherence of a Universal in its subject and its degree of perfection in Universality have three degrees.

Sic igitur, sicud inexistencia forme communis in particularibus est triplex, et (sicut de existencia accidentis a subiecto) est triplex: actualis, secundum rem, perfectissima; potencialis tantum, 2^m rem minus perfecta, et media; intellectualis tantum, sive 2^m intellectum tantum, minima: sic eciam videtur dicenda triplex rerum universalitas; realis actualis, realis potencialis, et intellectualis tantum, ultimam tamen — propter sui nimiam tenuitatem — difficilimam. Et videtur quod deus, sicud inmediate et pure apud suum intellectum fabricat alicuius rei realis extra se existentis universalitatem intellectualem tantum, sicud universalitatem tenuissimam, et hinc nobis difficilime perceptibilem; et quod deus, sicud distancius fabricat rei realis universalitatem potencialem tantum, sicud magis spissam, et inde nobis plus perceptibilem; et quod tercio, sicud distantissime fabricat rei ad extra universalitatem actualem sicud maxime spissam, et hinc | vel pre ceteris facilius perceptibilem. Ita ergo est 249a
triplex gradus universalitatis circa res ad extra.

What is the Universal that is merely intellectual?

Que autem res ad extra sit universale intellectuale tantum, dicetur sequendo sentencias Sancti Thome, quod supposita, nature, et quiditas angelorum sint huiusmodi.

7. maximum *MS.* 23. medio *MS.* 27. minimam *MS.* 41. suppositam quod *MS.*

We answer, according to St. Thomas, that the natures of the Angels are such.

Et, dato quod nesciremus rem distincte dari, que talis esset universalitas, nichilominus, propter iam adducta, videtur sentenciandum quod aliqua talis sit; et verisimile et probabile est quod supposita natura angelica sit huiusmodi.

We can neither admit that man is of the same species as the Angels, nor that they are all of one species. Both these theories seem incompatible with Holy Writ.

Nec videtur ponendum quod homo sit eiusdem speciei specialissime cum angelis, et quod non sint plures species angelorum. Nam ad Hebreos 2° dicitur de filio dei quod per unionem suppositalem nusquam apprehendit angelos, sed semen Abrahe. Unde, si angelus esset eiusdem speciei specialissime cum homine quoad spiritum intellectualem hominis, tunc natura angelica predicaretur concretive de filio dei, sicud natura humana, cum naturam specialissimam angeli assumpsisset, eo quod eadem sit natura specialissima (per adversarium) angeli et hominis. Hoc autem est contra textum nunc allegatum, cum 2^m naturam illam specialissimam angeli ita denominaretur concretive sicud 2^m humanitatem dicitur homo. Et quia ille textus iam allegatus dicit in plurali numero, "Nusquam apprehendit *angelos*", videtur quod innuat angelos differre specie. Alias pertinencius dixisset, ut videtur, "Nusquam apprehendit angelum", id est, naturam angelicam, si tantum una specifica esset in omnibus. Ymmo, si in rebus materialibus gradualis varietas et ascensus 2^m diversitatem specierum materialium est pro decore universi, videtur quod longe amplius in natura spirituali sit talis varietas et mixtura nobilis. Et pluralitas yerarchiarum et ordinum angelorum videntur hoc satis innuere. Et, si natura intellectualis increata simpliciter infinite distat a natura intellectuali creata, quomodo deus non posset facere naturas intellectuales re vel intellectu universales inter se essencialiter multum distantes?

And if God differs infinitely from created beings, why should He not create other beings which differ exceedingly from each other?

Sed, ad propositum quasi reddeundo, videtur quod deus rem constituit quam voluit esse tantum intellectualiter vel racionem essencialem, de quanto solum intel-
249b lectum; et solum 2^m racionem | habet et abstractum ab individuo vel supposito et a condicionibus individuantibus. Et 2^m hoc ei non repugnat, sed convenit, universalitas intelligibilis; et sicud illud quod ad aliquid habet diffe-

Close analog between the degrees of

1. dare *MS.* 10. femie *MS.* 13. p're *MS.*

8. Hebr. II. 16.

difference and of Universality.

renciam 2^{m} racionem tantum, non potest ex hinc habere differenciam realem, sic quod habet universalitatem intellectualem tantum, ex hinc non potest habere universalitatem realem actualem vel potencialem 2^{m} quam posset realiter multis informative communicari; sicud tamen quod 2^{m} racionem tantum differt ab aliquo differt ab illo, licet non realiter, sic quod est universale intellectuale tantum est universale, sed non quod posset multis formaliter communicari.

CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM PRIMUM.

Ulterius est hic dubium unum prius tactum amplius tractandum. Hoc valet: Utrum possit esse universale aliquod quod a principio mundi usque in sempiternum non existit aliquando in propria sua forma. Et videtur visibiliter et probabiliter quod non.

Can there be a Universal which never exists in its own proper form? No.

Pro quo primo supponendum est hic X esse generalissima formalia intrinseca principia rerum, nec posse esse plura; unum, substancie, cum in generibus communioribus non possit esse processus in infinitum; et novem accidencium, quorum necessitas et sufficiencia uno modo videtur sumenda 2m triplex *esse* totum ipsius substancie, ut substancia. Primo modo est tota quiditative ex partibus quiditativis, scilicet genere et differencia. Secundo modo est tota ex partibus qualitativis, sicud sunt materia et forma. Et 3° modo est tota ex partibus quantitativis, ut homo ex capite, corde etc. Et una illarum trium totalitatum est maxima, alia media, alia minima; igitur tot et non plures in substancia possunt repperiri. Et quia idem est *totum* et *perfectum*, tripliciter ergo sic substancia est perfecta substancialiter. Verumptamen, quia sic non est perfecta simpliciter, sed solum in genere, et sicud 2m quid; et substancia talis tripliciter perfecta per se existens non est hoc modo quo res perficiatur, sed est quod perficitur, et perfectibile est; igitur ipsa substancialiter et intrinsece secundum quid et diminute perfecta est ipsa accidentaliter et extrinsece perfectibilis 2m hoc quod ipsa est sic substancialiter et intrinsece tripliciter

First note that there are ten categories, and ten only: Substance and nine sorts of accidents. Substance may be perfected quidditatively, qualitatively, or quantitatively.

But this is only a possibility; to make it actual, something exterior is required, and that is the accident.

1. *A gap towards the end of the line;* Capitulum &c. *deest MS.* 2. *Blank space for Initial U MS.* 9. plūa vnū sbē *MS.* 12. vno° *MS.* 20. rpp'i *MS.*

5. *Forma.* The Author here enquires whether, v. g. Humanity could be possible, if no men were ever to exist; and he thinks not. This is the foundation of Wyclif's idea of a Possible: something that has existed or will exist. See. W.'s *Miscellanea Philosophica,* vol. I. *Introductory Essay.*

Now, if the substance be perfected in each of these ways, and each in three degrees (*little*, *more* and *most*) we have nine modifications.

perfecta et tota. Et per consequens 2^{m} hoc est ipsa tripliciter perfectibilis accidentaliter extrinsece. Et voco hec omnia accidencia extrinseca ipsi substancie, de quanto realiter accidunt sibi, et sic accidunt ad eam | et in eam. Et sic ipsa est aproprietate perfectibilis 250^{a} accidentaliter extrinsece, 2^{m} quod ipsa est tota quiditative primo modo. 2° modo est aproprietate perfectibilis accidentaliter extrinsece 2^{m} quod ipsa est tota qualitative. Et 3° modo est perfectibilis aproprietate accidentaliter extrinsece, 2^{m} quod ipsa est tota quantitative. Et quia ulterius ipsa substancia tota, quolibet illorum trium modorum quo est tota, habet ipsa unam manierem partis vel parcium que habet racionem numeri quo ad "sic totum esse". Et habet aliam manierem partis vel parcium que habet racionem medii quo ad illud sic totum; et habet tunc 3° totalitatem que habet racionem maximi quo ad illud "sic totum". Igitur ipsa substancia tota illis tribus modis totalitatis quo ad quodlibet sui "*totum esse*" est tripliciter perfectibilis accidentaliter extrinsece; minime, medie, et maxime. Minime quo ad manierem partis vel parcium, que manieres habet racionem minimi substancialis et intrinseci; medie, quo ad manierem partis vel parcium; que manieres habet racionem medii substancialis intrinseci ipsius tocius substancie; et maxime quo ad totalitatem ipsius substancie. Igitur ulterius oportet dare genus rerum, sicud minime perficiencium accidentaliter substanciam primo modo totam, et secundum genus rerum medie perficiencium, et genus rerum sicud maxime perficiencium accidentaliter extrinsece substanciam primo modo totam. Et consimiliter oportet dare tria genera rerum perficiencium accidentaliter extrinsece substanciam 2° totam. Et hoc minime, medie, et maxime. Et 3° modo oportet consimiliter dare tria genera rerum perficiencium accidentaliter extrinsece, minime, medie, et maxime substanciam 3° modo totam. Sic ergo novem oportet esse manieres vel genera rerum accidentaliter extrinsece perficiencium substanciam tripliciter totam substancialiter; nec poterint plures manieres rerum excogitari quam ille novem ad perficiendum accidentaliter substanciam et extrinsece.

And there can be no more.

5. app'e^{te} *MS.* 7. app'e^{te} *MS.* 9. app'e^{te} *MS.* 14. nūmi *MS.*

Et est hic sermo de manieribus rerum accidentaliter seu accidentalium que insunt substancie, ut perfecciones accidentales eius, ipsam proprie denominantes, que ab intrinseco sunt nature complete et finite essencialiter, propter quod oportet tales res accidentales materiales, perficientes sic accidentaliter substanciam, et ipsam proprie denominantes, sicud id quod denominat et non
250b sicud | *quo sit denominacio*, et existentes ab extrinseco nature complete et finite essencialiter esse res in specie et in genere et in differencia, cum ex genere et differencia complentur et finiuntur essencialiter et extrinsece. Igitur res accidentales prime maneriey de novem manieriebus iam dictis oportet esse eiusdem generis generalissimi, quo ad illam manieriem rerum, cum in generibus illius maneriey non potest procedi in infinitum versus communius genus. Et sic similiter in secunda manerie. Et sic de omnibus novem. Igitur oportet esse generalissima talium accidencium novem et non plura.

Each accident which signifies the same one of these nine modifications belongs to the same ultimate genus, whether to the first or the second, or any other.

Nec possunt alique tales res eiusdem maneriei de dictis novem maneriebus rerum accidentalium esse non eiusdem generis generalissimi; quia, cum quelibet earum sit res alicuius generis predicamentalis, si non esset eiusdem generis generalissimi, nec esset eiusdem manerieii de illis novem maneriebus.

For this special modification of the substance is one of the nine ultimate genera of accidents.

Nec eciam potest esse quod res unius maneriei et res alterius maneriey de dictis sepe novem maneriebus rerum accidentalium sint eiusdem generis generalissimo; quia tunc aliqua maneries rerum predicata esset ad invicem realiter permixte, cum tamen iuxta dicta ille maneries incommixte sunt et esse debent.

Nor can two different modifications belong to the same genus.

Sic igitur est unum genus generalissimum substancie et novem genera generalissima accidencium, nec plura esse possunt, iuxta deducta superius; et veri methaphysici veritate compulsi vel manuducti sunt ad ponendum et asserendum decem esse genera generalissima et non plura. Nominant autem ea *Substanciam*, *Quantitatem*, *Ad Aliquid*, *Qualitatem*, *Accionem*, *Passionem*, *Ubi*, *Quando*, *Posicionem*, et *Habere* (sive habitum). Nec est vis nimia vel multa facienda in nominibus et signis, dummodo

Thus we have Substance, Quantity, Relation, Quality, Action, Passion, Whereabouts, Time, Position, and Belonging.

3. d'nomiante *MS.* 5. miales = numerales? *MS.* 11. 9pler et funtr *MS.* 22. pnl *MS.* 28. predicte *MS.* 31. Sic *MS.*; *ib.* gamu *pro* genus generalissimum *MS.* 32. gnama *pro* genera generalissima *MS.*

ex parte rei habeantur quiditates X generalissime, una substanciarum, alia novem accidencium, que perficiunt et denominant substanciam sicud res nature complete et perfecte essencialiter intrinsece. Et 3^{es} quiditates generalissime comprehendunt res accidentales; que perficiunt, alique ut minime, alique ut medie, et alie ut maxime substanciam, 2^{m} quod tota est quiditative. Et alie 3^{es} quiditates generalissime 2^{m} istum modum respiciunt substanciam ut est tota quantitative. Et iterum alie 3^{es} respiciunt substanciam 2^{m} quod est tota qualitative.

I assume that hese categories are properly stated; the reverse seems improbable,

Et suppono quod novem predicamenta accidencium | bene 251a fuerunt assignata 2^{m} sua genera generalissima et nomina illorum generalissimorum, et 2^{m} raciones illorum generalissimorum; quia non videtur verisimile quod methaphysici huc usque deviassent in assignacione debita et vera novem predicamentorum accidencium cum suis principiis generalissimis. Verum est tamen quod hoc est argumentum topicum satis debile, cum nesciant hodie philosophi bene assignare genera subalterna in illis generalissimis, si sunt vera generalissima; nec efficaciter probare quod *quantitas* sit generalissimum, vel *qualitas*, vel *accio* etc. Eciam cum philosophi post lapsum Ade huc usque extraneant in via verorum morum; et post Cristum et beatam virginem Mariam eciam sanctissimi philosophorum aliquando sàltem venialiter extraneant in tali via morum, magis necessaria ad salutem quam via vera et debita assignandi novem predicamentorum accidencium cum suis generalissimis et subalternis et specialissimis.

though it is certan that Metaphysicians have in our days been unable to find the divisions of these ultimate genera, and even to prove that they are ultimate. Since the Fall the best philosophers have sinned; and sin is a greater error than a mistake in the Categories.

Let us suppose this then (although the classification does not satisfy me), and it becomes very difficult to assign each of the nine accidents to their several

Supposito tamen quod ita sit (quamvis huc usque non satis scio ita esse, nec vidi nec audivi probacionem huius ad satis et efficacem; si scriptura sacra alicubi hoc diceret, nimis sufficeret michi); supposito igitur, inquam, quod ita sit, difficile est dicere quis ternarius predicamentorum accidencium appropriate correspondet substancie, ut est tota quiditative, et iterum quid illorum predicamentorum trium appropriate correspondet

1. gna^{me} *MS.* 5. gna^{me} *MS.*; *ib.* 9plindant *MS.* 9. qualitative *MS.* 12. supposito *MS.* 26. sciffimi *MS.* 27. necy *MS.* 30. ffa^{mis} *MS.*

24. Adam and Eve and afterwards, Jesus Christ and Mary were supposed to be the greatest philosophers that ever existed.

ut minime inter illa tria perfectum substancie, ut est tota quiditative, et quid ut medie, et quid illorum ut maxime. Et simile est iudicium de aliis duobus ternariis predicamentorum accidencium quo ad substanciam, aliis duobus modis totam, sed qualitative et quantitative. Hoc tamen certum videtur, 2^m superius adducta, quod aliquis ternarius predicamentorum accidencium appropriate correspondet substancie, ut est tota quiditative, et alius ut est tota qualitative, et tercius ut est tota quantitative. Et iterum, quod unum predicamentorum de primo ternario correspondet ut minime perfectum accidentaliter extrinsece ipsius substancie, ut est tota quiditative; et secundum, ut medie; et tercium, ut supreme: et ita de aliis ternariis, licet forte nos habeamus hic in statu lapsus de hoc inseparabilem ignoranciam in pena peccati; que ignorancia tenet et impedit nos ne possimus in hac valle miserie istam materiam delectabilem efficaciter, distincte, et lucide calculare. Ideo forte, nisi deus graciose hanc materiam revelare voluerit, 251b consultum videtur a studiosa — vel pocius | super racione laboriosa — calculacione huius materie supersedere, dando operam quomodo in via morum debite ad patriam incedamus, cum inter sapientes terre in principiis huius materie sit contencio, que rixis turpiter et graviter est deformata.

divisions, and to find which corresponds to which.

It may be that we are on this point condemned to everlasting ignorance, in this valley of misery. Better let the question drop; especially when we see such shameful strife amongst the learned as to the existence of the Universals.

Hodie enim, heu! sic contenditur pro universalibus a parte rei, si existant, vel si sola signa humana naturalia, vel ad placitum instituta totaliter utilitatem talem rerum excludant. Et non scio videre quod solis signis in intelligendo obiective possit aliquis edocere tot (scilicet X) oportere esse predicamenta, et generalissima, et non plura.

I doubt indeed whether they who reject them can prove the 10 categories.

Sed reputo quod 2^m inducta superius profundatus methaphisicus eciam, ut est possibile, in hac via potest satis arguere et probare sapientibus etsi non grossis, oportere esse X generalissima et predicamenta et non plura. Distingwere autem et appropriare ea ad satis, sicud superius fuit motum, et a nobis queritur et desideratur: nescio si poterit, nisi deus graciose voluerit revelare. Quondam autem posui talem sufficienciam predicamentorum: Omnis res predicamentalis vel est

But a metaphysician grounded in this doctrine can, I think, give an adequate proof; for a complete one, revelation would be needful.

Every entity either does not belong to a

24. cpit' *MS.* 34. potp *MS.*

subject (and is a *substance*) or does.

non in subiecto vel est in subiecto. Si est non in subiecto, tunc sufficit pro omni tali genus generalissimum substancie, in quo omnes tales res predicamentales que sunt non in subiecto convenient essencialiter quiditative; sicud omnes eque primo conveniunt in hac proprietate que est *in subiecto non esse*. Si autem est res in subiecto

Belonging, it is either something *absolute*, or *relative*. If absolute, and it belongs to matter, it is *Quantity*;

principalis, vel est *absoluta* vel *respectiva*. Si absoluta, vel dependet ab *esse* potenciali, et tunc pro omni tali re predicamentali que est in subiecto, dependens appropriate ab *esse* potenciali (sive a materia) substancie sufficit hoc generalissimum *quantitas*, cum in illo conveniunt essencialiter quiditative, sicud omnes tales conveniunt eque primo in hac proprietate que est esse rem predicamentalem in subiecto dependentem appro-

if it belongs to form, it is *Quality*.

priate ab *esse* potenciali vel materiali substancie. Si autem est absoluta, ut dependet appropriate ab *esse* actuali seu formali substancie, tunc pro omni tali eodem argumento, ut prius, sufficit hoc generalissimum — qualitas.

If relative, it will be either *Relation* in general,

Si autem est res predicamentalis respectiva, hoc est duobus modis: vel est per se respectivus, vel quia causa concomittatur respectivus. Omnis res predicamentalis 2m istum primum modum qui est per se respectivus erit in generalissimo *ad aliquid*. Si autem illa res est respectiva quia causa concomittatur respectivus et non est per se respectivus, vel principaliter et appropriate dependet ab intrinseco vel ab extrinseco. |
Si ab intrinseco, hoc dupliciter; vel a parte qualitativa 252a
vel quantitativa. Si primum, vel a forma, sic est predi-

or Action, Passion,

camentum *accionis*. Si autem a materia, sic est *passio*. Si autem a parte quantitativa, que est unius racionis, et non diversificatur sicud pars qualitativa, tunc est

Position,

posicio. Si autem dependet ab extrinseco principalius et appropriate: vel a respiciente sic totum ut est qualitativum, vel ut est totum quantitativum. Si primum, hoc dicitur vel propter materiam: sic est *Ubi;* vel

Whereabouts, Time determination, or Belonging.

propter formam, sic est *Quando*. Si autem respicit totum quantitativum, tunc pro illo sufficit *Habere* vel habitus, Xum generalissimum.

15. app'etate *MS.* 22. que *MS.* 26. app'ate *MS.* 33. approprietate *MS.*

20. *Respectivus.* I have preserved the gender as in the MS. though here and further on it ought to be *respectiva*. Perhaps the copyist has given it the gender of *modus*.

Aliquas autem consideraciones quas reputavi utiles et efficaces ad fundandum hanc calculacionem aliquando adduxi, quas hodie propter oblivionem ignoranciam et tedium non sufficio. Nec curo hic instruere, quia tractatulus iste de universalibus nimis distenderetur, cum eciam superius plura videantur satis pueriliter esse sepius reppetita vel alia inpertinencia vel inutilia inserta. Et difficile est inexpertis et inusitatis in scribendo talia prima facie declinare. Gratus tamen sum de pluribus materiis hic insertis, quas reputo me utrumque invenisse et intellexisse, per qualescunque licet pueriles deducciones; et spero quod michi et aliis volentibus studiose querere et advertere poterit melius et lucidius apparere, cum profectum deducendi ad oculciores et profundiores materias methaphisice et sacre scripture.

I omit several arguments in support of this classification, partly to avoid swelling this tractate, already too lengthy on account of my inexperience.

Sed reddeundo et supposito sic esse X generalissima rerum, nec posse esse plura; supposito insuper quod quelibet species, que poterit esse species, potest esse sicud pars formalis sui generis, quemadmodum partes organie et officiales in corpore animalis; sicud sunt manus, oculus, digitus, antis, pes, nerwus, cor, epar, etc., sunt sicud partes materiales sui generis, sicud simplex parcialis caro, vel parciale os, vel parcialis sangwis, etc., dicuntur partes materiales corporis animalis: supposito denique tercio quod, sicud corpus animalis esset colobon si deexistat sibi aliqua sui pars formalis, non autem si defluat sibi aliqua pars materialis, — quod sic genus aliquod generalissimum esset colobon si non existeret sibi quecunque sua species possibilis,
252b non autem erit colobon si individua aliqua | sua nunquam sibi inexisterent: istis suppositis, visibile est et videtur quod deus non permittat aliquod de decem generalissimis a principio creacionis mundi usque in sempiternum esse colobon, cum facillime possit et summe sciat talem defectum, talem inperfeccionem, talemque monstruositatem a quolibet generalissimorum excludere et semovere. Contingeret autem aliquod generalissimorum esse colobon, si ipsum existens aliquam sui speciem posset habere quam tamen nunquam haberet. Videtur

Return to the main point. These ten categories have all their species as parts, even as the members of a body; and as a body would be crippled if any member were wanting, so each of these supreme genera would be imperfect if any species were lacking. This God could not permit. Therefore, at some time or other, every possible species must *be in existence.*

21. ant℘ *MS.* 26. colobo𝔶 *MS.*

21. *Antis.* I can find no word like this, but suspect that *auris* is meant. In careless writing, *r* and *t* were somewhat alike, and may have led to a mistake.

igitur quod non possit esse species substancie vel accidentis in universo que non existat in propria forma in mundo aliquando, licet post diem iudicii multe species rerum materialium amplius non erunt, sicud forte postea tempus non erit, nec motus sensibilis proprie dictus, si mundus erit totaliter consummatus.

Some species, however, will surely exist no longer after Doomsday, though some think that all will be somehow preserved in the bodies of men risen again. The Universe is entire, but at no one period of time.

Et sic forte alique species rerum requiruntur per esse in consummacione mundi que cessabunt existere esse, consummacione mundi superveniente. Nec videtur sentencia valere que poneret omnes species corporum materialium perpetuo remanere, saltem 2^m sua minima naturalia in corporibus hominum, que sunt corpora ultima et summe mixtionis. Non enim videtur quomodo cete grandia 2^m sua minima naturalia remanerent perpetuo in corporibus humanis, nec per subtilem divisionem anatomia medicorum invenitur species leonis, vacce, equi, cete grandium, in corpore hominis 2^m sua minima naturalia ipsum integrantes. Sicut ergo totum tempus mundi est perfectum et completum totaliter, sed in nulla hora nec in aliquo mense vel anno, sed in toto magno tempore: sic quodlibet generalissimum completum in speciebus suis, absque hoc quod sit colobon, sed non in quocunque tempore vel in quacunque evitate oportet hoc ita esse.

8. p̲ esse ͡ı 9fumato *MS.* 9. 2ɫ *pro* esse *MS.* 10. os *pro* omnes *MS.* 16. atenoıa *MS.*

10. The text is here extremely corrupt, though, as often happens in these works, the sense is plain enough.

CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM SECUNDUM.

Ulterius dubitatur circa materiam universalium, cum universalis natura, ut dictum est, nobilior est essencialiter quam natura singularis sub ea, et perfeccior eciam, sine proporcione racionali cuiuscunque finiti ad aliud finitum; alioquin agregatum individuum alicuius speciei posset parificari in perfeccione essenciali ipsi speciei; quod non convenit, 2^{m} dicta superius. Si ergo ita est, tunc natura communis essencialis ad spiritus intel-
253ª lectuales singulares in hominibus | erit dignior et perfeccior essencialiter eisdem. Quod non videtur verum: quia, cum quilibet talis spiritus racionalis singularis cuiuslibet hominis sit ymago ad ymaginem dei et trinitatis increate, cum ipse sit unica essencia et unica natura intellectualis, et tres res, quarum quelibet eque plene est ipse idem spiritus intellectualis, sicud deus est unica essencia, et unica natura, et tres res, quarum quelibet eque plene est idem deus; et natura intellectualis communis, cum sic non sit unica essencia et natura, sed plures nature singulares intellectuales: ipsa non erit ymago dei et ad ymaginem, sed solum vestigium trinitatis increate; sed quia res que est ymago et ad ymaginem dei dignior et nobilior est essencialiter, quia deo similior quam que non est sic ymago ad ymaginem dei: igitur, aut non est natura universalis intellectualis, aut universalia non sunt magis digna naturaliter suis singularibus.

Is the Universal more perfect than its singulars? It must be,

and yet the individual man, and not the Universal is the Image of God, and his soul is the image of the Trinity.

We should then conclude either that intellectual natures have no Universals, or that they are not more perfect than their singulars.

Hic plurimum negatur quod spiritus individualis et intellectualis sit ymago dei et ad ymaginem dei in hoc, quod ipse esset unica natura et 3^{es} res divisim et collectim substancialiter entes in illa natura, quarum quelibet eque plene esset idem spiritus totalis: quia sic esse trinum et unum videtur dignitas que soli deo

Most writers deny that this image exists.

1. *A gap of nearly a line;* Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *Blank space for Initial U MS.*

If the human soul is three things in one, it has what belongs to God alone; one man is three persons; meritorious acts, or the reverse, will not belong any longer to the man himself.

potest competere; et videtur deo quod creatura sic eciam esset trina et una, et non potest aliqua creatura propter sui modicitatem et imperfeccionem hanc dignitatem sumere: ymmo, sic eciam unus spiritus intellectualis Sortis vel Petri — ymmo, cuiuslibet hominis proprius spiritus racionalis esset 3^{es} persone, eadem racione qua deus est 3^{es} persone. Et sic quilibet homo esset 3^{es} persone humane, et per consequens tria supposita humana. Et sic unicus homo esset tria supposita humana, quod est erroneum omnino et oppositum in adiecto, cum quilibet unicus homo habet actus suppositales et personales qui solum illi individuo homini conveniunt. Quod si 3^{es} res spiritus racionalis ipsius hominis sunt 3^{es} persone et ipse homo una alia quarta persona, tunc nulli actus personales meritorii et demeritorii trium personarum et spiritu racionali ipsius hominis erunt actus ipsius hominis; et sic spiritus ipsius hominis meretur vel demeretur, pro quo homo nec premium nec supplicium reciperet. |

But we can admit this Trinity in the mind nevertheless. The three 'things' in the uncreated Trinity are called Persons by the Church; if the Church had chosen to call the three created 'things' persons too,

Sed admisso et concesso quod spiritus racionalis 253b Petri sit sic unica natura et tres res, cum — sicud deus sufficit essencialiter intendere intellectualiter se esse et ex hiis duobus tante quietatur in se, et sufficiencia est prima res in deo, scilicet pater; et intencio intellectualis secunda, scilicet filius verbum, etc. et quies est tercia res, spiritus sanctus, amor, delectacio etc. — sic consimiliter argumentatur de spiritu racionali et intellectuali ipsius hominis. Verumptamen ille 3^{es} res in spiritu increato, scilicet in deo, ex racionali et concordi consensu ecclesie vocantur 3^{es} persone. Et ex parte rei sunt 3^{es} persone, quia tres, non substancie, sed subsistencie individue nature intellectualis, quarum quelibet est per se una (cum descriptive persona sit *subsistencia individua nature intellectualis* per se una). Tres autem res in spiritu intellectuali creato non vocantur tres persone, sed una tantum persona, cum nullus sit accidentalis actus personalis inmanens, vel extra transiens unius illarum rerum, quin sit cuiuslibet earum. Verumptamen, — sicud in divinis prima sola producit ad intra secundam, et prima et secunda simul terciam — quod si ecclesia admitteret et concederet

12, 13. que nunc *pro* conveniunt *MS.*

3^{es} res in spiritu intellectuali creato sicud est in deo, et vocaret eas personas, tunc sicud unicus spiritus increatus est 3^{es} persone divine, ita concederetur quod unicus spiritus angelicus est 3^{es} persone angelice; et unicus spiritus humanus est tres persone humane, vel spiritus humani 3^{es} persone. Nec tunc oporteret dici quod Sanctus Michael est unicum suppositum et unica persona angelica; sed quia ecclesia graves et vehementes habuit inpugnaciones ab hereticis contra tres res in divinis, cum tunc, 2^m hereticos, deus esset 3^{es} substancie, cum tamen sit unica substancia sicud est unicus deus; ideo racionabiliter deerevit ex inspiracione dei vocare illas tres res personas; de spiritu autem angelico vel humano non curat ecclesia determinare tanquam necessario credendum katholico, si esset tres res vel si non esset, si credit de quolibet spiritu angelico quod ipse est substancia intellectualis per se existens non aptus
254a informative inexistere alicui alii | a quo supponeretur, et quod talis exerceat actum intelligendi, eciam accidentalem et individualem, qui solum uni spiritui intellectuali debetur. Ideo, iuxta morem philosophorum vocat talem spiritum unam personam, et non plures.

We should have had to admit that to be true. But on account of difficulties made by heretics, the Church has merely decided as to the Three Divine Persons, and left the rest free, only requiring us to believe that an angel is a pure spirit, which it calls a person.

Et secundum illam sentenciam ecclesia racionabiliter et subtiliter equivocat; ut videtur, uno modo dicendi vocando deum tres personas, et spiritum angelicum unicam personam; in spiritu eciam angelico 2^m naturam suam intellectualem possunt currere actus intelligendi mere accidentales et individuales, quos non potest aliqua res substancialiter existens in illo spiritu angelico exercere, nisi quelibet ibi sic existens eundem exerceat. Ideo 2^m hoc vocat spiritum talem unicam personam. Nec profundat se ecclesia, si ibi sunt res quarum prima secundam causat vel producit, et ille due terciam, cum hoc non sit necessarium simplicibus ad credendum. In deo autem, quia non possunt 2^m deitatem tales actus accidentales currere, realiter differentes a deo, individuales, sed oportet ecclesiam credere ibi esse tres res, quarum prima secundam principiat, et ille simul terciam, ita quod prima sit solum perducens, 2^a simul principians et principiata, tercia autem solum principiata, nec possunt pluribus quam hiis 3^{bus} modis res in divinis cogitari, oportebat illas res vocari tres personas realiter distinctas.

Reasonable and subtle equivocation of the Church in this matter.

It was necessary to define one question, but not the other.

27. cre' *MS.* 28. q? *pro* quos *MS.* 36. cre *MS.*

If the theory of the triplicity of the soul were derogatory to God's dignity, I would abjure it. But it is not so.

Si tamen in minimo derogaret dignitati divine sic in unico spiritu creato intellectuali esse tres res, quarum quelibet eque plene esset idem spiritus et eadem penitus natura intellectualis, tunc fide universali qua in universali omnem errorem contrarium recte fidei detestamur, eadem et hoc in universali dampnamus. Sed de obiectis superius contra hanc sentenciam videtur dicendum quod non derogat deo, sed attestatur super eius bonitate et sapiencia quod spiritus creatus est tres res et unica natura intellectualis, sicud non derogat deo quod spiritus creatus est intellectivus et libere volitivus atque possessivus summi boni et omnium bonorum dei, sicud et deus. De alio autem argumento posset in uno sensu concedi, ut videtur, prima facie: quod spiritus racionalis in homine est 3^{es} persone; et quod ipse homo est ille 3^{es} persone et quelibet earum, nec una illarum | potest aliquem actum accidentalem 254^b intelligendi vel volendi, vel sic de aliis, exercere merendo vel demerendo, nisi ipse homo (et quelibet earum trium rerum) illum exerceat; et sicud non male sed katholice sonat quod unicus deus est unica supposita divina et 3^{es} persone divine, ita eciam bene sonaret quod unicus homo esset tria supposita humana, et 3^{es} persone humane interioris hominis.

As to the acts, meritorious or otherwise, elicited by man, it may be admitted that they are elicited by the three parts of man together.

But the great difficulty touches Christ. How can He be three Persons, in his assumed Humanity? The position is heretical. Perhaps these parts lose their hypostases on being assumed by Him, or there are in a created being three constituents, but only one person.

Sed tunc insolubile argumentum videtur quod persona Cristi, que ab eterno ante incarnacionem erat unica persona, quod illa iam esset tres persone sui interioris hominis. Et si ille sint alie a persona divina Cristi, Cristus erit plures persone, eciam nove. Et est simpliciter hereticum quod persona Cristi sit plures persone. Forte diceretur quod ille 3^{es} res spiritus creati in Cristo propter unionem suppositalem ad verbum dei non habent proprias personalitates, sicud est in aliis puris hominibus; et omnes et singule sunt unica persona Cristi, sicud verbum, anima, et caro (secundum beatum Augustinum) sunt unus Cristus. Vel forte melius diceretur, — supposito quod sentencia sit vera de unica natura et tribus rebus spiritus creati, — quod licet tales 3^{es} res sunt in spiritu creato, in nullo tamen tali possunt esse plures persone, sed unica persona; quia, sicut ipsa natura intellectualis creata et unica unico

26. an̄ in cac̄onē *MS.* 41. vn̄o *MS.*

supposito induitur, sic et ille 3^{es} res eidem supposito induuntur. Et non possunt habere plures personalitates proprias, sicud nec natura humana in Cristo, 2^{m} aliquos theologos, potest habere propriam personalitatem, sed necessario oportet personari verbi dei eandem, si ipsa debet personari sicud personatur; et sic non potuerit esse plures persone. Nec oportet sequi, si in divinis 3^{es} res sint 3^{es} persone unius dei, quod sic ille 3^{es} sint 3^{es} persone eiusdem angeli vel hominis; quia hic ille 3^{es} res cum natura intellectuali eidem supposito sunt indute, qualiter non est in divinis. Et illam responsionem puto eligendam et priorem dimittendam, admissis tribus rebus substancialiter in spiritu creato.

What is a Person in God, is not necessarily so in men or in angels. I prefer this answer.

Et si hec responsio non valet, puto quod prior omnino sit invalida de argumento principali ubi arguebatur quod natura intellectualis singularis est ymago dei et
255a ad ymaginem | dei, et non natura intellectualis communis in prima dignior. Non sequitur quod una illarum trium rerum in spiritu creato (si ipse est tres res et unica natura) una, inquam, illarum trium rerum non est sic ymago et ad ymaginem trinitatis, quod ipsa sit una natura et tres res, sicud est deus trinitas. Et spiritus creatus, iuxta hanc sentenciam est sic ad ymaginem et ymago dei trinitatis. Et cum spiritus creatus est dignior et nobilior aliqua illarum trium rerum, est plene illa ymago trinitatis: sic natura intellectualis creata communis substancialiter pluribus spiritibus intellectualibus est multe tales ymagines trinitatis increate simul et divisim. Et igitur, non solum cum digna et nobilis sit naturaliter sicud aliqua illarum, ymmo, est naturaliter dignior qualitatibus illarum et omnibus illis simul, sicut due illarum sunt plus digne naturaliter quam altera tantum. Verumptamen, quia individuum intellectuale creatum recipit in se informative disposiciones gratuitas, gratum facientes ipsum individuum deo; natura autem intellectualis specifica pure abstracta et nuda quiditas suppositorum intellectualium creatorum non potest in se tales recipere: ideo non est mirum quod individuum

If this explanation be inadequate, we may deny that a singular intellectual nature being the image of God, its Universal is not so.

On the contrary, since the Universal is many such natures, it is this image many times repeated.

Yet the individual, being capable of receiving grace, may attain a greater

1. ῑditur *MS.* 2. ῑdunt^r *MS.* 24. t'tᵽ *pro* trinitatis *MS.*; *ib.* non est *MS.* 38. in deo *pro* ideo *MS.*

18. *Non sequitur.* I am not at all sure about the proper punctuation of the ten following lines, which are probably corrupt, or marred by omissions.

supernatural perfection than the Universal, just as Christ's Humanity, united to the Word, is more worthy than the whole multitude of men.

supra modum reddatur dignius, non naturaliter sed per graciam, ultra suam nudam speciem, quamvis eius species sine proporcione formabili seu racionali est dignior naturaliter quam illud suum individuum sit dignum naturaliter. Unde sic natura humana in Cristo, per graciam unionis suppositalis que sibi debetur, 2^{m} quod cum verbo dei et cum natura divina est idem suppositum verbi dei; per illam sine proporcione et ultra omnem proporcionem racionalem excedit totam multitudinem naturarum creatarum cuius multitudinis ipsa est pars, cum illi multitudini non debetur talis sublimitas et exaltacio in unionem supervitalem cum filio dei; et tamen econtra illa multitudo naturarum creatarum est proporcionabiliter dignior naturaliter, si meretur dici digna naturaliter, quam certe illa natura humana Cristi sit naturaliter digna.

15. c'te *MS.*

CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM TERCIUM.

Ultimo hic quo ad aliud superius motum, quod universalia talia sint superflua monstra et inutilia, cum nichil prosunt mundo, eo quod nichil possunt facere, respondetur quod hoc assumptum est falsum, quia universalia substanciarum sunt cause formales essenciales naturales, et cause finales essenciales naturales substanciarum individualium, et non econtra. Oportet universale, et per consequens omnino oportunum est 2^m 255b naturam, ad *esse Sortem* | *esse hominem*; et non econtra. Et det adversarius illud oportunum quod oportunum est ad *esse Sortem*, *esse hominem*, et non econtra; et non dabit, nisi communem humanitatem, que est illa oportunitas, et oportunum illud, scilicet, ad *esse Sortem*, *esse hominem*; et non econtra, sic quod humanitas communis est causa essencialis naturalis et formalis individui Sortis, et non econtra.

Are Universals useless and superfluous monsters? No. They are the formal and essential causes of things.

That an *individual man* may exist, it is necessary for *man* to exist; the former could not exist without the latter.

Est eciam causa essencialis finalis et naturalis, et non econtra. Cum enim deus propter signa sciat quod necessarium est secundum naturam ad *esse Sortem*, *esse hominem* et non econtra, et illa negacio 2^m se, *non esse hominem*, esset incomparabiliter dampnosior in natura et in mundo quam esset illa negacio secundum se dampnosa *non esse Sortem*; igitur incomparabiliter ipsi nature et mundo plus prodest naturaliter *esse hominem* quam ei prosit naturaliter *esse Sortem*, et per consequens incomparabiliter humanitas communis est melior essencialiter naturaliter quam Sor sit naturaliter bonus et essencialiter. Et per consequens, cum oporteat iuxta deductum superius humanitatem communem in natura esse, ad hoc quod Sor sit, et non econtra, humanitas communis est finalis essencialis naturalis Sortis in *esse* suo essenciali. Nec dubium de uno assumpto priori,

They are also final causes. The non-existence of universal humanity would be a far greater loss than the non-existence of any one individual, and therefore humanity is something incomparably more perfect in its nature.

1. *A gap of almost a line.* Capitulum &c. *deest.* 2. *A blank space for initial U MS.* 9. opꝫ vm *MS.*; *ib.* optunu *MS.* 19. pt *MS.* 32, 33. esse suo esse *MS.*

scilicet, quod illa negacio 2^{m} se, *non esse hominem,* esset incomparabiliter dampnosior nature et mundo quam illa 2^{m} se *non esse Sortem,* cum prima 2^{m} se tolleret omnem existenciam naturalem humanam, secunda autem 2^{m} se non tolleret nisi existenciam naturalem propriam Sortis.

We must admit that in so far as the loss of any quality is evil, in so far the having it is a good thing, and vice-versâ.

Sed nec oportet poni in dubium quin, quantum negacio vel privacio secundum se esset alicui dampnosa, quod tantum affirmacio vel habicio directe opposita tali negacioni vel privacioni esset proficua, et econtra. Et hoc semper 2^{m} se, vel ad minimum proporcionabiliter, ut negacio vel privacio secundum se est dampnosa, affirmacio vel habicio directe opposita est 2^{m} se proficua eidem; et econtra.

Proof.

Si enim aliqua duo bona, A et B, 2^{m} se essent eque proficua eodem, puta C, ita quod A et B 2^{m} se essent habitus vel affirmaciones ita eidem eque proficui, tunc oportet quod D et E eorum directe negaciones vel privaciones 2^{m} se essent eque dampnose eidem. Et econtra, si D et E negaciones vel privaciones 2^{m} se essent eidem eque dampnose, tunc A et B | habitus vel affirmaciones directe opposite erunt 256a
eque proficui eidem C. Nam si non, tunc A habitum ab ipso C, loco B, non eque proficeret sibi 2^{m} se, sicud B 2^{m} se; vel econtra, B habitum a C, loco A, non eque proficeret 2^{m} se ipsi C sicud A 2^{m} se; quod est contra casum et positum. Et patet consequencia; quia A habitum ab ipso C, loco B, et sic privacione ipsius B haberetur ab ipso C, cum magis vel minus dampnoso 2^{m} se ipsi C quam si B haberetur ab ipso C; eo quod per adversarium D privacio directe ipsius A et E directe privacio ipsius B secundum se essent ineque dampnose. Et per consequens 2^{m} plus et minus ipsi C; et per consequens ille due regule de duabus affirmacionibus eque perficuis 2^{m} se eidem et de duabus negacionibus 2^{m} se eque dampnosis 2^{m} eidem; ille, inquam, due regule sunt vere.

This is true, whatever proportions you take to exemplify it.

Et ulterius sequitur quod, si A habitus secundum se est in duplo magis proficuus ipsi C quam esset B secundum se, tunc et privacio ipsius A, scilicet D, esset 2^{m} se in duplo magis dampnosa ipsi C quam privacio ipsius B, puta E, esset dampnosa 2^{m} se ipsi C; et econtra, si privacio directa ipsius A, puta D, 2^{m} se est

26. pn̑uo *MS.*

magis dampnosa ipsi C quam esset sibi dampnosa 2^m se privacio ipsius B, puta E, tunc A affirmacio 2^m se est magis proficua ipsi C quam B esset sibi 2^m se proficua. Et ita consimiliter arguitur de proporcione tripla, quadrupla, et qualibet racionali proporcione.

Ex quibus patet principale intentum, videlicet: Si ista negacio, *non esse hominem*, 2^m se esset magis dampnosa ultra omnem proporcionem racionalem nature universorum et ipsi mundo quam *non esse Sortem* esset 2^m se dampnosum nature vel mundo, tunc econtra *esse hominem* 2^m se ultra omnem proporcionem racionalem erit magis proficuum mundo quam *esse Sortem* 2^m se esset sibi prodessens. Nec est hic cura si privacio non esset 2^m se precise tam mala sicud habitus et directe oppositus 2^m se est bonus. Defectus enim directe oppositus bono vere virtutis et gracie, 2^m quod illud est bonum honestum, non est 2^m se tam malus sicud illud bonum virtutis, 2^m quod est bonum honestum, est bonum. Alioquin sancti in coelo non essent plus accepti
256b deo quam sunt sibi | ingrati peccatores in inferno; quod est impium. Sic forte, inquam, privacio directe opposita affirmacioni est tam dampnosa secundum se alicui quam proficua esset 2^m se ipsa affirmacio eidem. Sufficit autem quod proporcionabiliter privacio 2^m se sit dampnosa alicui ut eius affirmacio directa 2^m se esset bona eidem.

It is thus clear that if the non-existence of Man is an evil incomparably greater than the non-existence of an individual, his existence is an incomparably greater good. Though this principle is not true as regards moral virtue which is, all things equal, more lovely than its contrary is odious.

Ulterius dicitur quod universalia substanciarum sunt magis proficua mundo quam sua singularia, cum efficiunt et faciunt omnia que efficiunt et faciunt sua singularia; et singularia non per se faciunt ipsa universalia. Unde species humana facit intellecciones, voliciones, sensaciones, lecciones, discursus, mociones, giraciones, alteraciones et omnia talia que faciunt singulares homines, et omnes acciones eorum; non tamen ipsa species humana exercet in se aliquam talem accionem accidentalem. Sic facit cursum et commestionem Petri, sed non currit nec comedit, sicud Petrus; sicud eciam deus facit cursum et comestionem Petri, sed non currit nec comedit. Unde, sicud deus propter suam immensam dignitatem abstractus est ab omni accidente reali realiter sibi condistincto (et dico abstractus 2^m naturam divinam Cristi, 2^m humanam naturam habet in se varia talia

I add that the Universals do all that their singulars do; *Man* produces the acts of running, understanding, &c. in each individual, though *Man* neither runs nor understands, &c. formally. As God has no accident (i. e. *quà* God, not *quà* Christ the Man) distinct from His essence, so it is with Universals, which are the cause of every

5. quolibet *MS.* 9. quod *MS.* 20. quam sunt sibi | quam sunt sibi *MS.* 31. lecones *MS.*

act of their singulars, and still more perfectly than they themselves are.

accidencia) sic genera et species substanciarum, propter suam supereminentem dignitatem naturalem, propter individuas substancias absolvuntur a perfeccione per accidencia, que eis inexisterent. Sunt ergo talia genera et species substanciarum raciones et principia intrinseca, substancialia, et formalia communia, et hec meliora substanciis individuis [racione] currendi, legendi, dolendi, amandi, laudandi, honorandi, deum etc. accionibus accidentalibus realiter ipsis substanciis condistinctis. Sed tales actiones non recipiunt in se informative, proper nimiam sui subiecti unitatem naturalem ultra supposita substancie naturaliter dignam. Et sic sunt principia, non que exercent tales acciones, sed quibus tales acciones exercentur.

It does not follow that they are agents. So they are causes of all that is done by their singulars, and far more perfectly.

Nec oportet sequi, si universalia substanciarum efficiunt et faciunt tales res vel tales actus, quod igitur in genere cause agentis | illos vel illos actus faciunt. Cum enim 257[a] prima materia habeat aliquem suum effectum, ipsam efficit et facit illum effectum suum, alias non erit effectus suus; non tamen materia prima in genere cause agentis aliquid facit. Unde, sicud omnis causa rei que sit est causa efficiens et faciens illam rem, non tamen causa agens illam rem; eciam sic universalia substanciarum primarum, ut vera principia quibus efficiunt et faciunt actus et opera suorum singularium, faciunt, dico, longe nobiliori modo, quamvis non ut agencia, quam faciant ea sua singularia.

They are on this account not less admirable, perhaps more so, than their singulars, for the Divine Grace in them.

Et sic, quamvis singularia tales acciones in se exerceant et non sua universalia, non tamen minus extollenda sunt universalia pro talibus accionibus naturalibus quam singularia de accionibus gratuitis; forte secus est, cum tales ex gracia gratum faciente exercentur. Quia autem universalia pro accionibus naturalibus singularium non minus sint extollenda quam ipsa singularia, licet sola singularia tales acciones in se exerceant, videtur ex simili constare.

The Son alone redeemed the world, yet the Father and the Spirit are to be praised equally therefor.

Nam licet solus filius dei, et non pater, nec spiritus sanctus in se exercuerint humiliacionem humidatissimam pro peccato et superbia generis humani, tamen non plus est filius pro illo laudandus quam pater vel spiritus sanctus, cum quilibet illorum

6. hoc *MS.* 7. racione *deest MS.* 12. diga͡ *MS.* 31. g͡tuitꝑ *MS.* 32. fa͡te *MS.* 38. h͡mliaco͡n h͡midatiffima͡ *MS.*

eque plene illam humiliacionem fecerit et participaverit, sicud ipse filius. Et sicud universalia substanciarum sunt principia substancialia formalia intrinseca suis individuis faciendi, agendi, et exercendi actus et opera; et ipsa per se non agunt nec exercent tales actus et opera proprie; nec sunt in sua puritate et nuditate essencialis bonitatis, quamvis forte, sub *esse* medie abstraccionis, puta de quanto quoddam medium teneret inter pura supposita et nuditate sui per se primi modi essendi, sicud aliquo modo similiter Cristus 2^{m} hominem mediat inter seipsum deum et purum hominem; quamvis, inquam, sub tali medio essendi forte potuerit eis aliquo modo vere attribui exercencia actum et operacionem: sic universalia accidencium sunt raciones essenciales |
257b et principia formalia intrinseca et essencialia suis principiis individuis ad informandum et denominandum individuas substancias, et non proprie eas informant et denominant. Et sicud universalia principia substanciarum sunt principia communia suis individuis, ut sic communiter concorditer et conformiter 2^{m} illa faciant, agant, et exerceant actus et suas operaciones; sic universalia accidencium suis principiis individuis sunt communia principia, et raciones communes essenciales ad informandum et denominandum communiter, concorditer, et conformiter supposita substanciarum.

In like manner, though the Universals taken apart do not act, whatever they may do in their state of union with their individuals; they are the principles from which every accident springs, yet they themselves neither inform nor determine their subjects.

Nequaquam ergo non multum prosunt universalia ipsi mundo, cum sic individua mundo faciunt esse unum, et sunt eorum ligamenta essencialia, quibus ad invicem uniuntur, colliguntur et adiuvantur, secundum que universalia res eiusdem generis vel speciei concorditer et consone serviunt deo et proficiunt mundo. Certum est quod, si, esset unus florenus qui eque prodesset quotlibet amicis sicud unus florenus uni soli eorum prodesset, primus esset multo acceptior et utilior ac melior quam secundus. Potencior autem communis humanitas quod prosit et proficiat omnibus, singulis, et quotlibet hominibus ad *esse* et *facere* quidquid naturaliter eque, ymmo longe plus quam singularis humanitas Sortis possit sibi prodesse ad *existere* et *facere* quidquid naturaliter fecerit. Igitur incomparabiliter melior est naturaliter mundo, et prodest communis humanitas,

Universals are therefore of great utility in the world.

If there were one florin that could be of as much use to a great number as an ordinary florin is to one man, the former would be far preferable. So likewise, Universal is far better than individual humanity.

8. quōdā *MS.* 26. nunquam *MS.* 28. earum *MS.* 35. porʳ *MS.*

quam humanitas quecunque singularis naturaliter. Et ita de universalibus aliis est iudicandum quo ad sua singularia.

We ought all to feel this bond of common humanity, be glad that we have it and help others to come to eternal life thereby.

Unde, cum simile naturaliter diligit suum simile, quilibet homo naturali amicicia debet naturaliter favere et congratulari omnibus et singulis hominibus quod secum habeant eamdem communem humanitatem que prodest et formaliter facit eque, ymmo, longe plus quam cuiuscunque singularis humanitas prosit et faciat ad *ipsum esse hominem*, et ad quodcunque suum *facere* naturaliter humanitus. Et si homines naturali amicicia debent suis proximis una secum favere de tali eorum communi bono formali, scilicet, communi humanitate, quanto magis debent studere quod amicicia gratuita vite eterne | meritoria faveant suis proximis secum 258
tali magno bono naturali.

No one ought to be set against the Universals, unless he were sure that they did not exist; and such certainty is impossible in presence of so many proofs in their favour.

Propter quod videtur quod nequaquam deberent homines scienter et voluntarie negare talia universalia in rebus, nisi evidenter cognoscerent talia non posse existere: quod nunquam contingit, cum manifestum est quod *quilibet homo* est homo, et patet toti mundo quod *quilibet equus* est animal. Et placet deo quod *quilibet fidelis* diligit deum, et oportet *quemlibet hominem* esse hominem sub potestate dei. Et fides katholica est quod *quilibet homo* qui nondum resurrexit resurget cum corpore suo; et tenendum est fideliter et katholice quod *quilibet homo* finaliter carus deo salvabitur; et defendendum est usque ad mortem quod *quilibet sanctus* in vita eterna clare videt deum. Et nullus Cristianus audet dicere quod hoc non esset iustum quod *quilibet dampnatus* in inferno punitur miro modo graviter. Istas et consimiles veritates a parte rei non est dubium esse vel innuere formas communes et universales in rebus singularibus; sophisticent se quantumcunque voluerint persequentes a re has et consimiles veritates.

Those who attack them are sophists who affect a common table, kitchen and meals with other men, yet refuse to have humanity in common with them.

Et cum aliis hominibus volunt habere mensam communem, coquinam communem, collacionem communem, etc. miror qualiter cum eisdem nolunt habere humanitatem communem. Volunt plus esse similes sibi in hoc quod sunt mensati communiter, coquinati, pransi, vel potati, quam in eo quod sunt homines; cum ad eos esse com-

12. vª *MS.* 26. est quod *MS.* 33. ĩnu'e *MS.*

muniter pransos est eis simul prandium commune, et ad eos esse simul et communiter mensatos est eis simul mensa communis etc. Sed ad "eos esse simul homines" non est eis simul communis humanitas; volunt simul in communi esse hospitati et nolunt simul in communi esse homines.

If they dine together, they have dinner in common; surely if they are men together, they have humanity in common. But this they deny!

Ego autem affecto, ut possum, quod meritorie plus michi cum aliis esse eandem communem humanitatem; et volo quod michi, sed non michi soli, insit humanitas; quia scio quod veritas ordinata a deo ex parte rei est quod michi, sed non michi soli, inest humanitas quam extollo et diligo, saltem naturaliter, longe super humanitatem meam singularem michi et omnibus ac singulis hominibus plus prodessentem ad *esse* et *facere* quam michi mea singularis humanitas prosit.

For myself I wish to share this common humanity ever more and more with others; for I know that it should be loved and extolled far above my individuality.

Et benedictus deus universorum qui non solum formas
258b rerum naturales singulares | sicut res privatas instituit, sed eciam pocius formas rerum naturales communes condidit et rebus indidit, sicud res publicas, videns huiusmodi formas communes, et sic res publicas, plus mundo naturaliter proficere quam singulares sibi prosint naturaliter. Et caveat homuncio exprobare et derogare factori suo, dicendo quod hoc non est bene ordinatum a deo, quod unumquodque animal est substancia; et quod deus peccat si placet sibi voluntarie quod unumquodque bonorum encium est bonum. Non sic, non sic! sed gaudeamus et supra modum congratulemur sibi de hoc quod unumquodque suorum creatorum plene subiacet sue regie maiestati etc.

Blessed be God, who not only made individuals, like private persons, but also Universals, like commonwealths, seeing how much superior they were to individuals. Let not a wretched man lay blame on his Maker for what He has done. No; let us rejoice and be exceeding glad in that the whole world is subject to Him.

Et sic est finis huius operis.

20. placet *MS.*

30. *Operis.* On the same page and the next line, but in another hand, very cramped, abbreviated and hard to read, follow various extracts from Wyclif's philosophical treatises as follows.

FRAGMENTA.

There are three modes of defence in the Exercise called 'Obligations'. The first consists in admitting nothing but the thing posited, irrelevant truths, and what immediately follows thence.

Tres sunt modi respondendi, secundum quorum quemlibet potest se homo defendere in quocunque casu fuerit, ne sibi concludatur.

Primus modus respondendi est Magistri Richardi Surinhet; et ille modus respondendi est quodammodo communis, secundum quod solum sunt tria in quacunque obligacione concedenda, videlicet positum et sequens inmediate ex posito, et verum impertinens scitum esse tale, ita quod penes illam viam id quod sequitur ex posito cum bene concesso vel cum bene concessis cum opposito bene negati vel oppositis bene negatorum non debet concedi, sed solum tria predicta.

Example: If *all men run*, and *you are a man*, you need not admit that *you run*. For if the premises form a copulative sentence (Every man runs and you are a man) you can admit the consequence, and deny the copulative *without denying either of its parts.*

Unde, si ponatur illa: *Omnis homo currit*, et admittatur illa, debet concedi. Et tunc si deinde proponatur: *Tu es homo*, illud eciam est concedendum, quia verum et inpertinens scitum a me fore tale. Et si tunc proponatur: *Tu curris*, hoc est negandum, non obstante quod sequitur ex posito, cum bene concesso; quia illa non est regula, scilicet: "Quod sequitur ex posito cum concesso est concedendum", sicud predictum est. Et si argumentatur quod contra: *Omnis homo currit, tu es homo: ergo, tu curris*, dicitur concedendo consequenciam et negando antecedens. Et si queratur pro qua parte, dicitur pro neutra parte. Unde, si maior proponatur, debet concedi, et si minor proponatur, debet eciam concedi; et semper, quandocunque fit idem argumentum, conceditur consequencia et negatur antecedens; tamen pro neutra parte. Et ita potest dici in omnibus obligacionibus vel insolubilibus quibuscunque; et ita quandocunque fit aliquod argumentum sive in casu, sive extra casum, si antecedens fuerit copulativa et non placuerit tibi concedere consequens, potes (si illa consequencia

2. *Blank space for initial T; small t in the centre MS.* 17. *after* fore, 4 *crossed off MS.* 31. ẏ *MS.*; *ib.* ẏ *MS.*

sit bona) concedere illam et negare antecedens; pro neutra tamen parte.

Si vero tibi fiat aliquod argumentum cuius consequens fuerit contra te et antecedens non sit una copulativa, sed sit una cathegorica, tunc, si consequencia valeat, concedas illam, sic dicendo: Concedo consequenciam, et si antecedens videatur esse concedendum a te concedas eciam antecedens, et constanter neges consequens. Et si opponens faciat tale argumentum (quia illud est fortissimum argumentum quod potest fieri ex parte opponentis): Illa consequencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et totum antecedens est verum: ergo consequens: concedas consequenciam, et neges antecedens; pro neutra tamen parte, quia tunc est una copulativa in antecedente. Et ita respondebis ad illam sicud prius. Et, nisi opponens sic, vel saltem consimili modo arguat, nunquam potest ipse quovismodo venire ad suum propositum. Et ita non dubitabis, quin 2^m illam oppinionem potes
259[a] defendere in quacunque materia | a quocunque argumento quod argumentum possibile est aliquid facere; quia manifestum est quod non est possibile aliquem argumentare contra te, nisi antecedens sit copulativa vel non copulativa. Si antecedens sit copulativa, dictum est qualiter tunc respondendum est; si vero non sit copulativa, respondebis sicud ultimo dictum est.

If they do not form a copulative, you can admit the antecedent and the consequence, yet deny the consequent; for the adversary, wishing to press his point, is obliged to make an argument with a copulative, that you can treat as before. No matter what the subject may be, you can always defend your point thus.

Alius modus respondendi est per quem potest sic aliter defendere in omni materia qualitercumque difficili vel ignota. Isto modo, si fiat tibi aliquod argumentum, cum consequens sit contra te, sive illud fiat in casu aliquo sive extra casum, concedas consequenciam, sic dicendo: Concedo consequenciam; et eciam concedas antecedens illius argumenti, si apparuerit tibi concedendum, si vero antecedens non apparuerit tibi concedendum, sufficiens est evasio ad illud argumentum negare antecedens; sed semper neges consequens illius qualitercunque fuerit, si videtur tibi quod ipsum fuerit

In the second mode, you admit the consequence, admit or deny the antecedent as you think fit, and always deny the consequent.

10. forlissi^m *MS.* 15. rn deb͡ *MS.* 20. 9ꝫ *pro* quod *MS.* 23. co^{va} *MS.* 25. *Gap at the end of line.* 26. *Blank space for initial A with small* a *in the centre MS.* 34. si suffins *MS.*

5. *Cathegorica.* I have left the word as it stands, but I think it ought to be 'hypothetica'. Unfortunately the writer gives no example here to illustrate his meaning.

And when you are urged to admit the consequent, refuse, because it entails self-contradiction. The adversary will never be able to go any farther.

contra te. Et, si opponens faciat tibi tale argumentum: Illa consequencia est bona, et totum antecedens est concedendum a te: ergo consequens est concedendum a te; negatur consequencia. Sed ad hoc quod argumentum valeat, oportet sic argumentare: Illa consequencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et totum antecedens est concedendum a te, et non repugnat consequens, et sic concedendum a te; ergo consequens est concedendum a te. Et si sic arguitur, conceditur et illa consequencia ut prius, et eciam conceditur antecedens eius, et negatur eius consequens. Et ita, quamvis in eternum arguerit opponens, nunquam, si voluerit, perveniet ad suum intentum.

Example: *Every man runs.* Admitted. *Some man does not run.* Denied. *You do not run, and you are a man*: admitted, but the consequent of that argument is denied, and also that of any argument to force you to admit that consequent. Here note that the two preceding modes can be used in any argument, but the following one is only to be used in 'Obligations'.

Exemplum illius pono tibi illam: Omnis homo currit. Admittitur; et si proponatur, concedatur. Deinde proponatur aliud, quod est: Homo non currit. Hoc repugnat posito; ideo illud est negandum. Et si argumentatur contra illud, sic: Tu non curris, et tu es aliquid quod est homo; ergo, aliquid quod est homo non currit: respondebis, concedendo consequenciam et eciam antecedens, si proponatur; sed negabis consequens. Et si forte argumentatur sic: Hec consequencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et antecedens est concedendum a te, et non repugnat antecedens esse concessum a te: ergo, consequens est concedendum a te: dicitur, concedendo consequenciam et negando eius consequens. Et tamen concedis eius antecedens omnino, ut dictum est. Et sic respondendo potes evitare nonnunquam deducciones ad plura inconveniencia consequencia ad ea ad que videntur gratis deduci. Hic sciendum quod secundum priorem modum respondendi et 2^m^ modum presentem potes defendere indifferenter in casu vel extra casum; sed 2^m^ modum 3^m^ iam sequentem non est conveniens ita respondere nisi fueris obligatus.

The third mode is as follows; answer as you think best, and when you have come to some absurd

Tercius modus est ille; cum fueris ad aliquem casum obligatus, respondeas continue sicud apparuerit tibi respondendum, quousque concedatur a te aliquod inconveniens: et tunc, quam cito fit aliquod argumentum bonum, cuius consequens sit contra te, respondens illo

8. si *MS.* 12. volu'r't' *MS.* 28. no unq̄ *MS.* 30. vn^r^ *MS.* 31. pn̄te *MS.* 34. *Gap of half a line MS.* 35. *Blank space, with small central* t, *for initial T MS.*

modo: Concedo consequenciam et nego consequens, si proponatur tibi. Et si argumentatur sic: Hec consequencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et totum antecedens est verum: ergo et consequens; nisi plus addatur, negatur consequencia; quia stat cum illo toto antecedente quod consequens significet secundarie et non precise primarie; ideo. Sed si sic argumentatur: Hec consequencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et antecedens et consequens significant precise primarie, et antecedens est verum: ergo consequens est verum; sic respondebis: Nego quod illa consequencia est bona, et dices quod hoc repugnat casui et responsioni quod aliqua talis consequencia sit.

conclusion, deny it. If the consequence is urged against you, deny it; because in these Obligations, words have lost their primary objective maning.

Exemplum ponatur ille casus quod Sor nunquam prius loquens loquatur, sed quod iam prius loquatur; et quod iuret super libro Evangeliarum quod ipse iuret est periurus, nec aliquis iuret nisi Sor; et potes admittere. Et si argumentatur: numquid Sor sit periurus vel non? dicas: Concedo, vel, Nego, vel qualitercunque apparuerit tibi dicendum. Et si concedas quod est periurus, et opponens argumentat quod non; quia, si Sor est periurus, et ipse iurat falsum quod ipse est periurus: ergo, ipse iurat sicud est et per consequens ipse non est periurus; respondebis concedendo consequenciam, et negando consequens, si proponatur; quia illud est contra responsionem tuam, et tamen tu concedes antecedens, si proponatur. Et tunc, cum argumentatur: Hec consequencia est bona, et antecedens est verum: ergo et consequens; sic respondebis: Nego quod illa consequencia est bona. Et dicitur quod repugnat casui et responsioni quod aliqua talis consequencia sit; et tamen, quociescunque fiat tibi talis consequencia, oportet concedere illam, et respondere te concedere illam; sed semper dicas quod nulla talis sit, et quod non stat cum toto casu, nec cum illa responsione, quod aliqua talis sit. Et sic potes te faciliter defendere in quacunque obligacione vel insolubili, eciam qualitercunque difficilis fuerit ille casus, licet adversari casum inpossibilem ex improviso. Faciliter adhuc potes evitare inconveniens, nisi illa que secuntur ex illa responsione vel ad que ius gratis deduci. Et ideo non timeas, si

Example: A man swears that be is committing perjury; you admit that. Then you are asked whether he is really committing perjury. You can reply, Yes, or No, as you please. If Yes, the opponent proves that he is not perjured, since what he swears is (as you admit) the truth. You have merely to deny the conclusion, admitting all the rest. When he attacks your denial, you merely say that the consequence does not exist at all, the argument being unmeaning, and you have admitted it merely as an obligational exercise; if understood otherwise, it is nothing. Thus you can

7. ĩo *MS.* 15. loqª *MS.* 16. f'r liarp *MS.* 17. fonpotes *MS.* 38. ie ca9 ℓ admiſa'ı, nn *being nearly a straight line MS.*

answer the greatest difficulties.

opus fuerit sic respondere in quocunque casu fueris obligatus. Sed tamen extra omnem casum ubi non sis obligatus, non est illa responsio valida sive valde conveniens. Sed, si fiat aliquid argumentum extra casum, pro eius solucione elige unam de duabus responsionibus predictis, quia ille indifferenter in casu et extra casum deserviunt. Et tantum, etc. |

INSOLUBILIA PULCHRA. 259b

Some 'insoluble' cases are more difficult than others; and to solve these, I take the rules given by Wyclif in his Logica.

Quia inter casus loycales aliqui sunt aliis difficiliores, et specialiter casus qui componuntur, proposiciones significantes affirmative vel negative pro se ipsis ex quarum veritate sequitur illas esse falsas, et econtra: Ideo, relinquendo vias erroneas famosiores in ista materia volentibus per ipsas incedere, pro recciori responsione habenda ad huiusmodi casus positos insolubiles communiter nuncupatos, suppono quedam tradita in 3cio tractatu loyco Magistri Johannis Wycliff.

7. *End of the line blank MS.* 8. *Title at the top of the page MS.* 9. *Blank space, with small central* q, *for initial letter MS.* 15, 16. īsolco *pro* insolubiles *MS.*

NOTAE ET QUESTIONES VARIE.

[1] Nota; de se humanitas 2^m modum communem est humanitas, et non de se humanitas 2^m quod huius est, illa neque illa; et sic de aliis. Igitur ipsa, cum sit illa humanitas de se, aut indifferens humanitas ad hoc quod sit illa vel illa. Etc. Vel sic: de se humanitas est indifferens ad hoc quod sit illa humanitas, vel quod sit illa (et sic de aliis): quanto de se erit singularis vel communis. Non singularis, quia contra racionem singularis humanitatis est esse de se indifferenter ad plures. Igitur est communis.

Humanity, indifferent to being this or that person, cannot be singular, must be universal.

Item, illa humanitas essencialiter et quiditative est humanitas. Vel igitur convertibiliter precise est illa humanitas singularis humanitas, vel non. Si sic, igitur ubicunque est humanitas, et in quocunque loco, ibi erit ista humanitas: quod est inconveniens. Si non, tunc illa singularis humanitas est in minus vel in plus quam humanitas. Non in plus; igitur, in minus: et per consequens humanitas erit sibi communis.

If a given individual humanity were the same thing as humanity, the individual would be wherever humanity was.

Item, Sortes est similis Platoni essencialiter vel substancialiter. Vel igitur in humanitate communi (et tunc habetur propositum), vel in singulari. Non 2^m, quia Sor sua singulari humanitate est sic homo quod non communis, Plato est sic homo .... et econtra. Et consequencia illata tenet in singulari humanitate sua: unus est alteri similis, et quod unus est homo sicut aliis.

Two individuals are alike; where is the likeness? not in the individuals themselves, as such, for individuality is opposed to likeness.

Item, quando aliquis scit de facto omnem hominem esse animal, non scitur de sciencia a tali, nisi ibi veritas sit communis, que est *omnem hominem esse animal*, que est communis humanitas, quia non distincte scitur agregatum ex omnibus hominibus ut singuli distincte sciuntur.

We know distinctly that all men are animals, yet this does not refer to all men, taken one by one.

5. aût *MS.* 8. conclusio *pro* quanto (?) *MS.* 25. z 9ª ilāā teno *MS.* 28. acali *MS.* 30. quod *pro* quia *MS.*

1. From III G. 10. Prague University.

God knows the dependence of 'Humanity' upon 'Animated Being'. Then He must know *something* in knowing this: but nothing singular.

Item, requiritur ad veritatem que est "hominem esse" "animal esse"; et non requiritur ad "hominem esse" "istum hominem esse". Hoc bene scit deus. Queritur ergo quid deus intelligat in hoc quod dicitur ad veritatem que est "hominem esse" et eius requisitum 'animal esse' in tali locucione, si deus cum intelligit distincte quid est hoc dictum et quia omnino est intelligibilis consequencia omnis quod deus per hoc dictum aliquid intelligat. Et non potest dici quod *rem singularem;* quia alias ipsa sunt falsa, et deus falsum non intelligit; ergo, rem communem intelligit.

Item, deum velle hominem esse, postquam ad consequenciam . . . . . . deum velle esse istum hominem (quemcunque homine demonstrando); quia sequitur: deus wult istum hominem esse; igitur wult hominem esse et est . . . . quam . . . . . . quia vult, istum hominem esse, igitur etc., Obiectum formale huius volicionis, "hominem esse", est prius quo ad consequenciam quam obiectum huius volicionis, "istum hominem esse". Et primum est "hominem esse". Et secundum est "istum hominem esse". Igitur prius est quo ad consequenciam, "hominem esse" quam "istum hominem esse". Et non singularem singulariter unum 1b
nec agregative unum, ut patet bene practicanti in ista materia. | 2a

| *Utrum omnis veritas habeat sibi oppositam falsitatem.*

Has every truth a corresponding falsehood opposed to it? No, for there is no falsehood corresponding to the truth of God's existence. On the other hand, every true proposition is

Respondetur quod non, quia non omne ens habet sibi oppositam non entitatem. Igitur non omnis veritas habet sibi oppositam falsitatem. Consequencia tenet a convertibili ad convertibile. Sed maior patet, quia prima veritas, que est *deum esse*, non habet oppositam falsitatem. [In] oppositum sic argumentatur. Omnis proposicio vera habet sibi oppositam proposicionem falsam; igitur omnis veritas habet sibi oppositam falsitatem: consequencia tenet a convertibili ad convertibile a parte

5. ritm *MS.* 7. aĩo, or arõ *MS.* 8. o, *MS.* 32. In *deest MS.*

12. *Item.* I have left several gaps in this passage, because it was impossible to make out the words. 25. 1b and the greater part of 2a contain the question *Utrum omnis forma animati substancialiter producta sit indivisibilis quo ad molem* already published in Dr. Beer's *Quaestiones Tredecim*, following on *De Ente Predicamentali.*

subiecti et predicati. Nam 'proposicio vera' convertitur cum 'veritate' et 'proposicio falsa' convertitur cum 'falsitate'. Et secundo quandoque omnis entitas dicitur veritas, sicud omne ens dicitur verum; et sic ille terminus, 'veritas', significat omne ens positive, et ille terminus, 'falsitas', contradictorie significat convertibiliter significatum cum isto termino 'non entitas'.

a truth, and vice-versa; but to every true proposition you can find a contradictory false one.

Et talem falsitatem credo non posse significare, cum omne vere significans significat entitatem, | 2b et per consequens veritatem; et sic iste terminus, 'falsitas', significat omnem veritatem negative. Sed isti termini, Verum, Falsum et Veritas, superaddunt super ens nominaliter intellectum tempus verbi: ut, dico vel credo veritatem; dico ens quod est: "proposicio significat verum vel falsum". Hoc est ens quod est, vel non est; et tunc dixi verum vel veritatem, quia tunc dixi ens quod tunc fuit; et falsum: tunc dixi vel concepi, quia ens, quod tunc non fuit; et ita verum vel veritas sunt passiones entis, significando ens, quod vere fuit, erit, vel potest esse. Sed sic non est ille terminus, 'falsitas'. Unde, si credo veritatem, credo ens quod est; vel si credo falsum, credo quod non est. Et sic secundo modo capitur veritas per adequacionem signi ad suum signatum et falsitas per defectum huiusmodi correspondencie, et talis veritas et falsitas sunt in signo tantum, cum sic forma denominans ipsum est verum vel falsum; et omnis talis falsitas videtur michi veritas, et posse significari. Sic ergo, *significare falsum* est *significare ens quod non est*, ut illa: Homo est equus; significat quod homo est equus, et hoc non est: igitur est falsum. Falsitatem autem primo modo acceptam inpossibile est esse, quia tunc est aliqua non entitas, ex quo sequitur quod omnis proposicio falsa secundarie significat falsum; quod ens quod non est, sed non falsitatem etc. Secundo, noto quod omnes denominaciones positive signorum respectu suum signatorum sunt principaliter capte: ut iste terminus, 'habitus', capit a suo significato ad significandum rem que est positiva; et iste terminus, "privacio", a re non positiva; et sic de aliis.

I do not believe that falsehood can mean non-entity; any thing that has meaning must mean something, or entity. The words 'false' and 'true' give us, together with entity, an idea of time; what is true is true now, or then, or at some possible time; but falsehood is simply a belief that something which is, is not.

It cannot be a belief in nothing, but always in an entity, and therefore falsehood does not properly correspond with non-entity.

Conclusio Prima. Veritas prima a parte rei (que est *deum esse*) non habet sibi oppositam falsitatem. Probatur. Veritas prima est veritas optima; igitur veritas

The First Truth (God's existence) has no corresponding

22. ſ3uo *MS.* 25. p̲ d'fctu *MS.*

falsehood. If it had, that would be something, and something absolutely bad, even as God is absolutely good; but there is no being which is not good to some extent.

prima non habet sibi oppositam falsitatem, sibi oppositam maliciam. Consequencia tenet a convertibili ad convertibile. Si ergo habet sibi oppositam falsitatem vel maliciam, habet sibi oppositam maliciam pessimam, eo quod est veritas optima; et per consequens ponuntur duo extrema, quorum unum optimum et aliud pessimum; et per consequens non omne ens erit bonum, et sic propria passio negabitur de suo subiecto; quia bonum de ente.

In God there can be no passivity, since He has no opposite.

Corollarium. Veritas prima est simpliciter impassibilis, ideo quia non habet sibi oppositam maliciam; igitur nec contrarium, etc.

There is no falsehood opposed to the Second Truth: the existence of creatures. For the opposite falsehood would be the worst of all things, since absolute Evil does not exist; and this 'Worst of all' is impossible for the same reason.

Conclusio 2ª. Veritas 2ª non habet sibi oppositam falsitatem. Probatur. *Esse* productum non habet falsitatem sibi oppositam, et *esse* productum est veritas 2ª. Igitur conclusio vera. Maior probatur. *Esse* productum est optimum post *deum esse.* Igitur non habet falsitatem sibi oppositam; quia si non, da [quod] oppositum habet falsitatem sibi oppositam. Igitur non entitatem continentem omnem descripcionem falsitatis primo modo dicte; et, cum *esse* productum sit optimum post *deum esse,* habebit oppositum pessimum post *non deum esse;* et per consequens erit productum pessimum, quod est contra conclusionem primam. Sed minor, scilicet quod omne productum est veritas 2ª, probatur: *Deum esse* est veritas prima, eo quod non habet sibi veritatem presuppositam causantem. Igitur est aliqua veritas 2ª. Probatur. Deum differens ab ista, et quecunque dabitur potest esse productum erit inpertinens; igitur conclusio vera. Nam potest esse productum post *deum esse,* et nulla est prior *post deum esse* producta esse; igitur productum esse post deum est primum, et per consequens prima veritas post deum esse; igitur est veritas 2ª.

Corollarium. Est dare optimum causatum: igitur optimum effectum: igitur rem optime factam; et hoc est esse productum optimum; igitur quod deus facit est esse causatum, etc.

18. quod *deest MS.* 19. 9ᶜⁱte3 oℯ *MS.* 20. d'fc'pcoe *MS.* 28. drs *MS.*

28. *Deum differens.* The following sentences seem to be absolutely unintelligible. Yet there is a mark (!) on my transcript, showing that the MS. is sufficiently plain.

Conclusio 3ª. Nulla veritas, capiendo veritatem primo modo et falsitatem, habet sibi oppositam falsitatem. Probatur. Nullum ens habet sibi oppositam non entitatem. Omnis veritas est ens; igitur nulla veritas habet sibi oppositam non entitatem. Et per consequens nec falsitatem. Consequencia prima tenet in *Celarent*, et 2ª ex notabili vel ex convertibili. Maior probatur; quia, si alio tempore ens habet sibi oppositam non entitatem, haberet oppositum contradictorium, quod est impossibile. |
3ª Sed minor, quod omnis veritas est ens, patet inductive etc.; conclusio ut proponitur est prima etc.

No truth has any opposite falsehood, taking the words in their meaning *as things*. For entity has no opposite non-entity that is contradictory to it.

SOPHISMA.

Sor albus et Sor calidus ponunt in numerum. Probatur. *Sor esse album* et *Sor esse calidum* ponunt in numerum; igitur Sor albus et Sor calidus ponunt in numerum. Consequencia tenet ab eodem ad idem; et non oppositum sed eadem res penitus est Sor albus et Sor calidus; igitur non ponunt in numerum. Tenet consequencia; quia, si ponerent in numerum, tunc non esset penitus idem suppositum, Igitur et respondendo negatur hoc supra.

Whiteness and heat are two different things in A; ∴ A white and A hot make two. But A is the same being as A ∴ they do not make two. We must deny the first assumption.

Utrum possibile est vere predicari affirmative et non abstractum de concreto?

Nota primo quod "abstractum" in terminis vocatur terminus qui significat formam substancialem vel accidentalem primarie; sed "concretum" est terminus qui formam et suppositum cuius est talis forma significat. Termini ergo isti, "humanitas, albedo, substancialitas", vocantur abstracta. Tales vero, "homo, equus, albus, grammaticus", vocantur concreta. Pro illa cognicione suppono dictum philosophi in predicamento quantitatis i. e., "Album solam qualitatem significat." Et ceterorum philosophorum qui in omnibus suis libris exemplificantes de accidente ponunt album, nigrum, iustum, et sic de

The abstract means the form of an idea separated from its subject; the concrete represents it with its subject.

6. p te3 *pro* tenet *MS.* 11. 9͡o *pro* conclusio questio *MS.*; *ib.* p'a *MS.*
17. 3 nopposit͡u *MS.* 30. 9no͡c *MS.* 32. 9. *pro* i. e. *MS.*

11. This is a deep thought, which modern philosophers would do well to notice. Two real contradictories are so divided that the one cannot be predicated of the other. Now, as a fact, entity *is* predicated of non-entity: "*Nothing* is something we think of."

aliis; non falsificando exempla eorum pueriliter, cum non per falsitatem in scienciam nos talibus inducant.

Every term may have a primary signification.

Suppono quod cuilibet termino significati est dare primarium significatum, innuendo illam sophisticam satis inutilem dicentem, "Homo primarie significat hominem, et tamen nichil homo primarie significat"; quia taliter sophistice ego promitterem denarium et nichil sibi dare.

That is the object towards which the mind is at first bent.

This depends much upon the predicate. A man is an animal; you do not think of any particular man.

Pro intellectu tamen, nota quod primarium significatum alicuius termini est significatum ad quod intellectus tali audito immediate fertur intelligendus; ex quo sequitur quod omnis terminus communis significans habet duplex significatum, scilicet primarium et 2ndarium; sequitur quod omnis terminus habens predicatum debet principaliter sumi pro significato suo primario. Exempli gracia, cum proponitur, "Homo est animal", intellectus audientis hanc proposicionem non fertur super Sor nec Platone, sed absolute super significato primario, quod est species humana que est humanitas. Si autem proponitur cum predicata humanitate, videndum est si predicatum limitat ipsum subiectum racione primarii significati vel secundarii. Et sic revertitur nobis illa antiqua regula et famosa: *Talia sunt subiecta qualia permittuntur ab eorum predicatis.* Exemplum ad significatum primarium. Hec est regula vera: "*Homo* communicatur multis, eo quod predicatum non potest competere significato primario huius termini *homo*, cum Sor non communicatur multis, licet Sor sit illa humanitas que communicatur multis". Exemplum 2i, scilicet significati secundarii, "*homo currit*" et predicatum limitat subiectum ad significatum secundarium, cum non potest competere significato primario, eo quod humanitas, sive species humana, non potest currere, nisi sit currens.

A man runs; you think of A, B or C.

The primary signification of *white* is whiteness existing in a subject, and the usage of ancient authors shows this abundantly.

Et 3° suppono quod significatum termini concreti accidentalis primarium est accidens sive forma talem substanciam denominans; ut huius termini, *album*, significatum primarium est *albedo substanciam albisans.* Similiter huius termini *iustum,* est *iusticia subiectum iustificans.* Ista supposicio tenet per primam Aristotelis auctoritatem allegantem: "*Album* solam qualitatem significat"; quod intelligitur primarie; sed substanciam

4. fūmdo (?) *MS.*; *ib.* sophist'am *MS.*   14. sptū *pro* sequitur *MS.*

cui inest albedo secundarie. Ex quo patet quare Porphyrius, Aristoteles, Commentator et alii antiqui philosophi in exemplis suis utuntur talibus concretis formaliter pro significato primario. Si non admittitur supposicio, argumentatur pro ea sic: "Album est denominatum, ergo ab albo, vel ab alio". Non ab alio, cum nec a nigredine nec a nigricia potest dici album. Ergo ab albedine. Et cum omne denominans, ut huius [modi], sit prius denominato, ut huiusmodi, sequitur quod a principali debet capere suam primariam significacionem sed omnem etsi non sequitur quod album omnem substanciam significaret quod factum est. Cum enim Sor primo nec Platonem nec hominem 2m sequitur et sic de aliis ergo solum subiectum denominativum quod posterius est denominatum ipsa albedine denominante.

What is it that makes white the colour it is? Either whiteness or some other colour: no other, ∴ whiteness.

Conclusio Prima: esse abstractum substanciale predicatur de suo denominato. Probatur. Omne tale est significatum primarium eiusdem a denominato: igitur conclusio vera. Assumptum patet in ista, et consequenter in simili: "Homo est humanitas." Nam si non predicatur vere, tunc non idem est homo et humanitas. Ergo in dictis secundum se non idem est "ipsum" et "ipsum esse" contra textum septimi metaphysice. Racione sic: Hec est falsa per adversarium: *homo est humanitas;* et cum sint termini significativi, habebunt signa disparata; ergo, homo non erit humanitas. Et tamen humanitas non significat actum hominis, eo quod implicat contradiccionem esse hominem pro aliquo gradu, et non esse humanitatem hominis. Ergo humanitas est substancia, et non anima hominis a pari, nec corpus; sequitur quod non est substancia, cum non sit pars hominis nec homo. Quo dato, quero: humanitas est aliquid vel nichil? non 2m; ergo primum. Tunc humanitas est aliquid, et non accidens, ut ostenditur. Igitur substancia vel corporea vel incorporea: si incorporea, tunc humanitas hominis est anima hominis; si corporea, vel racionalis vel non racionalis; si racionalis, sequitur

Man and humanity may be predicated of one another

If not, then what is humanity?

Not an accident of man;

not the soul, not the body, and not a substance. If anything, it must be identical with man.

1. quia *MS.* 8. modi *deest MS.* 18. adĩo *MS,* 23. sẽpti *MS.* 37. nolis *MS.*

10. *Sed omnem* is not clear; but if we suppose *secundum* for *sed*, and add some such word as *extensionem*, we see light. After *significaret* (l. 12) to the end of the paragraph, we have only a confused jumble of words.

propositum, quod humanitas est homo; si non racionalis, erit corpus hominis, et cum corpus non denominatur de sola humanitate, sequitur quod non sit corpus nec aliqua pars corporis, cum nulla talis dicitur esse homo ab humanitate.

And yet there is a difference between them.

Corollarium. Quamvis idem est homo et humanitas, tamen humanitas differt ab homine. Patet, quia aliquid potest convenire humanitati, quod non potest convenire homini pro significato predicamentali. Patet, quia humanitas potest assumi ypostatice, et non sic homo. Igitur corollarium verum.

Every ab stract term is truly and affirmatively predicated of its corresponding concrete term.

Conclusio 2ª. Omne abstractum vere affirmative predicatur de suo concreto. Probatur. Omne concretum, ut huius [modi], capit suum *esse* ab abstracto. Patet; nam album habet *esse* ab albedine, eo quod non potest esse album nisi albedo dicat ipsum esse album. Sed ad rem intellegendo . . . . . . igitur conclusio vera. Sed assumptum patet in predicamentis, cum omne denominativum denominatum cadat a suo formaliter denominante.

Corollarium. Omnes iste et tales proposiciones sunt vere: "Album est albedo", "nigrum est nigredo", "me sedere est sessio mea", "me legere est leccio mea", non obstantibus istis," "me legere sum ego legens", "album est substancia", "nigrum est substancia". *Corollarium:* quilibet audiens et intelligens, cum proponitur sibi "album", primarie intelligit "album", et secundarie "substanciam subiectam albedini". Ergo pari racione istam prius debet concedere: "Album est albedo", quam "album est substancia". *Corollarium*: remissiores sunt solum concedentes "Album esse substanciam" quam concedentes "album esse accidens"; sed utrique unum concedunt. Et patet, quia pulchre paralogizat sic arguens: "Album est albedo", et "Album est substancia", igitur, "Substancia est albedo". Similiter: Grammaticus est substancia" et "Grammaticus est accidens", igitur, "Accidens est substancia". Similiter, "Nullus homo predicatur denominative, omnis grammaticus est homo; igitur nullus grammaticus predicatur denominative". Vel sic: "Omnis grammaticus est formaliter denominatum; sed homo est grammaticus; igitur homo est

9. pli *MS.* 14. modi *deest MS.* 30. gressiores *MS.* 33. concedant *MS.*

formaliter denominatum." Et sic, multipliciter miscendo 2m fallaciam figure diccionis *multitudo, quid, in quale et aliquale in quid. Corollarium.* "Omnis grammaticus est substancia; *grammaticus* supponit personaliter pro *substancia*". *Çorollarium 2m*: "Omnis grammaticus est grammatica; grammaticus supponit simpliciter pro forma que est "hunc esse grammaticum, quod est grammatica". Et si obicitur: wulgares stomachabuntur cum sic concedentem audient; "habeo bonam scienciam grammaticam;" non mirum si veritate non intellecta loycus turbatur, dum principalissimis hoc philosophis contingit. Intelligens vero non stomachatur, sed pocius consenciet huius veritatis. Corollarium ultimum. Ideo ut proponitur est verum.

SOPHISMA.

Baccis est accidens. Probatur. Iam de petro non predicatur vere baccis; et inmediate post sic probabitur. Igitur contingenter inerit ei baccis. Igitur. In oppositum: Nulla substancia est accidens; sed omnis baccis est substancia; igitur nullus baccis est accidens. Consequencia tenet in *Celarent;* maior nota de se, minor quod omnis est substancia. Probatur, quia omnis baccis est homo, igitur est substancia etc. |

4ª Utrum inter omnia genita est possibile esse aliquid genitum quod retineat primum gradum essendi perfectissimum, etc.?

Is there any Begotten one who is the most perfect of all? No, for there is no limit to God's power.

Quod conclusio falsa, argumentatur sic. Nullum genitum est possibile esse perfectissimum, quia quocunque dato, potest eo esse perfectius, cum potencia dei non terminatur ad maximum; igitur conclusio falsa. Quod conclusio sit vera, probatur. Est dare effectum optimum, igitur est genitum inter omnia genita, quod retinet gradum perfectissimum: igitur conclusio vera, etc.

Yes, for the limit is the highest possible point of perfection.

Respondendo ad istam questionem, noto primo quod sicud generacio est duplex, sic et genitum correspondenter est duplex, primo generacio, que est substancie, que ideo dicitur propria, quia est mutacio subita vel successiva a *non existere* ad *existere*, presupponens essenciam

Note that there are two kinds of generation, one proper, causing a new existence, and the other improper,

9. *or* hec *pro* habeo (hed) *MS.*; *ib.* grammaticum *MS.* 16. Bacce (*and so on*) *MS.*; *ib.* de pet° *MS.* 17. p9c *MS.* 34. questio (*in full*) *MS.* 38. exiftet' *MS.*; *ib.* exift'e *MS.*

16. *Baccis.* I cannot find the word in Du Cange.

causing only a new mode of existence in a previously existent being.

subiectantem illam generacionem; que quidem essencia est ipsum generatum, etc.

Alia generacio est inpropria, et vocatur ideo inpropria quia (secundum eam) aliquid non dicitur fieri quod prius non fuit, sed dicitur *aliquale esse* (vel fieri) quale prius non fuit; et sic omnis naturalis sive creata generacio presupponit subiectum suum preexistere tempore vel natura proporcionabiliter. Genitum duplex proprium, quod est substancia producta; inproprium, quod est *substanciam esse aliqualem vel alicuiusmodi,* qualis, vel cuiusmodi, prius non fuit.

There are two grades of being, one essential, the other accidental. Every positive being has a certain fixed degree of entity, beyond which none can go.

2° nota de gradu essendi. Unde gradus essendi rerum est duplex, scilicet: gradus essendi essencialis, et alius accidentalis. Suppono ergo quod omne positivum habeat unum essendi gradum in ordine nature, quo gradu non est alius sibi prior. Patet supposicio ex hoc; quia si *a* positivum sit prius naturaliter illo gradu, tunc est signare illum gradum prioritatis; et cum non sit processus in infinitum, 2^m^ racionem Aristotelis, tunc est dare gradum quo primo naturaliter *a* est. Aliter non esset dare quid primo est aliquid; et consequenter nec ordinem nature, quod incriminet totam philosophiam. Patet igitur quod respectu cuiuslibet rei est dare unum gradum nature quo essencialiter est id quod est, et illum oportet esse primum. Quo habito, quod nullus potest esse prius naturaliter tali gradu, cum sic correspondenter graduatur; ergo, cum talis sit dandus, sequitur quod respectu cuiuslibet positivi est dare gradum essendi, quo ipsum non potest esse naturaliter prius: quod fuit probandum.

God has His fixed infinite perfection, and all beings are related to him in a given proportion. As He cannot change His being, neither can they theirs.

Confirmacio huius: deus est in summo gradu nature possibili, quo ipse non potest [esse] prior aut posterior; et quidquid citra deum est, est propter hoc in ordine nature prius, quod est deo propinquius. Sed quia gradus essendi dei est inmobilis, ita quod nullus gradus essencialis creature potest sibi esse propinquius aut distancius, igitur nulla creatura potest esse prius in ordine nature aut posterius in natura. Istis stantibus, sit conclusio prima etc.

Conclusio prima. Omnia genita positiva 2^m^ unum *esse* eius primo sunt. Probatur. Omnia genita positiva

21. caȓ een̑t' *MS.* 24. pnd9 *MS.* 26. esse *deest MS.*; *ib.* a' a' *MS.* 32. qo *MS.* 34. q̑o *MS.*

non inceperunt esse, et sunt, et quilibet divisim est. Igitur omnia genita positiva eque primo sunt, et eque primo quodlibet divisim cum altero est. Consequencia tenet, quia oppositum consequentis cum antecedente implicant. Sed quod omnia genita non inceperunt esse probatur; nam exempli gracia, sit Sor qui incepit; tunc argumentatur: si Sor incepit esse sic hodie, igitur Sor ante hodie nullum habuit *esse;* consequens falsum. Tunc Sor nec in deo ante hodie habuisset *esse*, et sic incepit in deo *esse*, et deus inciperet scire Sor esse, cum prius non scivit Sor esse, eo quod non fuit; et cum omnis sciencia dicitur relative ad scibile, sequitur quod si ante hodie scivit Sor esse, ante hodie habuit *esse:* quod est contra antecedens, etc.

All positive entities exist in one first mode of being. Not one begins absolutely, for then its ideal being would also begin, and God would not know him as possible until a certain moment. If then God knows it as possible before any given time it has being before that time. Several corollaries.

Corollarium. Omne genitum eternaliter habet *esse*. *Corollarium.* Non sequitur: Hoc generatur: igitur, non habet esse. *Corollarium 3^m.* Non sequitur: Sor et Plato habent *esse* unum; igitur, si Sor hodie est, Plato hodie est.

Si obicitur quod illa conclusio est contra diffinicionem generacionis quam ponit commentator primo physicorum |
4b dicens quod *generacio est transitus de non esse ad esse*, et contra communem scolam, que ponit Sor incepisse esse et non eque primo Sor cum Platone habere *esse*, posito quod Sor sit triennius et Plato biennius: solucio negat utrumque; primo quod est contra diffinicionem, quia diffinicio generacionis debet intelligi sic: generacio est transitus de non *esse* (quod est existere) ad *tunc existere*, cum quelibet res genita habet triplex *esse*, scilicet, *esse* intelligibile precedens *esse existere*, quod est 2^m, et *esse* in proprio genere. Unde iste est ordo rei genite in gradu essendi quod primo *est*, 2° *fit*, 3° *existit*, cum *existere* dicit quasi *extra esse* intelligibile *sistere*. Et sic via communis concedit quod Sor et Plato non eque primo sunt, i. e. existunt, et quod Sor incepit esse, cum arguitur ab inferiori ad superius cum impedimento. Conclusio 2^a. Primum *esse* productum, retinens primum gradum *esse*, inter cetera genita est perfectissimum. Probatur, quia ens anologum est primum productum. Patet, quia est pridem productum et nullum prius; igitur. Quod nullum prius probatur, quia, si

Solution of objection that this denies the definition of generation given by Averrhoës, and is against the common opinion, that one individual is before another.

There are three sorts of being, intelligible, existing, and specific; and we admit that generation is the passage from non-being to being (in existence). Likewise, as to any two

7. sic *pro* si *MS.* 18. vun͡ *MS.* 25. t're *MS.*; *ib.* bigei *MS.*
36. quia *MS.*

individuals. There is nothing anterior to being, which is above all things.

aliquid, sit id *a*: quo dato, arguitur sic: *a* est prius quid ens anologum; igitur *a* est prius quam ens. Consequencia tenet a convertibili sine impedimento; et si *a* est prius quam ens, tunc *a* est prius quam est: quod implicat. Et hinc vere dicit auctor de Causis in 4ª proposicione quod prima omnium rerum creaturarum est *esse*, et ante ipsum non est creatum aliquid; quia 2ᵐ glosam *esse* est supra sensum, et supra animam, et supra intelligenciam.

Corollaries. Transcendental Entity is the best of all possible created things; and this does not imply any restriction to God's omnipotence.

Corollarium primum. Deus facit bonum quo non potest melius facere; patet, quia produxit *esse* anologum, quo non potest melius facere. Nam, si aliquid produceret *esse* anologum, diceretur de ipso, cum ens vere equaliter de omnibus dicitur.

Corollarium 2ᵐ. Non sequitur: Si deus non potest producere melius quam ens anologum, igitur non est omnipotens, sicud non sequitur: Deus non potest se destruere; igitur, non est omnipotens, nisi assumeretur in minori: Et hoc potest esse aliquid; et tunc conceditur consequencia, et negatur minor, etc.

As the first is Being, so the second is Substance.

Conclusio tercia. Sicud est dare primum genitum, i. e. productum de *esse* intelligibili in *esse* actuale, sic est dare 2ᵐ genitum, quod est omnium genitorum post ipsum perfectissimum; et hoc est *esse substanciam predicamentalem.* Nam *esse* est primum, *esse substanciam predicamentalem* 2ᵐ, quamvis illa sint unum ydemptice, tamen distincta sunt formaliter i. e. 2ᵐ proprios modos essendi ipsius 2ᵐ primi entis volumptatem deputatos.

Corollaries. There is a regular order in nature, from first to last, beginning with Transcendental Being, and ending with individuals.

Corollarium primum. Est ordo essencialis rerum 2ᵐ prius et posterius in natura. Nam primum *esse* est ens, 2ᵐ *esse* substanciam, 3ᵐ *esse* substanciam corpoream; et sic descendendo usque ad individua, ubi iubet Plato quiescere, ut ait Porphyrius. *Corollarium 2ᵐ.* Quamvis idem est Sor esse et substanciam esse, cum unum de altero predicetur; tamen prius est *esse* substanciam quam *esse* Sor, et substancialiter ista sunt idem: igitur unum non est prius reliquo nature consequencia; sicud non sequitur: Materia et forma sunt idem, quia Sor; igitur materia non est prior forma; cum oppositum sit verum. Nam forma presupponit materiam, tanquam funda-

28. pmı ētꝰ *MS.*; *ib.* volūptˡᵉꝫ *MS.* 32. v'uibꝫ plō *MS.* 36. fūſta *MS.* 37. ꝙ; 9ª *in marg. MS.*

mentum; et propter hoc Commentator appellat materiam fundamentum nature.

Conclusio ultima. Sicud est inter omnia genita unum perfectissimum, gradum essencialem primum retinens, quod est metrum et mensura omnium aliorum (quia omnia producta in se claudens, et quia nullum aliud potest ipsum in modo essendi transcendere, cum sit communissimum) sic est dare unum specialissimum in suo gradu essendi perfectissimum, cum in modo essendi essenciali non proceditur in infinitum deorsum, et nec due species specialissime sunt, nec possunt esse eque perfecte essencialiter; quod alias esset eorum penitus *esse* idem, quia eadem diffinicio specialissima: et per consequens non due species essent, sed penitus una: quod est inconveniens.

No two species nor individuals can be equally perfect; there is therefore one that is the most perfect of all.

Corollarium primum. Ad *esse* specialissimum perfectissimum non sequitur individuum perfectissimum essencialiter, quamvis nullius speciei specialissime unum individuum est, vel potest alio individuo eiusdem speciei esse perfectissimus. Ex quo sequitur ulterius quod unus homo non est, nec potest esse, perfeccior alio essencialiter; licet bene accidentaliter unus sit perfeccior alio. *Corollarium* 2^m. Conclusio, ut proponitur, est vera ad racionem nunc antecedens. Et similiter 2^m etc.

Two beings in the same species cannot be one more perfect essentially than the other.

[Alia manu, valde abbreviata, hic additur]:

Nota quod prudencia debet dirigere operaciones humanas ad rectitudinem racionis, scilicet ad .... Sciencia autem moralis debet cognoscere qualiter passiones de subiecto, scilicet homo, libere concludantur, ut sunt *posse* malum facere, iustum, etc. Que autem sunt factibilia est prudencie; quia non potest bonum opus actu facere nisi prudencia occurrente, regulante appetitum ad quantum possit prosequi licite opus suum, et virtute inclinante appetitum ad obediendum prudencie. Ideo moralis philosophia de virtute prudencia debet pertractare. |

4. gd *MS.* 17. esse nec *pro* non *MS.* 22. sit perfeccior *twice MS.* 23. q͡o *MS.* 24. n͡c a͡ns *MS.* 27. *before* Sciencia *two very illegible words MS.* 29. h͡o *MS.* 31. faci^{ca} *MS.*

DE MATERIA. 5ª

This question supposes the existence of primary matter, which is also a primary substance. It can never be a predicate.

| Utrum materia, nunc sub una forma substanciali et nunc sub alia existens, sit informis? 135ª

Questio unum supponit et aliud querit. Supponit quod materia prima nunc sub una forma substanciali et nunc sub alia existat; et tunc querit utrum sit informis, etc. Suppositum sit: materia prima est subiectum primum ex quo aliquid fit, cum insit per se et non secundum accidens. Patet supposicio primo physicorum.

Ex quo sequitur quod materia prima est substancia prima. Patet, quia est subiectum primum, ut dicit supposicio. Igitur correlarium verum.

2° sequitur quod materia prima est solum subiectum et non potest esse formaliter predicatum, cum de necessitate semper subiciatur vel in subiectis procedatur in infinitum.

This primary substance is therefore matter, *quà* capable of receiving perfection from form; but God alone is *the* First substance.

3° sequitur quod prima substancia est materia prima perfectibilis a superstante. Patet exponendo per idem: subsistencia est materia prima perfectibilis a superstante, et nulla est prior nec aliqua; igitur corrollarium verum.

Correlarium. Non sequitur: Materia prima est prima substancia perfectibilis a superstante in ordine essendi rerum; igitur est prima substancia; cum deus sit prior substancia secundum verissimum ordinem rerum essendi.

Aristotle seems to say that matter is the First Substance; but he speaks

Hic obicitur dictum Aristotelis in principio de anima et multis aliis locis predictis. Nam ibi dicit quod triplex est substancia, una que 2^m se non est hoc aliquid, ut materia, alia species vel forma secundum quam materia

25. Sicut videtur *pro* Hic obicitur *MS.*

1. In Prag. Univ. M. S. VIII. G. 6. f. 84ᵉ there is an article that begins thus: sequitur alia posicio Reverendi Magistri Johannis de Hussynetz: Utrum materia . . . &c. The first page is similar to our MS. but it afterwards varies widely and the *desinit* is quite different. It was therefore useless to collate it; but I have noticed it, as throwing a doubt upon the genuineness of this composition.

est hoc aliquid in actu; 3° coniunctum ex hiis. Innuitur quod materia prima est prima subsistencia, precedens alias.

of it as dependent upon the First cause.

Solucio. Definicio Aristotelis est de substancia dependente a prima causa. Est tamen sciendum quod magis conveniens vocabulum materie prime est subsistencia quam substancia. Unde greci vocant materiam primam ypostasim ab *yppos*, quod est *sub*, et *stasis*, stacio, quasi substacio, eo quod substat omnibus formis eum sit primum subiectum, ut dicit supposicio. Greci ergo vocant materiam *ypostasym* et formam *usiam*. Consonancius ergo latini vocant materiam, subsistenciam; quia subsistit formis ut fundamentum. Hinc Commentator vocat materiam primam fundamentum nature. Similiter philosophus 10 metaphysice. Formam vero vocant superstanciam, eo quod stat supra materiam. Et hoc intendo de forma, que est altera pars compositi fundata in materia. Compositum vero, vel forma absoluta, ut intelligencia, vocant *substancia*, quia actu existens compositum (vel intelligencia) preter primam potest suscipere accidencia quibus substet. Unde compositum proprie debet dici *subsuperstancia;* quia substans 2^m unam partem (scilicet materiam) et superstans 2^m aliam (puta formam), et totum in se extans ut completum et finis utriusque.

Various terms used by the Greeks and the Romans to designate matter, Form and compound.

135^b | *Supposicio secunda.* Forma est res per quam aliquid est formaliter *quid*, vel *alicuius modi*, et est duplex; forma substancialis et forma accidentalis. Forma substancialis est forma qua substancia est substancialiter id quod est. Ex isto sequitur quod omne designatum per abstractum terminum alicuius substancie est forma substancialis: ut humanitas, aqueitas, igneitas, et lapideitas; et sic de aliis. Patet, cum quolibet illorum dat *esse quid*, cuius est forma. Homo enim est quid completum per humanitatem, cum homo essencialiter ab humanitate sit homo; ignis ab igneitate ignis; et sic de aliis formis substancialibus. Unde ex isto potest inferri quod omne superius est forma sui inferioris. Et non sequitur exinde quod sit pars eius superaddita, cum nec animalitas

The form is that by which anything is that which it is, or as it is. Humanity is that by which a man is a man; so humanity is the form of man; and so too of all other like abstract terms.

8. yjpos *MS.*

26. At the top of f. 135^b, is a long, very illegible, and irrelevant note about *peccatum contra naturam.*

tanquam pars superadditur humanitati, nec alia forma superior ad inferiorem.

The accidental form is that which makes anything as it is.

Forma accidentalis est forma qua aliquid est alicuiusmodi. Unde *ly* "alicuiusmodi" est signans omnem inherenciam accidentalem, sive qualitatis, sive quantitatis. Si ergo sua natura extra *esse* ydeale, sive intelligibile in mente divina, et extra *esse* actuale in causis secundis, tunc existit.

To exist is to be, but not vice versâ.

Corollarium primum. Omne *existere* est *esse:* et non econverso. Patet ex notabili.

Everything but God is in its natural causes, before it exists;

Corollarium 2m. Quelibet res citra deum prius naturaliter habet *esse* in causis secundis quam in existencia propria et natura grossa. Et prius natura dicitur in *esse* intelligibili preeminencie quam *esse* in causis secundis. Patet ex notabili.

and that being is more perfect than its existence.

Corollarium 3m. Quelibet res citra deum magis et nobilius habet se in causis secundis quam in existencia propria et natura. Quelibet res citra deum habet se in existencia proprie nature pro *esse* in causis secundis; et *esse* in causis secundis habet pro *esse* intelligibili prime cause; sicud patet ex notabili et corollario 2°. Sed "Propter quod unumquodque tale, et ipsum magis;" igitur corollarium verum.

If anything is in its causes, then it is really, since that form of being is superior to its own existence.

Corollarium quartum. Sicud sequitur: Illa res est in propria existencia, ergo illa res est: sic a forciori sequitur: Illa res est in causis; ergo, illa res est. Patet; quia in causis secundis est *esse* nobilius quam *esse* in propria existencia et natura; et *esse* in prima causa est nobilius quam esse in 2is causis vel propria existencia et natura; ut patet ex corollario 3°. Ergo *esse* virtuale et *esse* intelligibile nondum [sunt] nunc; et per consequens corollarium est verum.

Whatever was, or will be, or is possible, is.

Corollarium 5tum. Omne quod fuit et quod erit est *esse*; et omne quod potest esse est. Patet, quia quodlibet tale est in suis causis virtualiter, et in prima causa, 2m *esse* intelligibile: ergo, corollarium verum. Consequencia tenet ex Corollario 4°.

10. exnoli *MS.* 14. p'mecie *MS.* 19. pee *MS.* 20. pee *MS.* 31. sunt *deest MS.* 37. qo *pro* sequencia *MS.*

22. *Propter.* An old axiom, translated word for word from the Greek. 'The cause of any suchness possesses that suchness in a higher degree.'

We must admit ideas in the Divine mind, or patterns by which He has produced all things, since He acts according to a plan, and no one can specifically fashion different things after the same model.

Quantum ad primum articulum, *Utrum universalia solum nude pure habeant esse ydeale in esse mente divina*, sit prima conclusio quo ad suppositum: Idee ponende sunt in mente divina. Probatur. Deus rite et racionabiliter producit omnia. Consequens conclusio: racione vel racionibus producit omnia que producit. Consequencia tenet, quia impossibile est quid quantum racionabiliter producere sine racione, sicut *esse album* 136ᵃ sine albedine, et currentem sine cursu, et fortem | sine fortitudine; et sic de aliis. Et antecedens est notum de se. Tunc ex consequente sic arguitur: deus racione vel racionibus producit omnia que producit; et, quia non eadem racione producit hominem quam asinum, et asinum quam equum (et sic de aliis): ergo est alia racio qua producit hominem et alia racio qua producit asinum, et alia racio qua producit equum; et sic de aliis. Consequencia est nota; et antecedens propria parte est consequens prioris consequencie. Sed pro secunda parte sic probatur: quia, si omnia eadem racione produceret, hominem qua asinum, et asinum qua equum (et sic de aliis), sequitur quod ab eodem agente 2^m idem simpliciter et pro eodem producerentur homo et asinus; et sic in toto homo esset asinus, et econtra. Immo, quodlibet esset quodlibet: quod est absurdum. Conclusio: Est danda alia racio qua producit hominem, et alia racio qua producit equum; et sic de aliis. Et tales raciones sunt ydee secundum quas deus est productivus ad extra. Nec videtur aput quem sint iste raciones eterne, nisi aput deum, cum sacrilegum [esset] sic deum intueri extra se exemplar sui producti; ergo conclusio vera.

These patterns must be in God.

They are the same as the Intelligible Being of all that is.

Corollarium primum. Cuiuslibet rei citra primum, deum, prius habuit *esse* intelligibile; ideoque ab eterno, antequam habuit *esse* in propria existencia, eo quod quelibet res citra deum prius fuit productibilis quam producta. Et clare *esse* intelligibile est ydea; ergo corollarium verum.

Every creature is God as to its intelligible

Corollarium 2^m. Omnis creatura 2^m esse intelligibile vel ydeale est deus. Probatur sic: Omne eternaliter

7. qɔ *pro* consequencia *MS.* 29. esset *deest MS.* 33. ideo quia *MS.*

1. *Utrum.* This paragraph seems to have nothing to do with the question announced; it is either interpolated, or the tractate grievously mutilated.

entity, since that is an eternal possibility.

I add "as to its intelligible entity", though the restriction is not necessary, merely to avoid scandalizing the weak, who might say: So, this master says that every creature, even an ass, is God."

posse aliquid est deus; sed omnis creatura est eternaliter *aliquid posse esse,* ergo omnis creatura est deus. Consequencia tenet in Barbara. Maior probatur, quia Omne eternaliter *posse aliquid esse* est potencia eterna; sed omnis talis est deus; ergo etc. Minor probatur, quia, quocunque enti dato, ipsum est *posse aliquid esse,* et non inceptive, cum nichil huiusmodi potest incipere *posse aliquid esse;* ergo eternaliter. Et per consequens minor est vera. Et nominanter addidi in corellario "2m *esse* intelligibile vel ydeale"; nam, licet a philosophis et sapientibus in lumine naturali elevatis conceditur simpliciter, et concedi posset, quod omnis creatura *est,* propter limitacionem predicati quod limitat subiectum ad *esse* intelligibile vel ydeale iuxta consequentem regulam (Talia sunt subiecta qualia permittuntur ab eorum predicatis), attamen negarem occasionem errandi inperitis in ista materia, racione infirmitatis et inpericie materie concipientis, et precipue male interpretantibus, qui susurrant in angulis: "Iste magister concedit publice in scolis quod omnis creatura est deus, et asinus est deus"; verba capientes, et non sensum.

I should be a fool and a heretic to say that the physical entity of an ass was God.

Ideo addidi in corollario 2m *esse* intelligibile, non de necessitate sed ad explanandum sensum michi satis. Nam non sapientis sed insipientis, non philosophi sed stultilophi, non quod katholici sed heretici esset concedere quod ille asinus grossus 2m suum *esse* grossum esset (vel alia vilissima creatura esset) deus.

Every being has eternal entity.

Corollarium 3m. Quodlibet ens sive creatura habuit *esse* ab eterno; patet, quia 2m *esse* intelligibile vel ydeale, ut patet ex prioribus; ergo corollarium verum, etc. |

Every being is, in its ideal essence, its own prototype.

Corollarium 4m. Quelibet creatura 2m *esse* intelligibile 136b est exemplar sui ipsius 2m existenciam creature. Patet; quia quelibet creatura in sui existencia est exemplata ad exemplar sui *esse,* quod habet in mente divina; ergo corellarium verum.

The architypal world is infinitely superior to the real, since the Eternal is above the Temporal.

5tum corelarium. Mundus architypus est incomparabiliter melior isto mundo sensibili. Et patenter patet; quia mundus architypus est multitudo omnium productibilitatum extrapositorum factorum, que est temporaliter et contingenter: ergo corellarium verum. Consequencia

28. ꝙ ēs ꝫ *MS.*

tenet, cum quodlibet necessarium et eternum sit incomparabiliter nobilius temporali et contingente. *Sextum corelarium*: Negans pertinaciter ideas, sive mundum architypum, graviter derogat deo. Patet, quia abstrahens pertinaciter deo dominium istius mundi sensibilis et patentis, per quem regnat temporaliter et contingenter, graviter derogat deo: ergo multo a forciori abstrahens pertinaciter deo dominium mundi architipi, qui est incomparabiliter nobilior, per quem regnat necessario et eternaliter, gravius derogat deo. Ergo corelarium verum. Et ideo beatus Thomas, questione prima, abnegat beatum Augustinum in libro de trinitate, dicentem: "Qui negat ydeas infidelis est".

It is a grave offence against God to deny this architypal world, if the denial be pertinacious; St. Augustine calls it infidelity.

3ª conclusio est: Universalia ydealia in mente divina sunt ponenda. Probatur sic: Deus dat universaliter omnibus entibus *esse*, ut notum est; ergo est dare modum quo dat universaliter omnibus entibus esse. Talis modus non est singularis, quia alias per modum singularem daret universaliter *esse:* quod est oppositum in adiecto. Ergo oportet quod talis modus sit universalissimus, 2ᵐ quod dat omnibus universaliter *esse;* et talis modus est ydea communissima; ergo conclusio vera. Item, dat deus universaliter omnibus substanciis *esse*, et minus universaliter quam omnibus entibus *esse*. Ergo est dare modus quo dat minus universaliter omnibus substanciis *esse*. Antecedens pro prima parte notum est; sed pro 2ª parte patet sic, quia communius est dare omnibus entibus esse quam omnibus substanciis esse, ut notum est; ergo antecedens verum. Tunc ultra, ex consequente: talis modus non est singularis, quia est oppositum in adiecto quod per modum singularem daret universaliter *esse*. Ergo oportet quod talis modus sit minus communis priore; et talis modus est ydea; ergo conclusio vera. Et sic communiter, per arborem Porfyrii descendendo usque devenietur ad entitatem singularem. Nam est talis ordo universi; igitur conclusio vera.

We must admit ideal Universals in God, since he gives entity in a universal way, and less universally to some than to others.

Now these various ways are the Divine Ideas.

Corelarium primum: Sicud est dare res minus convenientes et magis convenientes in ordine universi, sic

Thus some Ideas are more, others less general.

2. Secundum *MS.* 23. substanciis — substanciis *in marg. MS.*
39. ques zmag℘ quens *MS.*

11. *Abnegat* is quite plain in the MS. But St. Thomas, as a rule, abstains from contradicting St. Augustine. The reference is too vague to be found in St. Thomas' writings.

proporcionabiliter est dare ydeas minus communes et magis communes in mente divina; sicud patet ex conclusione et eius probacione, etc.

There is an Idea of greatest generality and there is also its object, which is Transcendental Being, the best of all possible creatures. For we can conceive nothing, however perfect i that is not a being.

Corelarium 2^m. Est dare ydeatum communissimum, sicut est entitas analoga. Patet sic: quia, si est ideam dare communissimam ex conclusione, ergo, et ydeatum communissimum proporcionabiliter; et per consequens corelarium est verum.

Corelarium 3^m. Entitas anologa est primum causatum a deo factibile, summe possibiliter bonum infra deum. Pro prima parte patet sic, quia entitas anologa est primum ydeatum ex prioribus: ergo et primum causatum. Consequencia tenet ab eodem ad idem, vel a convertibili ad convertibile. Sed pro secunda parte probatur. Bonum est quod ens infra deum est, et non potest esse melius bonum infra deum quam quod ens infra deum est; ergo summe possibiliter bonum est quod ens infra deum est. Antecedens pro prima parte notum est, sed pro secunda parte sic probatur; quia, si oppositum potest esse melius bonum infra deum quam quod ens infra deum est, sit illud *a;* tunc argumentatur sic: *a* est | et non est deus, ergo est cau- 137a
satum a deo; et ultra: ergo est ens infra deum; et illud est melius quam ens infra deum; ergo ens infra deum est melius quam ens infra deum, quod est oppositum in adiecto; et per consequens totum corellarium est verum.

There are ultimate species and last effects, so that no others come after them.

Corelarium quartum. Est dare species proximas, et causata proxima, inter quas species vel causata non possunt alie species vel alia causata mediare, cum nulla species nec aliquod causatum potest perfici essencialiter; ergo, corelarium verum. Et antecedens patet speculanti conclusionem, cum sua probacione.

5tum corelarium: quod argumentum est verum; quid autem sit de quesito in se pertinebit in 3° articulo, etc.

The general opinion gives us 3 sorts of universals, (1) universals essentially distinct from their singulars by communication,

Quantum ad 2^m articulum, noto priorem divisionem, continuando de universali quod 2^m universale est in re; et tale ymaginatur esse triplex 2^m triplicem opinionem. Nam quidam opinabantur universale reale realiter essencialiter distinctum a singularibus cum universale communicacione, participacione, et predicabilitate priori-

5. si *crased? MS.* 29. vel que *MS.* 34. articli *MS.* 35. plebt *MS.* 41. 3 *pro* et *MS.*

tate nature insensibilitate, et multis differenciis distingwantur ex opposito a singulari. Et illius opposicionis videtur esse Burley, et per philosophum ascribitur Platoni in multis locis.

participation, and predication.

2m universale in re est quelibet res simplex universaliter apprehensa per intellectum creatum, et tale universale in racione substracti vel signati est res realis et in racione signati formalis est ens racionis solum; quia, ut sic, est forma communis substracta per intellectum creatum a circumstanciis et condicionibus individuantibus. Et talem formam in re non dicunt esse, quia dicunt quod omnis res est simplex, modo eo ipso quo talis forma esset res realis, ipsa esset singularis etc. Et sic esset circumscripta et cum hoc abstracta a circumstanciis individuantibus; et sic non esset circumscripta: quod implicat. Ergo illam formam dicunt solum esse per intellectum. Unde, sicut opus dicitur humanum, vel res divisa vel intellecta denominacione extrinseca, sic res singularis dicitur universalis denominacione extrinseca solum quando apprehenditur universaliter. Et de tali opinione sunt Egidius, sanctus Thomas et Commentator, dum modo intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus. Et similiter Aristoteles, dicens, "Universale est dum intelligitur, particulare vero dum sentitur". Et conformiter ymaginatur de materia prima et tempore; de quibus narrare, causa brevitatis, obmitto.

(2) Anything thought of universally becomes universal in the mind by abstraction.

But this is not said to be real, or in the things themselves, for if real, then singular; if singular, no longer abstract.

Egidius. St. Thomas, Averrhoës and Aristotle think thus.

3m universale in re est forma vel natura communis, multis suppositis communicata; et talis opinio est media inter predictas, quia concedit cum secunda opinione quod universale est singulare, et econtra, et concedit cum prima opinione quod universale differt a singularibus formaliter. Et de illa via fundant se super racionibus vivacibus et super auctoribus multorum philosophorum et doctorum. Nam pro illa via est Boecius in libro divisionum, ubi ponit differenciam inter divisionem qua totum integrale dividitur in suas partes integrales, et

(3) Another opinion admits with (2) that the Universals are identical with their singulars, and with (1) that they differ from them. This opinion is sustained by weighty arguments and great authority.

7. ɓti *MS.* 8. ɓti *MS.* 20. apprehendit *MS.* 21. ſint *MS.* 33. vinatibꝫ *MS.* 34. in ı͡ *MS.*

3. *Burley.* Walter Burleigh. See W.'s Miscellanea Philosophica, Introduction, p. LVI. 7. *Substracta.* This reminds us of the vulgar mistake, *substraction*, which has perhaps had its origin in Mediaeval Latin. Cf. the French word, *soustraction.* 16. *Implicat. Contradiccionem* understood.

divisionem qua totum universale dividitur in suas partes subiectivas essenciales, quia totum integrale, licet sit omnes partes sue collective, tamen est aliqua sui pars divisim. Sed totum universale est quelibet sui pars divisim, et omnes simul collectim. Pro illa eciam sentencia est commentator, 5to methaphysice 9to 3°; et dicens "Universale predicatum de partibus facit ea esse unum"; et expressius in decimo methaphysice, ubi exponit hunc textum philosophi, dicentis: "Genus quod est idem per substanciam omnia diversa", sic scribit describendo genus: "Genus est illud quod est predicabile de diversis 2^{m} quod est unumquodque eorum." Pro illa eciam sentencia sunt multi sancti doctores quos nominare et eorum dicta pro istius sentencie confirmacione, causa brevitatis, obmitto, etc. |

Every individual shares in the Universal which is its essence.

Corelarium. Omne individuum capit partem univer- 137b
salis quod est sua essencia a qua originatur. Et ideo pertinenter dixit Porphyrius: "Participacione (seu *partis capcione*) plures homines sunt unus homo."

Every creature is a being by this participation.

Corellarium 2^{m}. Omnis creatura est ens [2^{m}] participacionem, quia quelibet creatura habet finitam entitatem quam participat ab alio. Nam solus deus non sic participat, cum sit omnia in omnibus. Ergo, etc.

The Universal which is posterior to its singulars is universal only as to the symbols used to express it. This Universal, being only the sign of what is really universal, barely deserves that name.

3^{m}. Est universale post rem, sicud sunt conceptus communes, vel termini communiter significantes; et talia sunt universalia in signis, que sunt equivoce universalia. Sic homo depictus est homo, quia est signum representativum hominis; vel urina dicitur sana equivoce, quia est representativum sanitatis; sic hoc signum "homo" vel "animal" (et sic de aliis) dicitur universale, quia est representativum universalis rei. Et tale universale Linconiensis dicit esse impertinens, quia non est pertinens dictum quod terminus ex eo quod significet universaliter est universale; quia in selda videmus quod circulus representat vinum, et tamen non est vinum. Et dicitur universale post rem, quia consequitur universale reale sicud signum suum signatum.

If we know the real Universals, we easily know their signs, but not *vice versâ*.

Corelarium. Habita noticia universalium in re, faciliter habetur noticia universalium post rem; et non e converso. Patet, quia, habita noticia signatorum, habetur

2. esse *pro* essenciales *MS.* 20. 2m *deest MS.* 34. feli͡ *MS.*

34. *Selda*, a shop. (Du Cange.)

noticia signorum, et non e converso. Nam noticia signorum inpertinens est ad noticiam signatorum; ergo corelarium verum.

Quoad illum articulum qui fuit: Utrum universalia solum habeant *esse* intencionale et intellectuale per operacionem intellectus creati, sit conclusio prima.

Have the Universals only ideal being, given them by the mind?

Conclusio prima. Nullum est universale reale distinctum a singularibus realiter essencialiter. Probatur: quia alias sequitur quod nullum tale in predicacione ydemptica predicaretur de suis suppositis; et sic sequitur quod quodlibet superius esset inpertinens et alienum ad sua inferiora; cuius oppositum arguit philosophus. 7° Methaphysice; ergo conclusio vera. Confirmatur. Capta illa re communi que non est res singularis (per adversarium) tunc arguitur sic: Illa res est indivisa a se et divisa a qualibet alia re singulari; ergo est res singularis. Consequencia tenet ex diffinicione rei singularis; et cum est separata a singularibus, ergo non est res singularis: quod est contradiccio. Et antecedens pro prima parte clarum est, sed pro 2ª parte probatur; quia, si non est divisa a qualibet alia re, tunc esset communicata aliis rebus singularibus, et sic non esset distincta realiter essencialiter a rebus singularibus; quod est contra adversarium; igitur conclusio vera.

(1) A Universal really and essentially distinct from its singulars cannot be admitted, for, being apart from all the others, it would be at the same time singular and not singular; if not apart, it could not be distinct.

Corelarium primum. Quod opinio prima de universali in re que ascribitur Platoni est falsa, ideo in toto irracionalis, patet conclusione et eius comprobacione. Sed michi apparet quod mendaciter ascribitur Platoni; quia, cum Plato fuit divinissimus philosophorum, non est conveniens quod dixisset unum dictum ita fatuum quod non solum apud sapientes, verum eciam aput modicum elevatos in lumine naturali est dignum risu. Sed ipse intellexit hoc de ydeys, de quibus dictum est in primo articulo. Ideo verisimile est quod Aristoteles propter logicam propriam, in qua separatur a Platone, non capit sensum Platonis, sed equivocat solum in verbis, sicud eciam sepius fecit aliis philosophis antiquis.

This false opinion is ascribed to Plato, but I rather believe Aristotle to have mistaken his meaning.

27. exclusione *MS.* 28. me *MS.* 35. in qua fex a plone *MS.*

7. *Nullum.* This paragraph, together with the following, is interesting as showing the difference between Wyclif's and Plato's Universals. Plato assumed a Universe of really existing patterns of things, which were, as such, essentially distinct therefrom.

The Universal is not only the common form, apprehended by the mind; for if the abstractive process be right, (as it should be) it results in truth, and the Universal *is* what it is apprehended to be.

Conclusio 2^a. Universale in re non solum est forma communis per intellectum creatum universaliter apprehensa. Probatur. Nam abstrahencium non est mendacium, 2° physicorum. Si ergo intelligens abstrahit talem formam, vel abstrahit vere [vel non]. Si non vere, tunc est ficticium, quia false abstrahere non est abstrahere. Si abstrahit vere; ergo huiusmodi forma abstractiva vere est et ultima ex consequente. Ergo realiter *est*. Et quia talis forma per adversarium est universale; ergo universale realiter est, et per consequens non solum per intellectum causatum; est ergo construccio vera.

The Universal, apart from the act of the human mind, has entity of its own. For man is man, fire is fire, whether thought of or not; their essences depend on the Divine Intellect. Otherwise they would be in continual fluctuation, and multiplication.

Confirmatur sic. Subducta consideracione intellectus creati, universale habet *esse* quo (non solum per intellectum creatum) est; et per consequens conclusio vera. Antecedens sic: subducta omni consi | deracione intel- 138a
lectus humani, adhuc commune est cuilibet homini esse hominem, et cuilibet igni esse ignem; ergo antecedens verum. Antecedens probatur sic: quia indubio quelibet illarum veritatum universalium prius naturaliter dependet ab intellectu divino intelligente et ordinante sic esse, quam ad intellectu humano; quia deus agit hoc ab eterno et agit hoc, nec cessat hoc agere quando ita fit. Ergo etc. Et confirmatur, quia alias sequeretur quod tale universale multiplicaretur ad multiplicacionem actuum anime ceterorum perenniter, et inciperet esse quociens libuerit: quod est inconveniens, eo quod tunc logica non esset sciencia, cum sit de singularibus et universalibus que non sunt mansiva sed continue incipiunt et desinunt esse; ergo conclusio vera.

Many deny the Universals verbally but in reality admit them.

Corelarium: Quamvis multi vocibus negant universalia realia, ponunt tamen ipsam 2^m rem et intellectum. Patet, cum summe communius sit omni rei esse ens, vel omni homini esse animal, quam sit commune quod communiter in Praga quolibet anno sit disputacio de quolibet, vel quod communiter studentes post cenam vadunt spaciatum. Unde ergo per vocem asserere talia esse, est ponere universalia realia et res communes, vel negando res communes est negare propriam vocem et assercionem. *Corelarium* 2^m*:* quod 2us articulus, ut proponitur, est falsus, etc

5. vel non *deest MS.* 13. 9° *MS.* 25. per *MS.* 34. armo *MS.*

36. Cf. *German* spazieren, *Polish* spacerowac, *to take a walk.*

Quantum ad 3um articulum, qui fuit: Utrum universalia habeant *esse* reale et in propria forma, sit prima conclusio. Universalia realia sunt ponenda, quorum singulum 2^{m} essenciam est omnia sua supposita collectim et divisim ab eisdem, et a quolibet eorum differt formaliter. Ista conclusio habet 3^{s} partes; pro prima parte sic argumentatur multipliciter. Primo sic. Michi et non solum michi debetur *esse animal,* ut notum est, et non animal singulare, quia tale solum debetur uni quod non alteri. Ergo oportet quod sit animal commune, quod est omnia animalia singularia, et quodlibet eorum divisim; et tale est universale reale: ergo etc. Conclusio pro prima parte est vera. Confirmatur: Sor est similis Platoni in quantitate, et circumscriptis omnibus signis. Vel singulari, vel communi. Non singulari; quia Sor humanitate sua singulari est sibi ita similis, ita quod non alteri, eo quod sua humanitate singulari sic Sor est homo, quod non alteri; nec humanitate singulari Platonis ex eadem racione. Ergo est ponenda communis humanitas qua Sor est similis Platoni: igitur, etc. Item, homo differt essencialiter ab asino et est danda conveniencia essencialis qua homo essencialiter convenit cum homine, et talis conveniencia vel differencia non est in signo vel conceptu, quia conveniencia et differencia rerum essencialis fundatur essencialiter in rerum principiis, et non in signis; quia predicacio signorum vel eorum predicabilitas non est causa conveniencie et differencie rerum ad extra, sed e converso. Ergo oportet quod talis differencia et conveniencia sit realis. Et talis non est singularis, quia, si ista differencia singularis vel conveniencia singularis non esset, adhuc esset verum quod homo differt essencialiter ab asino, et homo convenit essencialiter cum homine. Ergo est ponenda differencia et conveniencia communis, et per consequens conclusio vera. Pro 2^{a} parte probatur quod alias, si universale differt a suis suppositis, tunc in proposicione ydemptica aut non communicaretur suis suppositis (eo quod ut sic haberet se disparate ad sua supposita ut patet intuenti) et esset in toto alienum et inpertinens suis suppositis; . . . . . et sic, cognoscendo suum superius,

We say that Real Universals are identical with all their singulars together or apart, differing from each only by a formal difference.

When two men are like, in what are they like? In their individuality? No, but in *something* else, which is identical with each.

A man differs essentially from an ass, and agrees essentially with another man. This difference and agreement is neither in words nor in thought; therefore in fact.

If the Universal were not the same as its singulars, it could not be predicated of them, or at least not properly.

6. puoce *MS.* 15. quod *MS.*

40. *Suppositis.* I think the missing member of the sentence ought to come here.

To the Universal belongs the property of being in many which the singular lacks; therefore they differ formally.

non cognosceretur suum inferius confuse. Non enim foret pertinens cognoscere *istum hominem*, cognoscendo universaliter speciem hominis, nisi ipse homo foret species et *illum hominem esse* esset *hominem esse;* ergo conclusio pro secunda parte est vera. Sed pro 3^a parte | probatur sic: quia aliquid convenit formaliter universali 138ª
quod non convenit singulari formaliter; et e converso: ergo differunt formaliter. Consequencia est nota, sed antecedens probatur sic: quia communicari pluribus convenit formaliter universali, et non convenit formaliter singulari; alias coniuncta universalitati esset incommunicabilitas; quod claudit contradiccionem, etc. Ergo conclusio tota vera.

Corollaries. Every universal is its singular, every individual is its species, &c., &c.

Corelarium primum. Quodlibet universale est singulare et e converso. Item, quodlibet individuum est species et quodlibet species est individuum. Item, species specialissima est genus generalissimum, et e converso. Similiter, differencia est genus, et differencia est species. Patent omnia ista ex 2^a parte conclusionis, quia in qualibet tali predicacione unum est reliquum secundum essenciam, cum differunt formaliter, ut patet practicanti: ergo corelarium verum.

Corelarium 2^m. Iste locuciones sunt concedende: Quilibet homo singularis est predicabile de multis, et tamen nullus homo singularis est predicabilis de multis. Item; Genus animalis est incommunicabile multis, et tamen genus animalis communicatur multis. Item: Iste homo est homo universalis, et tamen iste homo non est universalis. Similiter: Res universalis est res singularis, et tamen res universalis non est singularis. Patent omnia ista ex secunda et 3^a parte conclusionis, et noticia triplicis predicacionis.

Corelarium 3^m. Supposicio simplex et distinccio formalis in rebus est ponenda; quibus cognitis bene non procedit aliquis paraloysmus contra veritatem universalium et ydearum. Patet practicanti.

Corelarium 4^{tum}. × et responsale. Preter signa ad placitum instituta et conceptus humanos et species speciales et specificantes preter universalia ydeata, ponenda sunt universalia realia; patet ex dictis.

21. pçticanti *MS.* 37. × z rn̄ſale *MS.* 39. ydeª *MS.*

Corelarium 5tum. Primus articulus . . . . ut proponuntur . . . . sunt falsi, cum sint ex conclusione licet . . . . alio . . . . supposita sint vera. Patet etc.

Conclusio 2a. Quamvis species specialissima realis 2m essenciam est omnia sua supposita, cuiuslibet tamen speciei specialissime actualis omnia supposita inter se essencialiter distingwuntur. Pro prima parte conclusio patet ex 2a parte precedentis conclusionis. Sed pro secunda parte probatur de suppositis speciei humane. Et conformiter argumentatur de suppositis cuiuslibet alterius speciei actualis. Et argumentatur sic: Aliquod intrinsece essencialiter convenit Sorti quod non convenit Platoni; ergo differunt essencialiter. Et sic argumentatur de aliis. Antecedens probatur; quia *esse istum hominem* (demonstrato Sorte) habet quod sit Sorti et non Platoni, nec alicui alteri; et non accidentaliter, ergo, essencialiter. Antecedens pro prima parte notum est, cum Sor sit *iste homo* (demonstrato Sorte) ergo *esse istum hominem* (demonstrato Sor) convenit Sorti. Sed pro secunda parte probatur sic; quia sic Sor numeraliter est homo, quod sic numeraliter Plato non est homo; alias Sor esset Plato; et e converso. Non est verum ergo *esse istum hominem* alteri ex eadem causa. Pro 3a parte antecedens sic probatur; quia alias *esse istum hominem* numeraliter (demonstrato Sorte) posset abesse Sorti, et sic staret Sortem esse et ipsum non esse *istum hominem* numeraliter (demonstrando Sor), et sic Sor simul esset et non esset: quod est contradiccio.

Though each individual is its species, yet each is essentially distinct from every other.

For each individual has this, that he is not any other, and it is essential to him (or he would otherwise no longer be an individual).

Corelarium primum. Non sequitur: Sor et Plato differunt individualiter substancialiter; ergo differunt specifice. Patet ex conclusione, quia Sor et Plato differunt essencialiter substancialiter, numeraliter, et conveniunt in prima specie communi. Et conclusio: Argumentum non concludit quo argumentatur contra conclusionem quod species specialissima non est species specialissima.

It does not follow, because there is essential difference, that they differ specifically.

Corelarium 2m. Impossibile est esse duo individua eiusdem speciei specialissime que equaliter haberent eumdem gradum essencialem naturalem. Patet, quia Sor

If two beings were exactly equal in all things, they would be one

1. p̲pn͡it' ft' f͡li *MS.* 2. a͡lio *MS.* 15. qpt *MS.* 30. Inr *MS.* 33. 9o *MS.* 38. n̈alem *MS.*

1. *Primus.* I have placed gaps here, not for words that I could not make out, but for supposed omissions.

and the same being.

habet aliud *esse* numerale intelligibile quam Plato, sicud patuit ex conclusione et eius predicacione; alias Sor esset Plato, et e converso; quod est falsum. Et sic argumentatur de aliis. Igitur corelarium verum.

There are many essential differences amongst beings of the same species.

Corelarium 3m. Inter individua eiusdem speciei, unum est | perfeccius alio essencialiter; patet ex priori assumpto. 139a Et confirmatur hoc corelarium. Nam sicut genus est in suis speciebus, una est perfeccior alia essencialiter, sic stat quod unum individuum est perfeccius alio eiusdem speciei; quamvis tamen species equaliter est in omnibus suis individuis, sicut genus in suis speciebus.

Corelarium 4tum. Anima Cristi fuit perfeccior perfeccione nuda essencialiter numerali anima . . . . inde . . . . quod est contra articulum Parisiensis. Patet ex prioribus; Ergo etc.

The conditions of individuality are not conditions of being, but of knowing.

Corelarium 5tum. Condiciones individuantes non sunt principia essendi individuorum, sed solum cognoscendi. Alias individua eiusdem speciei solum differrent per condiciones individuantes, et sic solum accidentaliter; quod est contra conclusionem et eius probacionem. Ergo corelarium verum.

It is false to think, with the Peripateticians, that singulars may differ only numerically.

Corelarium 6tum. Opinio peripateticorum ponens res singulares solum differre numero, prout numerus est de genere quantitatis, est falsa; quia tunc solum differrent accidentaliter; quod est contra prius dicta. Sed pro hoc non nego quin res singulares differunt numero, capiendo numerum transcendentaliter; scilicet, pro essencia numerali qua una res singularis discernitur ab alia re singulari; et ita differt, cum capitur numero, in descripcione speciei specialissime.

God is not a species; for if He were, the Three Persons would be essentially distinct: which is a heresy.

Corelarium 7mum. Deus non est species specialissima; quod patet. Quia si esset species specialissima, tunc esset species specialissima actualis, cum actu habeat plura supposita; quia pater in divinis est deus, filius in divinis est deus, spiritus sanctus est deus; et quia cuiuslibet speciei specialissime actualis supposita inter

5. Int'didua *MS.* 6. aszo *MS.* 13. nualr (?) *MS.* 14. piiene *MS.* 17. oendi *MS.* 29. dt *MS.* 35. ff. *pro* spiritus sanctus *MS.*

6. At bottom of f. 138b is a quotation from St. Augustine that seems to have no relation with the subject matter. 14. *Parisiensis*. Possibly the Council of Paris, which in 1147 dealt with the doctrines of Gilbert de la Porée, who was finally condemned in 1148 by the Council of Reims.

se distingwuntur essencialiter, ex conclusione sequitur quod supposita in divinis, sive persone, distingwuntur essencialiter: quod est heresis; quia omnes persone sunt una essencialiter. Consequencia patet ex terminis. Et, eciam si esset species, tunc entitas analoga equaliter conveniret rei create et increate; quod est impossibile, cum deus sit infinite perfeccionis essencialis, ultra quamlibet rem creatam; Ergo corelarium verum.

Conclusio tercia et ultima: res universales incomparabiliter sunt meliores et nobiliores rebus singularibus. Patet conclusio multipliciter; quia *esse hominem* includit in se *istum hominem*, et cum amplius se extendit, ergo totam bonitatem universale includit rei singularis, et amplius extenditur nobilitas et bonitas rei universalis: ergo conclusio vera. Et per rem singularem non solum intelligo rem numeralem, sicut rem minus communem, quia res magis communis est semper nobilior minus communi. Confirmatur. Privacio rei universalis est peior quam privacio rei singularis; ergo res universalis est melior re singulari. Consequencia tenet; penes maliciam privacionis mensuratur bonitas habitus, quia, sicut malum est *rem aliquam non esse,* sic proporcionabiliter est bonum *illam rem esse.* Et antecedens probatur: *non esse animal* est peior privacio quam *non esse hominem;* et *non esse hominem* est peior privacio quam *non esse istum hominem;* et sic de aliis. Ergo antecedens probatur: per *non esse animal* plura bona tolluntur quam per *non esse hominem,* et *per non esse hominem* plura tolluntur quam [per] *non esse istum hominem:* ergo, etc. Antecedens probatur; quia, si non esset animal, non esset homo nec asinus; et sic de aliis speciebus: sed, si non esset homo, staret quod esset animal: ergo, etc. Confirmatur ista conclusio: Omne illud quod est magis propinquius deo, hoc est perfeccius et nobilius; sed res magis universalis respectu rei minus universalis est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia de quanto aliqua res propius accedit ad primum ens, de tanto *esse* est perfeccior; et quanto plus recedit a primo ente, de tanto plus diminuitur in perfeccione; eo quod deus in ordine essenciali universi est in supremo gradu possibili, et quidquid citra deum est eo ordine perfeccius,

Superiority of the Universals over their singulars. The more universal they are, the more perfect they must be.

For if All animals did not exist, no particular animals and therefore no men would exist; but if no men existed, there might still be animals; one would be a far greater loss than the other.

And the nearer anything approaches God, the more perfect it is; now as anything is more Universal, it is nearer to God.

18. quē *MS.* 29. per *deest MS.* 36. Minor (?) *MS.*

ergo est deo propius: et per consequens maior vera. Sed minor probatur, quia in ordine universi genus realiter prius est quam species, et species quam individuum; et generaliter magis universale minus universali. Genus in ordine essenciali universi magis commune est, propinquius supremo gradu essendi quam minus commune, et per consequens est conclusio vera, etc. |

We should prefer the universal to the particular good, and universal to particular things. For the Universal is better as more rationally desirable; the Particular, only as more useful; and even that, only as concerns temporal uses.

Corelarium primum. Quilibet conformando bonitatem 139^b sue bonitati divine tenetur . . . . plus deo plus diligere bona universalia bonis privatis. Patet, quia oppositum faciendo peccat. Nam 2^m duos theologos omne peccatum consistit in voluntate preponente minus bonum magis bono; sed generaliter bona universalia sunt magis bona bonis privatis: ergo corelarium verum.

Corelarium 2^m. Res universales plus diligi debent rebus singularibus. Patet ex conclusione et probacione eius, eo quod sunt magis bone; ergo etc. Patet eciam sic corelarium. In rebus singularibus relucet bonum comodi nobilius quam affeccio honestatis. Nam universalia non cedunt in comodum, si singularia cedunt in comodum. Si unus est dominus nobis, famulus nobis, vel alicuius etc., de hoc habeo comodum et utilitatem; sed de hoc quod est homo nullum habeo comodum. Ergo racione honestatis plus debent diligi et preponi in dileccione rebus singularibus: ergo corelarium verum. Sed quod dixi universalia non cedere in commodum, debet intelligi de comodo temporali. Nam noticia universalium est maxime utilis, quia via inductiva ad cognoscendum benedictam trinitatem, et ad intelligendum sacram scripturam. Pro prima parte patet, quia est aliqualis convenienca licet non omnimodo speciei ad supposita, sicud nature divine ad personas. Et ob hoc dicit Anshelmus de incarnacione, in capitulo primo: "Iste", inquit, "cuius ymago est ymaginibus corporalium adeo involuta quod non intelligit quomodo plures

5. g^s *pro* Genus *MS.* 10. *After* tenetur, *an illegible word; no gap MS.* 12. d^uos? = divinos? 15. privacio *quite plain MS.* 19. r'lucȝ *MS.*; *ib.* bōn *MS.* 22. n̄is *MS.*; *ib.* n̄is *MS.* 23. Intelit^eȝ *MS.* 33. ob^c *MS.*

9. At the top of f. 139^b there is a note on the *racio seminalis*, irrelevant to the subject-matter. 20. *Honestatis.* 'Bonum honestum' was the Good, as appealing to our reason.

homines in specie sunt unus homo, quomodo in illa sacratissima et altissima materia comprehendet quod plures persone quarum singula queque perfectus est deus, sunt una essencia?" Sed pro 2ª parte patet. Nam quando ille eximius philosophus et propheta Moyses dixit Genesis primo: "Producat terra animam viventem in genere suo cuncta reptilia et bestias terre *2ᵐ species suas*" non intellexit terminum vel conceptum humanum per genus et speciem, sed naturas universales communicatas multis suppositis. Et ita est de multis dictis sacre scripture que adiicere causa brevitatis obmitto.

Corelarium ultimum et responsale: quod conclusio, ut proponitur, est vera ad rem in oppositum nature antecedens; et sic est finis etc.

Quero an angeli habent cognicionem qua cognoscunt deum per species sibi naturaliter concreatas et in ipso deo vident illo modo omnia factibilia extra, cum illo modo in cognoscendo deum habent omnem ydearum cognicionem. Aliam habent hii cognicionem qua cognoscuntur res in proprio genere per species sibi naturaliter concreatas, qualem cognicionem homo forte in statu innocencie similiter habebat, ultra tamen predictas per sensus corporeos res per species naturales proprias cognoscendo. Sed cum peccavit, tantum sibi tercia cognicio remansit post proprias connaturales et concreatas. Ex parte autem anime necessarium est omnem intelligentem fantasmata aliena speculari: sed hoc dupliciter. Quandoque enim intelligibile virtuti sensitive est mediate subordinatum; ut scilicet sit sensibili coniunctum; dumque sensibile sensui obicitur ex tunc intelligibile. Per sensible cuius inmediate in actu reducatur, ut est in corporibus, lapide etc. qui non videtur oculo corporis sed intelligitur; quandoque mere intelligibile non per immediatam speciem intelligitur, sed per mediatam similitudinem, ut cum intelliguntur abstracta a materia, que propriis speciebus sensibilibus similitudines intelligibiles in mediatas generantibus omnino carent. 3ᵐ autem

Different states of cognition either of men or of angels.

12. v͡vfal = universale? *MS.* 13. in oppᵐ r ne ans *MS.* 19. h. *pro* hii *MS.* 20. pro *MS.* 23. reales? *MS.* 30. obicen' *MS.* 37. g‿a͡ntib3 *MS.*

15. *Quero.* After the ending of *De Materia* (if this be indeed that tractate) there follows a passage which may be by Wyclif, written in another hand, and excessively difficult to read. I have left a gap for one illegible word.

The good Angels passed through three stages of cognition, in the states of innocence, grace, and glory.

genus cognicionis per essenciam divinam participacione solum habent angeli boni et . . . . . Unde Angeli boni habent 3plex *esse,* scilicet, *esse* innocencie vel statum in illo instanti in quo liberum arbitrium habebant ad movendum se ad bonum vel malum. Prima cognicione quid agere deberent moti sunt in 2° instanti per volendi actum ad debitam subieccionem voluntati divine, conformiter gracia gratum facere adniti relinqueant status gracie. Post eodem 3° de consono moti sunt ad statum glorie et confirmacionis. Mali autem angeli solum habent duplicem statum: unum innocencie, secundo instanti 2^m culpe in 2° instanti. 3us pene et obduracionis in 3° consequenter usque in perpetuum eis inponeretur.

The bad Angels passed through two only, innocence and sin.

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